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Abstract 
This dissertation focuses on exploring the myth of “revolutionary marriage”, a popular and 
lasting marriage tradition of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  
The concept of “revolutionary marriage” came out of a marriage revolution initiated by the 
May Fourth radicals in order to challenge the traditional marriage system. This term was then 
borrowed by the early Chinese Communists who used it to depict their socialist marriage 
ideal. However, regarding the CCP’s marriage policy, there was always a gap between the 
progressive ideals and the conservative realities.  In every piece of propaganda the CCP 
swore to completely overthrow the feudal arranged marriage system and to give people in 
general, and women in particular, the freedom to love and marry. In its mass line practice, 
however, the Party had to make compromises with the old system, which was deeply rooted 
in Chinese society, by exercising constant restraint on the individual’s marriage freedom. To 
fill the gap between ideal and practice, the Party re-interpreted the ideal model of 
“revolutionary marriage” as one that demanded people’s unconditional submission to the 
Party’s arrangement of their love and marriage for the sake of the Communist revolution. 
After the founding of the PRC in 1949, the “revolutionary marriage” model expanded out 
across the party line to become a nationwide practice. 
Through a comprehensive examination of the theoretical sources, historical origin, social 
context, and practical applications of the revolutionary marriage model, I endeavor to argue 
that rather than a static socialist project, this model was actually a flexible social control 
program developed by its designers to fit in the context of a transitional China where the old 
traditions had been fundamentally challenged and while new practices and customs were still 
under construction. 
Keywords 
CCP, Communist Party, Chinese women, Confucianism, custom, danwei, ethics, legislation, 
love, marriage, reform, revolution, social control, socialization, tradition, work unit 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, China's established arranged marriage 
patterns began to be influenced by new ideologies, theories and social institutions that 
espoused a marriage model that was variously described by interpreters as “scientific”, 
“liberal” and “democratic.” Included among those who took the vanguard in this 
'marriage revolution' were the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  As the 
pious followers of Friedrich Engels, these leaders re-interpreted the concept of 
“revolutionary marriage” in accordance with the anarchistic socialist ideal, and were 
among the first to make a radical rejection of the traditional marriage system. In the 
Chinese Communist social revolution agenda, marriage reform was to play a critical role 
in persuading Chinese women to participate in production, to gain economic 
independence, and to support the CCP’s causes of Communist revolution. 
During the Party’s formative years, the marriage question was largely treated as a 
problem that would solve itself once women achieved economic independence. However, 
the CCP’s interests in marriage reform rose rapidly during the period of the Jiangxi 
Soviet (1931 to 1934), as socialist marriage laws were promulgated to advocate a form of 
unconditional marriage freedom in accordance with Marxist theories. These regulations, 
surprisingly, provoked as much trouble as progress within the Soviet due to unstable 
wartime conditions, the misunderstanding or misinterpretation of marriage freedom, the 
irrational methods of implementation, and, most of all, the contradiction between the 
radical nature of the regulations themselves and the conservative social realities on the 
ground in China. Although the focus of the CCP’s marriage reform would gradually turn 
from a dogmatic pursuit of Engels’ anarchic marriage freedom to a reserved rejection of 
the arranged marriage system, the marriage question would remain contentious for years 
after the reforms were implemented.   
According to the official histories of the PRC, as the prime successor to the May 4th 
revolutionary spirit, the CCP made the greatest contribution to the modernization of 
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Chinese marriage through its women's liberation, progressive marriage legislation, and 
free-marriage promulgation campaigns. However, in practice there was always a 
perceivable gap between progressive ideals and conservative realities. The CCP swore in 
every piece of its marriage-focused propaganda to completely overthrow the 'feudal 
arranged marriage system' and to give people in general, and women in particular, the 
freedom to love and marry. In its mass line practice, however, the Party had to make 
compromises with the old system that was deeply rooted in Chinese society by exercising 
constant restraint on the individual’s marriage freedom.  
To fill the gap between ideal and practice, and to balance the interests of the individual 
with those of the masses, the Party re-interpreted the ideal model of “revolutionary 
marriage” into one that demanded people’s unconditional submission to the Party’s 
arrangement of their love and marriage for the sake of the Communist revolution. After 
1949, in the process of establishing a socialist society, the “revolutionary marriage” 
model expanded beyond the Party line to become a nationwide practice. The Party 
organizations at all levels assumed the traditional role of family head in making marriage 
initiations, negotiations and decisions. Marriage, at this point, was not simply a love bond 
between two individuals, but also proof of one’s loyalty to the CCP, a sign of passion for 
the socialist revolution, and finally, a method of social control that the Communist state 
exerted to supervise people’s private lives.  
This dissertation will explore the myth of “revolutionary marriage,” a popular and lasting 
tradition of the CCP. The period under examination covers the first half of the twentieth 
century, from the early 1900s when Chinese intellectuals started to feel the necessity to 
reform Chinese marriage, to the 1950s when the revolutionary marriage practice became 
an established nationwide social tradition. Through a comprehensive examination of the 
theoretical sources, historical origin, social context, and practical applications of the 
revolutionary marriage model, I will argue that rather than a static socialist project, this 
model was actually a flexible social control program that was developed by its creators to 
fit the context of a transitional China where the old traditions had been fundamentally 
challenged and while new practices and customs were still under construction. 
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1.1 Approach, Methodology and Chapter Organization 
Whether or not the CCP truly liberated Chinese women from their traditional social 
inferiority has been an ongoing subject of controversy between Marxist historians and 
feminist social scientists for decades. The Party’s marriage politics have been among the 
most intensely contested topics in this debate. Few of the many articles and books 
dedicated to this topic, however, have gone beyond the official policies, laws and 
campaigns to consider the CCP’s day-to-day marriage practices. In neglecting this basic 
indicator of the Party’s real attitude towards women, the scholarship examining this 
question has never been able to establish an effective interpretation of the contradiction 
between the CCP’s policies and its practices regarding women.  
This dissertation will address this deficiency by providing a workable model of the 
Party’s regular marriage practice through an examination of revolutionary marriage as 
being a flexible synthesis of socialist doctrines, feminist ideals, CCP mass line 
experiences, and Confucian values. As a vital component of the CCP’s marriage politics, 
which had been practiced on a daily basis for several decades, this model was employed 
by party officials in order to reconcile the contradiction between the Party’s interests and 
the need of each individual woman. On the one hand, the policy theoretically recognized 
women as independent, free, individual and equal in terms of the Communist revolution 
and economic production. On the other hand, it strategically convinced women that the 
paramount qualification of a communist revolutionary was to obey absolutely the Party’s 
direction, even when it was regarding matters as private as love and marriage. The 
question I seek to answer in this dissertation is how the CCP’s marriage practice was 
shaped by Confucian family values, socialist doctrines, and feminist ideals, as well as the 
Party’s wartime requirements and experiences. In short, I will consider how marriage was 
shaped by the contemporary social context; how these values were interpreted in the 
CCP’s discourse; how they were understood, received and practiced in people’s daily 
lives; and most of all, how Chinese women’s lives were influenced by the CCP’s 
marriage politics. 
What distinguishes my approach from previous contributions to the field is that instead of 
focusing on the CCP’s marriage legislation and campaigns I will pay more attention to 
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the influences of traditional marriage politics on these policies. While tradition is 
frequently mentioned in the literature as a part of the background to Chinese marriage 
modernization, this study treats tradition as essential to understanding the puzzle of CCP 
social reform. On this basis, I will provide a critical discussion of the social context that 
created the CCP’s paradoxical attitude towards women and marriage reform. Compared 
to the imported socialist doctrines and feminist ideals, the indigenous Confucian 
traditions were much more flexible and adaptive. Although the Chinese Communists 
intended to completely destroy Chinese social traditions and replace them with the 
socialist models within a relatively short period of time, their efforts inevitably led to a 
hybrid society that transformed itself to fit in the CCP’s ideal. 
Susan Mann suggests that the conventional framework of history needs to be transformed 
or even destroyed by bringing women into history for “shifts in gender relations located 
carefully in time and space.”1 In the case of China, this transformation is particularly 
necessary because it is only by removing the clear-cut boundary between old and new, 
traditional and modern, conservative and progressive that we can begin to understand 
Chinese women. Helen Young came to this perception through her interviews with the 
female survivors of the Long March: 
When women are mentioned in standard histories, the usual focus is on the 
suffering of the women. However, the women interviewed did not view 
themselves as victims but believed that their work on the Long March was 
essential. The work they did was the meat of their own stories, a substantial 
part of the broader history.2 
Following Young’s insight, this study will endeavor to understand revolutionary brides as 
they understood themselves. They were neither a small group of radical revolutionary 
heroines, in an endless devoted pursuit of Chinese people’s liberation, nor were they 
suffering masses, passively waiting to be saved and liberated. Rather, as described by 
Ding Ling in 1942, they were lively human beings:  
                                                 
1  Susan Mann, Precious Records: Women in China’s Long Eighteenth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1997), 8. 
2 Helen Praeger Young, Choosing Revolution: Chinese Women Soldiers on the Long March (Urbana &Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 2001), 160. 
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Women are incapable of transcending the age they live in, of being perfect, or of 
being hard as steel…they are incapable of resisting all the temptations of society 
or all the silent oppression they suffer…They each have their own past written 
in blood and tears, they have experienced great emotions—in elation as in 
depression, whether engaged in the lone battle of life or drawn into the 
humdrum stream of life.3 
This paper contains seven parts. The introduction presents the key issues and conceptual 
framework of the piece. Chapter 2 provides an overview of pre-modern Chinese marriage 
politics, and the Confucian values by which they were influenced. In Chapter 3, I 
examine the marriage revolution launched by the May Fourth radicals in the 1920s and its 
impact on Chinese marriage thinking. The focus of Chapter 4 is the CCP’s marriage 
policies during the Great Revolution and the Jiangxi Soviet (from mid 1920s to early 
1930s) and Chinese Communists’ early efforts to reform Chinese marriage along the 
socialist ideal. The CCP’s marriage policies and practices during the Yan’an period (from 
late 1930s to 1949) is the focus of Chapter 5, with special attention on the “red love 
stories” that demonstrate how the “revolutionary marriage” model had developed into a 
fixed Party tradition. Chapter 6 explores how the “revolutionary marriage” evolved into a 
nationwide tradition of Communist China through the example of the Marriage Law of 
1950. The Conclusion includes a brief review of the theme of each chapter, and an 
extended analysis on the paradox of the CCP’s marriage policy and practice. 
1.2 Previous Scholarship on the CCP’s Marriage Politics 
Few books and articles published in the People's Republic of China (PRC) before the 
1990s are dedicated in their entirety to the study of CCP’s marriage politics. Most 
marriage discussions are embedded in more encompassing studies of the history of 
Chinese women’s liberation, a subject that had been dominated by the official discourse 
of the CCP even before the PRC was founded.   
The Chinese-language sources written before the 1990s, in the perception of  some 
Western scholars, “were often concerned less with historical fact than with reflecting 
                                                 
3  Ding Ling, “Thought on March 8”, originally in Jiefang ribao (March 9, 1942), translated in New Left Review I/92, 
July-August 1975, 102-105: 104. 
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current Communist Party decisions on how the past should be viewed.”4 Marxist 
historians, strictly constrained within the prefigured “base-superstructure” framework 
provided by Marxist historical materialism, pursued Friedrich Engels’ assertion that “the 
emancipation of woman will only be possible when woman can take part in production 
on a large, social scale” as an indisputable truth. 5 They universally present the process of 
women’s liberation in the form of a history of the women’s movement for economic 
independence and equal participation in production: “social class was the ultimate source 
of exploitation, and the oppression of women was defined as a problem of social class. 
With the success of the Communist revolution and the founding of the PRC in 1949, 
leaders assumed that the end of class oppression had also liberated women.”6 In this 
construction, women, as a whole, are removed from their gender characteristics, and 
treated as merely another exploited group or a potential revolutionary force, which shared 
men’s desire, purpose and enthusiasm for the socialist revolution. In this history, there are 
more than a few discussions on the CCP’s marriage politics, but they seldom go beyond 
the scope of how the Party’s women’s policies, marriage legislation and promulgation 
campaigns contributed to liberate women from their traditional burdens of marriage.7 
In recent years, as the academic atmosphere in China has become increasingly open, 
many Chinese scholars have begun to study the transition of Chinese marriage.8 They 
have carefully chronicled every significant change in Chinese marriage institutions since 
                                                 
4  Lily Xiao Hong Lee and Sue Wiles, Women of the Long March (Allen& Unwin, 1999), xii. 
5  Frederick Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (New York: International Publishers, 
1972), 148.  
6  Susan Brownwell and Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, “The Gender of Rebels”, in Chinese Femininities, Chinese 
Masculinities, eds. Brownwell and Wasserstrom  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 251. 
7  Zhongguo funü yundong shi 中国妇女运动史 [History on Chinese Women’s Movement in the New Democratic 
Era], ed. All-China Women’s Federation (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1989). Also see Liu Jucai 刘巨才, Zhongguo 
jindai funü yundong shi 中国近代妇女运动史 [The History of Chinese Modern Women’s Movement](Beijing: 
Zhongguo funü chubanshe, 1989). 
8  For example, Fan Jing 樊静, Zhongguo hunyin de lishi yu xianzhuang 中国婚姻的历史与现状 [Past and present of 
marriage in China](Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1990); Liu Xinping 刘新平, Bainianshishang: 
hunyinzhongguo 百年时尚：婚姻中国[Marriage in China, 1900-2000] (Beijing: Zhongguo gongren chubanshe, 
2002); Zhang Xipo 张希坡, Zhongguo hunyin lifa shi 中国婚姻立法史 [History of Chinese Marriage Law](Beijing: 
Renmin chubanshe, 2004); Chen, Zhongyi 陈重伊, Zhongguo hunyi jiating feichang liebian 中国婚姻家庭非常裂
变[Transition of Chinese marriage and family](Beijing: Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe, 2005); Wang Xinyu 王新宇, 
Minguo shiqi hunyinfa jindaihua yanjiu 民国时期婚姻法近代化研究[Modernization of the Marriage Law of 
Republican China](Beijing: Zhongguo fazhi chubanshe, 2006); Zhang, Zhiyong 张志永, Hunyin zhidu cong 
chuantong dao xiandai de guodu 婚姻制度从传统到现代的过渡 [From Traditional Marriage to Modern 
Marriage](Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2006). 
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the mid-nineteenth century, and have examined these changes from various perspectives 
with constant references to non-traditional sources such as popular magazines, 
advertisements, posters, and oral histories. Unfortunately, few of these contributions have 
included a specific discussion of the Communist Party-State’s daily marriage practice.  
Most of these approaches continue to adhere to the narrative of the official history, 
presenting change as a simple, linear process of modernization. In these works, the CCP 
was continuously portrayed as a brand-new political group that had completely broken 
with traditional China and, thus, maintained its image as the greatest contributor to 
Chinese marriage’s modernization.  The obstinacy of the old traditions and the 
difficulties of marriage reform were recognized to a certain extent in these studies, but 
the problems are identified as a temporary phenomenon that, like the issue of liberation 
for Chinese women, had gradually disappeared upon the completion of the economic 
transition in China from self-sufficient peasant economy to a socialist, state-operated and 
collective economy.9 This kind of universal, linear narrative might easily create “a 
predetermined history”, as Christian de Pee insightfully perceived: “Under the historian’s 
gaze it disintegrates into a collection of data that are held together only by the historian’s 
preconceived framework, which also gives them meaning.”10 
In 2001, a high-rating TV series called Jiqing ranshao de suiyue 激情燃烧的岁月 [Years 
of Passion on Burning] generated specific public interest towards “the revolutionary 
marriage” by portraying a “red marriage” story of a commander of the People’s 
Liberation Army and his reluctant young wife. Since then, a number of publications have 
told the love and marriage stories of the CCP’s leaders, generals and common soldiers at 
various stages of the party's history.11 However, most of these works were published in 
                                                 
9  Zhang Zhiyong, 2.  
10 Christian de Pee, The Writing of Weddings in Middle-Period China: Text and Ritual Practice in the Eighth through 
Fourteenth Centuries (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 14-15. 
11 For example, Huang Renke 黄仁柯, Luyi ren: hongse yishujia men 鲁艺人——红色艺术家们 [The Red Artists in 
Lu Xun Art and Literature Institute](Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 2001); Yang Wenyu 杨闻
宇 and Ma Xiaoxiao 马萧萧, Hongse Hunyin Dang’an 红色婚姻档案 I, II [The Archives of Red Marriage Vol. 1, 
2]( Beijing: Kunlun chubanshe, 2005); Kong Qingdong 孔庆东, “Shida yuanshuai de qingyuan”十大元帅的情缘 
[Love stories of the Ten Marshals],in Kong Qingdong, Kuaizhi yingxiong 脍炙英雄[Heroes in Praise] (Beijing: 
Chang’an chubanshe, 2009), 212-270  Li Bing 李兵, Junhun liebian 军婚裂变[Military Marriage] (Wuchang: 
Changjiang wenyi chubanshe, 1993); Lu Yiping 卢一萍, Huangyuan shang de diyidai muqin: Baqian xiangnü shang 
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the form of popular literature and lack the foundations of serious academic research. 
Under the label of “arranged free love”, these stories of revolutionary marriage were 
typically told in a romanticized “hero and beauty” pattern: the educated young urban 
beauty falls in love with the brave Communist hero, whom she respects and admires 
regardless of any discrepancy in their ages, education level, or cultural background.12 
Reluctance and coercion as motivations for the union were either denied entirely or 
consciously ignored by most contributors so as to avoid sensitive topics that might attract 
unnecessary official attention. 
In general, stories of revolutionary marriage are largely beyond the focus of academic 
historians of the PRC. On the one hand, the CCP official discourse still dominates 
Chinese academia, which therefore excludes any study detached too far from the theme 
of “anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism”, not to mention any approach that dares to 
question the Party’s established policies. On the other hand, for scholars who are living in 
the Danwei 单位[Work Unit] system, the Party’s interference in people’s private lives 
has become so common a routine that their research has lost any significance.13 
Since the mid-1970s, the dominance of official discourse in the field of Chinese women’s 
studies began to face challenges from feminist scholars.  These researchers were eager to 
question the validity of the Marxist historians’ conclusion that Chinese women’s 
liberation was a victory of the CCP’s social reforms. However, it was not until the 1990s 
that the local archival sources and oral histories became accessible to Western 
researchers. Before then, most contributors had to build their research based primarily on 
the official publications of the PRC. The insufficiency of this available data on Chinese 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
tianshan 荒原上的第一代母亲：八千湘女上天山 [First mothers on the wasteland: Stories About the Eight 
Thousand Hunan women on the Tianshan Mountain](Beijing: Shiyue wenyi chubanshe, 2006). 
12 Chen Zhongyi, 153-155. 
13 Officially, any marriage must be registered and approved in the government marriage registration office. This office, 
however, apparently relies almost entirely on approval by the couple’s respective danwei leaders. Applicants without 
such approval will not be registered for marriage. See G.Henderson, and M. Cohen, The Chinese Hospital: A 
Socialist Work Unit (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), 43. Also see Martin King Whyte and William L. 
Parish, Urban Life in Contemporary China (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 113. About the 
Danwei system, see Lü Xiaobo and Elizabeth J. Perry, eds., Danwei: the changing Chinese workplace in historical 
and comparative perspective (New York: M.E. Sharpe: An East Gate Book, 1997). 
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popular society inevitably led to a theoretical paradox: on the one hand, through 
examining the CCP’s and governmental archival documents, researchers had to 
acknowledge the fact that Chinese communists had done considerable work toward 
liberating women and that Chinese women were enjoying a high rate of economic 
independence; on the other hand, their personal experiences told them that gender 
inequality still permeated every corner of Communist China. 
In the past three decades, many research contributions have tried to interpret this paradox 
and, as an indispensable part of the Party’s policy towards women, CCP marriage politics 
have received unprecedented academic attention. However, few of these contributors go 
beyond a general discussion of the CCP’s marriage laws, regulations and promulgation 
campaigns to present a critical examination to the CCP’s daily marriage practice. Some 
assert from a feminist viewpoint that it is impossible for the CCP to achieve real gender 
equality because it is fundamentally a patriarchal organization and is a beneficiary of 
women’s subjection.14 Alternatively, others agree with the Marxist theory that real gender 
equality for the CCP is an unfinished mission, to be gradually obtained by consistently 
encouraging women’s participation in production.15 
Although these approaches are faced with certain limitations, they are nonetheless 
invaluable to the study of the revolutionary marriage model. An articulation between 
Chinese feminism and the CCP’s socialist revolution was first established by those 
contributors who built their research primarily on the PRC’s official publications in the 
1960s and 1970s. The CCP’s policies on women were variously interpreted in these 
works as a synthesis of feminism and socialism, a way to incorporate women’s liberation 
into the CCP’s revolutionary and reforming agenda, or as a workable expediency for the 
                                                 
14 Marilyn Young, ed., Women in China: Studies in Social Change and Feminism (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese 
Studies, University of Michigan, 1973); Elisabeth Croll, Feminism and Socialism in China ( London ; Boston: 
Routledge & K. Paul, 1978); Kay Ann Johnson, Women, the Family and Peasant Revolution in China (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1983); Judith Stacey, Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China ( Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1983); Christina Gilmartin, Engendering the Chinese Revolution: Radical Women, 
Communist Politics and Mass Movements in the 1920s(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). 
15 Delia Davin, Woman-work: Women and the Party in Revolutionary China (Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press, 1976); 
Patricia Stranahan,  Yan'an Women and the Communist Party (Berkeley : Institute of East Asian Studies, University 
of California, Berkeley Center for Chinese Studies, 1983); Phyllis Andors, The Unfinished Liberation of Chinese 
Women, 1949-1980 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983). 
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wartime need to attract more support from peasants. For example, Delia Davin pointed 
out that there had been two parallel tendencies in the modern Chinese women’s 
movement: the narrow feminist tendency, which concentrated on the struggle for 
women’s rights in the belief that true equality was possible without a revolution of the 
whole social system; and the socialist tendency, which held that women’s liberation 
could only be achieved under socialism and therefore further revolutionary activity was 
necessary. It was during the Jiangxi Soviet period (1931-1934) and Yan’an period (1937-
1949) that the feminist approach gradually accomplished its transition toward the 
socialist approach. Davin suggested that these periods served as “a laboratory”, arguing 
that the social change and experiments that took place there were later to determine the 
course of Chinese women’s history.16 
This opinion was soon developed by feminist scholars, who identified Chinese 
nationalism as the articulating point between Chinese feminism and socialism. In 
Elisabeth Croll’s 1978 examination of Chinese feminism, she argued that feminism in 
China had never been considered and practiced independently in the same manner as it 
had in the Western world. Rather, it emerged initially with Chinese nationalism and 
patriotism and then became synthesized with the socialism advocated by Chinese 
communists.17 This point was developed by Gilmartin in her 1995 contribution to the 
examination of early CCP gender relations. She suggested that the initial Chinese 
Communists who emerged from the May Fourth movement were intellectually 
predisposed towards feminism. They considered women’s emancipation to be “an 
essential component of the revolutionary endeavor to create a modern Chinese nation-
state.”18 
The CCP is often portrayed by Marxist historians as a brand-new political group, without 
any relation to pre-revolutionary China. The party policies, reforming agenda and 
practices are all labeled by this group as socialist or communist, all sharing the ultimate 
goal of overthrowing traditions and the ‘old ways’. There are no distinctions made 
                                                 
16 Davin, 16-18. 
17 Croll, Feminism and Socialism in China. 
18 Gilmartin, Engendering the Chinese Revolution, 2.  
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between the policies of Soviet Russia and other communist parties. However, a sound 
articulation between Confucianism and Chinese socialism was recognized by those 
radical feminist contributors who presented feminism and socialism as two adverse 
approaches. For instance, both Kay-Ann Johnson and Judith Stacey considered the 
serious “Confucian family crisis” that emerged in the last years of the Qing dynasty to be 
a direct inducement to social vicissitude in the early twentieth century. It is from this 
family crisis, according to Johnson, that the earliest Chinese Communists envisioned the 
eventual creation of a modern, secularized and relatively egalitarian family system that 
would shed many of its functions through the socialist transformation of society.19 The 
Chinese women’s movement, Johnson and Stacey argue, was initially a feminist 
collective action against the patriarchal repression of the Confucian social system. Its 
transition from the feminist movement into the socialist movement was actually a 
submission of Chinese feminism to the CCP’s inborn patriarchal tendency, an 
unconquerable legacy of Confucian society. A more insightful connection between the 
Chinese communists and the Confucian society’s patriarchal nature was offered by 
Christina Gilmartin; she pointed out that the CCP was never a typical communist party in 
the strict sense, but was rather a political force that emerged from traditional Chinese 
society with inerasable patriarchal marks. However, these feminist discourses have one 
fundamental flaw in common: by applying gender equality as a universal standard by 
which to judge Chinese women’s liberation, they failed to distinguish Chinese women’s 
culture and history from that of their European and North American sisters, and 
consequently more or less ignored Chinese women’s special requirements for 
emancipation. 
While considerable academic progress has been made in the field of Chinese women’s 
liberation since the 1980s, and despite the fact that Chinese society and historical 
resources have became more accessible to the public, the topic of the revolutionary 
marriage has still largely been left untouched by academia. The reason for this oversight 
is simple: for those living and working outside the PRC, revolutionary marriage was 
                                                 
19 Johnson, 28-35. 
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completely an “inside story”, generally unknown to those having limited familiarity with 
Chinese daily life and popular culture. 
In 1981, Elisabeth Croll's Politics of Marriage in Contemporary China presented a 
critical socioeconomic examination of the impact of the 1950 Marriage Law on Chinese 
marriage patterns in both rural and urban China.20 Based on a prodigious number of 
documentary materials, and her limited fieldwork experience in 1977, Croll perceived 
that most Chinese marriages, even after the promulgation of the 1950’s Marriage Law, 
were still of an intermediate variety: the marrying couple and their parents shared control 
and negotiated a compromise between arranged and free-choice marriages, and the terms 
of this compromise differed markedly between rural and urban families.21 However, since 
Croll’s focus was to examine how parental order retreated from the marriage-decision 
making procedure, her discussion on how the Communist state  officially  interfered with 
individual’s marriage was limited to the marriage registration procedure, and the political 
associations’ assistance for those facing parental obstruction or intervention.   
The discussions on the post-1949 marriage registration were further elaborated on in 
studies of the danwei system.22 Through their personal experiences, or the experiences of 
their Chinese acquaintances, these contributors discovered a hidden truth about 
contemporary Chinese marriage - the consummation of a marriage seemed to rely almost 
entirely upon the approval of the couple’s respective danwei leaders. Although approval 
was generally forthcoming (excepting when the people were considered too young, or 
when one was in some way politically suspect), those without such approval could not be 
registered for marriage.23 Circumscribed within the post-1949 period, the researchers of 
the danwei system were limited to simple descriptions of the danwei’s mechanism in 
terms of marriage control, despite the fact that the “revolutionary marriage model” as a 
social control program had started long before the establishment of the danwei system. 
                                                 
20 Elisabeth Croll, Politics of Marriage in Contemporary China (New York : Cambridge University Press, 1981), 1-23.  
21 Ibid, 25. 
22 Henderson and Cohen, The Chinese Hospital: A Socialist Work Unit; Whyte and Parish, Urban Life in Contemporary 
China; Lü and Perry.ed., Danwei: the changing Chinese workplace in historical and comparative perspective.  
23 Whyte and Parish, 113. 
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In the mid-late 1990s, the field of Chinese women’s studies saw a significant evolution of 
its epistemology and methodology. More and more scholars came to learn that bringing 
women into history required that the conventional framework of the discipline needed to 
be transformed, or even destroyed, in order to account for “shifts in gender relations 
located carefully in time and space”.24 This recognition led to a series of publications 
based on the oral historical sources of the female survivors of the 1934 Long March. In 
1999, Lily Xiao Hong Lee and Sue Wiles, utilizing exhaustive textual research, published 
the remarkable life stories of thirty of the veterans remaining from the two thousand 
women soldiers who set out on the Long March.25 In 2001, Helen Praeger Young made a 
path-breaking contribution to this topic by presenting the oral histories of twenty-two 
female survivors of the Long March.26 By mostly using the veterans’ own words, Young 
succeeded in providing the reader with a significant wealth of material about the women 
soldiers’ day-to-day lives. It was from the unvarnished image of the significant gulf 
between boys and girls, and the examples of individuality in a communal culture, 
uncovered by these studies that the Western scholars began to understand the 
revolutionary marriage. Unfortunately, neither Lee nor Young focused on marriage as a 
subject itself.  Instead, they endeavored to break the limits of linear time and space, and 
to deliver the relatively complete and real-life experience of each woman without 
becoming involved in the ongoing intensive debate between the Marxist and feminist 
academia over the CCP’s women’s policies. As Lee and Wiles claimed at the beginning 
of their work: 
We must make clear at the outset, however, that our motivation to write this 
book came not from a desire to defend the Communist Party’s claims of gender 
equality, which many Westerners have viewed with considerable cynicism. 
Rather, we are motivated by an admiration for those thirty young women of the 
Long March…who retained a lifelong commitment to their ideals despite the 
disappointments, and sometimes betrayals, of reality.27 
                                                 
24 Mann, 8.  
25 Lee and Wiles, Women of the Long March.  
26 Young, Choosing Revolution: Chinese Women Soldiers on the Long March. 
27 Lee and Wiles, ix. 
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In sum, over the past three decades, rapid progress has been accomplished on the history 
of Chinese women’s liberation in both China and North America. There have been many 
debates surrounding the CCP’s marriage reform efforts among the scholars of Marxist, 
feminist and socialist feminist schools, all of them are striving to make their own 
interpretations accepted as universal and objective. Limited by the clear-cut boundary of 
“modern”, however, few serious academic efforts have been made to examine the 
continuity of Confucian values in post-revolutionary China and the unique problems that 
derive from its legacy. Consequently, this neglect has led to a general failure in the 
literature to contextualize the contradictions inherent in the CCP’s policy that is 
exemplified by the confused revolutionary marriage pattern. Focusing on women’s 
economic and political transition in the modern era only, the Marxist and socialist 
feminist scholars have consciously or unconsciously ignored the fact that traditional 
values still largely shaped Chinese marriage and gender identities. Using solely the 
modern concept of gender equality to judge Chinese society, the radical feminist 
contributors cannot help but lose sight of Chinese women’s special requirements for 
emancipation. Moving beyond these studies, my dissertation seeks to uncover the 
common ground among the Marxist, feminist and socialist feminist discourses, and to 
shed new light on the role that the CCP played in Chinese women’s liberation. 
1.3 About the Major Sources 
The primary sources of this paper can be divided into three categories: the Confucian 
classics and related literature; the CCP’s official documents and archival sources; and 
unconventional sources, including interviews and popular writing.  
The first category serves to examine traditional Chinese marriage politics and their 
lasting impact on Chinese society. Since marriage legislation and practices in pre-modern 
China closely followed the theoretical guidance of the Confucian ethics, I refer to the 
Confucian classics such as Liji 礼记 [The Book of Rites], as well as various interpretative 
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literature and dynastic legal codes concerning marriage and family.28 I also examine 
popular literature, including personal diaries, travelogues, essays, poems and novels as 
more personal records of these marriage customs and practices. The second category 
contains the published and archival sources about the CCP’s official policies, legislations, 
promulgation campaigns and practices regarding women and marriage. Some of these 
resources are published, but others are archival documents only circulated within the 
party or administrative organizations like the All China Women’s Federation. The 
sources in the third category I have mainly used to explore the real practice of the 
revolutionary marriage model. This group includes the following three types of sources: 
1) Interviews.  
Since China has presently entered a more open era, many revolutionary brides are now 
more willing to talk about their marriages and lives.  This is especially true in cases 
where their powerful and much older husbands have passed away, or when the brides 
themselves began to reside outside of China. These interviews are an important part of 
my research. From May 2007 to December 2008, I held interviews with ten individuals 
who were either revolutionary brides themselves, or were friends or relatives of such 
women and who therefore had first-hand knowledge of this issue. Considering China’s 
political atmosphere and social customs, all of these interviews were held in an informal 
and unstructured way at the subjects’ own homes or by telephone.  Such care was needed 
in order to best relieve the interviewee’s emotional pressure or to avoid the awkwardness 
that someone from the senior generation might feel when talking about their love stories 
face to face with someone from the younger generation.  
All the interviewees appeared very cooperative in telling their life stories and answering 
my questions. Although they unexceptionally depicted their marriage as a happy success,  
I could still sense the uneasenss and reserve behind their passionate narratives. For 
                                                 
28 The legal codes I primarily refer to are the Great Ming Code 大明律例 and the Great Qing Code 大清律例. The later 
is almost a total copy of the former on the issue of marriage. The spirit of the Great Qing Code was followed by the 
Republican government until the 1930s when it was replaced by the Nationalist Government’s  Civil Code of 1930. 
For the translated codes see The Great Ming Code [Da Ming Lü], trans. Jiang Yonglin,Seattle and London: 
University of Washington Press, 2005; The Great Qing Code, [Da Qing Lü], trans.William C. Jones,  Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994. 
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instant, one of my interviewee became very emotional when telling me about how she got 
married to her husband who was a high-rank PLA [People’s Liberation Army] officer and 
eleven years her senior, only six days after their first encounter in the Korean front. But 
she insisted this marriage was her own choice, and depicted her husband as a very gentle 
man and a good father despite her daughter (whom I interviewed later in 2007) said 
something very different.29 To certain extent, I believe, it is an inevitable outcome of the 
Communist China’s constant political movements and brainwash programs. The people 
who survived the Cultural Revolution had learned to trust nobody, and to keep their 
hearts, minds and tongues consistent with the CCP’s official discourse. 
2) First-hand literature.  
In the official documents, both published and unpublished, the love and marriages of 
CCP leaders and generals are seldom mentioned, due to its private nature. It is in the 
memoirs and biographies of the party leaders and the women veterans that these stories 
are more commonly found. The other important written sources in this category are first-
hand accounts of events, both in English and in Chinese. The English sources are 
primarily the publications of the American journalists who visited China at different 
periods, such as Helen Foster Snow’s Inside Red China (1939), Harrison Forman’s 
Report from Red China (1945), Anna Louise Strong’s The Chinese Conquer China 
(1949) and various others.30  The Chinese-language sources are more varied in type and 
                                                 
29 This is from my interview with Mrs. Han who was over seventy years old in 2007. Her husband was a division leader 
of the PLA and past away in the early 1980s. Considering her emotional condition during the interview, I 
interviewed Mrs. Han’s daughter later to testify some important questions. According to the daughter, her parents’ 
marriage was an arrangement of the Party organization. Her mother had had a boyfriend before marrying her father. 
But they developed a harmonious marriage relation during the long years they spent together. While a gentle 
husband, Mr. Han was not a good father due to his bad temper. “My mother is a typical Chinese woman who never 
complains. Family is her whole world”, the daughter told me so. 
30 The publications of the American journalists include: Helen Foster Snow, Inside Red China: New Introduction by 
Harrison Salisbury (New York: A Da Capo Paperback, 1939); Helen Foster Snow, Women in Modern China ( Paris: 
Mouton & Co, 1967); Harrison Forman, Report from Red China (New York: Book Find Club, 1945); Anna Louise 
Strong, The Chinese Conquer China (Kansas: Haldeman-Julius Publications, 1949); Anna Louise Strong, China’s 
Millions: Revolution in Central China, 1927(Peking: New World Press, 1965); Nym Wales, Red Dust: 
Autobiographies of Chinese Communists (California: Stanford University Press, 1952); Edgar Snow, Random Notes 
on Red China: 1936-1945(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); Gerald Clerk, Impatient Giant: Red China 
Today (New York, David McKay Co., 1959).  
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include journals, social investigations, contemporary opinion pieces, and personal 
writings.31  
3) Media sources.  
Although revolutionary marriage couples and their lives have not provoked much 
scholarly attention, it has been a favorite theme in popular culture since the early 2000s. 
Stories of revolutionary families are told in films, TV series and live interviews and serve 
mostly as nostalgia for the early years of the CCP’s rule, when there were fewer divorces 
and extra-marital affairs.32 This interest in the revolutionary marriage on screen, and the 
widespread public attention and commentary evoked by this boom sheds great light not 
only on what happened in a revolutionary marriage, but also why it happened and why it 
has become a question for Chinese people today. 
As for secondary sources, I must acknowledge my great debt to both the Chinese and 
Western scholarship on Chinese women and their liberation. In addition to the broad 
perspectives, innovative research methods, and valuable insights that have emerged from 
previous academic contributions, the oral memories of the senior CCP members, and the 
archival sources these approaches have brought to light through exhaustive fieldwork 
have all been especially valuable to my own approach The CCP’s marriage practice, as 
revealed by the revolutionary marriage pattern, is a hybrid of Confucian ethics, feminist 
ideals, and a communist project of social control, all aimed at articulating the gap 
between progressive ideals and conservative social realities, which occurred during a 
                                                 
31 The Chinese sources include contemporary journals like Funü zazhi 妇女杂志[Ladies’ Journal]; social investigations 
like Li Wenhai 李文海, ed. Minguo shiqi shehui diaocha congbian: hunyin jiating juan 民国时期社会调查丛编：
婚姻家庭卷 [The Collection of Social Investigation in Republic China: Volume of Marriage and Family](Fujian: 
Jiaoyu chubanshe, 2005); collected contemporary opinion pieces like Mei Sheng 梅生, ed. Zhongguo funü wenti 
taolun ji, 6 vols.中国妇女问题讨论集 [Collection of Discussions on Chinese women’s problem](Shanghai: 
Shanghai shudian, 1989); personal writings like Cai Xiaoqian 蔡孝乾, Taiwan ren de changzhengj jilu 台湾人的长
征记录[A Taiwanese record of the Long March] (Taibei: Haixia xueshu chubanshe, 2002).  Chen Xuezhao 陈学昭 
Yan’an fangwen ji 延安访问记[Visit to Yan’an]( Hongkong: Beiji Shudian, 1940). Zhao Chaogou赵超构, Yan’an 
Yi Yue 延安一月[One Month in Yan’an]( Nanjing: Xinmin baoguan, 1946). 
32 The first decade of the twenty-first century saw a booming interest in the love and marriage of the military personnel. 
Several TV series were contributed to this theme, the highest rating one is Jiqing ranshao de suiyue 激情燃烧的岁
月[Years of passion], a twenty-two episode series; and Liushinian hunlian wangshi 六十年婚恋往事 [Love and 
marriage in the past sixty years], a documentary series based on the live interviews.  
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transitional period when old traditions started to collapse even as the new ones were 
under construction. 
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Chapter 2  
2 Making a Traditional Marriage 
Traditionally, Chinese people married through the arrangement of their parents or family 
head and via the recommendation of a matchmaker. Before the mid-twentieth century, 
when the vast majority of the Chinese population came to recognize and accept the 
modern concept of marriage freedom, this traditional system was the only marriage 
pattern known to Chinese society. This chapter seeks to provide an overview of 
traditional Chinese marriage politics from which the so-called “revolutionary marriage 
model” found its origin. 
The arranged marriage system started to take its form during the Shang (1600 BC - 1050 
BC) and Zhou dynasties (1050 – 221BC).1 During the Han period (206 BC-220 AD), the 
system was universally systemized and customized in accordance with Confucian norms. 
As a result of the growing official preference for Confucianism in subsequent dynasties, 
marriage law became an indispensable section of the dynastic legal codes that followed, 
with stipulations that sought to legitimize parental manipulation of marriages in 
accordance with filial piety, and to guarantee conformity to the Confucian doctrine of 
marriage and family. Numerous ritual instructions, virtue lessons and legal texts were 
also created by Confucian legal minds with the ultimate goal of ethically regulating the 
status and gender roles of their subject populations. 2 
                                                 
1  The parameters of the marriage system in the pre-Qin period is still a matter of controversy among scholars due to the 
complicacy of the era and differing interpretation to monogamy and polygamy. Many Chinese scholars believe the 
marriage system at that time was a conditional monogamy complemented with concubinage, a pattern that limited a 
man to one wife at a time, but not necessarily to one woman. See Chen Peng 陈鹏, Zhongguo hunyin shigao 中国婚
姻史稿 [Histories of Chinese Marriage](Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2005); Zhang Xipo 张希坡, Zhongguo hunyin lifa 
shi 中国婚姻立法史 [History of Chinese Marriage Law](Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2004); Cui Mingde 崔明德, 
“Xianqin zhengzhi hunyin chutan”先秦政治婚姻初探 [A preliminary study on the political Marriage of the pre-Qin 
period], Xinhua wenzhai, no. 9(2002): 62-66.  Western scholars, conversely, define this pre-Qin system as polygamy 
because the status and authority of principal and secondary wives of the ruling elites varied under different political 
situations. See Melvin P. Thatcher, “Marriages of the Ruling Elite in the Spring and Autumn Period”, in Marriage 
and Inequality in Chinese Society, eds. Rubie S. Watson and Patricia Buckeley Ebrey (Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc., 
1991), 25-57. 
2  Matthew H. Sommer, Sex, Law, and Society in Late Imperial China(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
2000). 
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However, in China there has usually been a gap between custom and law. The dynastic 
state consistently attempted to impose a marriage morality on its people that was in 
keeping with the Confucian ideal of harmony. In reality, when a marital decision was 
made, the utilitarian considerations for a marriage of convenience usually ran counter to 
the moral model described in the official discourse. This tendency was furthered by 
another fact: subject to the interest of the patriarchal family, rather than that of the 
individual, the mate-selection procedure under the arranged marriage system often 
excluded the participation of the principal parties, and was seldom propitious to free 
choice, love, and courtship. 
Through examining the marital ethics described in the Confucian classics, and the general 
marriage mechanism of pre-modern China, this chapter identifies the traditional Chinese 
marriage practice as a compromise between Confucian-oriented official discourse and the 
temporary interest-driven social reality. In this particular case, the dynastic legal code 
served to effectively maintain a balance between law and custom. Similar compromises, 
as I will demonstrate in later chapters, were constantly made by the marriage reformers or 
revolutionaries between the progressive marriage ideals they were pursuing and the 
ingrained social customs they were incapable of eradicating, even long after the arranged 
marriage institution was theoretically and legally abolished. 
2.1 Marriage and Matrimony 
Marriage is called “hunyin”婚姻 in Chinese.3 The various Confucian ethics and ritual 
textbooks broadly define this term in several ways.4 Literally, it can mean 1) the wedding 
ceremony or “liu li” 六礼 [the six rites of matrimony], a series of ritual procedures by 
which men and women get married; 2) the married couple, with “hun”婚 for groom and 
                                                 
3  Most of the Confucian classics that survived the Qin’s burning in 213 BC were revised during the Han dynasty when 
Confucianism acquired its dominance over the official ideology. The texts composed at that time became the 
fundamental principles strictly followed by the later dynasties. Among these works, the most commonly known is 
Liji 礼记[Record of Rites]and the opinion pieces dispersed in The Book of Odes 诗经, Analects 论语, Mencius 孟子, 
Book of Changes 易经, Comprehensive Discussion in the White Tiger Hall 白虎通, Lessons for Women 女诫 and 
Shuo Wen Jie Zi 说文解字 [A Han- dynasty Dictionary]. 
4  In the early twentieth century, its meaning was expanded to include marriage in the broadest sense: marriage patterns, 
wedding practices, and marital relations, with connotations of family organization, concubinage, chastity and 
divorce. (Pee, 14-15.) 
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“yin”姻 for bride;5 3) or the affinities of the bride and groom.6 These official 
interpretations stated the fundamental duties that a marriage should deliver: to legitimize 
sexual relations between male and female, to define the proper biological and social role 
of man and woman, and to demonstrate the proper relations between individuals, families 
and the state.  
The Liji 礼记 [Book of Rites], the ritualistic classic composed in the Han period and 
consistently followed by subsequent dynasties, identified the marriage ceremony as the 
“root of the other ceremonial observances,” which served to “establish the distinction to 
be observed between man and woman, and the righteousness to be maintained between 
husband and wife. From the distinction between man and woman comes the 
righteousness between husband and wife; from that righteousness comes the affection 
between father and son; and from that affection, the rectitude between ruler and 
minister.”7 A complete matrimonial procedure outlined in the work included six steps 
known as “the six rites of matrimony” (liu li): nacai 纳采 [the proposal with its 
accompanying gift], wenming 问名 [the inquiries about the (lady’s) name]，naji 纳吉
[the intimation of the approving divination]，nazheng 纳征[the receiving of special 
offerings], qingqi 请期[the request to fix the day], qinying 亲迎 [the (groom) in person 
fetching (the bride, bring her to his ancestral home)].8  
This ceremonial procedure, however, as purposely designed for the aristocratic class [shi
士], was too complicated and expensive for the commoners to follow.9 Therefore, the 
more common performance of the marriage ceremony was a simplification of this ideal. 
During the Southern Song dynasty, the Confucian scholar Zhu Xi (朱熹 1130-1200) 
simplified the ancient six steps into three: nacai 纳采 [proposal], nabi 纳币 [offering and 
                                                 
5  According to Kong Yingda’s interpretation, “the groom should fetch his bride at dusk (hun), and his bride will follow 
him (to his home) (yin), so husband is called hun and wife is called yin”. Zheng Xuan 郑玄(127-200), Kong Yingda
孔颖达(574-648), Liji zhengyi 礼记正义(Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1999), juan.61, 1617.  
6  Guo Pu 郭璞(276-324), Xing Bing 邢昺(932-1010), Erya zhushu 尔雅注疏(Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1999), 
juan 4, 122. 
7  Li Chi[Liji]: Book of Rites, 2 vols., trans. James Legge (New Hyde Park, NY: University Books, [1885]1967), 2: 428. 
8  Ibid. 
9  Chen Peng, 204-205. 
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receiving the betrothal gift] and qinying 亲迎 [fetching the bride].10 With minor variation, 
these three steps remained basic features of the customary procedure for acquiring a wife 
until the end of the imperial era.11    
In her insightful study of traditional Chinese family rituals, Patricia Ebrey elaborates on 
the distinctively Chinese mechanisms for achieving social and cultural cohesion: 
In Confucian theory, ritual was seen as an alternative to force. People who 
routinely performed proper rituals were expected to recognize their social and 
ethical obligations and act on them. Yet power clearly entered into the 
relationships of rituals, texts, and society. Power is an intrinsic aspect of ritual 
itself.12  
While simplified and varied in forms throughout dynastic China, the social and ethical 
obligations delivered by the Confucian marriage ceremony remained identical: regulating 
the natural urges of men and women within the framework of a wedding; distinguishing 
the separation between man and woman with a highlighted role of go-between; 
emphasizing filial piety with the parental will at the center; confirming the proper relation 
of husband and wife within a household; and enforcing effective social control by linking 
personal relationships to political order. 
2.1.1 The Distinction to be observed between a Man and a 
Woman: Sex and Marriage 
Gender conception in the sexual orthodoxy of imperial China was derived from the 
theory of yin and yang, or qian 乾 and kun 坤. These concepts are outlined in Yijing 易经
[The Classic of Changes]: 
The movements of qian (yang) create the male, and the movements of kun (yin) 
create the female…The function of the trigram qian is to take charge of the 
                                                 
10 Zhu Xi, Zhuzi jiali 朱子家礼 [Family Rituals of Zhu Xi] , in Zhuzi quanshu, 27vols.朱子全书 [Complete Collection 
of Zhu Xi](Shanghai: Guji chubanshe & Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe), 7: 857-947.  
11 For example, in the Qing dynasty, the marriage ceremony in the official records added some Manchu elements; the 
three steps of nacai, nabi and qinying were changed to nacai, pufang 铺房(prepairing the wedding chamber ) and 
qinying in accordance with the Manchu custom. See Zhao Erxun 赵尔巽, Qingshi gao.清史稿[Draft History of 
Qing](Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1976) , vol. 10, juan 89, 2643.  
12 Patricia Buckley Ebrey, Confucianism and Family Rituals in Imperial China. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1991), 7. 
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origination of the myriad things, and the function of the trigram kun is the 
formation and maturity of the myriad things…The myriad things are propagated 
when the seminal essence of the male is mixed with the blood of the female…the 
relationship of husband and wife is possible only after there are male and 
female.13 
While sexual relations between male and female were recognized by thinkers as the 
beginning of all human relations [renlun zhishi 人伦之始], the Confucian moralists 
insisted that marriage is inevitable in the Way of humanity “because among the great 
natural urges, there are none as great as those between male and female. The intercourse 
between male and female is the beginning of human relations…thus the ritual of marriage 
was established in order to emphasize human relations and broaden progeny.”14 Only 
after the natural urges between male and female were regulated within the framework of 
the Confucian sexual morality of li, could it serve to establish “the righteousness between 
husband and wife.” The Liji argued that it is through the purity of this initial relationship 
that all other righteousness derives: “from the distinction between man and woman comes 
the righteousness between husband and wife; from that righteousness comes the affection 
between father and son; and from that affection, the rectitude between ruler and 
minister.”15 Expanding on this idea, the Song philosopher Cheng Yi (程颐 1033-1107) 
added this annotation to the Yijing: “the sexual intercourse between man and woman 
makes the relationship of husband and wife. It is from the relation of husband and wife 
that all the other human relations originated”.16  
In this sense, the greatest significance of a Chinese marriage ceremony was social in 
nature and served to legitimately recognize the “righteousness” of a man and a woman’s 
sexual relationship. Only through a marriage ceremony could people’s biological 
identities be socially distinguished and recognized by society; only those sexual 
relationships that had been sanctioned by the appropriate rites under the social identities 
                                                 
13 “Yijing: Xici 1.1”[The Classic of Changes: Appended Statements 1.1], trans. Hai-ming Wen and John Trowbridge, 
in Images of Women in Chinese Thought and Culture: Writings from the Pre-Qin Period through the Song Dynasty, 
ed. Robin R. Wang ( Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.,2003), 29-33. 
14 “Baihu tong” [Comprehensive Discussions in the White Tiger Hall], trans. Paul R. Goldin, in Images of Women, 171. 
15 Liji, 2: 428. 
16 Originally see the Qing version of Cheng Yi’s Zhouyi Cheng zhuan 周易程传(The book of changes annotated by 
Cheng Yi), which was officially composed under the supervision of Kangxi Emperor in 1715. Quoted in Chen Peng, 
14. 
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of husband and wife could be legitimized.17 From this recognition evolved the most 
fundamental conceptions of Chinese marriage, as outlined below: 
1) Marriage is a virtual social imperative for all people. Every man must be a husband 
and every woman a wife, while no one should be left single. Sommer suggests that “ to 
be married was (and perhaps still is) the mark of social adulthood in China, and among 
the poor peasantry marriage served as an important status symbol for men- one that could 
only have gained in importance as the shortage of wives worsened.”18 When a man was 
financially incapable of supporting a wife, he would possibly employ some irregular or 
desperate marriage politics in order to find a wife and father a descendant. Sometimes, 
the social pressure to marry forced an individual to pursue such alternate means, even at 
the risk of breaking the law by leasing a temporary wife from the black market,19 at the 
expense of his reputation by inheriting a wife from a deceased brother20 or by marrying 
himself into his wife’s family as a zhui xu 赘婿 [married-in son-in-law].21 
2) Under the tenets of Confucian sexual morality, sex and marriage are inseparable: all 
acceptable sexual behavior should happen only within the boundaries of a legal marriage. 
All extramarital sex (including pre-marriage sex between future spouses) was considered 
illicit and banned. For instance, the Ming code stipulated that whoever commits 
consensual illicit sex [he jian 和奸] shall be punished by eighty strokes by the staff. If the 
                                                 
17 Jack L. Dull,  “Marriage and Divorce in Han China: A Glimpse at ‘pre-Confucian’ Society”, in Chinese Family Law 
and Social Change: in Historical and Comparative Perspective, ed. David C. Buxbaun (Seattle and London: 
University of Washington Press, 1978), 23-106. 
18 Sommer, 55. 
19 Wife leasing had a long history in China from the Southern and Northern dynasties into the Republican era. From 
Yuan to Qing, it was continually banned by the legal codes. The penalty for this violation varied from a verbal 
warning to a beating and betrothal cancellation. See Ye Liya 叶丽娅, “Shi lun dian qi fengsu”试论典妻风俗 
[Discussion on the custom of leased wife], Minsu yanjiu, no.3 (1989): 2-4. 
20 Inherited Marriage [Shoujihun 收继婚] was originally a nomadic practice. When a father died, his son would take his 
stepmother as his own wife. When an elder brother died, his wives would become the wives of his younger brothers. 
The purpose of this practice was to guarantee the family property would not be divided by the marrying out of 
widows. Besides concerns over property, it was also a practical method for a poor family to secure the limited source 
of women for the sake of reproduction, which made this an especially a popular practice in the remote and poor 
regions.  
21 Uxorilocal Marriage [ruzhuihun 入赘婚] occurred when a family did not have a son.  This family might prefer to 
continue their name and linage by keeping a daughter at home and bringing in a husband for her to join their family. 
The social status of a zhuixu was low and degraded from that of a proper son. Shiji suoyin described it as “the wart 
of body, should have been rejected but not”. (Sima Zhen 司马贞 (Tang). Shiji Suoyin 史记索引: juan 6. Quoted in 
Chen Peng, 742.) Although despised by the elite class, this tradition was kept in practice throughout the Yuan, Ming 
and Qing periods until the republic era. 
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offending women have husbands, the penalty shall be ninety strokes.22 This article was 
copied in full version by the Qing lawmakers.23 Such persistent and strong emphasis on 
the illegitimacy of extramarital sex inevitably led to a long-lasting confusion between 
marriage and sex, which continued across the borders of time and space into modern 
China.24 
3) Romantic love is not, and has never been a concern of the traditional marriage system. 
Affection or love may be necessary for a respected couple, and it should be an outcome 
of a successful marriage, but is in no way a prerequisite. In fact, even in the early 
twentieth century “romantic love” was still an exotic conception for Chinese people. In 
the Confucian morality of Li, the term “love”, or “ai”[爱] was most often used to 
describe a moral sense of responsibility between superior and inferior, such as emperor 
and vassal, father and son, husband and wife, elder brother and younger brother or master 
and servant.25 When it was used to describe the relationship between two lovers, like the 
love affairs represented in fiction, the term was seldom platonic. Historian Olga Lang 
commented that “love in old Chinese fiction is sexual love,” and suggested that the 
conscious perpetuation of family line provided Chinese people “a more realistic attitude 
toward the human body than Westerners. They do not conceal the physical aspects of 
love. But love does not exalt them as it does people in the West, nor do they need a 
romantic sublimation in order to accept it. The Chinese found an outlet for their feelings 
and emotions in love of nature and friendship; romantic love plays a small role.”26  
2.1.2 Righteousness between Husband and Wife: Familial Roles 
of Men and Women 
A marriage ceremony not only legitimized sexual relations between men and women, but 
also highlighted the transition of their social roles from a son and a daughter into a 
                                                 
22 The Great Ming Code, Article 390, 214. 
23 Tian Tao and Deng Qin, eds. Da Qing Lü Li 大清律例 (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 1999), juan 33, Lü 366, 552. 
24 During her interview with the women veterans in 1980s, Helen Praeger Young felt rather perplexed at one time by 
the language these senior women employed to talk about love and marriage until she came to a vital realization that 
they actually used the term “getting married”(jiehun 结婚) as a synonym of “having sex”. See Young, 199. 
25 Gudai hanyu cidian 古代汉语辞典[Ancient Chinese Dictionary](Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2005),7. 
26 Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society  (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1968), 34. 
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husband and a wife, as well as into a son-in-law and a daughter-in-law. According to the 
life schedule Confucians designed for the elite class, a man was expected to spend the 
years before marriage learning in preparation for a career and attending sedulously to his 
filial and fraternal duties. Before marriage, a man was not qualified to teach others even 
he might become very learned because “his object being still to receive and not to give 
out”. Only after he had a wife, he could begin to “attend to the business proper to a 
man”.27 A woman was expected to cease going out (from the women’s apartments) at the 
age of ten. The pre-marriage period for the elite female was a stage of training for 
household duties. She should be taught (the arts of) pleasing speech and manners, to be 
docile and obedient, to handle the hempen fibers, to deal with the cocoons, to weave silks 
and form fillets, and to learn women’s work.28  
For both men and women, the wedding served as a watershed of their childhood lives. 
Only after getting married, could a man step out of the domestic sphere and lead his 
public life. For a woman, the ceremony not only brought a residential transition from her 
natal family to her spouse’s, but it also confirmed her inferiority and obedience to her 
husband and her in-laws. For a woman, marriage was more important than it was for a 
man, as it represented a life-long duty she could never escape. Based on her study of 
traditional Chinese women’s common fate, Elizabeth Croll concludes: “Within the 
secluded quarters of gentry women or in peasant and working households, girls were 
reared and trained in anticipation of one single future–marriage. She was reminded that a 
girl’s happiness, well-being and welfare depended on marriage and a successful marriage 
at that; this was her future and her only future.”29 This destiny doomed most women to a 
lifetime sentence, due to the fact that it was impossible for a wife to leave her husband. 
The Liji taught people that “faithfulness is (specially) the virtue of a wife. Once mated 
with her husband, all her life she will not change (her feeling of duty to him), and hence, 
when the husband dies she will not marry (again).”30 Chinese historian Ban Gu 班固 (32-
                                                 
27 Liji, 1: 478-479 
28 Ibid. 
29 Elizabeth Croll, Changing Identities of Chinese Women: Rhetoric, experience and self-perception in twentieth-
century China (London: Zed Books, 1995), 36. 
30 Liji, 1: 439. 
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92 C.E.) expanded on this principle in Baihu tong 白虎通 [Comprehensive Discussion in 
the White Tiger Hall], his official transcript based on a 79 C.E. imperial conference on 
the Confucian classics. In it, he argued that “even if the husband’s behavior is evil, the 
wife may not leave him, because there is no principle whereby Earth can leave Heaven. 
Even if the husband is evil, she cannot leave him.”31 A wife had no legal grounds by 
which she could legally leave her husband without proper cause, and from the Tang Code 
through the Revised Law of the Late Qing period, there were provisions for criminal 
sanctions against wives who did so. The customary law was even more conservative on 
the issue of divorce, making it the unilateral privilege of the husband and his family. 32 
Man’s domination over woman was interpreted by the Confucian ethicists in the theory 
of yin and yang: “yin is lowly, and thus cannot act on its own initiative; one brings it into 
contact with yang in order to perfect it as yang takes the lead; yin acts in concert. The 
male acts; the female follows.”33  This gender inequality was highlighted in the six rites 
of matrimony. The ceremony on the wedding day was especially aimed at establishing 
the young wife in her position. From the moment the groom went in person to fetch the 
bride, every move performed by the new couple illustrated their fixed gender roles in the 
marriage: 
The bridegroom himself stands by (the carriage of the bride), and hands to her the 
strap (to assist her in mounting), showing his affection. Having that affection, he 
seeks to bring her near to him. It was by such reverence and affection for their 
wives that the ancient kings obtained the kingdom. In passing out from the great 
gate (of her father’s house), he proceeds, and she follows, and with this the right 
relation between husband and wife commences. The woman follows (and obeys) 
the man: in her youth, she follows her father and elder brother; when married, she 
follows her husband; when her husband is dead, she follows her son, ‘man’ 
denotes supporter. A man by his wisdom should (be able to) lead others.34 
Accordingly, the fundamental purpose of positing a wife in her deferential obedience was 
to secure internal harmony and thus to secure the long continuance of the family line. 
                                                 
31 Baihu tong, in Images of Women, 174 
32 Ti Yen-Hui, “Divorce in Traditional Chinese Law ”, in Chinese Family Law and Social Change, 75-106: 76. 
33 Baihu tong, in Images of Women, 171. 
34 Ibid. 
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2.1.3 The Affection between Father and Son: Parental Order 
In the Confucian family scheme, the paramount li is filial piety.  In this concept, the 
meanings of family relationships, duty and honor were all tied directly to the concept of 
the patrilineal line, from father to son, son to grandson. Having no care for familial 
posterity was considered one of the worst offences to correct filial behavior.35 The 
greatest significance of a marriage, in this sense, is in how it served to consciously 
perpetuate the family line.  As the Liji described, “to secure the services in the ancestral 
temple” and “to secure the continuance of the family line” were the ultimate goals of a 
successful union.36 Marriage under the empire was an act performed by families, not by 
individuals.  
One of the most conspicuous expressions of the authority and affection of Chinese 
parents was the privilege and duty of arranging marriages for their children.  As Mencius 
asserted: “when a man is born his parents hope he will find a wife; when a woman is born 
her parents hope she will find a husband. All parents feel like this.”37 The arrangement of 
a marriage was such a significant family matter that ideally all marriage decisions were 
made using extra caution and discretion, and the old generation was worshipped for their 
superior wisdom and experience on such matters.  
Under the norm of filial piety, which required children’s absolute obedience to their 
parents, sons and daughters had no right to refuse the life partners selected by their 
parents or the acting family head. This rule was repeatedly reinforced by the dynastic 
codes. For example, the Qing code says that marriage should be controlled by the parents 
or the grandparents of those supposed to get married. Those who married on their own 
would be punished under the charge of disobedience to parental instructions.38 A marital 
decision, in the context of filial piety, was not a matter of love or an individual’s choice 
of a life partner, but was rather an issue chiefly concerning obligations and 
                                                 
35 Mencius, The Works of Mencius, in The Four Books, trans. James Legge (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp. 
1966), 725. 
36 Liji, 2: 428. 
37 Mencius, trans. Bryan Can Norden, in Images of Women, 103. 
38 Da Qing Lü Li, Article 101.01, quoted in Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China: Exemplified by 
190 Ch’ing Dynasty Cases (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), 254-255. 
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responsibilities, obedience and disobedience. As Sommer perceives through his critical 
examination of the legal cases of the Qing, “in China, marriage rites symbolized not the 
free will of individual souls exercised before an omniscient God, but rather the 
submission of maturing children to family roles and filial duty.”39  
In traditional Chinese literature, there were many romantic love stories in which free love 
secretly escaped parental control.40 In the tales, a young man (often a scholar or potential 
candidate for the Civil Examinations) and a beautiful girl (often a daughter of a wealthy 
or political powerful family) fell in love after a short encounter. With the help of a 
servant, often a maiden of the bride, they exchanged love poems, letters and decorative 
items, set secret dates in backyards, and even developed sexual relationships. The stories, 
presented as tragedies, often ended with the betrayal of one party (usually the male) and 
the death of the other. In those rarer examples with happy endings, such as Xixiang ji 西
厢记[Romance of the West Chamber], the two lovers, after a temporary period of 
separation and suffering, would finally get their parents’ consent for marriage and live 
happily ever after. Such narratives were so popular during the Ming and Qing period that 
one might be easily misled into believing that free love was appreciated in pre-modern 
China, if one’s opinion were based solely on such accounts.  
This kind of story was often the creation of male writers making a living by producing 
love fantasies. The readers of these works were mostly young single male scholars. There 
were female readers of these stories, but not many. On the one hand, the official support 
behind the cult of “women’s ignorance” and their almost universal illiteracy excluded 
females from any significant reading group. On the other hand, for the educated elite 
women who were literate, such stories were prohibited from their inner chambers, being 
viewed by those in charge as vulgar, degrading and misleading. As Jiamu 贾母 [the 
                                                 
39 Sommer, 39. 
40 While  the term “free love” is defined in many English sources as “the idea or practice of having sexual relations 
according to choice, without being restricted by marriage or long-term relationships” 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_love), the “free love” used in this dissertation is adherent to its Chinese 
interpretation: ziyou lian’ai 自由恋爱, which was created by the Chinese social reformers in the early twentieth 
century in challenging the traditional arranged marriage system.  Therefore, the term “free love” used here refers to  
“a love feeling naturally grows between a man and a woman without the interference from the third party”. 
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dowager Lady Jia], a main character in Cao Xueqin's (曹雪芹 1724-1764) Honglou meng 
红楼梦 [Dream of the Red Chamber] commented: “They abuse people's daughters in 
every possible way, and then they still term them nice pretty girls. They're so concocted 
that there's not even a semblance of truth in them.”41  
Free love between two youths, no matter how fully it was felt by the two parties, could 
never trump the parental authority in making a marriage contract. Sometimes, young men 
and women were willing to let their parents know of someone they were attracted to as a 
potential spouse. Without parental permission, however, this love match would be 
blessed by neither law nor custom. Although some parents might consult with their 
children, it was more a gesture of affection than a will to transfer filial rights. Education 
instilling the spirit of obedience weighed so heavily upon the attitudes of the youth that 
children in the early twentieth century were still lacking the courage to reject a marriage 
imposed on them by their parents. As Tan Shih-hua, a college student in the 1920s 
explained: “It was not in vain that since my babyhood I had been taught good manners by 
my uncle, my grandmother, my teachers, and my mother, whose last words were: ‘Never 
fight, Shih-hua.’”42 
However, students in this field should keep in mind the fact that a parent’s authority in 
arranging marriage was accepted by most children as a matter of course. In pre-modern 
China, people were not taught to expect to gain love and happiness from marriage. The 
goal of  any official union was not for personal satisfaction but rather for the continuation 
of the family and of the “stream of life.” Under the dual influence of social ethics and 
legal jurisdiction, the attitude of children towards this power relationship was generally 
not antagonistic. Coercion existed, but only in a few cases.43   
                                                 
41 Cao Xueqin, Honglou meng (Dream of the Red Chamber), chapter 54. Translated by H. Bencract Joly H.B.M. 1891. 
http://www.woyouxian.com/b06/b060402/hlmen_en125.html (eBooks@Adelaide 2009) . 
42 Sergei M. Tretiakov, The Chinese Testament, New York, 1934, 187. Quoted in Lang, 292. 
43 M. J. Meijer, Marriage Law and Policy: In the Chinese People’s Republic (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press, 1971), 87. 
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2.1.4 No Matchmaker, No Marriage  
Gender separation is an important concept inherent in Confucian ethics. These teachings 
demanded boys and girls be separated when they reached the age of seven, on the 
understanding that sexual pleasure is one thing that men greatly desire and the natural 
urges between male and female are unparalleled after the age of sexual maturity has been 
reached.44 People believed “whenever there is licentiousness, it is produced from men 
and women not being separated.”45 The ideal pro-marriage gender relation described in 
the Liji was “male and female, without the intervention of the matchmaker, do not know 
each other’s name.”46 Seeing as the main goal of a marriage for most people was to 
produce pure-blooded descendants for ancestor worship, premarital sex and adultery were 
considered especially heinous and a threat to the patrilineal family order. Thus, love 
without a matchmaker’s interference was illicit under any circumstances. Mencius 
suggested “those who do not wait for the command of their parents or the words of a 
matchmaker--and instead bore holes through walls to peep at one another, and jump over 
fences to run off together—are despised by parents and everyone else in their states.”47 
The strict gender separation made the role of matchmaker so imperative that their words 
carried import equal to that of the parents in making a marital decision. As Han 
Confucians specified in Baihu Tong: 
Why is it that males and females do not marry on their own initiative, but defer 
to their parents and wait for a go-between? This is to avoid shame and hinder 
licentiousness. It is said in the Odes: ‘How do we proceed in taking a wife? 
Announcement must first be made to our parents. ’ It is also said: ‘How do we 
proceed in taking a wife? Without a go-between it cannot be done’.48 
Among the six steps of matrimony, divination was an essential part that decided whether 
or not a match was blessed.49  In this way, marriage was viewed as a predestined match 
                                                 
44 Baihu tong, in Images of Women, 171. 
45 Yili 仪礼, trans. Jack L. Dull, in Chinese Family Law and Social Change, 44. 
46 Liji: Quli 曲礼, in The Sacred Books of China, vol.4: The Texts of Confucianism, ed. F. Max Mueller, trans. James 
Legge, http://www.sacred-texts.com/cfu/liki/liki01.htm. 
47 Mencius, in Images of Women, 103. 
48 Baihu tong, in Images of Women, 172. 
49 The six steps of a formal matrimony further suggested a devout belief in the divinity of marriage. When the 
information of the boy was brought to the girl’s family as the first step of na cai, his name and birth time [shengchen 
bazi] would be read by a diviner [he bazi 合八字] who was able to predict whether or not the two parties matched. 
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arranged by a yue lao 月老 [an old man under the moon], a divine matchmaker who tied 
the feet of a future husband and wife with “the red cord”.50 This blessing would be 
testified to by the matched shengchen bazi 生辰八字 [name and birth time of the two 
parties], if their marriage was predestined. The real life matchmaker, who was also called 
a go-between, performed a dual role as either ritual performer or marriage negotiator (and 
sometimes both). Their duties included initiating a marital negotiation at the request of 
the future groom’s parents, going between the two families for opinion exchanges, 
helping to prepare and send betrothal gifts when the consent is obtained from the bride’s 
parents (or the family head in charge), witnessing the signing of marriage documents, 
arranging the wedding date and finally accompanying the groom to fetch his bride. With 
full participation in the marriage arrangement, the matchmaker was expected to secure 
the separation between man and woman before the wedding and to guarantee a marriage 
that conformed to the principle of li and the statutes of law.  
The matchmaker’s participation in marriage arrangement had been well-recognized as 
early as the Western Zhou period (1100BC-771BC). The response to the question, “How 
do we proceed in taking a wife? Without a go-between it cannot be done” from Shijing 诗
经 [The Book of Poetry] 51, illustrates how official positions were set to take charge of 
people’s marriage from a very early period in Chinese history.52 Although mei as an 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Similar procedures would apply to the girl in the rite of na ji, after detailed information about her was presented to 
the boy’s family in the second step of wenming. If the outcome of the divination was auspicious, which signified this 
marriage would become a blessed one, the marital contract would then be settled. The next steps would be the 
presentation of betrothal gift (na zheng) and diving for a good wedding date (qing qi). If the diving outcome was 
ominous, the marital proposal would be immediately rejected. See Zheng Xuan 郑玄, Jia Gong Yan 贾公彦(Tang), 
Yili zhushu 仪礼注疏(Beijing:Beijing University Press, 1999), juan 4, p. 60. 
50 The earliest record of yuelao is in Li Fuyan 李复言, “Ding Hun Dian 订婚殿”, Xu xuanguai lu 续玄怪录, quoted in 
Patricia Buckley Ebrey,The Inner Quarters: Marriage and the Lives of Chinese Women in the Sung Period 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1993), 56-57. 
51 “The Odes of Ts’e: Nanshan”, in Shijing (The Book of Poetry), trans. James Legge (Shanghai: Zhonghua Shuju, 
1931), 157. 
52 According to Zhouli 周礼 (Rites of Zhou), there were three official positions in the category of diguan[地官 the earth 
official] who might be responsible for marriage management: dasitu[大司徒 the grand minister], meishi[媒氏
matchmaker] and suiren [遂人 village magistrate]. One of the duties of dasitu was to “teach people with the ritual of 
marriage and people will not resent. He was also responsible for encouraging people to get married during the 
famine years for the sake of population growth. Meishi, is an official arranger of people’s marriages. Officials in this 
category recorded the name and birthday of people who reached the adulthood and thus ensured that men would get 
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official position disappeared from the court system following the Han dynasty, some 
matchmakers were still required to officially register marriages, especially for those who 
acted as go betweens for the royal families and upper social classes.53 The marriage of 
commoners largely relied on the simei 私媒, the private matchmaker, who worked as a 
go-between on either a full-time professional or part- time provisional basis. 
Before the Tang dynasty, the necessity of a matchmaker in marriage was a social custom, 
rather than a law.  Still, as far as it was promoting ethics, the de facto marriage was 
possibly still recognized with the considerations of the continuation of the ancestral line 
and ensuring women’s chastity.54 As a result of growing official interests in 
Confucianism from the Tang dynasty down to the end of the imperial era, the 
participation of a proper matchmaker in making a marriage arrangement was 
continuously codified in the dynastic law.55  Even when two families decided on a nuptial 
match together, a go-between was needed for formal communication. A marriage 
document signed without the presence and witness of a matchmaker was considered 
illegitimate by law.56 In this kind of case, the matchmaker would be punished for the 
unlawful marriage, along with the principal offenders, under the charge of misconduct.57 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
married before thirty and women before twenty. All marriages, births and divorces should be recorded by them, so 
that they could arrange marriages for the widows and widowers. Meishi also took in charge of the amount of 
betrothal gift, and to make sure it was not too much a burden for people. Suiren, as the local magistrate in charge of 
the village fairs, had as one of his primary duties to arrange his people’s marriages. 
53 Yuan dianzhang: Hubu 元典章：户部 [Yuan Code-Household], quoted from Rui Dongli 芮东莉, “The Historical 
Evolvement about Matchmaker in the Ancient Times of China” 中国古代“媒”的嬗变, Journal of Southwest Jiao 
Tong University[Social Science edition], vol.4, no.5(September, 2003): 69-72. 
54 Such an example was provided in Shiji: Sima Xiangru liezhuan 史记：司马相如列传[Record of history-Biography 
of Sima Xiangru]. In this story, Sima Xiangru allured Zhuo Wenjun 卓文君, a daughter of local rich man, and had 
her elope with him. Although their marriage did not get her parents’ consent or a matchmaker’s intervention, it was 
recognized later by both families.  
55 In Tanglü:huhun 唐律：户婚[Tang Code: Household and Marriage], it was stipulated that “matchmaker is required 
for any marriage making”. For a more detailed discussion see Zhangsun Wuji 长孙无忌, Tanglü Shuyi: Huhun lü 唐
律疏议：户婚律[Discussion on Tang Legal Code- Household and Marriage], juan 13, Lü 195. 
56 Gao Zhanxiang 高占祥, Meiren 媒人[Matchmaker] (Jinan: Shandong Jiaoyu chubanshe, 1999),74-76 
57 The ritual code of the Song stipulated that “those married against laws will be charged as offenders against ethical 
system, the direct family members and the matchmaker should be punished similarly, and cannot be absolved”, in 
Songshi 宋史 [History of Song], juan 68. A similar article can also be found in The Great Ming Code: Da Ming Lü, 
Article 6.18, 84; The Great Qing Code, Article 117, 135-136. 
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The professional matchmaker, however, was often regarded as unreliable and 
untrustworthy. Yuan Cai 袁采 (?-1195), a Song scholar and official, instructed parents 
not to put too much credence in what the matchmakers said: 
Matchmakers deceive the girl’s family by saying the boy does not seek a full 
complement of dowry presents and in fact will help in outfitting the bride. They 
deceive the boy’s family by promising generous transfer of goods, and they make 
up a figure without any basis in fact. If the parties simply believe what the 
matchmaker says and go through with the marriage, each side will accuse the 
other of dishonesty and the husband and wife will quarrel. There are even cases 
where the final result is divorce.58 
It was only if a family could not find a good marriage prospect through personal 
connections that they turned to a professional matchmaker and took his (or her) word as 
equal to that of the parents, though the matchmakers were almost always described as 
greedy profiteers who abused their position for personal gain.59 Until the Republican era, 
anecdotes about deceptive matchmakers were still commonplace.  One widespread 
example was a sensational story of an over-forty-year-old tailor in Suzhou who paid more 
than half of his property to a matchmaker who promised to find him a good-looking 
young bride. It was only after fetching the bride to his home that this poor groom found 
he had actually married a girl made of straw.60 The commonly perceived lack of 
credibility of professional matchmakers made many families resort to relying on advice 
from friends or relatives who volunteered to play the role themselves. They were always 
the most reliable negotiators, who generally knew more about the conditions and 
requirements of both families and sometimes even considered the intentions of the 
principal marrying parties. In the last years of the Qing dynasty, for instance, it was said 
that all the good marriages of the gentry families in the Jiangnan area were made by 
matchmakers who were relatives of the brides. 61 
Accordingly, considering that free and open cross-sex socialization was impossible or 
unavailable to potential matches and that paramount importance was continuously placed 
                                                 
58 Yuan Cai, Yuan shi shifan 袁氏示范, quoted in Ebrey, The Inner Quarters, 74. 
59 Gao Zhanxiang,131-146. 
60 Originally see in Dianshizhai huabao 点石斋画报. Quoted in Gao Zhanxiang, 169-170. 
61 Originally see in Wuyuan xianzhi (Guangxu) 婺源县志（光绪朝）, juan 3. Quoted in Chen Peng, 68. 
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on the perpetuation of the family line, the unions that a matchmaker made were seldom 
based on affection, but rather on the relations of husband and wife. Anxious parents, 
looking forward to having grandchildren have been a constant feature of Chinese society 
from the earliest times.  Therefore, the matchmaker as a social phenomenon instead of as 
a profession, transcended time, space and political systems, and became one of the 
deepest-rooted social customs in China.  
2.2 The Love Bond of Two Families: Criteria and Choice 
According to the ritual teaching of the Liji, an ideal marriage should seek to establish “a 
bond of love between two families.”62 This goal made marriage decision-making an 
occasion for thinking tactically and for balancing many considerations, a process which 
involved much more complicated and utilitarian matters than the nature and behavior of 
the bride and groom. While affectionate parents often saw themselves as choosing a good 
spouse for their children, they had very different definitions from their children as to 
what constituted an acceptable match. For the individual, acceptable could mean a 
beautiful and virtuous wife, or an affectionate and handsome husband who could bring 
marital happiness to the partner; for parents or the marriage-makers of a family, however, 
acceptable matches should primarily come from “good families”, from whom they could 
achieve political, social or financial benefits in the short or long term. Therefore, the 
parents’ search for a talented son-in-law or a bride was naturally a search for a “good 
family”.  
What was a “good family”? The answer found in the original Confucian text is “a family 
that possesses humanity and righteousness.”63 When put into practice, this standard 
seems too ambiguous and oversimplified. A “good family” was a comprehensive, 
inflexible and conditional conception, which was defined and re-defined constantly in 
accordance with the immediate or long-term needs of the marital decision-makers at the 
different social levels. In imperial China, where social and economic privileges, wealth 
and honor were bound tightly with political power and social hierarchy, the search for a 
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“good family” was often utilized by ambitious parents in order to seek improvements in 
familial reputation and honor, potential political allies, career promotion or judiciary 
protection.  
2.2.1 Criteria of “Good People” 
Sima Guang 司马光(1019-1086) suggested that people make a marital decision based on 
the following grounds: “the first importance is to examine the nature and behavior of the 
future bride and groom, as well as the family background of each side. Don’t only think 
of the riches and honor.” 64  He argued that no one could predict whether or not a poor but 
wise groom could develop his own riches and honor some day, nor could one assert that a 
wealthy but arrogant bride might not become the root of a family’s decline. The purpose 
of this instruction was to warn people not to be short-sighted in choosing spouses for 
their children, and to take talent and virtue of the prospects into critical consideration. 
The theoretical criteria for an individual “good spouse” were not as complicated as those 
for a “good family.”  As Ban Zhao 班昭 (45-117) suggested in her Nü Jie 女诫 [Lessons 
for Women], “Man is honored for strength; a woman is beautiful on account of her 
gentleness.”65 In general, the ideal bride’s first attraction to her husband and his family 
should be her virtue, and then her working capability. She must be a perfect performer of 
“San Cong Si De” 三从四德 or “the three obediences and the four virtues,”66 which 
ensured that she would be a loyal wife, a wise mother, an obedient daughter-in-law, a 
well-trained household manager, virtuous, decent, cautious with words,  diligent at work, 
and whole heartedly devoted to her husband and his family.67  
In daily life, a woman’s obedience was especially appreciated. A good wife should first 
recognize her inferiority to her husband, and thus make her husband feel respected and 
admired. Obedience in Chinese women was such an attractive quality to men that it 
                                                 
64 Quoted in Zhu Xi, Zhuzi quanshu, 7: 895.  
65 Ban Zhao, Pan Chao: Foremost Woman Scholar of China, trans., Nancy Lee Swann (New York: Century Co., 1968), 
82-90. 
66 “Three obediences” means to be obedient to father before marriage, to husband after marriage, to son after the death 
of husband. Morality, proper speech, modest manner and diligent work were the “four virtues” required for women. 
67 Ban Zhao, in Pan Chao, 82-100. 
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continued being the most attractive quality in a potential mate for men throughout the 
pre-modern era.  One man described how he indulged in this superior feeling over his 
wife in the early twentieth century: 
Accordingly among scholars I cut a poor figure. I am timid, and my voice plays 
me false in gatherings of men. But to my footbound wife, confined for life to her 
house, except when I bear her in my arms to her palanquin, my stride is heroic, 
my voice is that of a roaring lion, my wisdom is of the sages. To her I am the 
world; I am life itself.68  
Another virtue Ban Zhao suggested was vital for a good wife is in being “middle”, which 
she defined as never revealing personal emotions, especially feelings of love, which was 
considered a sign of licentiousness: 
If husband and wife have the habit of staying together, never leaving one 
another, and following each other around within the limited space of their own 
rooms, then they will lust after and take liberties with one another. From such 
action improper language will arise between the two. This kind of discussion 
may lead to licentiousness. But of licentiousness will be born a heart of 
disrespect to the husband. Such a result comes from not knowing that one should 
stay in one's proper place.69  
As for physical appearance, according to Ban Zhao it theoretically should never be an 
important consideration in making a marriage decision. It had been long a tradition of 
Chinese literature to call beautiful women huoshui 祸水, or ‘the source of trouble.’ The 
man who allowed himself to become emotionally involved with a beautiful woman was 
often criticized as fatuous and lascivious. Outside of the official doctrine, however, a 
woman’s appearance was very important. In fictional stories, a glance at a delicate young 
beauty could be enough to make a man lose interest in anything beyond pursuing her. In 
real life, being good looking was widely accepted as an advantage for any woman in 
marriage negotiations.  
Women’s education, however, was never a compulsory requirement due to a general 
belief that ‘a woman without talent is a woman of virtue.’ Throughout the imperial era, 
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the only works that women were permitted to read were virtue-teaching textbooks.70 
While literate women were preferred partners among the elite circle, with the chief 
consideration for their role as wise mothers, they were sometimes despised by those who 
asserted that “it was easier for literary women to become the subjects of illicit 
intercourse.”71 
The ideal groom, in theory, should be close to the consummation of his Confucian 
learning before the wedding. He would be expected to seek a career that could eventually 
bring improved reputation, honor and wealth to his family. He should be a responsible 
husband, a strict father, an obedient son, loyal follower of his supervisors, talented, 
decent, upright, diligent and strong-minded.72 Many young women, knowing that 
marriage was a lifelong commitment and that voicing grievances of an unhappy marriage 
would easily gain one a bad reputation for disobedience, preferred to find a husband that 
was known to them, such as cousins with different surnames or a boy from the same 
neighborhood. For a daughter, marriage with a cousin or someone well known to her 
family meant entering a network of women she knew, where her parents might continue 
to use their kin relations to monitor her fate and protect her interests.73 
Although daughters were often willing to let their parents know when they found 
someone they were attracted to as a potential spouse, the divergence between child and 
parents in defining “good people” was often sharp. The parents, in favor of hypergamy, 
seldom asked whether their daughter would be personally disadvantaged by marrying 
into a prominent family far away or by becoming the second wife of a man fifteen years 
her senior. They believed that a marriage into a “good family” worked to the betterment 
of both child and parents, regardless of the actual match itself. The bitterness of daughters 
made miserable through such matches was heard now and then throughout pre-modern 
                                                 
70 Volumes of textbooks were produced and printed to teach “san cong si de”. General readings for women include: Liu 
Xiang’s Lie nü zhuan 列女传[The Biographies of Chinese Women], Bao Zhao’s Nü jie[Lessons for Women], Mrs. 
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China.  As Qiu Jin 秋瑾 (1875-1907) , the heroine of an anti-Manchu revolution, 
numerated: 
…when a girl reaches the marrying age, her marriage will be arranged simply 
upon the word of two shameless matchmakers. The only concern [of her parents] 
is whether the groom’s family is wealthy and powerful enough. [They] care 
nothing about the family’s reputation, neither the groom’s personality nor his 
education…a bride who unfortunately married a bad guy can do nothing, but 
complain of her bad luck… 74 
2.2.2 Matched Door: The Politicized Love Bond 
In any period of Chinese history, the concept of “matched door” [mendanghudui 门当户
对] was always an indispensable element in making one’s family good enough to become 
a marketable commodity. It was generally believed that the best matches could only come 
from those families of similar background, property and socio-political status, which 
ensured shared common ground and interests between the two families and the two 
parties. However, like the definition of a “good family”, the parameters of the “matched 
door” were never a fixed conception. 
Before the Song dynasty, when the aristocratic elite class had unparalleled privileges in 
every aspect of life, a family’s worth was most defined by its ancestry, which was closely 
related to its blood and origins. Establishing a “matched family background” was 
officially advocated at that time as “a marriage principle that was established by our 
ancestors and should not be violated.”75 Marriage, like dresses, costumes, food and 
decorations, was a mark of one’s social rank and taste. Studies of marriages from the late 
Han to the Tang periods have shown that the highest-ranking families married within 
their own ranks as much as possible, and used such marriages as markers of status.76 
The enthusiasm for finding a potential family with matched noble-blooded ancestry 
gradually faded after the Tang dynasty, when marriages between the old aristocratic 
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families were consistently constricted. From the Song dynasty onward, individuals who 
scored in the top percentile of the Imperial Examination, who accumulated reputation and 
wealth through their official performance and merit, emerged as a new elite class. This 
transition contributed to a fundamental change in marriage politics. In the Song and 
subsequent dynastic context, a “good family” was defined more by official rank, political 
reputation and economic power than by blood and origin. However, the concept of 
“matched doors” was still popular among elite families, although ancestry had stopped 
being a primary concern.  This tradition continued until the end of the Qing dynasty. In 
Wuyuan xianzhi 婺源县志 [Gazetteer of Wuyuan county] record keepers recorded that in 
the Guangxu years (r.1875-1908), the gentry families in Jiangnian “emphasized ancestry, 
ignored betrothal gifts and dowries…there was no luxurious wedding feast.”77 
For ordinary people, the most symbolically desirable catch for one’s daughter was a 
talented young man who had potential for doing well in the Civil Examination. 
Conventionally, it was the duty of the groom’s family to initiate a marriage negotiation. 
However, when the image of the ideal son-in-law transitioned from a man of noble blood 
into a man who would rise to hold an important government office, the bride’s family 
often took the lead in initiating a marriage proposal; this initiative was especially true 
when the bride’s family had certain economic advantages over the groom’s. More than a 
few stories were told about how a poor but intelligent scholar was fortuitously chosen to 
become the son-in-law of a rich man. For instance, one such narrative was recorded in a 
Qing short stories selection entitled San Yi Bi Tan 三异笔谈[Notes on the Strange 
Stories]. In the tale, Wang Shiyu 王侍御, poor and without family lineage, was a private 
teacher of a rich family of Yao. One night, the Yao master accidentally found that there 
were two lanterns in front of Wang when he was walking alone in a field. The image of 
two lanterns was regarded by Yao as a portent of a bright future, so the master 
immediately sent his matchmaker to initiate a marriage negotiation with Wang’s uncle. 
Although Yao’s proposal was declined at first due to the excuse of “unmatched doors,” 
and attracted mockery from his neighbors, he persisted and finally won Wang as his son-
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in-law. Yao’s foresight was proved valid in later years by the fact that Wang succeeded in 
the Civil Examination and became a high official as shiyu 侍御[imperial censor], which 
led to the Wang family’s lasting prosperity.78  
A perfectly matched marriage was often praised as “a beautiful bond of Qin and Jin” 
[qinjinzhihao 秦晋之好]. This idiom was derived from a frequent martial alliance made 
between the two states of Qin and Jin of the Eastern Zhou period.79 In fact, this saying 
testified to the tenet that a perfect marriage was in the first place a political marriage that 
managed to establish a love bond between two political groups. In the context of late 
imperial China, highlighted by the constant bloody feuding between different political 
factions, binding two groups through marriage was widely employed as a strategy by 
ambitious politicians in order to cement allied powers. Marriages among the members of 
a political clique became a precondition of the formation of such a clique and 
subsequently a confirmation of political dependence among the clique members. As 
Chinese historian Chen Peng concluded in his cornerstone work on Chinese traditional 
marriage, “throughout China’s marriage history, most upper-level marriages, ranging 
from royal family members to the scholar-official [shidafu 士大夫] class, were made on 
political motives.”80 
Certainly, not all families demanding “matched doors” were pursuing a marriage of 
convenience. Many less ambitious parents were actually inclined to find prospects among 
their existing relatives, such as the paternal sister’s children or maternal brother’s or 
sister’s children, for sake of kinship expansion. Such marriages probably occurred at all 
social levels.  Both the Ming and Qing legal codes included an article that banned 
marrying daughters of one’s own paternal aunts or the daughters of one’s maternal uncles 
or aunts. In such cases, the punishment for violating the law was 80 strokes of the heavy 
stick.81 However, disobedience of these laws was so common that the Qing government 
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had to assent to a compromise.  The Qing code includes a comment in the legal statute 
next to this article instructing the local judges that “in dealing with the case of a marriage 
between different-surname cousins, it is better to follow the common custom [and leave 
the offenders unpunished]”.82 
For affectionate parents, expecting happiness for their children, matching family 
background and social status often indicated parallel education and economic conditions 
that might constitute the common ground and interests of the two parties, which were 
recognized as critical to a family’s harmony. 
2.2.3 Monetary Marriage: The Commercialized Love Bond 
The arranged marriage pattern is called “monetary marriage” [caihun 财婚] in many 
sources due to the role economic concerns played in making a marriage contract. At the 
ritual level, people were taught that “unless the marriage presents have been received, 
there should be no communication or affection between [the two parties].”83 The 
presentation of betrothal presents was then a universal practice that marked the final step 
of the marriage negotiation. In general, the betrothal gift was considered more essential 
than a dowry because it served as both proof of the credit of the groom’s family and also 
as a bride price paid to the bride’s family as compensation for meeting the expense of her 
upbringing and now losing her labor.   
Confucian scholars always frowned at people’s natural greed, especially when talking of 
marriage. For example, Sima Guang saw greediness for transient wealth and rank running 
rampant among prospective parents-in-law and identified negotiating dowries as a 
distinctly vulgar act.  He criticized families for “treating their daughter as an item in a 
sales transaction” by drawing up “a contract saying ‘such goods, in such numbers, such 
goods, in such numbers,’” pointing out that “these were actually the methods used by 
brokers dealing in male and female bondservants.”84 Unfortunately, for those parents 
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with no long-term expectation for family harmony, ethical doctrines were much less 
attractive than the economic profit promised by a prudent match. By the Qing dynasty, 
this tendency had developed into social custom. Qing scholar Zhao Yi 赵翼 (1727-1814) 
observed how the value of the betrothal gifts and dowry were often the central issue 
discussed in a marriage negotiation: “all marriages concerned and bargained with 
presents and money, it is a rather common phenomenon that surprised nobody.”85 
Behind the Confucian doctrinal loathing for economically motivated marital choices was 
the practical realization that an over-charge of betrothal or dowry prices generally 
prevented people who could not afford the expense of a wife from continuing their family 
lines. The demand for a wife and then male descendents sometimes pushed the monetary 
marriage pattern into an extreme form, such as the case of leased wives [Dianqi 典妻], 
which formed a major black market for wives of the lower classes. For a poor family, 
desperate for food and life supplies, leasing a wife to another man was sometimes 
perceived as the only choice of the husband. Most renters were single poor men who 
could not afford the price of a normal betrothal. To rent a temporary wife in order to 
continue the family line was their only choice for fathering a male descendent. In these 
situations, a lease was necessary and the term could range from a half-year to three years, 
according to the first husband’s will. When the term was expired, the wife would either 
be returned to her original husband or the term could be extended if the second husband 
requested and the first husband agreed.     
Wife leasing had a long history in China from the Southern and Northern dynasties into 
the Republican era,86 although the custom was theoretically a direct violation of neo-
Confucian ethics, which taught that “starving to death is a very minor matter; losing 
one’s chastity is a matter of the greatest importance”.87 On legal grounds, it was in fact 
considered a situation of de facto bigamy. From the Yuan to Qing periods, it was 
continually banned by the legal codes. The penalty for violating this law varied from a 
verbal warning to a beating and betrothal confiscation. However, the weight of legal 
                                                 
85 Zhao Yi, Nian er shi zhaji 廿二史札记(Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), juan15, 317. 
86 Fan Jing, 129-130. 
87 Cheng I 程颐, Ercheng ji 二程集, juan 25. Translated in Ebrey, The Inner Quarters, 199. 
  
44
concerns was negligible in the face of the more heavy filial piety custom: compromises 
had to constantly be made in the juridical practices of pre-modern China.88 
The considerations of political and economic interests constituted the two major elements 
of thinking on arranged marriages, which both required precise calculation and cool-
headed negotiation. They were always closely linked.  When a marital decision was made 
on the basis of matched political grounds, a great deal of money was presented by each 
side in the form of betrothal gifts and dowry respectively. This was done for both sides as 
a display of political and economic strength, a declaration of the credit and loyalty 
towards the marital bondage and as a requirement of the public recognition of the 
alliance. For those families seeking to match based on economic grounds, a marriage 
arrangement was conducted more like a commercial trade between seller and buyer than 
as a love bond between two families; economic profit and reproduction concerns were at 
the center of such negotiations. 
2.2.4 The Marriage Age: Ideally, Legally and Practically 
In order to enlarge the population of the Chinese empire, and to reasonably balance the 
needs and supplies of the source of women in their populations, dynastic rulers kept 
urging parents to be “diligent in [arranging] marriages for your children.”89 Commonly, 
the approach started when a son or a daughter came close to reaching the marriage age. 
However, there have always been perceivable gaps between the ideal age, the legal age 
and the actual age. According to the ideal life course described in Liji, a man is ready for 
marriage at the age of twenty, after he is capped, and should obtain a wife before turning 
thirty.  A woman is considered ready at fifteen, after being hair-pinned, and should be 
married out before she is twenty-three.90 However, the legal marriage age adopted by the 
dynastic law-makers seldom kept up with this ideal. In general, the earliest marriage age 
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poverty or illness, which gave the husband no alternative, or when the wife had no natal family to go to, she might be 
permitted to remain with the second husband and the first husband was not required to surrender the betrothal price 
paid to him (Bodde and Morris, 428-429). 
89 Baihu tong, in Images of Women, 171. 
90 Baihu tong, in Images of Women, 175. 
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once officially declared was fifteen for a man and thirteen for a woman; the latest ages 
individuals could marry was legally set at thirty for man and twenty for a woman.91  
In actual practice, people’s marriage age varied widely in accordance with their social 
and economical status. Both late and early marriages were common. Although the 
dynastic governments from the Yuan to Qing periods consistently banned people from 
engaging their children at a very young age (or sometimes even before they were born) 
by establishing the legal age for man and woman to organize a marriage, this article was 
largely considered a mere scrap of paper in most cases. 92  The custom of child betrothal 
and adopting daughter’s in-law was the most common method employed by rural families 
to locate a wife when the source of potential women was not sufficient. Many adopted 
girls were sold by their natal families in return for food and money, despite the well-
known recognition that an adopted-daughter’s status in her future husband’s family was 
sometimes little better than that of a slave. Child betrothal was also popular among the 
upper classes as marriages among the members of a political clique became a 
confirmation of the political interdependence of the clique members.  In such cases, some 
ambitious politicians in need of an ally could not wait for their children to grow up or 
even to be born before purchasing loyalty in such a manner.  
2.3 The Rectitude between Ruler and Minister: Marriage in 
the Official Policies 
In imperial China, political order was complimentary to the hierarchy of the patriarchal 
family.  When a ruler received the Mandate of Heaven, he became the symbolic parent of 
his people and the sovereign of all under the sky, who ruled the state as the family head 
ruled a household.93 Like all parents, it was a ruler’s responsibility to broaden his 
people’s progeny. From a very early period in history until the late Qing period, Chinese 
                                                 
91 Both Tang and Song encouraged early marriage. The lowest legal marriage age (15 for man, 13 for woman) was 
declared by the emperor Xuanzong of Tang, which was followed by the Song rulers. The founder of Ming improved 
the legal marriage age to sixteen for man, fourteen for woman. This standard was followed by the Qing rulers until 
the twentieth century.(See Chen Peng, 384-385.)  
92 Da Qing Lü Li, Juan 10, lü: No.101, Li: No. 390, 218. 
93 Shangshu: Hongfan 尚书：洪范[the Book of Documents: Great Plan], trans. James Legge ( Sacred Books of the 
East: 1861), Vol. 3. http://ctext.org/shang-shu/great-plan (accessed in 2006) 
  
46
rulers promoted policies that urged parents to “be diligent in [arranging] marriages for 
your children” for the sake of population growth.94 These edicts followed the Confucian 
admonishment toward rulers, “it would be a great shame for a superior man if he be 
charged with the care of a large territory, and the people be not correspondingly 
numerous.”95 This responsibility was applied to all similar parent-child relations. The 
Qing code, for instance, stipulated that the master who failed to marry out his maid at her 
proper age would receive 80 blows of the heavy stick.96 
In the same spirit, a local magistrate who was respected as a fumu guan 父母官 [parental 
official] might possibly overrule the parental authority in arranging marriages for singles 
within his jurisdiction, if he felt the necessity to enhance population growth.  This kind of 
act would be considered as an important achievement in his political career by the 
dynastic court. In China’s historical records, marriages initiated by county magistrates 
were numerous.97 Sometimes, a superior official would volunteer to play matchmaker for 
his subordinates or their children, which was considered a gesture of father-like affection. 
A marriage proposed by a superior or by the emperor himself was never easy to decline 
or dissolve, just as it was almost impossible for a child to refuse a parent-arranged 
marriage. Furthermore, in the context of late imperial China, which was highlighted by 
constant bloody feuding between different political factions, a marriage proposed by a 
superior official was seldom a simple matching of two mates.  Under most circumstances, 
when a superior proposed a marriage with his subordinates, what he actually expected 
was a political deal for their loyalty, support, and military power.98 
Sommer identified that the framework of sexual orthodoxy throughout the imperial era 
was an ideology of social control that was inclined to link personal relationships to 
                                                 
94 Baihu tong, in Images of Women, 171. 
95 Liji, 2: 166. 
96 Da Qing Lü Li Article 101.01, quoted in Bodde and Morris, 226.  
97 Chen Peng, 30-55. 
98 For example, the Taizu of Song 太祖 (927-976 ) married his three daughters to the sons of three generals who had 
helped him come to power; Three daughters of the famous general Xu Da徐达 (1332-1385), an early Ming military 
leader with great battle achievements, were married to the princes of Zhu family. One of them later became the 
empress of Chengzu of Ming 明成祖 (1360-1424).See Chen Peng, 49 
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political order. 99 Marriages in this kind of link worked to connect an individual to the 
family, a family to the community, and a community to the state, within the Confucian 
morality of li. In this spirit, marriage was seldom considered by the Chinese as solely a 
personal issue between two individuals, but was rather an issue that affected families, 
communities and even the nation.  
This conception, at the core of Chinese marriage thinking, was subjected to various 
expansions and re-interpretations in accordance with contemporary contexts. It is not 
uncommon throughout Chinese history to see that women were used as pawns, to be 
moved into position in order to strengthen political lines at various levels of society. 
Tributary brides of the Zhou dynasty were sent to allied states for the sake of hegemonic 
competition, consolidation of alliances, and military protection from powerful affinities, 
as a military strategy, as a move of surrender or as a measure of appreciation.100 
Princesses from the Han to Tang periods were frequently sent to hostile ethnic tribes or 
states as generous peacemaking gifts from the central authority.101 The daughters of high-
ranking officials were married into the families of allied powers as a confirmation of the 
alliance or into hostile families of opposing political standing in order to serve as either 
spies for the natal family or as a peace-making envoy seeking temporary armistice. The 
stories of these sacrificed daughters were often told in highly patriotic tones in the official 
discourse, which portrayed them as exemplary national heroines and paragons of loyalty 
and piety. For a woman, sacrificing personal happiness in order to obey parental 
arrangements to marry a barbarian for the sake of national peace or cultural 
                                                 
99 Sommer, 30. 
100 As early as the Zhou dynasty, after King Wu conquered the Shang, he managed to associate the feudal princes of 
different surnames by presenting tributary brides and thus making them his affinities.  In the subsequent wartime of 
the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods, tributary brides were regularly and frequently sent between 
powerful states and weak states, and between two powerful states. 
101 Since the Han dynasty, after China was unified under a centralized imperial power, the regular tributary-bride 
system was replaced by the irregular practice of heqin 和亲(peace-making marriage). This peace-making marriage 
was designed to bond the imperial government to minority authorities who threatened the borders of the empire. One 
hundred and fifty cases of this kind of marriage were recorded during the period from the Han to Qing dynasties.  
More than one hundred princesses of the central government were married out to the chieftains of the minority 
groups in order to seek peace along the borders. After the Song dynasty, the heqin practice only occurred among 
minority regimes including Liao, Xia, Jurchen, Mongol, Tibetan and Manchu. The Han Chinese regimes seldom 
married their princesses out, due to a growing realization of the distinction between civilian and barbarian. (See Cui 
Mingde 崔明德, Zhongguo gudai heqin tongshi 中国古代和亲通史[History of Heqin in Ancient China], Beijing: 
People’s Press, 2007).  
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communication might be the maximum contribution she was capable of to making to her 
society. Sacrifice, in this sense, was mandatory and was considered a great honor. 
2.3.1 The Lawbreaking Marriages  
In making a marriage decision, marriage-makers always had to keep in mind the need to 
avoid making matches that broke the law. The first rule of a matchmaker was to 
guarantee that the marriage he (or she) made did not violate laws.  Otherwise, he (or she) 
would be subject to severe legal penalty. Lawbreaking marriages fell into two broad 
categories: marrying to the wrong people and marrying at the wrong time. 
The wrong people, in this case, included those with the same surnames, with debased 
identities, bigamists, adulterers or adulteresses. It was traditionally agreed that people 
should not marry even remote patrilineal relatives who shared the same surname 
[tongxingbuhun 同姓不婚]. A marriage within the kinship relationship or between close 
relatives was considered a serious violation of the principle of gender separation.  This 
was considered abhorrent from both a moral and a genetic perspective: marriages of those 
with the same surnames might possibly produce unhealthy descendents or sterility 
because the two parties of such marriage were theoretically born with the same patrilineal 
ancestor. Since the Ming dynasty, even marriages between cousins with different 
surnames were announced as illegal.  Those men who were found guilty of taking in 
marriage the daughters of their patrilineal aunts or the daughters of their matrilineal 
uncles or aunts received 80 strokes of the heavy stick.102  
The ban on marriages between commoner [liangmin 良民] and debased people [jianmin
贱民] was another fixed rule that repeatedly appeared in the dynastic legal codes. Two 
groups in this category were usually seen in the legal records concerning marriage: unfree 
people such as slaves and bond-servants and registered prostitutes such as courtesans and 
singing girls. The Qing code specified that any household head who arranged for his 
slaves to marry daughters of commoner families would be punished by 80 strokes of 
beating with the heavy stick, the marriage would be dissolved and any change in status 
                                                 
102 The Great Ming Code, Article 114, 85. Also See the Great Qing Code, Article 108, 129. 
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would be corrected.103 Furthermore, Qing officials were legally prohibited from taking a 
courtesan (prostitute) as wife or concubine. Convicted wrongdoers in this case were 
punished by 60 strokes of beating and divorce.104  
The imperial code put extra emphasis on the proper timing of marriages. In general, 
people were not allowed to marry under two circumstances: during the mourning period 
and during a period when parents were imprisoned. The mourning period varied 
according to the relationship between the deceased and mourner: for the death of a parent 
or a husband, in the case of the remarriage of a widow, the standard mourning period was 
three years. In case of the death of an emperor or empress, a special edict would be issued 
to announce the mourning period and whether marriage would be banned or not during 
this period. For example, when the Guangxu emperor (光绪 1871-1908) and the Empress 
Dowager Cixi (慈禧 1835-1908) died simultaneously on November 15, 1908, the ritual 
department announced that no marriage would be permitted for officials within one 
year.105 As the traditional Chinese marriage was centered around filial piety, and served 
primarily parental demands, a marriage could not be arranged and held without the 
presence of the grandparents, parents or any other official family head. Therefore, getting 
married at a time when the paternal grandparents or parents were in prison was 
considered seriously unfilial behavior, and any offender was subject to a punishment of 
80 strokes with the heavy stick.106 
All of these prohibitions, whether they were official or customary, served “not to ban a 
certain kind of conduct per se, but rather to regulate that conduct in such a way as to 
make the performance of distinct moral standards as a definitive mark of different levels 
of status.”107 If the nature of marriage in pre-modern China was to continue the ancestral 
line, to distinguish gender separation, to legitimize sexual intercourse between husband 
and wife as well as to assert the righteousness of human relations, then the particulars of 
                                                 
103 The Great Qing Code, Article 115, 130.  
104 Ibid. 
105 Zhao Erxun, Qingshi gao, Vol. 10, juan 82, 2706. 
106 The Great Ming Code, Article 111 and112,84-85. 
107 Sommer, 247. 
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exactly how to create and sustain a marriage was a matter worthy of high-minded legal 
concerns. 
2.3.2 Concubinage: The Gap between Law and Custom 
Although Confucian ethics preached the virtues of monogamy, the practice of having a 
concubine was allowed in a pre-modern Chinese household. The relation between 
husband and wife was interpreted through the classics as akin to that between the sun and 
moon.108 As there is only one sun and one moon, there should be only one husband and 
one wife in one marriage. Only a wife could officially be married to a husband.  Thus, 
the formal term used in the taking of a concubine was “to buy”. Liji distinguished 
between wife and concubine with the betrothal process: “if there were the betrothal rites, 
she became a wife; and if she went without these, a concubine.”109 Zheng Xuan explained 
“why use the word ‘buy’ when a man is taking a concubine? Because a concubine is as 
humble (priced) as any other thing”.110 
In both the domestic and public spheres, a wife and a concubine were in legally divided 
social roles which one was not allowed to confuse.  The Qing Code specified: “wife 
means [husband’s] equal. Honored [gui 贵] as she is, she should be treated equally to her 
husband. Concubine, however, is only a sex servant whose status should be humble.”111 
Within the inner chamber, if a concubine arrogated the wife’s role in managing the 
household or performing ancestor worship without the family head’s or the wife’s 
authorization, she would possibly be charged with disordering the house.112 As only one 
wife was allowed to one husband at one time, both in custom and in law, when a man 
married two wives, the later married one was automatically degraded a level to a 
concubine. 
                                                 
108 Liji, 2: 433. 
109 Liji, 2: 479. 
110 Zheng Xuan, Liji Zhengyi, juan.51, 1418. 
111 Shen Zhiqi 沈之奇, Da Qing Lü ji zhu 大清律辑注[Collected Notes of the Great Qing Code](Beijing: Falü 
chubanshe, 2000), 258 
112 In the official discourse, this disorder broke the marriage contract, damaged the right way of the couple, insulted 
human ethics, overturned the cap and shoe and violated the ritual teachings. In the Ming and Qing code, the penalty 
towards disordering a wife and concubine was strengthened to 100 strokes of the heavy staff for the offenders.(see 
Shen Zhiqi, Da Qing Lü Ji Zhu, 258)   
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While taking a concubine was never favored in the Confucian orthodoxy, few dynasties 
actually legally banned this tradition. In China’s literature and historical records, it is 
actually not uncommon to see cases where a husband took two wives at the same time in 
different places, especially for those who held distant posts or traveling merchants. The 
only exception was The Great Ming Code, in which commoners were not allowed to take 
concubines, excepting only those who were 40 years of age or older and had no sons. 
Any violation of this law was punishable by 40 strokes of beating with the light stick.113 
Still, neither ethical teachings nor legal bans efficiently prevented poor families from 
selling their daughters for money or rich people from buying concubines. It had been so 
popular a practice in the Qing period that the lawmakers had to abolish this article from 
the legal code. At the end of the imperial era, taking concubines had become a fixed 
social custom in some areas of China. Hu Puan, a contemporary writing at the end of 19th 
century commented on this: 
 “…polygamy is prevalent in Guangdong, people’s wealth was judged through 
counting how many wives and concubines he has. For many, taking concubine is 
only a way to earn reputation. It is said one plutocrat owned one hundred and 
eight pepper trees, which provided him with great annual fortune. So he took one 
hundred and eight concubines and supported each with the profit of one pepper 
tree. And those who had three wives and four concubines were more common. 
Only in this way did the middle class feel capable of maintaining their dignity”.114 
The case of concubinage illustrates the distant gap between law and custom in pre-
modern China, which existed because much about people’s real lives was dominated by 
survival logic quite different from, and often at odds with, the priorities and pretensions 
of the state. When a law was proved unacceptable to people, it was either deliberately or 
unconsciously neglected, compromised through judicatory flexibility or simply deleted 
from the code altogether. As Sommer perceived, the laws of imperial China were made in 
order to regulate people’s performance according to their social status and roles. When 
certain customary practices ran across the status boundaries and were performed by the 
                                                 
113 The Great Ming Code: Article 109, 84. 
114 Originally in Cheng Dong, Liu Shuyong ed., “Jiu Zhongguo Da Bolan, 1900-1949”旧中国大博览[The old China 
Expo, 1900-1949],1996. Quoted in Gao Xinwei 高新伟, Qiyan de suiyue: zhongguo gudai funü de fei zhengchang 
shenghuo 凄艳的岁月：中国古代妇女的非正常生活[The Abnormal Life of Women in Pre-modern 
China](Zhengzhou: Henan Renmin chubanshe, 2006), 72. 
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people from upper to lower strata, the related law lost its regulating strength and thus 
became subject to abolishment.115 
2.4 Conclusion 
Marriage, following Confucian ethics and ritual textbooks, was a socially sanctioned 
moral norm for all Chinese people; it was a fundamental human relation that served to 
identify and confirm man and woman’s biological and social roles. The ideal marriage 
pattern, according to these guidelines, should be a predestined marital bond made 
between two families that possessed “humanity and righteousness” for the purpose of 
continuing the patrilineal line of descent.116 A credible matchmaker would initiate the 
marital negotiation at the will of the groom’s parents, under the assumption that the 
groom and bride did not know each other’s name before the wedding. After they got 
married in a proper performance of the six rites of matrimony, the couple was expected to 
fit into their respective roles within the household. 
Throughout the imperial era, marriage served as the pivot of a network of social control 
that inclined to link personal relationships to political order through asserting the 
“righteousness” between parents and children, husband and wife, rulers and subordinates 
as well as the state and individuals. The dynastic state imposed control over its people by 
repeatedly claiming its supremacy in the realm of interpreting this “righteousness”. 
In this discourse, marriage is not about the romantic and passionate love developed 
between two matched souls, the individual’s free choice of a life partner or the matching 
of two equals. The people in charge of a pre-modern marriage were not the bride and 
groom, but were rather any number of other interested parties: the parents, grandparents, 
other relatives who served as family heads, the indispensable matchmaker and, in some 
cases, rulers from different levels of society, acting in their role as ‘social parents’ of 
their subject populations. Marriage, in this definition, was a rational approach to a 
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common situation that parties undertook seeking the best interest and mutual-benefit of 
all concerned.  
Marriage, in the social context of hierarchal China, was also a symbol of one’s social 
status. Ideally, a prospective couple should be matched first based on their ancestries. In 
real life, however, with the decline of the aristocratic elite and the rise of the meritocratic 
elite, the pursuit of finding partners with noble origin was replaced by more utilitarian 
motives in making marriage arrangements. The tendency to transform the marriage 
arrangement into a commodity became more and more perceptible in post-Tang period 
marriages. A great deal of money was invested in locating a talented son-in-law, who 
then was expected to gain a bright official career through the Imperial Examinations. 
Money, in forms of betrothal gifts and dowries, became the dominant consideration in 
making a marriage arrangement at this time. As a result, poor families had to discover 
irregular ways to get access to females in order to father male descendants.  They did so 
by taking in adopted daughters-in-law, stepping into an uxorilocal marriage or by renting 
another man’s wife. Another theme of the traditional marriage was political interest, 
which applied mostly to upper-level marriages. Marriage, in this case, was largely used as 
a political strategy in order to seek national security, political alliance or a desired career.  
While the dynastic law-makers tried to enact detailed marriage prohibitions in order to 
regulate people’s marriage practices according to the Confucian ethical model of li, the 
influence of tradition and custom was always beyond the control of state power. 
However, in the process of promulgating laws and making compromises, transitions did 
occur in Chinese marriage thinking, though such arrangements were slow and for the 
most part invisible to contemporaries. As will be discussed in the next chapter, it was 
only in the past two centuries that such transitions have become perceptible.  
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Chapter 3  
3 Making a Marriage Revolution 
Through a systematic examination of the transformation of Chinese marriage thinking 
from the late-nineteenth century to the May Fourth era, this chapter seeks to illustrate 
how “free marriage” was learned and practiced by the Chinese at a time when old 
traditions and customs were still holding a predominant position over new thoughts; it 
will expand on how Chinese thinking on marriage differed from Western models, and 
how it was re-interpreted to match Chinese social context. What I argue in this chapter is 
that the modernization of Chinese marriage was not a transient event, but was rather a 
process that mixed gradual and progressive, old and new, traditional and modern, 
Chinese and Western, urban and rural; a development that was at the same time curious, 
romantic and challenging but also difficult, slow and requiring a lot of consideration, 
patience and compromise. In examining the process of revolutionizing Chinese marriage, 
charting the adoption of Western models is only half of the story: the other half is in 
looking at the evolution of tradition. 
3.1 Serving Marriage for the Country: Marriage Transition in 
the Late-Qing Era 
When the first group of Chinese officials arrived in Europe in the late 1860s, they were 
shocked to find that “the marriage of the western man and woman was self-determined. 
Before getting married, they were like friends.”1  They were also surprised at the fact that 
“when making the marital decisions, parents played minor roles and could not forcefully 
marry their children without their own willingness.”2 These discoveries informed the 
nineteenth-century Chinese, who had previously believed that arranged marriage was a 
universal practice, about the existence of another option: the self-choice marriage. Before 
the weixin 维新[reform]reformers rose to power and began to implement constitutional 
                                                 
1  Zhang Deyi 张德彝, Hanghai shuqi 航海述奇[Strange Stories in Voyage], quoted in Liang Jingshi 梁景时. “Jindai 
Zhongguo Weixinpai hunyinguan toushi.”近代中国维新派婚姻观透视 [A Perspective on Marriage View of the 
Modern Chinese Weixin School], Dongfang Luntan, no.1 (1997):36-39, 36. 
2  Xie Qinggao 谢清高. Hai Lu 海录 [Records on the Sea], quoted in ibid.  
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reforms in the last decade of the nineteenth century, however, most policy-makers in 
China considered that the ideas of love and self-choice in marriage were exotic and 
dangerous.  They argued that this kind of practice in China would lead to family collapse 
and social disorder by arrogating parental authority in marriage arrangements and thus 
violating the paramount rule of filial piety and breaking down gender separation. For the 
vast majority of Chinese, who were generally ignorant about the outside world, the 
arranged marriage pattern was still the only marriage system they knew and practiced.  
3.1.1 Baozhong: Reforming Marriage for Better Wives and Wiser 
Mothers 
The earliest attempts at reforming Chinese marriage came from the late-Qing reformers’ 
pursuit of baozhong 保种[improving the Chinese race].  Led by Kang Youwei 康有为
(1858-1927) and Liang Qichao 梁启超(1873-1929), the weixin reformers used official 
propaganda in order to ascribe China’s defeats in the second half of the nineteenth 
century to a perceived racial weakness in the Chinese.3 Recognizing the self-choice 
marriage as “a necessity of China in the future,” they proposed that it was only when a 
young man was allowed to choose his own marriage partner that he could possibly marry 
a good girl on the grounds of age, appearance and education. 4  Conversely, they argued 
that only under such a free choice system could an educated and physical healthy girl 
marry a man that she would love and then act as a genuine help-mate to her husband and 
an intelligent mother to her sons. They further argued that only under the roof of a 
peaceful and harmonious family could a man devote himself wholeheartedly to the 
national salvation cause and a woman produce physically and mentally healthy sons who 
might be the future members of China’s national defense force. 5 Therefore, they 
                                                 
3  Liang Qichao 梁启超, “Lun Zhongguo zhi jiangqiang” 论中国之将强 [On the future strength of China], Shiwu bao 
31 (30 June 1897); Collected in Liang Qichao, Yinbingshi heji-wenji 饮冰室合集（文集）[Collected writings from 
the ice-drinker studio-Collected essays]. (Taibei: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), juan 2, 11. 
4  Yan Fu 严复(1854-1921), “Lun hushang chuangxing nüxuetang shi”论沪上创兴女学堂事[Discussion on the 
establishment of girls’ school in Shanghai], Guowen Bao 国闻报 [Daily of National News],January 10,11,1898, in 
Yanfu zuopin jingxuan 严复作品精选[Featured works of Yan Fu], ed. Xu Zuhua 许祖华 ( Beijing: Chuangjiang 
wenyi chubanshe, 2005), 167-170.  
5  Liang Qichao, “Chuangshe nüxuetang qi 创设女学堂启[Announcement establishing the Girls' School]”, in 
Zhongguo jindaishi jiaoyu ziliao huibian: wuxu shiqi jiaoyu 中国近代史教育资料汇编：戊戌时期教育[Collected 
  
56
suggested that elite parents should adjust their mate-selection politics in order to marry 
their sons to those girls with the potential to become a “good wife and wise mother” in 
terms of natural feet and school education.6 
Initiated by the weixin reformers, and later supported by the Manchu court, the anti-
footbinding movement and the wide establishment of girls’ school in China brought the 
first perceivable wave of the transformation of China’s marriage conceptions. 7 On the 
eve of the Xinhai Revolution, it had been a fact that more and more Chinese elite parents 
had come to realize that an educated, physically-healthy daughter might not only increase 
the family income, but also gain more advantages in finding herself a suitable husband.8 
This realization primarily came from some social celebrities’ publicly known preference 
for well-educated girls. For example, in 1900, Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培 (1868-1940) lost his 
first wife at the age of thirty-two. Being from the top percentile of the Imperial 
Examination system, and holding the post of supervisor in the Zhongxi School of 
Shaoxing[Shaoxing zhongxi xuetang 绍兴中西学堂], he became a new favorite potential 
son-in-law of the elite families. In front of the various matchmakers crowding into his 
home he declared his criteria for his future bride: she had to have natural and unbounded 
feet and had to be well-educated. One year later, Cai married Huang Zhongyu 黄仲玉, a 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
education documents of modern China: education during the period of wuxu]. (Shanghai: Jiaoyu chubanshe, 1993), 
185-188. 
6  To improve the Chinese race, the weixin reformers recognized that Chinese women should be trained in order to fit 
into their new role as the good helpers of patriotic husbands and the wise mother of future strong soliders. The 
precondition for this possibility was to emancipate women from their disadvantageous situations: the physical 
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8  Gao Shiliang 高时良, Zhongguo jiaohui xuexiao shi 中国教会学校史 [A history of Church Schools in 
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57
girl known to be talented at calligraphy and painting, who also had unbound feet.9 Zhang 
Taiyan 章太炎 (also known as Zhang Binglin 章炳麟, 1868-1936), a master of guoxue 
[traditional Chinese learning], also married a career woman with “freedom and equality 
of thoughts,” who had been a newspaper editor.10 
Considering that social transition was a gradual process, to be undertaken step by step, 
marriage reform was always a matter of necessity, but not one of urgency in late-Qing 
China. According to Kang Youwei, who went so far as to suggest a total rejection of the 
marriage system because “people can merely vow to be united, but find it very difficult to 
hold to their union for long,” the process of women’s emancipation had to go through 
three stages of social evolution: the Age of Disorder, the Age of Increasing Peace and 
Equality and the Age of Complete Peace and Equality. 11  He argued that any precipitous 
change unmatched with its proper stage could cause great disorder. For this reason, his 
progressive and utopian marriage plan was kept unknown to the public until 1935, when 
his Datong shu 大同书 was published in a full version.12  
Joan Judge believes that in the Chinese world view, rights were not natural and inherent 
in individuals but rather were contingent, to be granted in accordance with the 
individual’s demonstrated ability to exercise them effectively. The right to free marriage 
was also presented by officials as contingent on a certain level of education.13 One 
textbook in the early 1900s explained why the free marriage pattern that was so popular 
in the West was impossible for China: in the West, it suggested, “both men and women 
were learned and literate”; whereas in China, the masses of illiterate women would be 
easily deceived by profligates, and the practice would degenerate into “dissolution and 
debauchery.”14 Yan Fu also thought that there was no feasibility in a plan for a self-
                                                 
9  Liu Xinping, 6.  
10 Ibid.,12. 
11 Kang Youwei 康有为, Ta T’ung Shu: The One-World Philosophy of Kang Youwei, trans. Laurance G. Thompson ( 
London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958), 153-163. 
12 Ibid. Introduction. 
13 Joan Judge, “Citizens or Mothers of Citizens? Gender and the Meaning of Modern Chinese Citizenship”, in 
Changing Meanings of Citizenship in Modern China, eds. Merle Goldman and Elizabeth J. Perry 
(Cambridge/Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2002),28-29. 
14 Xie Hongji 谢洪赍, Chudeng xiaoxue nüzi xiushen jiaokeshu 初等小学女子修身教科书[Lower-level elementary 
female ethics textbooks]. Shanghai: Zhongguo jiaoyu gailiang hui, 1906. 
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determined marriage system before Chinese women were completely released from their 
seclusion and illiteracy.15 This precondition to change meant that the late-Qing officials’ 
marriage reforms would largely remain in the form of written proposals rather than 
effective actions. 
When proposing his free-marriage idea, politician Tan Sitong 谭嗣同 (1865-1898) 
emphasized that “no family should coerce another family into a marriage bond.”16 
Marriage for the weixin reformers was continuously defined as a bond between two 
families instead of two individuals. The purpose of a marriage in their general view was 
to create an encouraging family atmosphere for the national salvation movement, for 
which both husband and wife should subordinate their personal needs for the greater 
good of the nation. This was, in fact, merely a nationalist version of the traditional 
marriage conception outlined above: a bond of love between two families to secure their 
services for the Chinese nation and to secure the continuance and improvement of the 
Chinese race. The individual needs and feelings of the people were still largely excluded 
from marriage considerations. 
3.1.2 Individual Happiness Vs. Public Welfare 
The revolutionaries who were devoted to overthrowing the Manchu’s rule over China 
seemed to go a little further at this point by recognizing marriage as a social contract 
between two individuals in love. For example, Jin Yi (金一 1874-1947), the author of 
Nüjie zhong 女界钟 [Women’s Bell],17 believed marriage should be a ritual of love spirit, 
an expression of the “burning point of love power.”18 However, like the earlier reformers, 
few revolutionaries applied this theory to their revolutionary movement due to the belief 
that all social transformations could only occur under the auspices of a new republican 
government. The case of Qiu Jin 秋瑾 (1875-1907) is an example of the most radical 
                                                 
15 Yan Fu, Yanfu zuopin jingxuan, 169. 
16 Tan Sitong, “Hunan bu chanzuhui jiaqu zhangcheng”湖南不缠足会嫁娶章程[Marriage rules of Hunan anti-foot 
binding association]”. Quoted in Liang Jingshi, 38.  
17 Jin Yi, 1874-1947, used the pen-name ‘Jin Yi who loves liberty.’ His work was possibly the first document in China 
to deal specifically with the issue of women’s liberation, and he had been  hailed as “our women’s Rosseau”. Nüjie 
zhong is a propaganda pamphlet he wrote for women’s emancipation. 
18 Jin Yi, Nüjie zhong[The women’s bell]( Shanghai: Datong shuju, 1903), 67. 
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woman of her time.  Qiu Jin bravely stepped out of an unhappy arranged marriage and 
successfully encouraged many other educated women to do the same by speaking out 
about their displeasure with the marriage arranged for them by their parents and by 
helping women gain financial independence through education and training in various 
professions. However feminist and radical Qiu Jin was, she was also convinced that all 
the solutions for women’s problems lay in the establishment of a new republican 
government in which women could acquire equal political participation, rights and an 
equal voice in making their own life decisions.19 
Subordinating one’s personal interest to the greater needs of society has been an 
important characteristic of Chinese society throughout the nation’s history.  
Fundamentally, it is a heritage that evolved from Confucian ethics, which requires that  
followers adhere to proper hierarchical relationships, from high to low and from top to 
bottom. As Sun Yat-sen (孙中山 1866-1925) emphasized repeatedly, the individual 
should subordinate his personal interest to the group and devote his talents to seeking 
public welfare: “[the] individual had no freedom, only the group had freedom.”20 For the 
late-Qing elite, saving China from crisis by peaceful constitutional reform or by violent 
national revolution was of primary importance.  Marriage alone was too personal an issue 
to be directly related to the public interest and the general feeling was that peoples efforts 
were better served in aiding the rapid change of China’s fate. 
A more traditional concern that caused most male reformers and revolutionaries to 
deliberately shy away from the marriage problem was the established division between 
the public and the domestic spheres. According to the Confucian classics, a gentleman 
[junzi 君子] should never speak publicly of inner chamber affairs, especially not of 
emotional feelings from relationships as private and personal as those between married or 
unmarried couples.21 At a time when most of the population was still dominated by 
Confucian ethics, for an individual to address his or her desire for self-choice marriages 
                                                 
19 Kazuko Ono, Chinese Women in a Century of Revolution, 1850-1950, ed. Joshua A. Fogel (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 1978), 60. 
20 Meijer, 24. 
21 Liji: “Nei Ze”内则, in The Sacred Books of China, vol.4,  The Texts of Confucianism, ed. F. Max Mueller, trans. 
James Legge, http://www.sacred-texts.com/cfu/liki/liki10.htm.  
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and free love in public would have been considered mixing up public affairs with 
domestic issues, and encouragement to broach others’ privacy. Before they could 
establish a new government that could provide ethical and legal support for marriage 
reform, neither reformers nor revolutionaries dared to challenge popular social ethics for 
fear of risking their own reputations and reliability among the masses. 
3.1.3 The “Civilized” Marriage Practice 
During the first decade of the twentieth century, when the conservatives and radicals 
were debating over whether or not the arranged marriage was a bad social custom, a few 
young people took the initiative by arranging their own marriages.  
The first public marriage advertisement was posted in Dagong Bao 大公报 [L'impartial] 
on June, 26 of 1902 by an anonymous man who called himself nanqing zhishi 南清志士
[a man from Nanqing of ideals and integrity]. He provided a list of criteria for his 
prospective bride: 1) natural feet; 2) having basic knowledge of Chinese and western 
learning; 3) following a wenming jiehun 文明结婚 [civilized marriage ceremony]22; 4) 
having the freedom and willingness to choose her own groom.23 He especially 
emphasized that physical appearance, age, ethnicity (Han or Manchu), personal beliefs 
(new or old), social status and personal property were not important to his decision. On 
the Zhongwai ribao 中外日报[Chinese and Foreign Daily] of July 27, 1902, this 
advertisement was praised as “the most civilized marriage advertisement of the world.”24 
Although there is little known about the actual result of the advertisement being posted, it 
is obvious from the particulars that things like unbound feet, education and independence 
                                                 
22 The so-called “wenming jiehun” (civilized marriage ceremony) emerged in the big cities and trading ports in the 
early twentieth century. It was a simplified marriage procedure that added many elements of the Western marriage 
ceremony. On the wedding day, the groom and bride were required to sign their hunshu 婚书 (marriage certificate) 
with their matchmaker, witness and the person presiding over the wedding, which would then be read aloud to the 
audience.  This was followed by speeches respectively given by the matchmaker, the witness and the friends of the 
new couple. Sometimes, the person presiding over the wedding, who was often the groom’s parent, family head, 
supervisor or teacher, would be invited to give the new couple some advice. At the end of the ceremony, the 
audience would sing a wedding song together to bless the couple. See Xu Ke 徐珂 ed., Qing bai lei chao, 13vols. 清
稗类钞[Late-Qing Anecdotes] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), 5: 1987. 
23 Liu Xinping, 13. 
24 Ibid. 14. 
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had already been accepted by at least some of the young elite as the new basic conditions 
for a successful marriage.  
As the first public personal ad for a marriage partner in China, it is not surprising that this 
advertisement immediately came under attack from numerous social groups. One 
somewhat unforeseen critique came from the radical female activist Lin Zongsu 林宗素 
(1877-1944), who described it as “treating civilized woman like a slave, taking for 
granted that women would crowd to him whenever he demanded,” and decrying the 
advertisement itself as “a way dealing with the prostitutes in Shanghai.”25 The over-
sensitive tone in this critique insinuated that on the one hand, the first batch of Chinese 
'new women' felt deeply insecure with their newly-achieved independence and respect, 
and were confused by the fear of returning to the traditional marital situation of being 
selected and traded as little more than commodities. On the other hand, it shows how 
these women, like most other Chinese, no matter how civilized or modernized they 
labeled themselves, still deeply believed that marriage or direct social contact between 
the two sexes was too much of a taboo issue for any public address. No true gentleman 
would openly speak out about his need for a wife and any public display of love properly 
existed only between a prostitute and her client. An advertisement for marriage like this 
could also possibly be nothing more than a dandy’s public flirting with all the educated 
young women. Of course, as Lin pointed out, part of the embarrassment came from the 
anonymity of the author: “even if there are women who are willing to contact this ‘man 
from Nanqing’, without his name and address, how can they get in touch?” 26 
Learning from this lesson, Wang Jianshan 王建善, a student who returned to China from 
Japan, posted his own marriage advertisement in Shibao 时报 [Time newspaper] on July 
5 of 1905.  He provided his real name, address and profession, and requested that his 
prospects contact him by letter. Wang was also the author of Tongxin dinghun fa 通信订
婚法 [Correspondence Pre-contract of Marriage], a booklet that introduced a novel 
                                                 
25 Liu Xinping,14. 
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“decent” method for educated young people to search and find a desired match.27 Wang 
suggested that young men and women should first come to know each other through 
correspondence, and even eventually sign their marriage contracts by mail. The booklet 
was rather profitable at the time: according to Shibao, “the first print was sold out 
immediately and people required a quick reprint.”28  Finding a life partner among pen 
pals became a fashion among the urban youth, who were eager to find a lover by self-
choice but who dared not break the barricades of gender separation.  
While most Chinese women halted at the stage of refusing to be a party to an arranged 
marriage rather than taking the next step in choosing 'Mr. Right' for themselves, a few 
heroines started to publicize their own marriage demands. Da Gongbao 大公报
[L'impartial] published such a report on June 28, 1909: 
Zhang Weiying 张维英 is a lady from Zhejiang. She studied in Japan and 
currently resided in Jiangxi. Now she is working as a teacher in a girls’ school, 
teaching painting and handcraft. She is also a founder of a forum for free 
marriage…At an age of twenty-one, single, and aspiring for free marriage, this 
lady attracted so many suitors to ask for her hand in marriage that she had to 
hold a series of tests to examine their health and knowledges. She declared, if 
someone could meet her criteria, she will marry him with a civilized 
ceremony.29  
In this case, it was the woman’s turn to set marriage standards for the man: she listed 
physical health and academic performance as the most important two standards for her 
'Mr. Right'. As with most of the marriage advertisements posted at that time, little is 
known about the result or even the validity of Ms. Zhang’s advertisement.  
Early marriage advertisements almost universally demanded a marriage match that was 
natural, educated, healthy and independent. On the one hand, these common 
characteristics reflected the transition of the mate-selection standard from seeking a 
match for the family to seeking a match for the individual. On the other hand, although 
these advertisers set marriage as the ultimate goal of all their subsequent communication, 
                                                 
27 This booklet was published by Shanghai youzheng shuju in 1905. 
28 Shibao, Nov.1, 1905. Quoted in Liu Xinping, 14-15. 
29 Da Gongbao, June 28, 1909. Quoted in Liu Xinping, 42-43. 
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they seldom mentioned the word ‘love’, nor did they discuss what kind of personal 
feelings they were expecting to develop with the candidate in the course of courtship. 
Furthermore, under the circumstances of the early twentieth century, when “freedom and 
modernity” became a dominant theme, such advertisements, whether true or false, 
worked as a showcase for modernity. They served to position progressive youth who 
wished to cut themselves off from the old family system, announced the arrival of an era 
of social transformation and challenged old traditions. The content of these 
advertisements shows how the theory of “marriage as a social contract” had been 
accepted by advertisers and editors. The marriage partner was not yet being constructed 
as a love match, but now had to be a candidate that met certain requirements who was 
thus qualified to sign the contract. 
3.2 From Marriage Reform to Marriage Revolution 
As a response to the cultural confusions provoked by the turbulent post-1911 political 
situation in China, and also as an effort to avoid sensitive political topics that could 
possibly provoke the ruling warlords, enthusiasm for marriage revolution and gender 
equality subsided dramatically in the second decade of the twentieth century.30 Still, 
Chinese intellectuals devoted themselves to a wide debate on marriage reform. In the 
beginning, late-Qing reformers continued to gain recognition from intellectuals for their 
efforts to re-interpret Chinese traditions and customs in order to match the new political 
context. The moderate marriage reform proposals, however, soon met severe challenges 
from the radical proponents of the New Culture Movement (New Culturists) as a part of 
                                                 
30 After the 1911 Revolution, many of the women’s military fighting corps were disbanded. Although a few radicals 
organized to struggle for the rights of women to elect and be elected as representatives to the new National and 
Provisional Assemblies, most of the former women revolutionaries joined moderate groups.  These organizaitons 
insisted that the first important goal for Chinese women was to cultivate their capacity for political participation by 
popularizeing women’s educational and professional development. This was in fact agreed to and encouraged by the 
new leadership of the republican government, which believed that Chinese women were “not powerful enough to 
start to compete with men in the political power.” See Sun Yat-sen, Sun Zhongshan quanji 孙中山全集[The 
complete collection of Sun Yat-sen](Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1982), 438. After Yuan Shikai袁世凯(1859-1916), a 
devotional Confucian conservative, seized supreme power in China, he and his warlord government launched a 
“return to Confucianism” movement and re-emphasized woman’s virtue and obedience.  The women’s movement 
was quickly crushed by the conservative forces as not in accordance with Confucian ethics. 
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their crusade against the “fengjian” 封建 [feudal] traditions.31 In the subsequent May 
Fourth Movement, a marriage revolution was launched so rapidly and impetuously that 
ideas of marriage reform were almost completely eliminated from public opinion 
thereafter. 
3.2.1 A Middle Course between a Parent’s Order and a Child’s 
Choice 
The question of whether or not elders have the authority to arrange their children’s 
marriage became a topic that attracted broad public attention and debate in the pre-May 
Fourth era. Funü zazhi 妇女杂志[The Ladies’ Journal], which was first published by the 
Commercial Press in Shanghai in January 1915, became one major forum that hosted 
such marriage debates.32 
Before the New Culturalists’ crusade against tradition was fully deployed, public opinion 
on marriage reform was dominated by a mixture of expectation for China’s quick 
modernization and anxiety over the disorder caused by a too rapid social transformation. 
For example, at the commencement of the Henan Women’s Normal School in 1915, the 
minister of Education Shi Bao’an 史宝安, delivered a public defense of the tradition of 
parental authority arranging marriages for their children. He utilized the Confucian 
reverence for elders, arguing that the senior generation was more socialized and 
experienced in the matter of marriage than the younger one. He argued that a life partner 
arranged by parent(s) must be better than a partner arranged by oneself, due to the fact 
                                                 
31 “Fengjian”封建 or feudal originally refers to the political ideology of the Zhou Dynasty of ancient China; literally 
translated it means “decentralized system of government”.  In the Marxist historiographical interpretation of Chinese 
history in China, this term has popularly been used to describe the society from Zhou to Qing,  but recent scholarship 
has suggested that fengjian lacks some of the fundamental aspects in comparison to European feudalism. Since the 
end of the dynastic rule in China, the term “fengjian” was more often used in a negative way, similar to “traditional” 
in English. For more references, see Q. Edward Wang, “Between Marxism and Nationalism: Chinese historiography 
and the Soviet influence, 1949-1963”, Journal of Contemporary China, volume 9, issue 23(2000): 95 – 111. 
32 As the most successful publishing house in China, the Commercial Press had bookstores in twenty-eight Chinese 
cities, as well as in Hong Kong, Macao, and in Singapore. The Ladies’ Journal was thus able to reach women across 
a wide geographical area, unlike most women’s magazines, whose influence was limited by constraints in 
distribution and finance. Because women’s literacy was still a status symbol in the 1910s, the journal naturally 
targeted women of the middle and upper classes. Female teachers and students contributed to its forums and 
columns. But most of the articles were written by men, including the editor in chief, Wang Yunzhang王蕴章, and 
many of its readers were men. For a discussion of the background of The Ladies’ Journal, see Jacqueline Nivard, 
“Women and the Women’s Press,” in Republican China 10, no. 1b (November 1984), 37-55. 
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that people in love are generally short-sighted and blind to the negative aspects of their 
mates, whereas parents would be more considerate and far-sighted in their choice, owing 
to their natural love for their children. Therefore, Shi concluded “it is impossible that the 
marriage of our country's men and women could not be decided by their family heads [家
长 jiazhang].”33 Further, Shi attributed the fact that there were many unhappy couples in 
China to the early marriage custom and public distaste for divorce. The problem for 
China, according to Shi, was how to dissolve the marriage or engagement of mismatched 
couples, rather than how to deprive parents of their marriage decision-making authority. 
The solution, he argued, was to regulate people’s marriage (or engagement) age and to 
prolong the waiting period between the engagement and the wedding. Like the cautious 
late-Qing reformers, Shi suggested a gradual social reform process: “If we acted with 
undue haste,” Shi warned, “we would meet greater resistance. It is necessary to know that 
haste will make waste.” 34 
Along with the rise of the New Culture Movement after 1915, the readers of Funü zazhi 
read about a more comprehensive and controversial debate over how to properly combine 
the free-choice marriage practice with the traditional parental arrangement. The 
consensus opinion that arose from such discussions was that young people should be 
given the right and freedom to choose their own lovers, but for the final marriage 
decision they should gain the consent of their parents. This theory was exemplified by 
two articles in 1917: “Jiehun gailiang shuo”结婚改良说 [Discussion on Marriage 
Reform] by Qu Li 趋礼35, and “Lun hunzhi”论婚制 [Discussion on Marriage System] by 
Ding Fengjia of Wujiang 吴江丁逢甲.36 
Both articles were published in the “Shelun” 社论[Social discussion] column, which 
hosted discussions based on the hottest social problems from the front page of the Funü 
zazhi. Both Qu and Ding agreed that the traditional arranged marriage pattern was 
                                                 
33 Shi Bao’an , “Henan nüzi shifan xuexiao biye xunci” 河南女子师范学校毕业训词[Speech on the commencement 
of Henan Women’s Normal School],Funü zazhi, no.1 (1915): 1-9, 4. 
34 Ibid., 9. 
35 Qu Li, “Jiehun gailiang shuo” [Discussion on Marriage Reform], Funü zazhi, no.5 (1917): 2-9. 
36 Ding Fengjia, “Lun hunzhi” [Discussion on Marriage System], Funü zazhi, no.7 (1917): 1-8.  
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obsolete and did not fit in the social context of a Republican China that complimented 
individual rights and personal freedoms. Based on the observation that mutual feelings of 
love were often absent in the arranged couple, the critics admitted that free love and pre-
marital communication were necessary and important elements for happy marriages. 
Ding in particular called for more public attention to be given to the reform of the 
marriage system than to that of the political or educational institutions. From the 
perspective of national salvation, he claimed “people trapped in unhappy or unhealthy 
marriages are often depressed and weak, incapable of producing healthy offspring. This 
posed great dangers to the Chinese race…Therefore, Chinese marriage should be 
reformed ahead of the political system and education, otherwise, the root of the Chinese 
nation would gradually deteriorate, and then there would be no hope for China to 
resurrect itself.”37 
Considering China’s conservative social realities, however, both Qu and Ding believed 
that the family’s supervision and opinion were still necessary factors to consider 
whenever contemplating a marriage match. Qu claimed that the acquisition of parental 
approval for one’s own love choice was in fact not only in order to show respect to one’s 
parents, but also to pay deference to love. 38 Ding believed that true love only existed 
between two people who were matched on specific grounds such as “blood and gene, 
family background, potential for future development, personalities, age and 
thoughts…[and] the best way of getting married is to select the marriage subject by the 
free will of two parties, but the final decision of marriage should be left to the parents 
after a careful examination on the subject (with the criteria given above).”39 
In their search for accommodation between the two extremes of parental consent and 
children’s free choice, Qu Li and Ding Fengjia demonstrated typical Confucian thinking 
by resorting to “zhongyong zhidao”中庸之道 [the doctrine of mean], or the middle 
course. Zhongyong 中庸 comprises the elements of “equilibrium” [zhong] and 
“normality” [yong]. The translation of these two words as the Mean suggests the 
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fundamental moral ideas of moderation, balance and suitability.40 In the 20th century, this 
policy was adapted by various reformers and scholars in order to find a middle point in 
the intersectional area between Chinese tradition and foreign culture, and henceforth to 
concoct conciliations in order to reach equilibrium and harmony.41  
New mate-selection criteria were made in accordance with these new marriage politics. 
In his 1918 “Zefu zhi yanjiu”择夫之研究 [Studies on Husband Selection], Wei 
Shouyong 魏寿镛 provided women with a criteria list for a potential husband that 
included nine conditions: 42 
1. Family background [mendi], appearance, intelligence and education. 
2. Age 
3. Profession 
4. Property 
5. Family members 
6. Physical health 
7. Mental health 
8. Daily living habits 
9. Temper 
With regards to age, Wei believed the best age for marriage was from 20 to 28, with the 
man being two or three years older than the woman. This list was a combination of old 
and new marriage politics: it juxtaposed individual qualities such as appearance, 
intelligence and education with traditional conception of mendi [family background] as 
being of the first importance; postponed marriage age to an appropriately 'modern' 
standard; emphasized economic potential; stressed the role of an individual’s health for 
the sake of family line continuation; and required matched personality traits such as 
habits and temperament. Although more personal interests were added into the selection 
criteria, love was seldom evaluated as a crucial element in making a good match. On the 
contrary, love was described as more like an unstable emotion that might easily lead to 
wrongdoing. Parental supervision and examination of potential matches were thus invited 
in expectation that they would neutralize any harm caused by impulsive love emotions. 
                                                 
40 Wm Theodore DeBary and Irene Bloom, eds., Sources of Chinese Tradition: From Earliest Times to 1600 (New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1999), 333-339. 
41 Sun Shiming 孙实明, “Lun Kong Meng de Zhongyong zhidao” 论孔孟的中庸之道[Discussion on Confucius and 
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This is the other side of the “doctrine of mean”, which demands that an individual 
constrain his/her self and deny personal feelings for the sake of remaining in a state of 
moderation.43 
The contributors of these moderate opinions met radical critiques from anti-arranged 
marriage crusaders. Lu Qiuxin 陆秋心, the female chief editor of Xin Funü 新妇女 [New 
Women] and a devoted Marxist, questioned their loyalty to democratic principles. She 
argued that the so-called consensual arranged marriage was in actuality parallel in 
political terms to the Constitutional monarchy system, which had proved to be a failure in 
China.44 Lu compared three marriage systems with three political systems in order to 
illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of each.  She suggested that a marriage completely 
arranged by the parents without the consent of the children was analogous to a monarchy, 
under which the masses were largely deprived of the right to speak; in the same manner, 
she noted that a marriage arranged by the parents with the consent of the children was 
parallel to the constitutional monarchy system, under which people’s freedoms were 
limited and under the control of authorities; in an ostensibly democratic state, such as the 
new Republic of China, Lu concluded, it was essential to allow  free marriage between a 
man and a woman without any interference from a third party.  
3.2.2 The Anti-arranged Marriage Crusade 
These moderate marriage reform proposals met severe challenges from the radical New 
Culturists, beginning with Chen Duxiu’s (1879-1942) assertion in 1904 that “nothing 
about Chinese marriage is reasonable.”45  In his “Kongzi zhi dao yu xiandai shenghuo”孔
子之道与现代生活  [The Way of Confucius and Modern Life] published in 1916, Chen 
went further in claiming that it was ridiculous to force gender separation on modern 
people when cross-sex socialization was practiced worldwide. The difference between 
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open socialization and gender separation, according to Chen, paralleled the difference 
between feudalism and modernity.46 
The next heavy blow to traditionalists came from Lu Xun (1881-1936), who quoted a 
letter from an unknown young man in his “Random Thoughts” as an example of how 
people suffered from arranged marriages. This young man called himself “a wretched 
Chinese …[who] doesn’t know what love is.”47 The core of his complaint was about his 
arranged marriage: when he was nineteen, his parents had found him a wife and while 
they got along quite well together he complained that “this marriage was arranged and 
brought about by others [just like] two cattle under the master’s order.”48 Lu Xun made 
no personal comment in his article and only replied to the question of what constitutes 
love with a simple “I do not know either”.49 This response was not surprising, 
considering the fact that Lu Xun at that time was himself still trapped in an unhappy 
arranged marriage to wife Zhu An 朱安, and had not yet met his true love Xu Guangping
许广平.50 From Lu Xun’s point of view, this letter demonstrated that “the son of man is 
awake. He knows what sins have been committed by the old and the young. So he feels 
distressed, and opens his mouth to make this cry.”51 Furthermore, Lu Xun asserted that 
loveless arranged marriages caused other social problems such as prostitution and 
concubinage. At the end of this article, Lu Xun concluded that “freeing our children 
completely” was the only way to “settle old scores.”52  
On November 15, 1919, a reluctant arranged bride named Zhao Wuzhen 赵五贞 killed 
herself in her bridal sedan on her wedding day. This incident pushed the public crusade 
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against arranged marriages to its zenith. The Shanghai newspaper Da Gongbao 
[L'impartial] opened a special column on the subject and invited people from all walks of 
life to comment on the incident. Mao Zedong established his initial fame in the circle of 
literati through his series of comments on this issue from November to December of 
1919.53 He asserted that Miss Zhao had “died for love of freedom”, identified the 
arranged marriage as a crime and claimed that “all parents who are like the parents of 
Miss Zhao should be put in prison.” 54  Like many other new culturists, Mao identified 
China’s 'evil feudal society' as the principal offender in this tragedy.  
Tao Yi 陶毅 (1896-1931), an editor of Nüjie zhong 女界钟 [Women’s Bell], presented 
her own comments on Miss Zhao’s suicide from a comparative basis:  
A young man has complete freedom to decide whether to marry his betrothed or 
to break off the betrothal. But a young woman has no freedom to decide anything 
other than whether to hang herself; she had no possible answer besides the words 
‘I would rather die’. No matter how strong she is, she cannot resist those time-
honored bright lights of Confucianism and paternal authority.” 55  
Tao identified Miss Zhao as a martyr “who sacrificed herself to reform the marriage 
system.”56 No matter how Miss Zhao’s death was interpreted, the New Culturists 
delivered an identical narrative of her plight: as one of the most basic institutions of the 
feudal society, the arranged marriage system was the origin of unhappiness and death 
and, therefore, it should be destroyed together along with the society in which it had been 
growing and developing.  
Following the May Fourth tradition, it was clear to reformers that employing a foreign 
mouthpiece was of central importance to effecting change on Chinese marriage practices. 
One such individual was Ellen Key (1849-1926), a Swedish feminist writer who argued 
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that “love is moral even without legal marriage, but marriage is immoral without love.”57 
Another foreign influence on the movement was Dora Black (1894-1986), a British 
feminist writer and the second wife of the eminent philosopher Bertrand Russell.  Black 
had accompanied her husband to China in 1920 and lectured in Beijing for a one year 
period, during which she gave two lectures addressing questions on marriage and 
women’s economic independence.58 Joining these influential women was Edward 
Carpenter (1844-1929), an English socialist philosopher who analyzed the negative 
effects of the institution of marriage and argued for sexual and economic freedom for 
women.59 Although most of these discourses were established in accordance with the 
European social context of the early twentieth century, they were contextualized by 
Chinese students in the process of implementing their own marriage reform programs. 
For example, to legitimize her demand for a free marriage system, Lu Qiuxin, an early 
member of the Chinese Communist Party, borrowed the stages theory of Socialism and 
correlated the marriage institution with the economic infrastructure on which the whole 
social system was built. She believed that marriage practice would change in accordance 
with the transformation of the economic infrastructure. As a traditional marriage 
institution, Lu argued, the arranged marriage was built on the foundations of an 
agricultural infrastructure, as part of the ‘big family system’ that worshiped parental 
authorities. However, in contemporary China, the agricultural economic foundation was 
being gradually replaced with industrial infrastructure and the ‘big family system’ was 
being dissolved. Lu concluded that the marriage institution, in turn, should be 
transformed from the arranged pattern into a free pattern in order to meet the 
requirements of such a transition.60 
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During the May Fourth movement, as more and more intellectuals changed from 
progressive to radical stances in order to embrace the cause of the New Culturists, the 
middle-course theory was soon overwhelmed by more clamorous demands for 
unconditional consensual relationships and a momentous nationwide anti-arranged 
marriage campaign. The 1920s witnessed a passionate marriage revolution in China’s big 
cities, where urban youth struggled to release themselves from their excruciating filial 
duties. The arranged marriage was termed a “mechanical marriage” and recognized by 
these young people as a product of a patriarchal family system in which the children were 
manipulated by their parents in the same way that machines were operated by workers. 
The lack of love as a factor in the process was generally nominated by critics as the first 
and original sin of this marriage pattern.61 Sometimes, the attack went to extremes in 
applying an oversimplified equation to the custom: arranged marriage = loveless sex = 
rape + prostitution. In a brief article published in 1922, Ke Shi 克士 claimed that “the 
loveless couple in an arranged marriage, even if they have lived their whole life together, 
could not possibly escape God’s final judgment for the sin of leading a life of rape and 
prostitution.”62 As a result of such fierce attacks, and in spite of the continuing 
predominance of arranged marriages throughout China, the theories of free love and self-
choice marriages had become tenets few dared to challenge in public. 
3.3 Love Revolution 
With the anti-arranged marriage crusade that started with the New Cultural Movement 
and peaked in the May 4th era, came a growing public demand for free love and self-
choice in marriage partnerships. Indoctrinated with such ideas as “love is the only basis 
for marriage” and “loveless marriage is immoral”,63 the urban youth who were struggling 
to release themselves from filial duties became the leading force of the marriage 
revolution of the 1920s. While filled with the radical desire for freedom, love and 
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romance, people often felt inexperienced and confused when confronting the 
unprecedented freedom of making their own choices in a partner. At the same time, while 
positive changes like open socialization, free love, romantic courtship, premarital 
cohabitation and self-choice marriages were all becoming common urban phenomena, 
more negative aspects of modern relationships like facile breakups, illegal love affairs, 
and divorces appeared 'like bamboo shoots after a spring rain'.  As a contemporary 
observer perceived in 1924: 
In these years, the customs of our society experienced a sudden change under the 
Western influence. Once the traditional ethics was sentenced to its death, 
marriage became the issue calling for the widest concerns…Many young people 
of our country are too hasty to catch on to the real meaning of marriage before 
taking actions, and therefore suffered painful failures…This cannot be 
considered good for society…64 
In response to the social disturbances provoked by this radical transition of marriage 
conceptions, the open debates on marriage moralities were again raised by a group of 
elites.  These men and women sought to fully reconstruct Chinese marriage norms in an 
attempt to clarify the confusion surrounding love and marriage and to provide correct 
guidance and effective solutions for the issues that had arisen.65 
3.3.1 Defining Love 
Agreeing with the observation that the “Chinese have no love; Chinese do not know the 
meaning of love; so it is impossible to discuss love with Chinese”, marriage advisors in 
China at the time often began their advice with an introduction on the nature of love. 66 
Although 'love' [ai 爱] was defined broadly in the Confucian classics, the word was more 
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often used to describe a moral sense of responsibility between a superior and an inferior 
(such as the relationships between emperor and vassal, father and son, elder brother and 
younger brother, master and servant) rather than to describe the affectionate feelings and 
intimate behavior between two lovers.67 When they did refer to this kind of intimacy, the 
classics often indicated illicit sexual involvement.   
How to interweave the Western conception of “love” with Chinese marriage discourse, 
without provoking strong opposition from both conservatives and radicals, had been a 
critical intellectual concern of the May 4th era leaders. Although the Western 
interpretation of love was familiar to the Chinese urban youth of the 1920s through early 
feminist and New Culturalist advocacy, the marriage moralists represented by the 
contributors of Funü zazhi felt it necessary to establish a uniquely Chinese interpretation 
of the concept. 
To distinguish modern love from its traditional conception, the new cultural elite created 
a discourse of “lian’ai” [恋爱 amativeness] to specify the practice of lovers. According to 
one well-accepted definition given by Wu Juenong 吴觉农 in 1922, love was “the lust 
that originated from the nature of two sexes, restricted by reasons and self-control power, 
following free minds and worshiping mutual respect, joining two parties’ souls and 
bodies to fulfill the mission of individual and race.” 68  While recognizing love as the 
natural and inevitable lust that was driven by man and woman’s biological-chemical 
mechanism in response to the demand for racial continuation, the marriage reformists of 
the May Fourth era unanimously put their emphasis on humankind’s mental control over 
sexual desire and took spiritual love as an absolute prerequisite for any sexual behavior. 
They argued that it was the human being’s capacity to restrain from sexual desire that 
distinguished human procreation from animal mating and, thus, made human love unique 
and sacred. 69 Sex, while being accepted by analysts as a necessary part of the process, 
was actually viewed by most of them as the dark side of love, in opposition to the 
brighter, spiritual side. People were repeatedly warned by these authorities about the 
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dangers of sexual indulgence and were called upon to use their mental powers in order to 
constrain their lust before the spiritual love connection was consummated. Otherwise, 
pure, sacred and virtuous love would be degraded as dirty, unsanctified and unprincipled 
licentiousness.70 Similar to the traditional Confucians, who agreed upon the inevitability 
of marital sex, these new moralists recognized engagement and marriage as the only 
procedures that could legitimize and purify sexual behavior through the ritualized 
confirmation of the love-based relationship. 
3.3.2 Confused Love Practice 
The traditional love practice, as described by one free-love advocate, was like playing 
“hide and seek” - people were asked to close their eyes and try to love anyone he or she 
could catch.71 What most worried the social reformers of the 1920s, however, was what 
would happen when people were allowed to open their eyes. When free and 
unconditional love was upheld to a paramount position, contemporary observers easily 
perceived the unrest that could be caused in big cities from the exposure of illegal love 
affairs to neighborhood gossip, sexual indulgence between young lovers, breakup notices 
in newspapers and competitive boasts from economically-motivated ladies about the 
generosity of their lovers or husbands. These concerns consequently provoked a new-
round of fears about moral decline in China.  
Part of the misunderstanding surrounding modern love came from general confusion in 
society about the latest available socializing opportunities between the opposite sexes. 
Under the strict regulation of traditional gender separation, the only open socialization 
allowed between men and women was that between a prostitute and her customer. For 
most couples, the wedding day was the first time a bride and groom met.  It was not until 
the 1920s, after female students were officially admitted onto university campuses, that 
face-to-face communication in public between the two sexes even became a possibility. 
Even then, public tolerance for socialization between the sexes was still rather low. Girls’ 
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school students, for example, constantly complained about the school administrators 
reading and confiscating personal letters from their likely boyfriends under the excuse of 
protecting the innocent, unmarried girls.72  
Marriage reformists and female activists were especially disappointed by the fact that 
many men and women ignored the significance of gender equality behind open 
socialization, and instead assumed that love and marriage were the only purpose of cross-
sex socialization.73 This misconception was caused partly by the general lack of 
experience among the Chinese people in dealing with the opposite sex due to the long 
history of gender separation, partly by the natural law of sexual attraction and most of all, 
by the contemporary social context of the 1920s. Because most commoners had not yet 
been exposed to modern ideas, wherever and whenever a young man and a young woman 
were seen spending time together, it often attracted public gossip and attention. As Yang 
Zhihua 杨之华 (1900-1973) perceived in 1922, people developed a tendency to identify 
any public communication with love, which therefore deliberately pushed them to 
develop the “business of love”, which subsequently led to meaningless sex, easy 
breakups or frequent divorces. Yang felt that that this kind of love was “caused by 
outside pressure”,  took it as an objective obstacle against individual freedom and true 
love and blamed those people “who have been steeped in the old tradition to resent and 
make a fuss about socializing between men and women” 74. 
Like “open socialization”, “courtship” was another term that was traditionally interpreted 
by Confucian thinkers as an immoral expression of illegitimate love, most often used to 
describe the relationship between prostitute and patron.75 Love stories such as “Xixiang 
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ji”西厢记 [Romance of the Western Chamber] and “Qiangtou mashang”墙头马上 [By 
the wall, on the horse] are the only traditional sources of such affairs.  In these tales, 
practices that defined “courtship” include the hero and heroine falling in love at first sight 
during a chance meeting, exchanging secret poetry, engaging in secretive nocturnal 
meetings and having hasty sexual encounters. These popular stories became the only 
available texts that could provide the Chinese youth of the 1920s with an example of 
courtship. Sometimes, courtship methods employed by inexperienced young men were 
awkward. It was said that female students often received love letters from unknown 
admirers and sometimes a girl could get several dozen love letters from one person within 
a few months. Those who were misled by sexual instinct and the popular misconception 
of cross-gender socialization found it difficult to distinguish friend from love subject. An 
accidental exchange of words, a letter or even eye contact between a man and a woman 
was easily mistaken by one or both inexperienced parties as an expression of love.76 It 
was common to see two young people rushing into a love affair or engagement after only 
exchanging letters or poetry, and even before their first formal date.77 It is no surprise that 
many such rash love affairs ended with a quick breakup or short term marriage, which 
attracted fierce critiques from conservatives as it confirmed their worst fears. 
Another source of the disturbances caused by changing conceptions in China about love 
concerned a growing interest in money among urban educated young women. 
Considering that there were still very few formally educated women in China in the 
1920s, there was a tendency among critics to suggest that young, educated ladies were 
“trading their identities as women students for rich husbands”, “voluntary play toys of 
men” or “parasites of man”.78 Their perceived money-worshipping tendency and greed 
for material luxuries led to the complaint that “free-love is a luxury only available to the 
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rich.”79 However, in a society where women were theoretically and practically 
discouraged from having an independent life, no matter how hard the ideas of 
“independent love” and “unconditional love” were pushed, it was difficult for a woman to 
find a decent, easy and well-paid career after graduation. In speaking of Nora, the heroine 
of Henrik Ibsen’s iconic A Doll’s House, Lu Xun predicted that after she left the 
dollhouse, in a society that offered her no psychological support and no means of 
financial support “she can hardly avoid going to the bad and returning…Dreams are fine; 
otherwise money is essential.”80 Finding a decent lover or husband was no doubt much 
easier for a Chinese ‘new woman’ than trying to find gainful employment.81 
The mania of a few young people for “unconditional free love” became a source of public 
disturbance in the 1920s. For instance, in 1922 Yang Zhihua published an article 
criticizing a male suitor who tried to press her into a romantic affair with him without 
considering her unwillingness and the fact that she was happily married. This man, who 
labeled himself as an advocate for unconditional love, alleged that “as long as two people 
know and care about each other, love does not depend on the amount of time they have 
spent together.” When his advances were refused by Yang, he “spread the rumor that he 
and she were romantically involved”, and “kept writing her intimate letters, asking her to 
divorce her husband and marry him.” In one letter, he said: “love is a necessity of life and 
an indication of life force. Just as when one worships and prays to God or Buddha, one 
has to continue to do so even if one’s prayers are not answered…One cannot stop loving 
simply because one’s love is not requited.” Love, in his interpretation, was simply a 
flirting game: “in society there are some young men and women who try to seduce the 
opposite sex by wearing fancy clothing and using specially rehearsed language. That is 
what people call ‘flirting.’ But wealth, fame, erudition and personality could also seduce 
people. So ‘flirting’ is nothing but a bad name a few old moralists and intellectuals gave 
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to the proletarian underdog’s expression of love.”82 Here, love was interpreted as not only 
absolutely unconditional, but also selfish and vulgar. Since the enthusiasts of  absolute 
and unconditional love insisted that “true love is a pure and forever thing that never 
changes no matter what happens” and the belief that “faith will move mountains”, their 
self-wills produced more than a few cases like the one Yang encountered. 83   
Sometimes, a man’s persistent infatuation with a woman, like the man in Yang’s case, 
was more of an issue of ‘face’ than that of love. Edward Alsworth Ross (1866-1951), an 
American sociologist who traveled to China in 1910, perceived that in the early twentieth 
century “a class of Chinese students was horrified to learn from their teacher that in 
America a young man proposing marriage to a maiden might be refused. To them the 
rejection of a man by a mere woman implied a loss of ‘face’ too dreadful to 
contemplate.”84 For a man obsessed with men’s superiority over women, establishing a 
love relation with a woman he desired is like a game between a hunter and his prey. The 
more beautiful and dangerous the prey, the more exciting and challenging the hunt would 
be and the more powerful and strong the victorious hunter would be proved. 
Pushing the idea of love freedom to its extreme, some radicals went so far as to advocate 
free sex. For example, a respondent to a marriage survey of 1927 added his comment on 
the questionnaire: “we do not need useless monogamy… Our opinion is to abolish the 
marriage system and replace it with men and women’s free union (not marriage). This is 
a union based on love. Free sexual behavior should be advocated.”85 This notion, of 
course, was cause for alarm from the marriage reformists. Addressing this bold claim, the 
surveyor Pan Guangdan 潘光旦(1899-1967), derided: “although monogamy is not an 
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unalterable principle, in current and the closest future, it is impossible to be ‘useless,’… 
in this way Chinese family problems would never ever be solved.”86 
3.3.3 Programmed Love Practice 
In order to address the public disruption brought about by changes to traditional policies 
regarding open socialization, courtship and free love, marriage advisors designed several 
'love programs' for youth to follow. These programs followed three fundamental tenets: 
first, free love should be established on the basis of economic independence, to the 
exclusion of all monetary considerations; second, the two parties in love should be 
monogamous, so as to be spiritually and sexually loyal to each other;87 third, love should 
be the union of matched bodies and matched souls. 88  
One such love program was designed by Zhou Jianren 周建人 (1888-1984), the editor of 
Funü Zazhi, and the younger brother of Lu Xun. In this program, a complete love process 
should include three phases: first, a friendship period when a man and a woman socialize 
and communicate like friends; secondly, a courtship period when a man and a woman 
who have been friends deliberately develop love feelings between one another; third, a 
consummation period when the procedure of lian’ai [corporeal and spiritual 
incorporation] takes place. Taking the idea of matched souls as the basis of any life-long 
love relation, Zhou emphasized the importance of a long duration for the friendship 
phase, in pursuit of the best understanding of each other’s personalities and interests.  He 
asserted that the breakup of a love relation was a possible outcome of undeveloped love 
caused by the lack or insufficiency of the friendship period. 89  
Many love programmers took cross-gender socialization as a dangerous shortcut to 
forming meaningful relationships and therefore attempted to design a program that might 
avoid wrongdoing while adhering to the principles of free love. A program published in 
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1923 introduced three policies that were intended to prevent such false steps. The first 
policy was to avoid unnecessary social contact between the sexes in general. The second 
policy required the two parties to keep a cool head and not broach the issue of love too 
easily. Once love had occurred, this second policy called for a precautious self-
examination in order to assess the compatibility and marriage suitability of the couple. 
People at this stage were instructed to ask themselves four questions: 1) Am I satisfied 
with his or her level of education and knowledge? 2) Do we have matched personalities? 
3) Will he or she accept my love? 4) Is it possible for us to get married? The program 
insisted that if any of the above questions could not be answered in the affirmative then 
the 'love sprout' should be terminated as soon as possible. The third policy set a general 
age limit against adolescent love with the suggestion that one should talk about love only 
after he or she had entered university.90 Like the designer of this love program, these 
marriage advisors generally tried to relieve the public’s uneasiness about cross-sex 
socialization by advocating a “marriage-tracking” socializing manner based on critical 
thinking, mutual willingness and compatibility. Marriage here was set as both the premise 
and the goal of love. Just as sex was allowed only under the condition of marriage, love 
was allowed to occur only under the consideration of marriage. 
This love program was exemplified in the love story of wife Gu Qizhong 顾绮仲 and 
husband Zhang Mianyin 张勉寅 published in 1922.91 At the beginning of the story, 
Zhang was introduced as a friend of Gu’s brother. He and his future wife did not know of 
each other until one day when Miss Gu mistakenly opened a letter that had been sent to 
her brother from Zhang.  The letter evoked Gu’s interest, so she tried to acquire more 
information about Zhang from her brother and subsequently asked for a formal 
introduction. After a few correspondences, the two got engaged through exchanging 
photos and started to see each other. Their courtship, which actually began after the 
official engagement, included face-to-face talks two or three times per week and frequent 
correspondence. In a five-day trip to Hangzhou, a couple of months before the wedding, 
                                                 
90 Zhou Baohan 周宝韩, “Zenyang shi shejiaozhengdang de taidu”怎样是社交正当的态度[What is the proper manner 
of socialization], Funü Zazhi, vol.9, no. 6 (1923):116-117. 
91 Gu Qizhong & Zhang Mianyin, “Women de jiehun”我们的结婚[Our marriage], Funü Zazhi, vol. 8, no.1(1922): 32-
41. 
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they slept together for the first time. They got married with a simple tea-party wedding on 
July 9th, 1921, and reportedly lived happily ever after. 
The lian’ai process in the story of Zhang and Gu revealed the hybrid nature of the love 
practice in China in the 1920s. Like most of their conservative countrymen, the couple’s 
pre-engagement contact was limited to indirect knowledge and the exchange of a few 
letters.  Photos were exchanged only after the engagement was made. Although the match 
was formally arranged by Gu’s brother (their parents had passed away years earlier), her 
eagerness to settle on a marital engagement illustrated not only the activeness and 
autonomy a Chinese ‘new woman’ was able to use in pursuit of her own marriage 
freedom, but also the social reality that the self mate-selection opportunities available for 
women were so few that she had to take a quick and decisive move in order to seize the 
opportunity when it arose.  
It is evident that Zhang and Gu's relationship was still relatively conservative, in that 
marriage was the goal from the outset and that they only became lovers after they had 
become engaged. This example is consistent with the moderate marriage reformers’ 
proposition that engagement and marriage were the only procedures that could legitimize 
and purify sex behavior through the ritualized confirmation of love relations. In the 
progressive minds of urban youth, love and marriage were identical and served each other 
in a causal manner. Only under the guarantee of marriage could love be allowed to 
develop freely between the contractors.  
3.4 Marriage in Revolution 
The gap between the radical theory and reserved marriage practice was further revealed 
in a series of surveys conducted by sociologists and educators in the 1920s. With students 
as the main group of respondents, many such surveys were carried out in schools at 
various levels in form of questionnaires. The surveys utilized here are: Chen Heqin’s 陈
鹤琴 marriage investigation of students in the Jiangnan area (Zhejiang and Jiangsu) in 
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192192; Gan Nanyin’s 甘南引 broad survey in 1924 on students from 26 provinces of 
China studying in Beijing93; Pan Guangdan’s 潘光旦 survey in 1927, which included 
participants from all walks of life94; Chen Lilan’s 陈利兰 marriage survey of 200 women 
students from Beijing in 192995; and Zhou Shuzhao’s 周叔昭 investigation in Yanjing 
University in 1931.96 With the exception of Chen Lilan’s all-female survey, only a few of 
the other studies involved women respondents: Pan Guangdan’s survey involved 44 
women and Zhou Shuzhao’s study included 45 female participants. Considering the 
issues of marriage and family, these surveys provided first-hand statistical data on how 
marriage thoughts were transformed and practiced in the May Fourth era by the most 
privileged societal group that was in the closest contact with Western social institutions. 
                                                 
92 Chen Heqin, “Xuesheng hunyin wenti zhi yanjiu”学生婚姻问题之研究[Studies on the marriages of students], 
Dongfang zazhi, issue 18, no. 4,5,6 (1921). Collected in Li Wenhai ed.,Minguo shiqi shehui diaocha congbian, 1-33. 
Chen was a professor of education in the Southeast University and carried on an investigation of 266 male students 
in the form of questionnaires about their marriage opinions. Participants were divided into three cohorts: married 
(184), engaged (181) and single (266).  
93 Gan Nanyin, “Zhongguo qingnian hunyin wenti diaocha” 中国青年婚姻问题调查 [Marriage investigation to the 
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average age being in their 20s. Similar to other studies, the respondents were divided into three categories: married 
(395), engaged (130), single (315).  
94 Pan Guangdan, “Zhongguo zhi jiating wenti” 中国家庭问题 [Questions on Chinese Family], Xinyue shudian, 1928. 
Collected in Minguo shiqi shehui diaocha congbian, 259-359. Among Pan Guangdan’s 317 respondents, 44 were 
women, and 274 were youths. Most of them came from the Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, accounting for 77% of 
the total. As for occupation, 141 of 273 male respondents were in academia as students, researchers or teachers; 68 
were in business; 20 in transportation and 9 in a political field. As for women respondents, 29 were in school as 
students or teachers, others were writers (1), school staff (4), doctors (2), artists (1) or were jobless and stayed at 
home (5). As for the education level, 116 were in the level of university (36.6%), 158 were in high school (49.8%),  
24 were in elementary school, 10 were home educated, and 9 unmentioned. Among them, 151 men and 25 women 
were single, 102 men and 16 women were married, 1 was a widower and 4 were widows; 4 were divorced men, 1 
man was in a free love relationship, 1 woman was celibate, 12 individuals remained unmentioned.. 
95 Chen Lilan, “Zhongguo nüzi duiyu hunyin de taidu zhi yanjiu” 中国女子对于婚姻的态度之研究 [Studies on 
Chinese women’s Marriage View], Shehui xuejie, vol. 3, no.6 (1926).  Collected in Minguo shiqi shehui diaocha 
congbian, 224-251.This was an investigation of all female students. Although 500 questionnaires were distributed, 
only 200 were fully answered. Most respondents were women students studying in Beijing, who came from thirteen 
provinces but mostly of  Zhili origin (72 out of 200). Age ranges were from 14 to 27, with most being 20-24. Again, 
the data was divided into three cohorts: married (40), engaged (40) and single(120).  
96 Zhou Shuzhao, “Jiating wenti de diaocha”家庭问题的调查 [Investigation on Family Questions], Shehui wenti, vol.1, 
no.1 (1931). Collected in Minguo shiqi shehui diaocha congbian, 360-381. The investigation was held in 1931 at 
Yanjing University. It included 188 participated students, 143 men and 45 women. 
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3.4.1 Why Marry?  
Why do people get married or what is the goal for people in a marriage? These are 
questions that often appeared at the top of the questionnaires. The decline of the 
traditional family conception following the May 4th movement led to a significant 
transformation of marriage goals among the urban elite, who were then engaging in an 
enthusiastic pursuit of modernization. In Gan Nanyin’s 1924 survey, among the 249 
single male respondents who gave explicit answers to “why marry”, 213 believed that 
marriage should serve individual purposes.  These purposes could vary from finding a 
good helpmate at home, satisfying a human’s sexual needs, giving spiritual comfort, or 
pursuing domestic happiness. Only 36 respondents (14.45%) considered the purpose of 
marriage was to continue the family line. Zhou Shuzhao’s 1931 survey at Yanjing 
University yielded similar results: 56 out of the 143 male students who participated 
agreed that the first priority of a marriage should be to enjoy romantic love and live 
together with one’s love. Producing children remained in second place as a priority, with 
54 supporters.97  
Compared to men, educated women seemed more idealistic regarding the subject of 
marriage. Chen Lilan’s marriage survey in 1929 revealed that while women played a 
relatively active role in pursuing their own marriage happiness and considered marriage 
an individual matter, they also felt it concerned social responsibility and human duty. The 
sublime goal of marriage, Chen concluded from the answers she collected, “is to match 
the souls of two, which is not only a physical match, but also a mutual attraction of spirit 
and intellect. The goal of marriage is to increase mutual happiness, to serve the country, 
to fulfill the mission of producing capable and quality citizens for the country.”98 
For most urban commoners and the rural population, however, producing male 
descendents in order to continue the family line was still the dominant purpose of 
marriage. This tendency was primarily revealed in Pan Guangdan’s 1927 survey.  Pan 
utilized the answers of 317 respondents, whose educational background ranged from 
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university to home-educated. Most of the respondents chose “producing good children” 
as the first goal of a marriage, followed by “romantic life with a life partner.” The option 
of “serving parents” ranked third in importance while “sexual desire” was the last. 
Among Pan’s 116 respondents with university degrees, 48% chose romantic love as the 
first goal of a marriage. Contrary to the most educated cohort, none of the 24 participants 
with an elementary school education cited romantic love as being of primary importance 
in a marriage.99 
Pan Guangdan, as one of China’s most distinguished sociologists and eugenicists with a 
Master’s of Science from Columbia University, showed uneasiness with Chinese young 
people’s overemphasis on “romantic life”. His experiences in America (1922-1925) led 
him to consider the growing demand for romantic life in China as a sign of over-
developed individualism.  He believed that the spread of this kind of thinking might lead 
to a marriage crisis in which men and women were irresponsible, sexually indulgent, and 
ignorant of their familial duties.100 Pan believed that the primary duty of a marriage was 
to produce and raise children and that this duty was particularly vital for Chinese society 
where family was the basic social unit. His argument was that it was the children, instead 
of the couple, who should be the center of a family. Once this center was removed, he 
feared, the family would collapse, which would then create social disorder.101   
3.4.2 Who Decides on a Marriage? 
After the May Fourth mania for personal freedom faded, there was a general return to 
conservative marriage thinking in China. Social surveys of the 1920s demonstrated that 
most people investigated were married by third party arrangement. Gan Nanyin’s 
marriage survey in 1924, for example, shows that of the 395 married subjects, 341 were 
married to arranged partners and 91 out of 130 subjects were engaged by arrangement.102 
Although more and more people believed in individual autonomy for marriage decisions, 
few youths actually had enough courage to entirely exclude their parents’ opinions from 
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the process. When Pan Guangdan conducted an investigation at two universities in 1926, 
most respondents (78.2% at one school and 79.7% at the other) agreed that there were 
benefits in making a joint decision between the individual and his or her family.103 Pan’s 
survey the following year yielded a similar result: although 312 out of 317 respondents 
disagreed with total parental control of marriage decisions, 253 of them considered that 
parents acting in a consultant role was necessary and suggested that children listen to 
parental opinion. According to Pan Guandan, the final decision for a marriage should be 
left in the hands of cautious and objective parents, rather than those of hot-headed youths 
in love.104 Zhou Shuzhao's survey shows that among his 188 respondents at Yanjing 
University, 63.29% supported this kind of joint decision process for modern marriages.105 
Compared to men, female students were more active and autonomous in making marriage 
choices. Chen Lilan’s 1929 survey of 80 married or engaged female students showed that 
most participants (52 out of 80) were married or engaged under their own free wills or 
from a joint decision made with their families.106 Among her 120 single subjects, 75 
expressed preference for a self-determined marriage, while 45 preferred making the 
marriage decision with their family. Thus, at the same time the arranged marriage 
practice was fading from urban life, the co-decision pattern was gaining rising support. 
Among the 45 female participants of Zhou Shuzhao’s 1931 survey, 38 chose the “co-
decision” option that combined parental consent with the daughter’s free choice.107 
While the language of free marriage called for a total rejection of the interference of third 
parties, completely excluding parents from marriage considerations was a process filled 
with guilt for those young Chinese who grew up under a conservative family system. In 
1923, one young man with the pseudonym “Mr. M” provided his personal experience as 
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an example of how painful this move was. In order to escape from his arranged marriage 
to an illiterate woman, Mr. M went to another city against his parents’ will. When he 
learned that his father was legally sued by the fiancé’s family for breaking off the 
engagement without grounds, he could not help feeling guilty. He only felt better when 
his action was encouraged by his New Culturist friends. However, his guilty feelings 
returned and redoubled upon receiving a letter from his father, in which he was told that 
his ex-fiancé had become a spinster, sworn never to marry. Although their engagement 
had been cancelled, she continued to look after Mr. M’s sick mother. Touched by her 
behavior, Mr. M in return took an oath of life-long celibacy and painfully broke up with 
his pen-pal girlfriend. His letter ended with a sigh of “now what is left to me is only 
penitence.”108 Cutting off the family and chasing personal freedom was easier said than 
done. Parental affection, the devotion of traditional female virtue and the responsibilities 
of filial piety were all parts of an ethical network that were woven into the fabric of 
Chinese society.  These traditional notions could not be broken by the individual without 
losing part of one's humanity. This might partly explain why respondents to the 1920s’ 
surveys largely preferred the moderate consensual solution over the more radical total 
rejection of parental opinion.  As Chen Heqin suggested, “under the present circumstance 
that the knowledge and morality of Chinese have not been completely constructed, a full 
copy of the Western marriage institution might cause wrongs; the best solution is a 
combination of old and new.”109 In general, urban areas in May Fourth era China saw the 
popular existence of three types of marriages: traditional arranged, radical free-choice 
and an eclectic mix of parental order with children’s consent. The third type was 
considered by many contemporaries the best for a transitional period, although it ran 
against the principles of free love.110 The tendency was to increase individual autonomy 
in order to assert one’s own leading role in marriage decision, while limiting the parents’ 
roles to being advisors and consultants.  
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3.4.3 How to Find a Prospective Marriage Partner? 
As more and more parents and matchmakers were excluded from the mate-selection 
process, the problem of finding a prospective marriage partner fell entirely upon the 
shoulders of the eligible youths themselves. Open cross-gender socialization certainly 
provided many more opportunities for men and women to get to know each other, but as 
the moralists had warned, social intercourse oriented by mate-selection could easily lead 
to moral decline and many other social problems. Nonetheless, for many post-May 4th 
youths, any intervention from a third party was considered a violation of their “natural 
love”. 
When Chen Heqin’s single male respondents were asked “what will you do to find 
yourself a marriage partner”, more than half (70 of 132) chose that the process “started 
with daily socialization and purposeful observation”. Only 38 respondents expressed their 
preference for introduction to potential partners from third parties (friends or family 
members).111 In 1924, when the same question appeared in Gan Nanyin’s survey, among 
the 313 single males, only 21 (6%) agreed on the need for the intervention of a third 
party. Friends, teachers and relatives were cited as the respondents’’ most favored 
initiators. While generally rejecting a third party’s intervention, many youths were 
confused about how to meet girls in a proper way. Almost half of Gan’s respondents (153 
of 313) considered open socialization was a viable way to meet and develop love with 
future marriage subjects. The other half (139 of 313), however, either left inexplicit 
answers or simply answered “I don’t know.” 112 
Still, inch by inch, the old customs were yielding to more modern ideas. Courtship might 
not have been as commonly seen, but young people sill conversed under parental eyes on 
occasion. Even under circumstances when they might not talk together directly, young 
people were now permitted to see each other across a room or to exchange photographs.  
The new youth in China increasingly insisted on knowing what kind of a person was 
proposed for them. More than half of the engaged respondents in Gan’s survey had met 
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their fiancés before the wedding. Furthermore, among those who claimed they had never 
seen their fiancés in person, many had still seen photos of their betrothed.113 Chen Lilan’s 
1929 survey further revealed that among highly educated girls, it had been the fashion to 
marry someone one already knew well, though there was no obvious pattern of broad 
objections to the matches arranged for them. Among the 80 married and engaged female 
respondents, 71 knew their husbands or fiancée well before the marriage contract was 
consummated.114 In a society where most families still considered women’s education 
unnecessary and wasteful, those families that did allow girls to acquire higher education 
were typically more enlightened and generous in dealing with their children’s marriages. 
The 1920s saw a radical transition in the way people picked their mates. Although the 
morality of mate-selecting socialization was still in question, developing free love from 
relationships made in open cross-gender socialization had been recognized by reformers 
as an ideal method for youth to find life partners. Generally, the educated youth were not 
satisfied with having only limited familiarity with their partners before marriage, while 
many parents felt that this was the border where their compromises lay. What the youth 
was really expecting from open socialization was not only the freedom to find love, but 
also the right of choice in partner. For those who utilized this kind of open social 
intercourse, the process was a matter of both love and freedom. 
3.4.4 When to Marry? 
Pan Guangdan’s survey in 1927 revealed a tendency for later marriage ages among 
intellectuals. Among the 317 participants, the earliest marriage age was 21 for men and 
20 for women. More than half of those surveyed remained single after 25.115 Chen Lilan’s 
1929 survey of female students indicated that the early marriage tradition had already 
been considered outdated among the “new women” circle. Most of the married women 
under her investigation got married at the later ages of 23 or 24.116 Zhou Shuzhao’s 
survey in 1931 further confirmed this tendency. About 53% of his male respondents 
                                                 
113 Gan Nanyin, 203-204. 
114 Chen Lilan, 231. 
115 Pan Guangdan, 273. 
116 Chen Lilan, 228. 
  
90
considered the ideal marriage age was 25-30 for men and 20-25 for women; Most of his 
female respondents preferred ages 30-35 for men and 25-30 for women.117 
The fundamental reasons behind people’s preference for late marriages may have 
involved the new concepts of marriage explored above, but they also depended on 
economic realities. When marriage became a matter of choice in China, people began to 
enjoy the process of mate selection and experiencing longer pre-marital romances. 
Moreover, for those who managed to enter high school or university, the earliest 
graduating age was 18, only after which could an individual find a job and gain his/her 
own economic independence. For both men and women, later marriages meant more 
guaranteed individual freedoms, more promising careers and more economic support. 
As for the age gap between genders, the surveys demonstrated that both men and women 
preferred the matches of an older husband to a younger wife.118 The reason for this 
preference, as cited by respondents, was largely cosmetic: biologically, a woman often 
looks older than a man of the same age so it was considered safer for a woman to marry 
an older husband. Chen Lilan confirmed this point by asserting that “for present women, 
age is such a critical matter that it will decide the fate of marriage.”119 This kind of 
uneasiness about age was so deeply rooted in women’s minds that it was still perceivable 
among those who had obtained the more important potential of economic independence. 
3.4.5 Whom to Marry: Mate-selection Politics 
As these social surveys revealed, utilitarian concerns such as wealth, political power and 
appearance had been theoretically excluded from the public marriage considerations of 
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the post-May Fourth generation, if not necessarily in private considerations. For many 
young people, mate selection became a rational thinking process with a straightforward 
purpose: finding an ideal wife or husband as quickly as possible. Criteria lists for 
potential partners that were recommended by marriage consultants thus often included 
categories for personality, education, profession, physical condition, interests, family 
background and moral consciousness.120 
According to the surveys, men’s criteria for an ideal wife included personality, physical 
condition, education, household managing ability, appearance, sexual morality, family 
background, profession or economic capability, thoughts on motherhood and dowry. 
Although the data for women’s criteria is less complete, the available statistics suggest 
that women were most concerned with personality, physical condition, ability to handle 
affairs, education, sexual morality, appearance, profession or economic capability, family 
background, thoughts on fatherhood and property.121  
In comparison, we find that men and women were identical regarding their top two 
priorities: personality and physical condition, with the former trait being considered 
critical for compatibility and the latter for reproduction. The first divergence between the 
genders appeared with respect to the third issue: where men expected more educated 
women, women sought men who were more capable managers (i.e. reliable). The second 
divergence appeared over issues of appearance and sexual morality: where men attached 
more importance to appearance, women felt that men should be morally conscious and 
constrain their sexual behavior.   
In general, both men and women seemed to care less about family background, wealth 
and political power than personal compatibility. Having a good personality ranked at the 
top of all the criteria lists (for both men and women), as presented in the social surveys. 
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Investigators used the word “xingqing 性情” for the English word ‘personality’, which is 
a synthesis of the characters disposition and temper. Although it may appear contrary to 
the expectations of the ostensibly liberated May 4th generation, the surveys from the 
1920s demonstrate that possessing a mild temperament was still considered by educated 
young men as the most desirable trait in an ideal wife. For example, in Chen Heqin’s 
survey, approximately 87% of the participants (223 of 257) chose “mild temper” as the 
most important personality trait in an ideal wife. A college student writing about his 
illiterate wife in 1924 commented that “her mild temper is the only thing I appreciate 
about her. She adores me so much that she obeys every word I said. Therefore I can 
possibly transform her to meet my expectations (for a modern wife).”122 The surveys 
from the later period yielded a similar result, suggesting that in spite of the gains of the 
women’s rights movement in China, the typical husband still sought a “mild tempered 
wife” that could be more easily dominated and manipulated.123  
As for the women in the surveys, who customarily had little chance to speak out about 
their expectations for a husband, most appeared awkward and inexperienced when asked 
to comment on the subject.124 Among the few who did respond to Chen Lilan’s survey, 
most respondents desired a man who was gentle.125 Although few discussed the 
motivation behind this choice, it is safe to assume that in a society where a woman had to 
marry into her husband’s family with little or no regard for love or her own arrangements, 
finding a passionate and gentle husband not only meant more affection and love, but also 
less pressure from her future in-laws. Whereas men were expecting a wife of mild 
temperament to follow their orders, women made the same choice in order to find more 
romantic and affectionate family circumstances.  
The physical condition of potential partners that were discussed in the surveys often 
comprised two aspects: health and appearance. Although both men and women ranked 
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physical health as second in importance only to personality, physical appearance was less 
a concern for both men (ranked 5th) and women (ranked 6th).126 Under the influence of 
eugenics theory, Chinese intellectuals were of the opinion that the weak physical 
condition of parents was to blame for the production of unhealthy babies, and ultimately 
made for a weak nation. For most women, however, marriage was still a singular 
business, and the value of a married woman lay primarily in her reproductive capabilities. 
Whether or not the husband was healthy enough to inseminate her would decide the fate 
of the latter half of her life.    
The image of a physically healthy woman in China changed in accordance with the 
transition of people’s aesthetics. In the 1920s, the term ‘natural’ came to be defined as 
healthy, and this definition applied specifically to women’s physical appearance, with the 
condition of their hair and feet being of particular importance. In China, appearance had 
never ranked high as a factor in choosing an ideal wife, even after the decision-making 
rights had been transferred from parents to children. The investigations of both Pan 
Guangdan and Zhou Shuzhao showed that appearance ranked fifth among the male 
respondents’ wife-selection considerations, next to personality, health, education and 
household management ability.127 However, excluding appearance from the top three 
marriage considerations did not mean that Chinese men did not care about their wives’ 
appearance at all. For example, Chen Heqin’s 1921 report indicated just how much these 
men did care about a woman’s looks. Among his 257 respondents, only 24 men (9.34%) 
claimed that they did not care at all about their wives’ appearance. Conversely, more than 
half (54.28%) expressed expectations for a good-looking wife and about one third 
(35.74%) claimed a preference for simple looking women.128 
It is not unusual that men would be attracted to beautiful women, but it is unusual when 
they are not. A couple of considerations may help explain this result. Firstly, it had been a 
tradition of Chinese literature to call beautiful women huoshui 祸水 - the source of 
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trouble. The man who allowed himself to become emotionally involved with beautiful 
women was often criticized as being fatuous and lascivious. This belief led to the popular 
saying “marry a wife for her virtues, take a concubine for her beauty.” Secondly, the 
traditional belief that the simpler a woman looks, the more obedient and virtuous she is 
was further validated by the growing concern for money among contemporary urban 
ladies. Many women spent freely on luxuries such as makeup, clothing, jewelry and 
accessories.  This new trend prompted the public belief that beauty ‘cost a fortune’, 
which was in contrast to the continuing value placed on hard work and simplicity.129 
Conversely, a woman without thick makeup, expensive clothes and jewelry often left the 
impression of a person who led an austere life, which was suitable for a good housewife. 
Lastly, according to the free-love discourse, two people who truly love each other should 
not care about the other party’s appearance. An open claim of one’s preference for 
simple-looking girls would be the best demonstration of one’s belief and support for true 
love. Considering the slight probability that a woman would be both virtuous and good-
looking, men had to make the moral choice of putting virtue above appearance in order to 
avoid public criticism.  
As for what constituted a physically attractive female in 1920s China, hair and feet were 
of primary importance.  With the exception of a few fashionable female students, 
professionals and radical activists who dared to cut or curl their hair, most women still 
combed their hair into traditional styles: plaits for single women or buns for married 
women.130 The surveys revealed that “dark long hair” was still an indispensable part of a 
single man’s dream-girl image.131  Girls’ feet were also represented as a serious 
consideration of male thinking on potential partners in the surveys prior to 1930. As more 
and more educated young men became infatuated with women who had unbound feet, the 
                                                 
129 In Gan Nanyin’s survey on single men’s preferences for women’s disposition, most respondents (207) checked the 
option “advocating thrifty and simple lifestyle.” Comparatively, far fewer respondents checked the options 
“beautiful looking” (139) and “dandified” (17). Minguo shiqi shehui diaocha congbian, 190. 
130 According to Gan’s survey, among the 397 husbands, only six managed to have their wives cut their hair.  
131 Gan Nanyin’s survey revealed that women’s hair was still a matter in consideration as late as 1924. Among the total 
842 respondents, 57 left no answer, 396 (47%) agreed that their wives or future wives could cut their hair, while 389 
(46%) disagreed. Most male consenters to women’s cutting their hair were married men (213 of 396), and dissenters 
were mostly engaged or single men. 
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custom of footbinding rapidly retreated from urban life.132 Gan Nanyin sorted out a direct 
correlation between men’s affections and their wives’ feet. In his married cohort, 242 of 
397 men had wives with bound-feet but only 34% of these men said they had affection 
for their wives. Among the 40 men whose wives’ feet were 'liberated', however, 46% 
showed affection for their wives. This rate was improved to 53% for the 96 men whose 
wives had never bound their feet.133 In summary, men’s aesthetic judgment in the May 
Fourth era evolved to appreciate more natural looks in women: feet without the distortion 
of traditional binding, natural hair without artificial styling and a natural face without 
over-applied makeup all made up the definition of a modern and attractive woman. For 
Chinese men, their wife’s appearance still ranked next to her virtue and reproductive 
ability.134  
 Compared to men, women’s expectations on the issue of physical appearance were much 
simpler. In Chen Lilan’s investigation, only 15% of the single female respondents were 
concerned about whether or not their future husbands would be good-looking.135 This 
trend is not uncommon, considering the popularity of finding a “talented groom and 
beautiful bride” [langcai nümao 郎才女貌], a common phrase used to describe an ideal 
match. Although men had pledged to focus more on women’s virtue and talent than on 
their appearance, women generally stuck to the traditional emphasis on men’s talent, 
since it would fundamentally decide the living condition of their married lives. 
In the 1920s, the theory that ignorance is a woman’s virtue had been reversed through the 
full development of women’s education. Educated girls were now ‘selling like hot cakes’ 
in the matrimonial market. This tendency was testified to again and again in the social 
surveys. For example, Chen Heqin’s survey in 1921 showed that more than half of the 
respondents (131 out of 219) not only expected educated wives, but also preferred 
women with a higher education. Gan Nanyin’s survey further demonstrated that illiteracy 
and a lack of formal education had become a dominant problem that endangered existing 
                                                 
132 Dorothy Ko, Cinderella’s Sisters: A Revisionist History of Footbinding (Berkeley , Los Angeles, and London: 
University of California Press, 2005), chapter 2. 
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marriages. Among the 395 married male respondents, 64% had wives who had never 
entered school. 233 of these men said that they were dissatisfied with their wives’ 
ignorance and illiteracy, many of them thereby expressed resentment for their marriages 
and some even wanted to sue for divorce as a result. Where illiteracy had once been a 
woman's virtue, it was now a liability and female education had become one of the most 
important quantities in a potential marriage partner.  As many families started to realize, 
“at present, it is very difficult for a girl without school education to find an intellectual 
husband even if she is wealthy.”136  
3.4.6 To Marry or Not? 
While most Chinese social theorists were concerned with reforming the institution of 
marriage, more than a few radicals and anarchists sought to abolish it altogether, or even 
to adopt lives of celibacy. The advocates of marriage abolishment, or feihun zhuyi 非婚
主义 introduced Russian-born American anarchist Emma Goldman (1869-1940) as their 
mouthpiece. In 1897, Goldman openly spoke out in favor of “the independence of 
woman, her right to support herself; to live for herself; to love whomever she pleases, or 
as many as she pleases.”137 Goldman’s article “Marriage and Love” defined marriage as 
an economic arrangement and an “insurance pact” that sucks away a woman’s soul by 
making her a parasite and an absolute dependent. Therefore, she proposed a situation 
born out of love instead of from marriage.138 Although Goldman accused the marriage 
institution mostly from a feminist perspective, her male Chinese followers put more 
emphasis on achieving the unlimited freedom of love. As Zhe Min 哲民, a contributor of 
the journal “Juewu”觉悟 (Awakening), argued in 1920:  
 “It is the existence of a marriage system that leads to the division of husband 
and wife; this division then becomes the source of all kinds of gender 
inequalities, and discriminations towards women...a marriage system not only 
causes family tensions, and constraints between father and son, but also 
                                                 
136 Hu Jiaoqin 胡焦琴, “Nüzi qiuxue bujin zai zengyi zhishi” 女子求学不仅在增益知识 [The purpose of women’s 
education is not just about increasing knowledge], Funü zazhi, vol. 9, no.6 (1923): 34-35. 
137 Alice Wexler. Emma Goldman: An Intimate Life (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 94. 
138 Emma Goldman, Anarchism and Other Essays (New York & London: Mother Earth Publishing Association, 1911), 
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provokes a lot of inheritance problems. Without a complete rejection of marriage 
system, there will never be brightness and happiness in China...”139 
Labeling themselves as lovers of freedom and opponents of the 'feudal family', many 
young men took marriage abolition as a panacea to all social problems. Through rejecting 
arranged wives and cohabitating with younger, prettier and better educated lovers, these 
radicals saw themselves as cutting off feudal bonds and challenging patriarchal 
authorities, though this behavior was socially criticized as simply loving the new and 
loathing the old’.  
Again, like with other changing perceptions, men and women had diverse grounds for 
supporting marriage abolition. While men preferred to look for unlimited free love, many 
women chose to adopt celibacy. Employing celibacy as a political tactic against 
unwanted arranged marriages, dangerous and endless childbearing and the demanding 
duties of motherhood was not unusual in Chinese history. As early as the1900s, there had 
been celibate women groups known as “zishunü”自梳女 [self-wedded women], who 
lived together in communities in Southeastern China. However, in the first two decades 
of the twentieth century, women’s celibacy began to win more widespread public 
attention. In 1916 the Shanghai shibao 上海时报 [the Shanghai Times] reported that 
“fifteen young girls from rich families in Nanjing organized a society named ‘Not 
Marry’. The members of this society swore not to marry and advocated simple 
appearances.”140 Similar societies or associations were reported to have been established 
throughout China in the 1910s. On May 11, 1920, twenty-year-old Chen Ciduan 陈赐端 
committed suicide when her parents declined her plea for adopting celibacy and arranged 
for her marriage against her will. In a letter left to her family, Chen imagined she would 
have a miserable married life and claimed that she preferred death to such an existence. 
This case was similar to Zhao Wuzhen’s, the above mentioned bride who committed 
suicide in her wedding sedan. Chen Ciduan was labeled a martyr for women’s celibacy, 
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and as a heroine who sacrificed herself in a battle against the traditional marriage 
system.141 
Celibacy, originally considered a personal choice, was proposed as a kind of “ism” 
during the May Fourth era. When educated groups of men and women were given the 
privilege of pursuing a professional career, one women had never been granted before, 
love itself was considered by many of them to be a distraction from one’s whole-hearted 
devotion to his/her career. Zhang Ruoming 张若名 (1902-1958), the first Chinese female 
to obtain a PhD. in France and a co- founder of Juewu she 觉悟社 [Awakening society] 
in 1919, believed that life-long devotion to one’s career was necessary for Chinese 
women’s emancipation:  
To contribute to "women's liberation", some of us have to take it as a life-long 
career, and devote herself into it wholeheartedly... According to the present 
condition of China, for those who are willing to be the vanguard of women's 
liberation, the best choice is to remain single.142 
Among a few highly-educated professional women like Zhang, life-long celibacy or 
marriage at a later age became a social trend that openly testified to women’s desire for 
gender equality, freedom of love and rejection of feudal duties. What should be noted is 
the fact that the real number of life-long celibate women was small, although their voices 
were loud. Most of these women eventually gave up single life due to various personal, 
social or economic pressures. The lack of economic independence and social recognition 
for these women were the biggest barricades against widespread adoption of life-long 
celibacy. Women without a stable income and strong minds often ended up either 
returning to the traditional domestic domain, or escaping into a nunnery.143  
Most people, of course, did not agree with the choice of celibacy. According to Gan 
Nanyin’s 1924 investigation of marriage, among 835 respondents, only 13% agreed with 
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the concept of celibacy, and most of the supporters were those already engaged by 
arrangement but who did not dare to cancel. Fear of lifelong loneliness and boredom and 
going against human nature and evolution were the main reasons the respondents cited 
for their opposition to celibacy.144 
3.4.7 ‘Love the New and Loathe the Old’ 
Although it was not uncommon for educated men in the May Fourth era to reject their 
arranged spouse in the name of anti-feudalism and free love, most people were confused 
over how to deal with their unsatisfactory matches. When Gan Nanyin’s married cohort 
was asked about how to deal with an unwanted wife, they were given four options: 
divorce, concubinage, inhospitality and expecting early death. However, most of the 
respondents (215 out of 390) refused to answer this question because they thought it was 
impossible to solve this problem under the contemporary social context.145 Although 
there is no record of how women thought they would deal with their unwanted husbands, 
it is certain that they would have been more confused and desperate at the prospect than 
men, who still had choices other than suicide to deal with the issue. 
Divorce was not an entirely new idea in twentieth century China: it had long been 
possible for a man to divorce his wife based on the traditional 'Seven Grounds'.  These 
included disobedience to one’s parents-in-law, failure to bear a son, lascivious conduct, 
jealousy, malignant disease, loquacity and theft.146 In the modern age, these grounds 
shifted from an emphasis on the faults of women to an emphasis on love. However, it was 
still the norm in the modern period to regard divorce as being a result of a woman's failed 
virtue. Moreover, legal, social and economic protection for divorced women was slow to 
develop. How to deal with the dissolved marriage was a major social controversy. Both 
divorced parties would have to confront a series of social pressures; while the husband 
was criticized for disrespecting women, ‘loving the new and loathing the old’, the wife 
might face poverty, a bad reputation and life-long loneliness. 
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Caught by the contrast between their thirsts for free love and their guilt over betraying 
their spouse and acting in an unfilial manner, many men embraced bigamy. Under the 
recognition that an arranged marriage contract was a life-long commitment of the 
groom’s family to the bride, and that the life of a divorced woman might turn out to be 
very hard, some professional marriage advisors suggested that formal divorce was not 
necessary.147 Although it was the husband who decided whether or not to separate from 
his old-style wife, his spouse could decide not to agree to divorce and remain with her 
parents-in-law even after her husband had established another family outside the natal 
household. Among the upholders and followers of this theory were many great names, 
including Chen Duxiu, Lu Xun, Guo Moruo 郭沫若 (1892-1978) and Jiang Jieshi 蒋介石
(1887-1975).148 Their marriages, however, were either erased from the official histories, 
marginalized in their biographies, or presented in the form of romantic stories that were 
full of admiration for their revolutionary spirits and passion for true love and male 
charisma. 
The practices of bigamy and polygamy in China had been a big concern of women’s 
rights activists and moralists until the 1920s. It was not uncommon for one man to have 
more than one wife simultaneously in different cities in the form of either cohabitation or 
actual marriage. In most cases, the women involved were mutually ignorant of the others, 
and were incapable of preventing such developments when they were not: the wife who 
was restrained inside the domestic sphere by the traditional gender division had no 
authority to interfere with what her husband was doing outside of her own household. 
Only under conditions where women could step out of the domestic sphere at will could 
they gain equal respect in a marriage, or get rid of an unwanted marriage.149 
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From these surveys and forums, one can perceive the confusion and disturbance that 
surrounded the changing conceptions of love and marriage in China during the transition 
period. Four issues were commonly attributed to these changes: moral decline caused by 
the temporary lack of ethical principles during the transition; a lack of clarity over the 
real meaning of love and confusion between sexual desire and emotional love; unequal 
educational opportunities for men and women, which led to women’s inability to gain 
independence, inflated vanity and consequently openness to temptation from men; and 
ineffective legal legislation prohibiting the practices of bigamy and polygamy.150 In a 
society where women’s professions were not fully developed and supported, the 
increasing calls for free love and independent spirit could only become a burden on those 
women who could not economically afford independence. 151 In the 1940s,  what had 
been primarily an urban marriage problem turned into a more widespread economic one, 
as more and more young women had to trade their marriages or sexual freedoms in return 
for temporary or even life-long sustenance. The fundamental solution to this love unrest, 
in this sense, lay more in the achievement of women’s emancipation than in any other 
factor. 
3.5 Rural Marriage: Renewed Traditions 
Speaking broadly, the marriage reforms outlined above had not reached farther than the 
cities and the upper classes until the third decade of the twentieth century. In the 
countryside, people continued to live in more traditional, pre-modern, ways. Although the 
prestige of Li was slowly declining, its function, especially within the family dynamic, 
was still very strong and even tended to become stronger as other social relationships 
were affected by the changes of the modern era.152 Much of the population of rural China 
was not yet aware of the existence of choices such as free love and self-determined 
marriages. Based on her field investigations among the rural population of the Liuquan 
柳泉 area in the early 1930s, scholar Pan Yumei 潘玉梅 concluded that in this area 
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marriages were still largely arranged.153 Having a matched family background, the 
groom’s bread-winning ability and the bride’s appearance were the three primary general 
principles for consideration in mate selection.154 Parental orders and a matchmaker’s 
words were also still imperative in making a marriage decision:  
Parents’ order and matchmaker’s words remain the most important elements in 
rural marriages…When a girl reaches her marrying age, her parents will discuss 
her marriage with relatives and matchmakers whenever they meet… if her 
family is poor, one word of her parents might decide her whole life. It is not 
until the eve of her wedding that the bride came to be informed on how her 
marriage was arranged.155 
Among the 233 married women under investigation, all were married under the 
arrangement of their parents, matchmakers, relatives or neighbors. Most of them were 
engaged by the age of 15 and married by 17. The investigator made particular note of a 
unique phenomenon: those girls from rich families often married much older husbands. 
This trend is evident in popular saying from that area: ‘bad for the first, better for the 
second, and best for the third’ [头房苦，二房香，三房赛娘娘]. The meaning behind 
the expression was that a new husband did not know how to treat his wife when he was 
first married, while in his second marriage he began to know how to treat his wife well 
and, if he had a third chance, he would know how to treat his wife like an empress. One 
rural woman who married at the age of twenty four told the investigator:  
 I was married out so late because my natal family was very picky. It was not 
until I passed my twenty-fourth birthday that they found a man good enough for 
me. Although he is 24 year older than me, he is wealthy. Owning house and land, 
we never worried food and cloth. This is very precious. We have been married 
for six years.  Now I am the mother of two daughters. Everything in this 
household goes well. Although I married late, all my neighbors admired our 
happy marriage.156 
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At the same time, rural China experienced a growing demand for betrothal gifts and 
dowries. Continuous natural disasters and warfare during the early twentieth century 
caused a rapid decline in rural living conditions.  Marriage, therefore, became a 
convenient way for a family to accumulate wealth. For many poor parents, exchanging a 
daughter for cash became a strategy for survival. For example, in the Lechang 乐昌 
county of Shandong, a peasant family generally did not ask for betrothal cash in the early 
Republic era.  After the 1920s, however, the family of the groom was often asked for 
betrothal gifts ranging from one hundred to three hundred yuan.157 According to one 
investigation of 1530 households in northern, central and eastern China conducted in 
1920, the cost of marrying in a daughter-in-law accounted for 25% of a family’s annual 
cost of living in the north, but almost 40% in the central and eastern regions.158 In 1930, 
in Jiangcun 江村, a village in Anhui province, the total cost of a betrothal gift, dowry and 
wedding banquet was about 500 yuan, which was  almost the same as the living expenses 
of an average family for an entire year.159 This rapid increase in marriage expenses 
caused men’s ability to afford a wife to drop steeply on the one hand, and the popularity 
of adopting a daughter-in-law to rise on the other. The latter fact was supported by the 
work of sociologist Qiao Qiming 乔启明 (1897-1970), who conducted an investigation of 
22 villages in 11 provinces in China during a period from 1929 to 1931.  Qiao uncovered 
that the custom of adopting a daughter-in-law was practiced in most areas as “the most 
economical strategy” by both the bride and groom’s families, neither of which could 
afford the betrothal gifts and dowries,”160 
3.6 Legalized Love and Marriage 
Before the Nanjing government was established in 1928, there had been no real official 
effort made to rationalize the legal structure along the lines of the societal changes that 
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were then taking place in China.  The marriage laws used and practiced before 1930 were 
basically a synthesis of the Great Qing Code and the legal precedents of daliyuan 大理院
[The Supreme Court] from the pre-modern era. Although law-makers kept instilling new 
elements into their legal practices in order to meet the new judicial requirements that 
were emerging after the 1910s, they could not effectively solve the marriage problems 
that arose due to the hybrid nature of the legal institutions themselves. 161 For example, in 
the 1920s the Qing stipulation that any marriage required the express permission of the 
parents was still legally retained and the written legal code on divorce was still largely 
based on the “seven grounds” mentioned above. No article had ever officially 
contemplated marriage as being a matter of free choice for men or for women. When the 
Nationalist Party (GMD) established its regime in 1928, marriage laws had lagged too far 
behind people’s actual thinking on marriage practices to provide effective solutions to the 
complicated issues of modern Chinese society. 
On May 5, 1930, the Nanjing Nationalist government officially enacted the Marriage 
Law (under Book IV- Family). Referring to legal codes on family from other modernized 
nations, especially those of Germany and Japan, the 1930 Code marked a radical 
conceptual departure from the past. Where the Qing code viewed the patrilineal family as 
the basic social unit, the new code placed the individual, male or female, at the center.162  
Keeping in mind that a civil code could not disregard the cultural and social context in 
which it was to operate, the Nationalist law-makers undertook the adoption of the foreign 
laws onto existing Chinese customs. They did so by the adoption of a syncretic vision for 
China’s reformed legal system, which “combined what they considered the individualist 
emphasis of the West with the familial emphasis of Chinese tradition, into something new 
that was ‘social’ in its emphasis.”163 Their guiding concern, in fact, became no longer just 
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to copy the West but was instead to work out accommodations between the Western 
model and Chinese traditions and realities.  
This desire to synthesize especially dominated the formation of articles concerning 
marriage. Every effort was made by these lawmakers to avoid unnecessary contradictions 
between codified laws and customary practices. Even though the first article under the 
“Marriage” category clearly stipulates that “An agreement to marry shall be made by the 
male and female parties of their own accord” (Article 972), many compromises can be 
found in the articles that followed. For example, the parental authority over marriage 
decision-making was legalized through the specifications in the following articles: 
“where a minor makes an agreement to marry, the consent of his statutory agent must be 
obtained” (Article 974) and “A minor must have the consent of his statutory agent for 
concluding a marriage” (Article 981). However, the code also provided the principals 
with full grounds to cancel any unwanted engagement that had been arranged by their 
parents (Article 976).164 
As for divorce, mutual consent was made possible, and the only required formality was a 
written document signed by two unconnected witnesses (Articles 1049-1050). Any 
children were to be brought up by the father, unless it was provided otherwise by 
agreement (Article 1051). Divorce by judicial decree after ex parte application was 
granted based on the following ten grounds: bigamy, adultery, ill-treatment so as to 
render life altogether intolerable, ill-treatment of the husband’s parents by the wife or of 
                                                 
164 Article 976: Where one of the betrothed parties is found in one of the following conditions, the other party may 
dissolve the agreement to marry: 
1.Where, having made an agreement to marry, the party makes another agreement or concludes a marriage 
with another person; 
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the wife by the parents-in-law to such an extent that life becomes altogether intolerable, 
continued desertion in bad faith, attempt on the life of one of the spouses by the other, 
malignant disease, serious and/or incurable mental disease, uncertainty of the 
whereabouts and mortality of a spouse for at least a three year period, when a spouse has 
been sentenced to imprisonment for not less than three years or when a sentence to 
imprisonment has been passed for an infamous crime (Article 1052).  
Sun Yat-sen’s spirit of group freedom is evident throughout the Civil Code of 1930:  His 
assertions that the “individual had no freedom, only the group had freedom” and his 
belief that the individual should subordinate his interests to the group and devote his 
talents to the benefit of it, seeking public welfare were the ideological background to the 
new laws.165 Meijer points out that “law was therefore a machine that would restrain anti-
social acts and promote things beneficial to society such as security, organization, 
morality, production, economic enterprise, culture, etc. Law should aim at the stability of 
society, the maintenance and development of economic enterprise and the adjustment of 
social interests.”166 In particular, the function of this new law was to abolish the old Li 
and replace it with a strengthened feeling of national solidarity and rehabilitation. 
Confronted with a disturbed social environment, moderate moralists and legalists 
attempted to chart a middle course between progressive modernizing expectations and 
conservative social realities in order to achieve a peaceful transition from old to new, 
from traditional to modern and from customary to legal.  
In China, there has long been a substantial gap between practiced customs and written 
laws. This gap was even more distinct in the case of the 1930 Civil Code. Its impact 
never reached farther than the populations in cities and among the upper classes. Aside 
from the fact that Chinese people in general were traditionally very weak in 
understanding laws, two factors accentuated this general inefficiency: conservative social 
realities in China and the chaos of almost constant warfare. Although the law-makers had 
made as much concession as possible to social customs, they were blamed by their 
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contemporaries for ignoring the social situation in China and for blindly copying Western 
laws.167 Besides warlord regionalism, the constant fighting between the Nationalists and 
the Communists, and eventually the Japanese invasion, retarded the central government’s 
efforts to establish effective legal enforcement at all levels.168 When Liang Qichao was 
reviewing the Reform of 1898, he concluded that “if only changing things without 
changing laws, and only changing laws without changing people, there will be no 
difference between change and no change.”169 This conclusion might also be applied 
here: although the government tried to reform Chinese society through making new laws, 
popular reluctance to change made all its efforts vain. 
3.7 Conclusion 
In the marriage history of China, the May Fourth era marks a significant turning point 
during which the traditional arranged marriage pattern was supposed to be completely 
overthrown and the Western free-choice pattern was supposed to be admitted as a modern 
model for people to follow. Instead, what this marriage revolution brought to the 
contemporary Chinese was not only unprecedented freedom of choice, the radical desire 
for freedom, love and romance, but also confusion, disturbance and worry. 
Confronted with the evils that accompanied the granting of freedoms in matters of love, 
the marriage reformists sought to construct a new series of marriage norms in order to 
regulate people’s behavior. On the one hand, they emphasized humankind’s mental 
control over its sexual desire and took spiritual love as a prerequisite for sexual behavior; 
on the other hand, they advocated that love and marriage were identical and served each 
other in a causal term. They asserted that it was only under the guarantee of a marriage 
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promise that love could be allowed to develop freely between the contractors. These 
theories composed the basic content of the pre-1949 Chinese marriage discourse. 
A series of social surveys, media debates and legislation from the 1920s and 1930s 
exposed the fact that people’s thoughts on love and marriage were in a hybrid condition. 
While the Chinese urban elite publicly declared their preference for a postnuptial 
romantic life over reproduction as the main point of a marriage, claiming this was a 
function of modernization, for most urban commoners and the rural population, 
producing male descendents in order to continue the family line still dominated marriage 
preferences. While the language of free marriage spoke about a total rejection of the 
interference of third parties, most young Chinese chose to embrace parental supervision 
and consent, since completely excluding parents from marriage considerations was a 
painful process that inevitably caused guilty feelings. While expecting a passionate and 
romantic love experience, many youths were inclined to use a criteria checklist in order 
to select their partners more efficiently and rationally. While traditional family-interest-
oriented mate-selection politics had evolved into an individual-compatibility-oriented 
pursuit of personal happiness, the traditional power of the family in China persistently 
imposed constraints on marriage decisions, both ethically and economically. While more 
and more husbands preferred educated, natural-looking and mild tempered urban wives, 
how they were expected to deal with their old-style traditional wives was still a cause for 
public concern. While a legal code was established by the government in order to 
legitimize people’s freedoms in love and marriage, compromises were simultaneously 
made to relieve the tensions between modernizing expectations and conservative social 
realities.  
At the same time that urban intellectuals were engaging in controversies of love and self-
choice marriages, people in the countryside continued to live in traditional ways. How to 
launch an effective marriage revolution in the rural area became a major concern of the 
Chinese Communists in the 1940s, when they tried to mobilize the peasant population in 
support of their cause. This struggle is what will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4  
4 Making a Socialist Marriage 
This chapter examines the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) early marriage policies and 
practices, from the 1920s to the 1930s. The marriage issue attracted a great deal of 
attention in the formative years of the Chinese Communist Party, since many of the early 
leaders labeled themselves as being in the vanguard of the marriage revolution. As the 
pious followers of Friedrich Engels, they re-interpreted the concept of “revolutionary 
marriage” in accordance with anarchistic socialist ideals, and tested the new 
interpretations on themselves through a radical rejection of the traditional marriage 
system.   
During the Great Revolution of the 1920s, the Chinese women’s rights movement and the 
more specific marriage problems that had arisen alongside it were theoretically 
marginalized by the CCP as issues that would be naturally solved along with the 
achievement of economic independence for Chinese women. In actual practice, however, 
whenever a women’s association was founded, it immediately became the local women’s 
asylum from unhappy marriages. The CCP’s interests in marriage reform rose rapidly 
among the radical and mostly urban-born Party leadership during the Jiangxi Soviet 
period of the early 1930s. Pro-women marriage laws were promulgated by these leaders 
in order to not only destroy all the “fengjian” [feudal] marriage practices but also to 
construct unconditional marriage freedom for the individual, in accordance with Marxist 
ideals. These regulations, however, evoked as much trouble as progress within the Soviet 
due to the chaos of wartime conditions, the misunderstandings or misinterpretations of 
the Code itself among the populace, the irrational methods of implementation that were 
used by the CCP and, most of all, the contradiction between the Regulations’ radical 
nature and the conservative social realities on the ground in China. 
The first generation of “revolutionary marriages” appeared alongside the formation and 
development of the Chinese Communist Party. Some of these marriages were consensual 
love unions between radical “fanfengjian”反封建 [anti-feudal] intellectuals and 
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progressive 'new women' who were eager to replace the traditional family system with a 
socialist consensual union. Others were temporary partnerships between two secret 
communist agents serving in the CCP underground.  Another group of parings were 
arranged or semi-arranged matches between an elder party leader and a younger partisan, 
for whom the nuptials were more like a duty of the revolution than a true marital union. 
Although such marriages were often essentially common-law relationships and were 
sometimes only temporary, their consummation or dissolution were generally subject to 
the Party’s consent. Despite the fact that the free will of the two participants in a marriage 
was frequently stressed in the CCP’s written policies, Party interference in the love 
affairs of its membership became something of a party tradition during the Soviet period. 
Class background, the requirements of the revolution and loyalty to the Party all emerged 
as primary explanations for Party decisions to either arrange or prohibit a match.  
Through a careful examination of early CCP marriage theories, policies and practices, 
this chapter demonstrates that although CCP rhetoric possessed the May-Fourth spirit of 
freedom and socialist ideals about marriage freedoms, its actual efforts to act on these 
principals were frequently frustrated by the patriarchal social traditions of the Chinese 
people and their wartime expediencies. To meet these demands, women were asked to 
subordinate their personal freedoms, individual interests and even marriage choices for 
the greater good of the revolution. In general, the Party's marriage policies were defined 
more by the need for women to serve the revolution than by its stated ideal of achieving 
their liberation.  
4.1 Socialist Marriage Ideal: Marxist marriage theory 
Marxist theories first began to circulate amongst the Chinese elite in the early twentieth 
century. In 1905, Zhu Zhixin 朱执信 (1885-1920) translated parts of The Communist 
Manifesto and published them along with brief introductions to the lives of Marx and 
Engels in the Minbao 民报 [People’s Newspaper].1 However, it was after the Russian 
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Revolution in 1917, and China’s diplomatic humiliation at Versailles in 1919, that 
Marxism started to gain the full attention of certain Chinese intellectuals. In May of 1919, 
Li Dazhao 李大钊 (1889-1927) devoted a full issue of Xin Qingnian 新青年 [New 
Youth] to Marxism. And from this point forward Marxist study groups were established 
nationwide. By the mid-1920s, New Culture leaders such as Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao 
had wholeheartedly accepted Marxism-Leninism as a scientific form of socialism that 
could easily explain the complicated concept of social progress and simplify the 
confusing events of history. In July of 1921, twelve delegates attended the founding First 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai.  The twelve delegates, including 
a young Mao Zedong elected Chen Duxiu as the first Chairman and General Secretary. 
Thereafter, Chinese Communists started to apply Marxist theory toward the reformation 
of Chinese society. 
The primary theoretical source underpinning socialist views on marriage came from 
Friedrich Engels’s Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. Though the 
complete translation did not appear in China until 1929, the gist of his argument was 
conveyed in partial translations and summaries that arose beforehand and was echoed in 
the translations of August Bebel’s writings.2  Engels defined the monogamous marriage 
system “as the subjugation of the one sex by the other,” from which developed the 
antagonism between men and women and the male sex’s oppression of the female.3 By 
identifying the problem of traditional marriage as a class problem, he concluded that “the 
marriage is conditioned by the class position of the parties and is to that extent always a 
marriage of convenience.”4 This kind of marriage of convenience, according to Engels, 
“turns often enough into the crassest prostitution- sometimes of both partners, but far 
more commonly of the woman, who only differs from the ordinary courtesan in that she 
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does not let out her body on piecework as a wage worker, but sells it once and for all into 
slavery.” He conclusively categorized all marriages from before the industrial revolution 
as being in line with prostitution, which was essentially a condemnation of the marriage 
institution of  the Western world: “Marriage according to the bourgeois conception was a 
contract, a legal transaction, and the most important one of all because it disposed of two 
human beings, body and mind, for life.”5 
Achieving women’s economic independence was considered by socialist theorists to be 
the only way to truly liberate them from their lifelong work as prostitutes: when “large-
scale industry has taken the wife out of the home into the labor market and into the 
factory, and made her often the breadwinner of the family, no basis of any kind for male 
supremacy is left in the proletarian household.”6 Once wives gained financial rights that 
were equal to their husbands, Engels continued, “the proletarian family is therefore no 
longer monogamous in the strict sense, even where there is passionate love and firmest 
loyalty on both sides and maybe all the blessings of religious and civil authority…The 
wife has in fact regained the right to dissolve the marriage, and if two people cannot get 
on with one another, they prefer to separate.” 7 In summary, the fundamental solution to 
the marriage problem, according to Engels, was to replace the old and oppressive 
marriage system with a free and consensual union, based on women’s access to the work 
force and their achievement of economic independence. 
Engels glorified marriages based on mutual love and proclaimed that they were a human 
right that equally belonged to both men and women. His work suggests his belief that any 
marriage that does not rest on mutual sexual love and the true and free agreement of both 
husband and wife is immoral. However, he recognized that full freedom of marriage 
rights could only be established for the people in general when all of the economic 
influences on an individual’s choice of a marriage partner were removed.8 Following the 
theory that “only the marriage is moral in which love continues,” and the fact that “the 
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intense emotion of individual sexual love varies very much in duration from one 
individual to another, especially among men,” Engels again argued for the abolition of 
marriage altogether; he suggested that a mutually agreed upon separation would benefit 
both partners, as well as society, when affection had come to an absolute end or was 
supplanted by a new passionate love, which would then spare people from “having to 
wade through the useless mire of a divorce case.”9 
For the Chinese Communists, the major difficulty in applying Engels’ theories to Chinese 
society lay in how to conquer the major gaps that existed between Socialist ideals and 
Chinese cultural realities; specifically, the issue was in determining exactly how to adjust 
the theories in order to fit into a Chinese social context. This problem was especially 
essential regarding issues of marriage and love, since Engels' ideas were in direct conflict 
with Chinese conceptions on gender, love and marriage. In fact, the problems of marriage 
reform in the Chinese context, were often problems of adaptation and implementation. 
4.2 Liberating Marriage Through Women’s Liberation: The 
Great Revolution 
The first generation of the Chinese Communist leadership demonstrated great interest in 
offering Chinese women’s emancipation in return for their support of the Communist 
revolutionary cause. As devoted students of Engels, these leaders attributed all of 
women’s societal problems to their absence of economic independence and argued that 
socialism was therefore a natural elixir.10 Chen Duxiu, for example, identified the general 
lack of independent personalities in Chinese women as fundamentally an economic 
problem, asserting that it was only under the socialist context that women could be given 
equal access to work opportunities and thus become their own masters. Otherwise, he 
continued, “she would just go from slave of her family to the slave of the capitalist.” 11 
Chinese Communist theorists argued that women’s economic independence should be the 
essential premise upon which all other rights (such as the right to vote, to marry freely, to 
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divorce and to take paid maternity leaves) would be received.12 They warned that any 
attempt to reverse this sequence of premise and consequence was incorrect and 
misleading.13 The Resolution of the 2nd National Congress in 1922 set the basic tone of 
the CCP’s women’s movement: “women’s liberation must be accompanied by the labor 
liberation. The real liberation of women can only be obtained after the establishment of 
the proletarian regime.” 14 In this spirit, the CCP’s women’s movement during the Great 
Revolution (1924-1927) focused primarily on the nationwide establishment of women’s 
departments, as well as on the struggle of urban female workers’ for equal work 
opportunities and equal payment.15 
How were contemporary Chinese working women and their marriages changed by their 
newly available economic independence? Was it actually an elixir to the suffering of 
Chinese women? An investigation in the 1930s, performed by the American sociologist 
Olga Lang in Shanghai, Wuxi, and in the villages of Jiangsu, demonstrated that their 
working experience in factories did help some women gain power at home. Of the 46 
wives she examined who were either then employed in factories or had been previously, 
36 acknowledged that they had growing power at home. They were more often consulted 
by their husbands on daily affairs, and their advice carried much more weight with other 
family members.16 One woman explained to her interviewer why her husband always 
came to her with problems: “I have worked in the factory since I was very young and I 
know more of the world than my husband, who never left his native village.”17 The wife 
of a Jiangsu peasant said, “Since I earn money, my husband asks my advice.” Another 
young female worker in Tianjin declared, “My husband cannot beat me now and I can 
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spend my money as I please.”18 Therefore, some wives did attribute their improved 
domestic situation to their economic independence. 
Contrary to Communist expectations, however, among the women workers whom the 
CCP assumed to have the greatest revolutionary spirit, few really believed that their 
bread-earning abilities could reverse their traditional gender roles at home and gain them 
complete equality with men. Lang observed that although many informants answered 
affirmatively when they were asked whether they believed in equality between men and 
women, “it seems that most referred only to equal opportunity in education and work. 
Only a few believed in equal authority in the family.” She pointed out that these women 
generally still clung to traditional thinking on gender, such as: “Men are stronger than 
women and therefore they should rule” and “Men should rule outside the house, women 
inside.”19 A few of the women Lang interviewed even complained about their husbands’ 
incapability and looked forward to the moment when they would cease working. Lang 
therefore came to the conclusion that “the women workers had not sought to change their 
position, the change was imposed on them by their new economic role.” Instead of 
feeling liberated, these independent women suffered because their relations with their 
husband seemed to them to violate traditional Chinese ideas on gender and property. 
“The best-adjusted marriages,” according to Lang, “are those where the women do not 
dominate their husbands but are equal to them or at least exercise their domination in a 
traditional tactful form.”20  
The CCP’s emphasis on economic independence did not mean that the marriage issue 
was shunned completely. The immediate solution to the problem of arranged marriages 
that was suggested by early female communist workers was to establish women’s 
associations and to collectively oppose the arrangements. For example, Xiang Jingyu 向
警予 (1895-1928), the founder and first Chief of the Women’s Department of the 
Chinese Communist Party, believed that the low social position of Chinese women was 
caused by a backward social system.  She postulated that the emancipation of women 
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could only be achieved by a change in this social structure, which would thereby free 
men and women alike. As for the solution to the Chinese marriage problem, she pointed 
out that the arranged marriage institution had long been a tradition in China and, 
therefore, it was not something that could be overthrown by individuals. For Xiang, the 
only solution was to set up a mutual aid association for self-determined marriage, through 
which young women looking for marriage freedom could fight against the old custom 
together.21 Xiang’s confidence in the power of women’s associations found support in 
Mao Zedong’s “Report on an Investigation of the Hunan Peasant Movement”. In this 
article, Mao claimed that apart from the traditional systems of political authority in China 
(such as clan and theocratic authorities), Chinese women were also dominated by the 
authority of their husbands. Agreeing with Xiang, Mao suggested that women’s 
organizations were an effective solution to their suffering, noting that since “the women 
in many places have now begun to organize rural women’s associations, the opportunity 
has come for them to lift up their heads, and the authority of the husband is getting 
shakier every day.”22  
Like the female revolutionaries who before the Revolution of 1911 believed that 
women’s liberation could only be possible after the founding of the new republic, many 
women workers during the Great Revolution period were convinced that their secured 
liberties and equal rights could only be available after the establishment of a new social 
system. When American reporter Anna Louise Strong interviewed women’s rights 
activists in Hubei in 1927, her respondents unanimously gave answers to her questions 
about women’s liberation that were in line with the position of the CCP: 
…this injustice cannot be overcome by goodness and submission but only by 
fighting. We think you must first overthrow the old economic system and make 
a new society where people can be good. It is not possible for women to be 
equal with men just because the law says so; but if the new society is organized, 
then all people get true liberty and women also can be equal.23  
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While union organizers expected women to join their organizations for the collective 
struggle against capitalist exploitation, most union members, as acknowledged by the 
Dean of the Hubei Women’s Union of 1927, initially came to the union in order to ask for 
protection from abusive marriages. Compared to the issue of women’s economic 
independence, the issue of marriage freedom was more sensitive and paradoxical to deal 
with.  As the Dean told the reporter: 
During the period of transition until law and courts get properly established, the 
women’s unions have taken a certain power in such matters (divorce). If we do 
not grant the appeals of the women, they lose faith in the union and in the 
women’s freedom we are teaching. But if we grant the divorces, then we have 
trouble with the peasants’ union, since it is very hard for a peasant to get a wife, 
and he has often paid much for his present unwilling one.24  
Under such circumstances, she reported that skirmish or conflict was inevitable: 
There was in one district a peasant woman who begged for divorce from her 
husband and got it. Thereupon all the members of the local peasants’ union, in 
number about a thousand, said: ‘If even a woman can put away her husband, 
how much more can we men.’ They all began sending their wives home to the 
parents as a strike against the women’s union. This caused such a scandal in the 
neighborhood that at last the women’s union went to the first woman and 
begged her to go back to her husband in the interests of the peace of the 
neighborhood.25 
Strong came to the conclusion that the fundamental difficulties faced by the Women’s 
Union when dealing with the marriage problem lay in its lack of legal or social 
authoritative power.26 These difficulties were further complicated by the deep-rooted 
contradiction between individuals and families, or individual women and patriarchal 
kinship. This issue had been the biggest obstacle hindering most efforts at marriage 
reform throughout Chinese history. Until individuals took over the place of patriarchal 
families and were recognized as the basic social unit by Chinese society as a whole, the 
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authorities had no choice but to concede to the demands of families for the sake of social 
stability. 
4.3 Idealized Marriage Freedom: the marriage legislation in 
the Jiangxi Soviet 
After the breakup of the first united front in 1927, and a series of futile uprisings that 
followed, the Communists retreated to the Jinggangshan 井冈山 revolutionary base 
comprising parts of Jiangxi, Fujian and Hunan. During the five-year period that 
Communist armies held this area, they politically organized the peasant population and 
instituted various social policies. Women’s work throughout the Soviet period was 
focused on rear-area support for the war effort, necessitated by the continuous need to 
fight against the Guomindang (GMD) encirclement and annihilation campaigns.  
The peasant women in Jiangxi were recognized by the CCP as more advanced in a 
communist sense than their rural sisters in other parts of China.  The Party claimed that 
these women had great potential to be reformed into a revolutionary force because they 
“directly participate in the economy of the villages, occupy an important place among the 
troops of the poor peasants in the villages, and have enormous influence in the life of the 
peasants.”27 Chinese Communist leaders were looking to win over women’s support for 
the Communist revolution, as well as to utilize their influence over men for army 
recruitment.  On the advice of the Russian-led Communist International (Comintern) the 
CCP enacted a series of polices that aimed to “abolish and destroy the legal norms of the 
old society, to oppose the relations of oppression and exploitation of the feudal family 
and to guarantee the participation of the masses of women in the political power by the 
exercise of their rights of election and being elected, to guarantee their economic 
independence and ownership of land.”28 
                                                 
27 “Zhongguo gongchandang diliuci quanguo daibiao dahui wenjian: Funü yundong jueyi’an” 中国共产党第六次全国
代表大会妇女运动决议案  [Documents of the Sixth Congress of the CCP: Resolution on Women’s Movement], in 
Zhongguo funü yundong wenxian ziliao huibian,1918-1949, 208-214. Translated in Meijer, 38. 
28 Originally seen in Chen Cheng, Collection of Documents Taken from the Communists During the Campaigns of the 
National Government, usually referred to as the Chen Cheng Papers, reel No. 4, document No. 008. 2411, 3047,c-1. 
Translated in Meijer, 38. 
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4.3.1 The Marriage Code of 1931 
At the first Congress of Chinese Soviets, held in November of 1931, the provisional 
constitution was promulgated. Article II of this constitution provided the guidelines for 
later marriage legislation: 
The purpose of the Soviet Government is to guarantee the fundamental 
liberation of the women. Freedom of marriage is recognized and measures for 
the protection of women will obtain the material basis to enable them to cast off 
the bonds of the family by gradual stages, and to participate in economic, 
political, and cultural life.29 
Following Engels’ prediction that the traditional family would cease to exist as a social 
unit, the Communist constitution established that the state would take direct charge of 
individual affairs and provide total freedom on issues of marriage and divorce to each 
individual. This principle defined women’s marriage freedom as a powerful weapon to 
not only guarantee women’s liberation but to also help women cast off the bonds of the 
family. In this spirit, the Marriage Code called for both abolition of the 'feudal' marriage 
system and a gradual abolishment of the family system through women’s achievement of 
economic independence and active participation in public affairs. 
After a serious debate amongst CCP leaders, the Marriage Regulations of the Chinese 
Soviet Republic were officially promulgated on December 1, 1931.  Disagreement over 
the proposed regulations arose between new arrivals from Shanghai, who were 
indoctrinated in the radical urban love and marriage theories outlined above, and who 
objected strongly to the views and practices held by the local Party groups in Jiangxi, 
who themselves favored keeping restrictions on marriage and divorce rights. Eager to 
modernize rural China, the radical leaders proposed strong marriage legislation that 
contained no restrictions, mediation clauses or ambiguous qualifications.30 The 
Regulations included seven chapters: General Principles, Contracting Marriage, Divorce, 
Care and Custody of Children after Divorce, Arrangements Concerning the Property of 
                                                 
29 Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. Fairbank, A Document History of Chinese Communism (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press: 1967), 217.  
30 Kay Ann Johnson, Women, the Family and Peasant Revolution in China (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1983), 34. 
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the Man and the Woman after Divorce, Care of Children Born before Registration of 
Marriage, and Additional Provisions. 
In order to establish the principle of ‘freedom of marriage’, these Marriage Regulations 
codified an individual’s rights to marry and divorce, prohibited coercion or the 
interference of third parties in marriage and claimed freedom of choice as the basic 
principle of every official union. The established marriage age was 20 for men and 18 for 
women. Polygamy, the sale of women as wives, the practice of taking an “adopted 
daughter-in-law”, and all forms of child marriage were prohibited in the statute, as was 
marriage between men and women who were blood relatives within five generations. 
While prohibiting the traditional aspects of a marriage ceremony (such as the exchange of 
betrothal gifts, a dowry or a feast), the regulations still required the registration of any 
marriage or divorce with the local government.  For the first time, a Chinese government 
attempted to transform its citizens’ marriages from an affair of family or society into one 
that fell under the control of the state.31  
The 1931 law granted an individual the complete freedom to seek divorce in a terse and 
simple provision: “When one party, either the man or the woman, is determined to claim 
a divorce, it shall have immediate effect (Article 9).” The only legal procedure required 
was to “register the divorce with the xian [county] or municipal soviet” (Article 10). The 
provision for post-divorce arrangements obviously took the side of women under the 
recognition that “although women have obtained freedom from the feudal yoke, they are 
still laboring under tremendous physical handicaps (for example the binding of the feet) 
and have not obtained complete economic independence. Therefore, on questions 
concerning divorce, it becomes necessary to protect the interests of women and place the 
greater part of the obligations and responsibilities entailed by divorce upon men.”32 
Following this recognition, the official guarantees provided for divorced women were 
                                                 
31 Appendix B: “Marriage Regulations of the Chinese Soviet Republic of 1st December 1931”.  
32 “Zhonghua Suweiai Gongheguo zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui diyici huiyi guanyu zanxing hunyin tiaoli de jueyi”
中华苏维埃共和国中央执行委员会第一次会议关于暂行婚姻条例的决议 [The resolution on the provisional 
marriage regulations of the first conference of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet, Nov. 28, 
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根据地法制文献选编[Selected Legal Documents of the Revolutionary Bases during China’s New Democratic 
Revolution], eds. Han Yanlong and Chang Zhaoru (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1984), 788. 
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attractive: although the rearing of children born prior to the divorce is recognized by the 
law as the responsibility of the man, if both the man and the woman wish to raise the 
children, they shall be entrusted to the custody of the woman (Article 11). When the 
children have reverted to the woman’s custody, the man shall be responsible for two-
thirds of their living expenses until they are sixteen years of age (Article 14). Another 
regulation benefiting women stipulated that “if the woman has not remarried after 
divorce, the man must provide for her, or cultivate land on her behalf, until she remarries 
(Article 15).” 
However attractive the new law was to some, others did express concerns about these 
guarantees. In February 1932, a local cadre leader from Yongding 永定 county named 
Xiang Rong 向荣 wrote to the central government regarding the divorce regulations. He 
thought the regulations were unfair to men, that they would not only impose groundless 
and unwilling divorce on some men but also burden divorced husbands with their ex-
wives' living expenses. In his reply to Xiang Rong, central committee member Xiang 
Ying 项英 (1895-1941) explained that the absolute freedom to divorce was a basic 
principle that distinguished the proletarian marriage law from that of the bourgeoisie; 
giving more freedom to women in divorce rights was an effective measure in prohibiting 
men from marrying too easily, which is what had happened in the past. “The spirit of the 
marriage law”, Xiang Ying stressed, lay in “fundamentally exterminating the old ritual 
teachings of the feudal society that fettered women, and annihilating men’s oppression 
over women” Therefore, he argued, it was normal that more women than men sued for 
divorce, which was actually a positive sign of women’s liberation. 33 To encourage this 
tendency, Xiang Ying pointed out that refusing to grant a woman’s application for 
divorce because her request was groundless could not be considered in keeping with the 
ideals that were the foundations of the new law. As the pious followers of Engels’ 
marriage theory and as the dedicated students of the New Culture and May Fourth 
                                                 
33 Xiang Rong. “Guanyu hunyin tiaoli zhiyi”关于婚姻条例质疑 [Questions on the Marriage Regulations], in Jiangxi 
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Movement’s revolution, the lawmakers of the Soviet Jiangxi were so eager to get rid of 
the old customs that they refused to take into the consideration the possibility that “under 
the present circumstance that the education of the masses was still very weak, love and 
marriage disturbance would be inevitable.”34 As Xiang Ying wrote: “this is what the 
Confucian pedant fabricated to insult women. Our cadres should completely clean these 
feudal thoughts out of our minds, and uphold divorce freedom.”35 
Although the urban-centered Communist law-makers intended to benefit and protect the 
female population with these laws, the section of the leadership with rural origins 
believed that the Marriage Code should serve as a means to help poor male peasants to 
obtain wives. Mao Zedong, for example, pointed out in his investigative report of 1930 
that one of the cruelest aspects of the old Chinese society was that many of the lower 
class peasant men were unable to find wives under its rules. These men were thereby 
unable to meet the basic, minimal criteria for achieving manhood in traditional society. 
Mao argued that marriage reform would help improve the situation for these men because 
it undermined the ‘purchase marriage system’ that allowed the wealthy class to control 
more than its equal share of women, while making marriage a ruinous financial burden 
for even  middle class peasants. Mao and the Soviet government, therefore, invited poor 
and unmarried men to use the new marriage freedoms in order to find women and get 
married, despite being unable to meet traditional requirements.36 
4.3.2 Dilemma of Application 
After the Marriage Code was officially promulgated at the end of 1931, newspapers and 
magazines in the Soviet-controlled region, as well as educational classes of all kinds, 
were organized and engaged in a large-scale propaganda campaign focused on the new 
law.  The propaganda aimed at ensuring that both husbands and wives understood the 
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new marriage policies of the Party and the Soviet Government, and how these served to 
further the cause of the revolution. 
For most rural women, who had long been living under the absolute authority of their 
natal families, husbands and in-laws, the benefits brought about by the Marriage Code 
were obvious: it provided a strong legal defense against physical violence and spiritual 
abuse and guaranteed the right for women to pursue careers and personal happiness. For 
example, within a three-month period from April to June of 1932, there were a total of 
809 divorce cases and 656 marriage cases in the northeast part of Jiangxi.37 Most of these 
new couples were married under their own will and chose their own partners. In the 
divorce cases, more than half of the wives were so eager to end their unhappy marriages 
that they sued for divorce without asking for equal division of property. The local 
government regarded this as a clear sign of women’s liberation from fengjian lijiao 封建
礼教 [feudal ritual teachings].38 
In the official discourse of the CCP, this law was boasted about as “one of the great 
victories in the history of humanity [which] has burst the feudal shackles that have bound 
human beings, especially women, for thousands of years [and] won support for the 
soviets from the broad masses of people.”39 However, a very different kind of sentiment 
is found in the contemporary local reports and records, which reveal just how naïve the 
Communist enthusiasm for women’s liberation appeared to be in the face of the 
complicated and conservative environment of wartime rural Chinese society. The 
attractive divorce guarantees provided by the new legislation became the source of a 
great deal of trouble and disturbance, as it gave women unprecedented opportunities to 
separate from unwanted spouses: under the excuse of devoting herself entirely to 
revolutionary work, a woman could easily divorce her husband and leave her children to 
                                                 
37 “Gandongbei shengwei funübu guanyu funü gongzuo wenti gei zhongyang fuwei de baogao” 赣东北省委妇女部关
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38 Ibid. 
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him; the husband would then pay the family debts, raise the children, tolerate her in his 
house and even financially support her for as long as she wanted, provided she did not 
marry anyone else. This so-called ‘complete divorce freedom’ instead of balancing the 
scales, “practically undid the freedom of divorce for men, and thus impaired that equality 
of the sexes.”40 Consequently, local women’s abuse of divorce rights became a common 
practice. It was not unusual to see a woman file for a divorce immediately after a fight 
with her husband or in-laws, only to retract the claim two days later. Marriage and 
divorce became so easily obtained for women that some of them married over three times 
in one year in the frivolous pursuit of romantic love. According to a December 1933 
investigation in the Changgang xiang 长冈乡, in an area where the marriage law 
propaganda was hailed by the CCP as a huge success, one percent of women revealed 
they had gotten married three times within four and half years.41 Furthermore, contrary to 
the Party’s expectation that these pro-woman regulations could earn widespread women’s 
support for Red Army recruitment, in some cases divorce could actually be utilized by 
the wife in order to prevent her husband from joining the armed services. Many wives of 
Red Army Soldiers requested a divorce because their husbands had lost contact for more 
than a couple of years.  When refused, these women were reputed to “make a racket daily 
or gave birth to illegitimate children.”42 
This kind of manipulation of the marriage freedoms granted in 1931 inevitably provoked 
growing resentment among male peasants. As Mao had anticipated, a few economically 
disadvantaged men were able to find wives thanks to the abolishment of the monetized 
ceremonial procedures.  However, it was far more common for poor married men to lose 
their wives due to their new freedom in marriage choices, and to the convenience of 
divorce procedures. In the rural area of Jiangxi in the 1930s, where the average living 
condition was at a subsistence level and where most women were incapable of achieving 
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economic independence, a husband who could provide for his family was highly 
preferable to one who could not.  
A directive issued by the Soviet central government in 1932 acknowledged that the 
Marriage Regulations had not been well followed by the population at large. There were 
still many cases of buying and selling marriages, forced unions and child brides and both 
the physical and verbal abuse of women was still common everywhere. Furthermore, 
many local governments resorted to the use of oppressive and interventionist measures in 
order to deal with marriage problems. For example, in Xingguo, women appealing for 
marriage freedom had been imprisoned and tortured by the local cadres. Some desperate 
women instead even resorted to poisoning their husbands in order to get rid of an 
unwanted marriage.43 Merciless husbands who intended to pursue a new lover but who 
feared the new divorce responsibilities tried various methods to reject an unwilling wife.  
Examples of these methods included extreme cases of murder and the frequent use of 
violence in order to drive the woman to commit suicide.44 
The dogmatic Communist leadership, however, took any imposition of limitations on 
marriage freedoms as being contrary to Bolshevist principles.  These leaders counted any 
criticism of the new laws as stemming from conservative feudal thoughts on the part of 
the local cadres and the incapability of the woman workers and made it clear that these 
were both the fault of invalid implementation of their policies. A report given on March 
8, 1932 asserted that “the women’s work in the Soviet area was the worst of all the mass 
works [because] neither the party nor the Youth League were engaged in leading women 
to fight against the feudal customs and habits.” As a result, wrongdoing was everywhere: 
“It is common to see the mother-in-law oppress her adopted-daughter-in-law. When the 
case was reported to the local government, their neighbors helped cover their abuses … 
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These phenomena proved that women in the Soviet were still dominated by feudal 
thought, and we are at fault if they remain ignorant of the women’s movement.”45  
Responding to this critique, some local cadres adopted harsh measures in dealing with 
cases regarding marriage and divorce, in order to demonstrate their progressiveness to the 
Party: lawbreakers were confined and then forced to parade in public wearing tall paper 
hats.  These local authorities also adopted a hard line on divorce: in one case, a woman 
who wished to return to her husband was instead detained and sentenced to hard labor in 
order to pressure her to follow through with her divorce proceedings.46  
These harsh measures only provoked further resentment from the people. In 1932 for 
example, the young wife of a middle-class peasant in east-Jiangxi returned home one day 
later than expected because of a Youth League meeting. Her husband asked her at that 
time to inform the family of her whereabouts should this kind of event happen again. The 
following day, the woman reported to the Soviet government that her husband had 
forbidden her from going out and she sued for divorce. The government subsequently 
detained her husband until over three hundred male villagers petitioned the government 
to release him, insisting that the woman's claims were groundless.  These men threatened 
to divorce their wives en masse in retaliation if the prisoner was not released. After 
negotiations between the Party leaders and women workers, the husband was released, 
the wife was criticized for lying to the Soviet government and her request for divorce was 
declined.47 Cases like this happened everywhere within the Soviet region in the 1930s.  In 
the face of defiant and disgruntled male peasants, who composed the potential 
recruitment source for the Red Army, the local authorities had no choice but to find 
compromise in the new laws, generally at the expense of women’s marriage freedoms. 
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The accumulating resentment of the new laws among the male population was blamed by 
the CCP on those female workers who had emphasized the importance of dealing with 
women’s marriage problems over dealing with the issue of their participation in 
production. These women were criticized for leading the movement for women’s rights 
away from the general communist movement, for becoming isolated from the greater 
class struggle and for facilitating the emergence of a gender contradiction that could 
possibly obstruct Chinese land reform.48 A female advocate of free love could be 
criticized in official circles as being a “petit bourgeois young lady” who succumbed to 
“romanticism” and immorality, and who was worthy of incurring the “disgust of the 
masses.”49   One directive issued by the central government in 1934 struck out at such 
women:  
We can see everywhere that our working women cadres cut their hair, and 
shorten their garments. But as to being occupied by the taste of taitai [lady] and 
xiaojie [miss], they are estranged from the masses. They shout some slogans and 
sing some songs, but they refuse to make friends with local women; they 
scarcely try to inspire local women’s revolutionary spirit; they show little 
attention to the simple-looking women, and only talk to those who are pretty.  
Many women cadres are very romantic or even unprincipled in their thoughts 
and activities. This tendency to romanticize work provoked a strong revulsion 
among the masses…no one would willingly obey the orders of one so 
unprincipled.50 
Although self-determined marriage had been identified in Party doctrine as a permanent 
policy, romantic love never gained official recognition as an acceptable practice. This 
might have been caused by the contradiction between Engels’ love theory and traditional 
Chinese sexual conceptions. Engels did suggest that the mutual affection that occurred in 
a romance between the two parties be the one paramount reason for a marriage, 
outweighing all other considerations.51 Yet, he also asserted that real love affairs between 
free men and free women in societies other than the ideal proletarian “occurred only in 
the course of adultery [because] in the first place, it assumes that the person loved returns 
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the love” and thus requires that the woman have equal footing with the man; He 
continued by claiming that “secondly, our sex love has a degree of intensity and duration 
which makes both lovers feel that non-possession and separation are a great, if not the 
greatest, calamity.”52 For the Chinese who grew up under circumstances that valued 
gender separation and women’s chastity, however, female adultery was among the most 
immoral and heinous crimes.  
Romantic love between young people or cadres was therefore regarded by the public in 
general as being a very dangerous tendency that tended to disturb people’s Party service, 
cause a negative impression among the masses, damage the authority of the Party and 
weaken its leadership. Ideas on marriage freedom and romantic love in Party documents 
were thus intentionally to be avoided. For instance, a resolution in 1931 asserted that “the 
present marriage problems [would] guarantee the freedom of marriage and divorce, 
abolish the selling and buying marriage system and child brides, and explain to the 
masses about the real meaning of marriage freedom, while opposing all anarchic 
romantic behavior.”53 Excluding romance from love and marriage was a persistent 
conception that was repeated in the CCP’s mass propaganda in order to distinguish 
communist freedom from that of the bourgeoisie. While people were encouraged to make 
their marriage choices freely, they were expected not to fall in love romantically. In the 
CCP’s official discourse, romantic love was interpreted as a kind of abuse of marriage 
freedoms, which catered to the petit-bourgeoisie inclination for absolute individual 
freedom or liberalism that would inevitably lead to anarchic behavior and moral 
corruption.  Such a tendency, the doctrine argued, might possibly endanger the 
established puritanical social order of the rural revolutionary base, and weaken the 
peasants’ support of the Party and of the Revolution itself. 
From 1932 onward, the Jiangxi Soviet faced increasing military pressure from the GMD 
army’s fourth and fifth encirclement campaigns, which was compounded by serious 
economic problems resulting from a successful GMD blockade of the region. Moreover, 
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rumors that were fabricated and spread by the GMD forced the Party leadership to re-
examine its marriage policies. According to these rumors, the CCP’s marriage regulations 
promoted promiscuity by “forcing people to collectivize their wives among all the 
Communists and their partisans.” 54  Occasional sexual wrongdoings were exaggerated by 
the anti-communist propaganda as a universal phenomenon in the Soviet area. As China’s 
rural society was still dominated by the patriarchal clans who had a much lower tolerance 
for licentious behavior than their urban contemporaries, these rumors constituted a 
serious blow to the vital CCP-peasant alliance. 
At a time when the most urgent problem facing the Party was the survival of the 
revolution and the expansion of the Red Army, CCP leaders had to admit that “absolute 
freedom of marriage was a leftist slogan, which was apart from political reality.”55 To 
correct this problem, they stated, “we must resolutely oppose the absolute freedom of 
marriage, which hampers our struggle, and we firmly believe that we are able to win 
freedom of marriage on this basis.”56 In order to avoid any marriages that would so 
endanger the communist cause, from this point forward all Party members were required 
to obtain permission from the organizations for any marriage or divorce.  Non-Party 
members were forced to obtain similar permission from their local Soviet.57 The Party’s 
interference with an individual’s marriage rights was, in this sense, imperative for the 
sake of social stability, the needs of revolution, and the Party’s reputation.    
4.3.3 The Marriage Code of 1934 
In the midst of the GMD’s fifth and final encirclement campaign, when the collapse of 
the Jiangxi Soviet Republic was a virtual certainty, the CCP government promulgated a 
new and revised marriage law in April of 1934. The rationale behind the revised law was 
to reconcile the government’s official marriage policy with its urgent need to recruit more 
men into the Red Army. Although the spirit of the new law did not strikingly differ from 
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that of the previous regulations, two major issues distinguished the 1934 version from 
that of 1931: military divorce and de facto marriage. 
While sticking with the principles of divorce freedom, the 1934 marriage law took into 
account the special needs of military recruitment. Women were considered especially 
necessary to the recruiting process in their roles as mothers, wives, sisters and lovers to 
the soldiers, who would effectively encourage their sons, husbands, brothers and lovers to 
join the army.58 However, peasant women were much less progressive than the Party and 
cadre leaders had expected. In some areas, women made the conscious decision not to 
marry Red Army soldiers out of their fears over the helpless situation they would face 
should their husband die. Some women even preferred to marry surrendered soldiers who 
had served in the Nationalist army on the expectation that they would bring them to the 
cities one day. Moreover, more than a few Red Army wives declared their intention to 
divorce their husbands once they entered active service, or to commit adultery. Such 
eventualities seriously jeopardized the morale of the soldiers, since most of them were 
poor peasants and could not possibly afford a second marriage.59 
This problem with soldiers’ marriages and divorces caught the attention of the Soviet 
leadership long before the promulgation of the New Marriage Code. Discussions over 
whether or not a divorce should be granted to army wives appeared in local reports soon 
after the implementation of the 1931 Marriage Code. The solution came in April of 1933, 
when a mandate from the Soviet central government finally ruled that the interests of the 
soldiers on the battlefield were of the first importance to the revolution: “During the 
service period, the divorce application put forward by the wife should obtain the consent 
of the husband, if he disagreed, this divorce should not be granted by the government.”60 
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suqu funü yundong shiliao xuanbian, 405-406. 
60 Cai Huiwen 蔡会文 and Yu Zhaolong 于兆龙, “Tongling: wei jieshou he zhixing zhonghua suoweiai gongheguo 
zhongyangzhengfu guiding hongjun yu qi qizi de hunyin guanxi de mingling”通令：为接受和执行中华苏维埃共
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Many of the wives who sued for divorce did so because they did not know whether their 
husbands were alive or dead due to the lack of effective correspondence to and from the 
frontlines.  Addressing this problem, the political department of the Red Army expedited 
the issue of casualty rolls and asked army officers to order every married soldier to 
contact his wife at least once every three months to inform her of his current situation. 61  
This spirit was repeated in a divorce provision for Army personnel in the 1934 Marriage 
Code, which specified:  
Wives of soldiers of the Red Army when claiming a divorce must obtain the 
consent of their husbands, but in areas where communication by letter is easy 
and where the husband had not returned home nor communicated by letter for 
two years, the wife may approach the local government and request registration 
of the divorce. In areas where communication by letter is difficult, and four 
years have elapsed since the husband last communicated by letter or since he 
last returned home, the wife may approach the local government and request 
registration of the divorce (Article 11).62  
Meijer believed this provision was very important, as it froze the matrimonial status quo 
of the military and put the members of the armed forces in a separate category from the 
regular citizenry. It was a concession that seems to have been aimed at placating the 
peace of mind of the soldiers at war, thus freeing them from worry about the situation of 
their families away from the front; even if the marriage had been concluded in the old 
'feudal way' it was now protected and the woman was forced to sacrifice her freedom to 
divorce to the higher interests of the State, which at that time were focused on the morale 
of the army.63 This special exception to the CCP’s spirit of free divorce was subsequently 
repeated in most regulations on marriage in Communist-held China and it was even 
preserved in the Marriage Law of 1950. 
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Soldiers and Their Wives], in Jiangxi suqu funü yundong shiliao xuanbian, 331-332. 
61 Ibid. 
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Although divorce provisions for common people in the Marriage Code of 1934 remained 
adherent to the principle of ex parte divorce, a significant change occurred in the divorce 
protection granted to women. Article 15 of the Code provided that a husband was obliged 
to support an ex-spouse after a divorce only when she lacked the capacity to work or did 
not have a definite occupation, and that if the man lacked that capacity himself the 
provision did not apply.64  This article, therefore, put an end to the parasitic practices of 
some divorced women that had been granted by the 1931 Regulations.    
Another striking alteration in the 1934 Code was the legal recognition of de facto 
marriage status for common-law relationships (unmarried cohabitation). Article 9 
declared that “a man and a woman who cohabit are considered to be married, whether or 
not they have registered.”65 This Article made it clear that registration, though still 
required, was not to be understood as having constitutive force. Therefore, a marriage 
was not solely constituted by the State that legalized it, but was rather constituted by the 
will of the parties themselves, as evidenced by the fact of their living together. There is 
little documentary evidence to explain why the Party leaders were so anxious to legally 
recognize the de facto marriage at a point when the Soviet was on the edge of collapse. 
However, it seems reasonable to assume this provision was on the one hand a desperate 
posture made by the ruling CCP leaders in an attempt to demonstrate their faith to the 
Communist ideal.  On the other hand, it was a temporary concession to the traditional 
marriage custom for the sake of social stability in the Soviet and to aid military 
recruitment for the Red Army.  
In 1933, with the support of the Comintern, the leftist faction of the CCP (as represented 
by Wang Ming 王明(1904-1974) and Bo Gu 博古 (1907-1946) successfully excluded 
rural-born leaders such as Mao Zedong from the decision-making circle of the Soviet 
government. As the more devoted and pious followers of Marxism-Leninism, this faction 
looked forward to a fundamental marriage reform that was more in accordance with 
Engels’ marriage ideals and which would subsequently finally undo the family system. 
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For these leaders, the Communists were destined to end the marriage institution 
altogether and replace it with free consensual unions based on unconditional love.66 The 
legal recognition of de facto marriage, in this sense, could be considered a demonstrative 
step these individuals made in order to prove their loyalty to the Comintern and to the 
communist ideal, even under dire stress. 
Another consideration that led to legal recognition of de facto marriage was the fact that 
the peasant masses consistently preferred the traditional way of getting married, with a 
customary wedding feast, even though legal marriage registration via the state was 
repeatedly emphasized by the Soviet organization at all levels. However, a marriage 
without any legal registration created problems when dealing with the division of 
property or child custody in the case of divorce. Through recognizing the de facto 
marriage, the authorities insured that legal protection would still be extended to those 
who got married without legal marriage registration.67 
The Marriage Code of 1934 was never fully implemented due to the Red Army’s failure 
against the GMD’s fifth encirclement campaign. As soon as the Nationalist Army 
reclaimed the Soviet area in the second half of 1934, the GMD administration 
immediately started working to restore its own marriage system and to bring the region in 
line with the rest of Nationalist China. In dealing with marriage lawsuits that were 
continuously coming forth, the Nationalists chose to re-instate the marriage system 
according to the wills of the two principal parties of the marriage. For example, remarried 
people who voluntarily asked to be re-united with their ex were allowed to do so without 
being charged with adultery or bigamy; those who were unwilling to be re-united with 
their ex were permitted to stay in their current marriages; if one party of the new couple 
wanted to go back to the former marriage and the other party did not, then the current 
marriage would be sustained. The ex could claim no more than one hundred yuan in 
compensation. 68 
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The issue of marriage reform gained unprecedented attention during the Jiangxi Soviet 
period. While aiming at the large-scale mobilization of women’s productivity, communist 
policy-makers and promulgators displayed an enthusiasm for the topic that was never to 
be seen again in communist China. As the first practical attempt by the Chinese 
communists to reform rural China, the Marriage Code was advanced, progressive and 
radical enough to represent the communist ideal of social revolution. However, as an 
urban creation that was modeled onto a foreign ideal, and as a reflection of the radical 
May Fourth spirit, the new definition of marriage could not fit into the social context of 
the 1930s rural China, where traditions and customs were still deeply entrenched. 
Although the CCP was not completely ignorant about the difficulties it faced with 
marriage reform, it was still overly idealistic in its expectations of a rapid and positive 
outcome from the application of such a drastic change. In a patriarchal society like 
China’s that was dominated by unequal gender relations, liberating women from their 
suffering inevitably antagonized both sexes, since man had been recognized as the 
primary oppressor of woman and as the beneficiary of such oppression. 
The wartime situation in the region further intensified the difficulties the CCP faced in 
pursuing immediate woman’s liberation.  This was due to the need for the Party to 
balance expedient wartime demands for recruitment expansion with women’s requests for 
marriage freedom.  This balance proved to be a long-term paradox that impeded every 
step of the Chinese communists on their way to acquiring the ultimate goal of women’s 
liberation. In March of 1934, Mao Zedong pointed out that the victory of liberating the 
masses of women from the "barbaric feudal marriage system" and to put into effect a 
marriage system of genuine equality between men and women would both come: 
...as a consequence of the victory of the democratic dictatorship of workers and 
peasants…it is first necessary to overthrow the dictatorship of the landlords and 
the bourgeoisie and to carry out the land revolution. Only when the laboring 
masses of men and women, and the women in particular, have political freedom 
in the first place and considerable economic freedom in the second place, can 
freedom of marriage be finally guaranteed.69  
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This judgment politely suggested that marriage freedom was not of primary importance 
to the CCP during the war and it was something that should wait until after the victory of 
the Communist Revolution. Based on this perception, the CCP’s focus for women’s work 
during this later period switched from marriage freedom to women’s education and 
productive participation. Nevertheless, new marriage regulations were continually 
promulgated. 
4.4 Marriage of Convenience: Partner and Party 
As devotees of a socialist marriage revolution, many early CCP members 
‘revolutionized’ their own marriages by leaving their arranged wives, seeking romantic 
lovers, or even through rejecting the entire marriage system. The simplification of the 
marriage ceremony through the reforms of the 1930s largely blurred the boundaries 
between marriage, cohabitation and consensual union.  As a result, the married lives of 
some top CCP leaders appear to have been quite chaotic before 1949. From a legal 
perspective, many of these men led a life of polygamy because they seldom legally 
divorced their ex-wives before they moved on to their next marital relationship. 
Under the so-called condition of being ‘consensual unions’, the relationships of many 
high-ranking CCP leaders turned marriage into relationships of convenience that were 
consummated or dissolved in accordance with the transition of their own sexual interests 
or with changes in the wartime situation. These marriages of convenience, although 
against the very spirit of the CCP’s Marriage Code, were frequently arranged or dissolved 
legally by the Party, through a flexible interpretation of the discourse of revolution. 
An examination of the biographies of these various leaders reveals a general pattern in 
their marriage practices before 1949.  The young revolutionary would often get married 
or engaged at an early age through a traditional third party arrangement, with which he 
was ultimately never satisfied.  The Party would then grant him permission to reject or 
leave his arranged traditional wife for a romantic lover during the course of the Great 
Revolution.  This new love, however, was often short-lived due to the rapid changes of 
the political and wartime situation and the two would generally be forever separated by 
either death or the breakup of the relationship. Fortunately for him, the hero was seldom 
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lonely with the help of considerate Party comrades.  Even under hostile circumstances 
such as the Jianggangshan and the Long March, he was able to meet a new lover who 
was often a young local partisan. She might not be well educated or pretty, but was 
definitely passionate, loyal and obedient to both her new partner and to the Communist 
Revolution. Sometimes, the marriage resulting from this last union could be a permanent 
one. However, there were also many cases of break ups after the CCP found a more 
peaceful and stable base in northern China. In the face of the influx of much younger, 
prettier and lively urban women who crowded into Yan’an at the end of the 1930s, a 
veteran wife might suddenly find that she had completely lost her husband’s affections. 
Under these circumstances, whether or not the leader could sue for a divorce and apply 
for a new marriage was left for the Party to decide. 
4.4.1 The Revolutionized Marriage 
Among the early Chinese communist leaders, many were the devoted students of Engels’ 
radical analogy of the marriage institution as being akin to legalized prostitution. They 
thereby proposed a total rejection of the matrimonial rituals and marriage system in both 
the legal and customary sense. For example, Shen Zemin 沈泽民 (1900-1933), an early 
CCP leader, published one impassioned indictment of the marriage system that adhered 
to this extreme interpretation. He believed that the marriage system in China had a 
tendency to turn women into prostitutes, forcing them to unconsciously sell their most 
precious commodity, which he argued was their sexual virtue: 
Money, of course, is not the only reason why women degenerate into this 
deplorable status, as women do not necessarily always demand money. Women 
have their own reasons for exchanging their only possession—their sexual 
services. In order to avoid the isolation of remaining single, or to fulfill a desire 
to become a mother, or to have their vanity indulged, women often marry men 
they do not love. Emotionally their predicament is similar to the experiences of 
prostitutes, for they have to painfully submit to their husbands and put up with 
fondling caresses in the absence of love. 70 
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Hatred of this prostitution-like marriage system consequently drove radical young people 
in general, and educated young women in particular, to embrace the ideal form, as 
suggested by Engels: a consensual union based on two matched revolutionary souls. 
Compared to women, men were generally more inclined to accept the idea of a 
consensual union, due to their natural preference for younger and healthier women over 
older and weaker ones. This inclination was especially true in the context of China’s 
traditional polygamous society, where women had been frequently purchased and 
bestowed as gifts or trophies, and where changing wives or taking new lovers was not a 
serious matter for a military commander or political leader in comparison with the 
revolutionary duties he assumed. 
As the avant-courier of the marriage revolution, Chen Duxiu suggested that free love 
could not exist under any marriage system and was among the first CCP members to 
exemplify Engels’ theory in his own marriage. 71 Chen married his first wife Gao Xiaolan 
高晓岚(1876-1930) through the arrangement of their parents in 1897, immediately 
following his success in the civil service exam. As the eldest daughter of a general, Gao 
Xiaolan was regarded by Chen’s contemporaries as a perfect match for him, though she 
was illiterate and her feet were bound. From a traditional perspective, Gao Xiaolan was a 
dutiful wife who gave her husband three sons and was also a mindful daughter-in-law 
who carefully took care of Chen’s family until her last day. However, in the eyes of Chen 
Duxiu, Gao Xiaolan represented everything he hated about the old institution.  As Chen’s 
friend described at the time of his marriage: “the discrepancy in their thought is more 
than one century…they often quarrel with each other…their relationship is not 
harmonious.”72 In his “E Su Lun” 恶俗论 [Discussion on bad customs] which was 
published in 1904, Chen ranked the marriage system at the top of all China’s bad customs 
because “nothing about Chinese marriage is reasonable.”73 He especially took issue with 
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the impossibility for engaged or married people to dissolve an unsatisfactory 
arrangement. Chen and Gao’s relationship went from bad to worse in 1900, when Gao 
refused to use her dowry to fund Chen’s plan to study in Japan. In 1911, Chen left Gao 
and openly began a consensual union with Gao Junman 高君曼 (1888-1931), who was 
his wife’s step-sister and with whom Chen felt real love. Their relationship was of course 
intolerable to both families and Chen’s father went so far as to expel them forever from 
his family.74  
Gao Junman was a very different woman from her stepsister, who was more than ten 
years her elder. As a graduate of Beijing Women’s Normal Institute who had made a 
strong commitment to becoming a ‘new woman’ and to living her own life, Gao defied 
social conventions by living with the man she loved. Influenced by the ‘love mania’ 
boom of the May 4th era, many pro-communist and educated young women became 
followers of the teachings of John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), who argued that the main 
issue in marriage was not about what a marriage ought to be but rather what women 
ought to be. Once the latter issue was settled, he argued, the former would settle itself. 75 
Women living in the USSR provided contemporary Chinese youth with a living example 
of a ‘new woman’. The following statement, made by a contemporary female Soviet 
activist, was taken as a motto by thousands of young Chinese women: 
The new communist woman should be a liberated individual …sexually active 
and living in a comradely marital union in which economic calculations should 
play no part. The private family should give way to the collective; jealousy, 
possessiveness, and narrow and exclusive concern for one’s own child should be 
replaced by the higher value for collective love. Marriage would then lose its 
bourgeois stability, and a couple, now equal workers, would stay together only 
so long as their mutual love remained.76 
By openly declaring their preference for a consensual union, these radical young women 
adopted a posture that was designed to break up the hypocrisy of the old matrimonial 
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system and to uphold the principals of love as established on the basis of real matched 
personalities.77 For them, sexual experimentation was a symbol of their independence and 
of their equality to men.  For many of these women, the romantic notion of two idealistic 
young lovers fighting together for their country became a reality. 
Unfortunately, not every romance ends with a ‘happily ever after’.  Chen Duxiu and Gao 
Junman’s love ended with a breakup in 1925 after Gao had given birth to two children. 
Shortly thereafter in 1931, Chen Duxiu began another relationship with factory worker 
Pan Lanzhen 潘兰珍, who was twenty-nine years his junior. The two were not formally 
married, however, until after Gao Junman’s death from cancer in 1931.78 
Certainly not all communists were as desperate as Chen Duxiu to leave their first wives. 
Instead of pursuing a new lover, some Party members chose to stay with their arranged 
wives throughout the revolution period. One good example of this was the case of Li 
Dazhao (1889-1927), who was one of the most progressive of the New Culturists and the 
strongest upholder of the free love principle.  In spite of his outspoken beliefs, Li spent 
his entire life with his rural wife Zhao Renlan 赵纫兰, to whom he had been betrothed as 
a child, in spite of her being six years his senior, illiterate and having bound feet. Li 
Dazhao tried to take his wife and children with him most of time, despite traveling 
extensively, and he was never reluctant to introduce his wife to his friends and colleagues, 
even after he became a prestigious professor at Beijing University.79 Another communist 
leader who kept loyal to his traditional marriage was Ren Bishi 任弼时 (1904-1950), who 
remained married to Chen Congying 陈琮英(1902-2003) until the end of his life. In 
contrast to many other communists, who were eager to isolate their arranged wives from 
their revolutionary work, Ren chose to bring Chen with him when he was assigned to 
work in the CCP underground, even though she was illiterate and was far from being a 
shining example of a ‘new woman’. During the Great Revolution and the later 
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Nationalist’s white terror periods, Chen worked as a messenger, delivering secret 
documents and messages to party members.80 
Just as these two examples illustrate how wives were rewarded by their husbands’ 
patience and loyalty, the traditional devotion and unconditional obedience these women 
displayed to their husbands should be counted as an important factor that contributed to 
the stability and harmony of their relationships. For example, contrary to Gao Xiaolan’s 
refusal to sponsor her husband Chen Duxu’s plan to study overseas, Zhao Renlan 
exhausted all her personal savings in order to sponsor her husband Li Dazhao’s study in 
China and Japan, all while raising their two children alone during the ten year period 
from 1906 to 1916.81 Chen Congying told her American interviewer that the solid 
foundation of the love between her and her husband was made up of two main elements: 
one was the friendship that had started in their teens and the other was her selfless 
devotion to her husband. Chen acknowledged that she herself had had no revolutionary 
leanings before Ren brought her to Shanghai. However, she had tried her best to support 
Ren’s revolutionary schooling in Moscow with all her earnings from working in a 
stocking factory. She explained, “the only thing I knew was to follow his lead, because I 
knew whatever he was doing must be good.”82 It was her devotion and obedience to her 
husband that finally transformed her into a communist revolutionary.  
4.4.2 Marriage without Matrimony 
Since the early twentieth century, the complicated marriage procedure of liuli had been 
under constant attack from Westernized Chinese intellectuals. As early as 1904, Chen 
Duxiu had identified the Chinese marriage ceremony as being the most unreasonable 
ritual in the world - a situation that was constantly abused by the bride’s family’s greed in 
always bargaining for more betrothal gifts and tainted by ridiculous wedding customs 
such as “kujia”哭嫁[cry at the wedding], “bai tiandi”拜天地[worship Heaven & Earth] 
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and “nao xinfang”闹新房[play tricks in the wedding chamber].83 These customs, 
according to Chen, revealed the overall contempt of traditional Chinese society for 
modern conceptions of human rights, especially concerning women’s dignity.  Chen 
argued that these outdated practices must be rejected by more and more Chinese young 
people who were “well educated and reasonable.”84 
As Chen had predicted, one of the vital traits of modern marriage practice in China was a 
tendency to simplify the matrimonial procedure in accordance with the New Culturist 
discourses of free love and anti-feudalism. In the post-May Fourth era, it was common to 
see a young urban couple get married in a simple ceremony, without any marriage 
certificate or legal registration, both of which were viewed as being unnecessary for true 
love. One young couple who got married but refused to sign a written marriage contract 
publicly claimed that “the so-called marriage contract equals an exchange contract, which 
is used to guarantee the credit of seller and buyer. But our marriage is not an exchange, 
and thus requires no contract…only those who were blinded by money worship would 
like to deal with marriage in the same way as they deal with business. The sacred love, in 
this sense, is treated like deceiving trade!”85 
Under most circumstances, the informal ceremony adopted by communists during the 
pre-1949 era was a simple dinner, a tea party, a poker game or sometimes even just an 
open statement.  Zhou Enlai 周恩来 (1898-1976) and Deng Yingchao 邓颖超 (1904-
1992) had set the precedent for simple weddings among their friends and comrades. Deng 
Yingchao described her wedding in this way: “we had no marriage ceremony at all, only 
inviting our friends. We promised to love, to respect, to help, to encourage, and to 
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console each other, to have consideration for each other, to have confidence and mutual 
understanding.”86 When Ren Bishi and Chen Congying got married, they chose to follow 
Deng and Zhou’s example. On their wedding day, the couple simply invited some of their 
comrades to share a meal where they raised their cups to toast one another and then took 
a wedding photo.87 
Mao Zedong was also a passionate advocate of the marriage revolution. His arranged 
wife died in 1910, having never been truly accepted by her spouse.88 In 1920, Mao began 
living with Yang Kaihui 杨开慧 (1901-1930). The two were married later that year, but 
refused to hold an open marriage ceremony, which they claimed as a vulgar act [俗人之
举 surenzhiju].89 The two were separated in 1927, after Mao left to participate in the 
Autumn Uprising.  In October of 1930, Yang was arrested for being the wife of the 
revolutionary and was executed one month later. The boasts of both Mao and his 
biographers about his deep love for the late Yang seem strained, considering the fact that 
Mao had publicly announced his love for a nineteen-year-old partisan He Zizhen 贺子珍
(1909-1984) years before her death. The new union was publicized in 1928 with Mao’s 
open declaration that “Comrade He Zizhen and I have fallen in love! Our comradely 
affection has changed to true love and from now on our life together will be devoted to 
the revolution.”90  
The idea of simple weddings was especially appreciated by those Chinese who preferred 
consensual unions to traditional marriages. This preference might be attributed to the fact 
that many advocates for consensual unions, like Chen Duxiu and Mao Zedong, actually 
led lives of bigamy because they seldom bothered to legally divorce their traditional 
wives before beginning new relationships. Contemporary public opinion usually took the 
side of wives in criticizing husbands who sued for divorce after taking new lovers, calling 
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the action a case of ‘loving the new and loathing the old’.  For this reason, getting 
involved in an open divorce might indeed have jeopardized a man’s reputation and career.  
For those who were trapped in an arranged marriage and desperate to embrace a new 
love, the socialist marriage ideal of a consensual union was a way for these leaders to kill 
the proverbial two birds with one stone: on the one hand, they would not necessarily 
divorce their traditional wives, who could then still look after their in-laws; on the other 
hand, under the auspices of a simplified marriage ceremony, they could also give their 
new lovers the mingfen 名分 [identity] of being a ‘Mrs’ without provoking too much 
public opposition (although theoretically, romantic love and sharing a matched passion 
for the revolution should have been more than enough sentiment to develop a marital or 
marital-like union). The first chapter of this work discussed how one fundamental goal of 
a traditional marriage ceremony was to socially legitimize a man and a woman’s sexual 
behavior through the proper performance of a series of common rituals, which followed 
legal guidelines and were done with attention to public opinion. Conversely, the 
simplified marriage ceremony proposed by these revolutionaries more or less blurred the 
boundaries between a formal marriage and a de facto marriage by passing over the legal 
process and by minimizing social attention.  
4.4.3 Marriage of Convenience for Revolution 
The first batch of ‘revolutionary couples’ emerged from the Chinese Communists’ 
underground work. These marriages, temporary or otherwise, were first made in order to 
serve this underground work, according to the recollections of Ren Bishi’s wife Chen 
Congying.  She recounted that after the cooperation between the Nationalists and the 
Communists came to a bloody end in 1927, local landlords in Wuhan had refused to rent 
out rooms to single men for fear of harboring a communist. They believed that a 
communist agent would never travel with a wife or family because Nationalist 
propaganda had taught them that all communists were the destroyers of families who 
advocated unconditional free love. Therefore, these landlords coined a saying: “No 
spouse, no house.” Thus, under these circumstances, an unmarried Chen Congying had to 
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accompany her future husband whenever meetings or work brought him to Wuhan, in 
order to help him avoid the suspicion of the landlords.91 
Unlike Ren Bishi, who chose his arranged wife as his life partner, most undercover 
communists undertook the more temporary and convenient form of marriage by finding a 
female volunteer who was often a young passionate partisan of the CCP, and was willing 
to play the role of wife. For example, Xie Xiaomei 谢小梅(1913-2006), the wife of 
revolutionary Luo Ming 罗明（1905-1987） frankly admitted that it was primarily 
“Because of the requirements of our [party] work, Luo Ming and I got married.”92 Xie 
and Luo were married in 1931 with “some comrades [acting] as matchmakers” after they 
were assigned to live and work in the same building as husband and wife. Happily, this 
marriage lasted for more than half a century until Luo passed away in 1987. 
Not all revolutionary couples were as lucky as Xie and Luo, however. Many such 
marriages came to a sudden end upon the death or arrest of one or both parties, such as 
was the case of Zhou Wenyong 周文雍 (1905-1928) and Chen Tiejun 陈铁军 (1904-
1928). As the leader of the workers’ movement in Guangzhou, Zhou was on the 
Nationalist government’s most wanted list after 1927. To protect his real identity, the 
CCP arranged for Chen to play the role of Zhou’s wife. Unfortunately, they were both 
arrested in January of 1928 and executed soon after. According to official sources, their 
relationship was one of pure comradeship. Although they had long harbored strong 
feelings for each other, it was only on the execution grounds that they finally dared to 
speak their love for one another and to declare their wedding without worrying about 
interfering with their revolutionary work.93 
4.4.4 Love vs. Comradeship: the Love Life of Zhu De 
In the revolutionary era CCP parlance, love was seldom used to describe a relationship 
between two revolutionaries who had romantic feelings for each other.  The synonym of 
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love in the official communist language is ‘comradeship’, meaning a relationship based 
on a matched revolutionary spirit. The love life of Zhu De 朱德 (1886-1976) provides an 
excellent example of how disturbing wartime love could be for high-ranking party 
members in the pre-1949 era. 
Thanks to Agnes Smedley and Helen Snow, two American reporters who pushed their 
way into Yan’an and held interviews with the chief leaders of the CCP in the late 1930s, 
Zhu De’s love story is well known to many Western readers.94 Unlike Mao, who was 
often described as a womanizer who preferred new to old, Zhu gained a better reputation 
both at home and abroad with his almost half-century long marriage to Kang Keqing 康
克清（1911-1992）, despite the fact that she was his sixth wife.  
Zhu De first married his maternal cousin through family arrangement in 1905.  Although 
Zhu left her in 1906, they never formally divorced and she never remarried. Like many 
other revolutionaries, Zhe De seldom mentioned his first wife in public. Zhu’s second 
wife was Xiao Jufang 萧菊芳, an eighteen-year-old student at the Normal School and the 
daughter of an intellectual family that had played an active role in the reform movement 
and the Revolution.  Zhu described her as “a sincere and fairly progressive girl, and her 
feet had never been bound.”95 This second marriage lasted from 1912 until 1919, when 
Xiao died of typhoid. In her talk with Zhu in the late 1930s, Smedley reported him saying 
that “the marriage was not bourgeois, and that the two of them had even met and talked in 
the presence of Jufang’s family, before they made up their minds. This was a 
revolutionary step in those days: respectable girls, even after the Revolution, still did not 
talk with their husbands before marriage.”96 Even though Smedley sensed that Zhu did 
not love Xiao, his second wife did give birth to his only son, and therefore the American 
concluded that “though Chu (Zhu) thought of himself as a modern man he was still in 
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many respects a product of the old social system,” who married Xiao only because he 
was a normal man and needed a wife. 97 
Shortly after the death of his second wife, under the arrangement of his army friends and 
in order to find a mother for his infant son and a hostess for his household, Zhu De 
married Chen Yuzhen 陈玉珍.  Like so many of the revolutionaries’ new partners, Chen 
was an educated ‘new woman’ with natural feet. She had reached the advanced age of 
twenty-one and, by traditional standards, was almost considered an old maid because she 
had rejected every suitor that had been introduced by her family. Smedley perceived, 
“when General Zhu talked of this woman who soon became his wife, his voice and 
manner underwent a very great change, a change of which he seemed utterly 
unconscious. The word ‘love’ never passed his lips, yet it seemed to me that he had loved 
Chen Yuzhen almost from the moment of their first meeting.”98 Zhu De himself also 
acknowledged that he was immediately attracted to her poise and dignity. It seems Zhu 
was quite satisfied with this marriage and described his life with Chen as a “lost 
paradise” of personal happiness. This happy marriage came to an end in 1922, without 
any official fanfare, when Zhu De went to Germany for study. As Zhu De explained to 
Smedley: “We had sometimes corresponded but she had long since known that my life 
belonged to the revolution and that I would never return home.”99 Like most arranged 
wives who were abandoned by their husbands, Chen Yuzhen never remarried and spent 
the rest of her life taking care of Zhu De’s parents and his son. 
Zhu De’s fourth wife was He Zhihua 贺治华, a pretty nineteen-year-old high school 
teacher who was fluent in both English and German.  She accompanied him throughout 
his travels and gave birth to his daughter Zhu Min 朱敏. However, He Zhihua divorced 
Zhu De in 1926 in order to marry a younger communist named Huo Jiaxin 霍家新. In 
1928, when the first united front split, Huo and He betrayed the CCP by selling out Luo 
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Yinong 罗亦农 to the GMD. This might explain why Zhu De seldom mentioned He 
Zhihua in public in his later years. 
In 1928, Zhu De entered his fifth marriage on Jinggangshan with a twenty-four year-old 
local partisan named Wu Ruolan 伍若兰 who was from a leading intellectual family. He 
claimed that this was not a conventional marriage, since both Wu Ruolan and her family 
knew about his marriage to Chen Yuzhen but had decided not to be bound by 
conventional forms. Wu was an activist who worked in the Political Department of the 
Jiangxi Soviet and spent most of her time out in the villages. This marriage lasted only 
one year and came to a sudden end with Wu’s capture and execution by the GMD during 
the Third Encirclement campaign in 1929. 
As had become his pattern, Zhu De got married shortly after Wu’s death, this time to an 
illiterate peasant girl named Kang Keqing. Though at the time, Kang was only seventeen 
years old while Zhu De was forty three, their marriage lasted for almost half a century 
and made Zhu and Kang a model couple of the CCP. Although the couple remained 
childless, Kang’s marriage to Zhu was widely regarded as a loving union between two 
exemplary revolutionaries that was maintained through a consolidated comradeship.  
Kang confessed to her American interviewer that “I didn’t fall in love with Zhu De in the 
romantic manner when I first met him, though I liked him very much because he lived as 
a common soldier and did the same work.”100 Her first reaction towards Zhu’s proposal 
was outright rejection because she was anxious about the vast discrepancy in age, 
experience and education between them; while she was not quite seventeen, Zhu De was 
forty-three.  Furthermore, while she was an illiterate peasant, he was her commanding 
officer, a man admired and respected by all of his people, including Kang herself. 
However, at the time none of these reasons were considered by Zhu to be valid objections 
to the partnership. Finally, she bowed to the inevitable and became Zhu’s loving wife. 
Smedley described a pleasant moment of domesticity between the couple at their dinner 
table: 
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She socked the Commander-in-Chief (Zhu De) playfully on the arm, and he 
seemed to like it enormously as he beamed at his young prodigy. She never 
refers to him (Zhu De) as her husband, but as “Comrade” in a sort of third 
person tone of voice. I beamed at them both and thought what a marvelous pair 
they were…101 
Among the communists, romantic love was never a required notion, or even a vital 
condition for marriage. Helen Snow was told by Chinese Soviets that “the revolutionary 
women in the Chinese Soviets have no patience with any silly bohemian notions about 
free love and whatnot. For them the new marriage is a serious social institution and to be 
defended as such. All 'petty-bourgeois romantics' were long ago weeded out of the 
revolutionary movement like noxious flowers.”102 Male Communists largely played the 
role of patriarchal family head, rather than that of an affectionate husband – they took 
marriage for granted as a necessity for life. As the American reporters who had personal 
contact with Chinese communist leaders perceived, “it was not at all unusual for a man to 
marry again shortly after his wife’s death. The family, not the individual, was still the 
basis of Chinese society… Personal love was not yet the basis of marriage, though it 
might develop afterwards.”103 
4.4.5 The Arranged Revolutionary Match 
Zhu De’s marriage experience is representative of marriages among the high-ranking 
CCP leaders. All ten marshals of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had more than 
one marriage.104 The wartime marriage, for both parties, was more like a convenient 
relationship that served their sexual, political and revolutionary needs, and which was 
often made to favor the person with the higher position.105 Sometimes, a wife would be 
arranged by the Party as a measure of comfort to someone whom it believed was valuable 
and precious to the communist revolution.  
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Among the wives of these leaders, some were like Yang Kaihui: devoted followers of 
Engels who actively embraced the idea of a free-consensual union but who dared not to 
challenge social conventions by entering into a de facto marriage to an already married 
man. However, the majority of them were more like He Zizhen and Kang Keqing: young 
women who were raised in conservative rural societies that had never heard of the ideas 
of ‘free love’ and ‘cross-gender socialization’, and who were very inexperienced in 
matters of love. In her memoir, Kang reminisced about how Zhu De had proposed to her. 
He had been in the habit of chatting with the young partisan women in the soviet base on 
Jinggangshan whenever he had a few spare minutes, she said, but one afternoon he had 
sought her out when she was alone and then asked her to marry him. She was taken aback 
and asked for a little time to think it over; he had her brought to his quarters the next day 
to hear her answer but she only stood quietly. She said Zhu De responded to her awkward 
silence with the words: “It looks like you’re too shy to say. How about this: you don’t 
have to say anything unless you’re opposed to the idea. I mean, can I take your silence as 
a yes?” When Kang Keqing didn’t move a muscle, Zhu De said, “So, I’ll say it again. 
Will you marry me?” Kang Keqing said she was glued to the bench, speechless. After 
several minutes Zhu De concluded the one-side negotiations with: “So it looks like that’s 
a yes, then.”106 
As the passionate partisans of the communist revolution and admirers of their husbands, 
women like Kang Keqing accepted these matches to elder Party members as being a part 
of their devoted service to the revolution.  Their husbands they viewed as revolutionary 
comrades. Some of these matches were actually imposed on the wives and the women did 
not always accept without some form of coercion from the Party. However, like the 
traditional relationships between parents and children, when a match was arranged 
disagreement existed but it was seldom openly antagonistic. After several rounds of talks 
with their upper leaders, these wives were often persuaded to accept the match under 
their own free wills.  
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For instance, Jian Xianren 蹇先任 (1909-2004), the ex-wife of He Long 贺龙 (1896-
1969) told her American interviewer how as a well-educated twenty-year-old she got 
married to He, a thirty-three year old illiterate man in a high position: “He Long and I had 
feelings for each other. He wanted to get married so that he could take better care of me, 
since I was the only woman among 1000 men.” Even still, she was not convinced she 
should marry a man who was so very different from her in temperament, background, and 
education.  As she stated:  
I wasn’t too willing because He Long was a military man and liked to gamble, 
and I was an intellectual. I was idealistic about my future and he was not my ideal 
as a partner…My friends criticized me because I wanted to wait and he didn’t 
want to. They reminded me that he came over from the Nationalists to the 
Communists in face of great Nationalist odds. He was ‘old military’ and should be 
congratulated. I said, ‘Would it be all right if I don’t marry anyone at all?’ But my 
colleagues persisted, so I agreed.107 
Unfortunately, like many others, He Long divorced Jian Xianren soon after the Long 
March, and married a girl who was twenty years his junior named Xue Ming 薛明(1916-) 
in 1942.  
 Compared to Jian Xianren, the fate of Xiao Yuehua 肖月华 (1907-1983) was even more 
miserable. Her marriage to Otto Braun (1900-1974) , whose Chinese name is Li De 李德, 
was in fact an assignment that was entirely imposed on her by the Party.108 Before Li De 
was sent to China as a Comintern agent in late 1933 in order to advise the Chinese 
Communist Party on military strategy, he had separated from his lover Olga Benario.109 
His special position as the Comintern representative in China granted him privileges over 
most Chinese Communists.  One of these privileges included choosing his pick of 
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bedmates.  As Bo Gu suggested, “given the precious time and energy this foreign advisor 
would contribute to Chinese revolution, his sexual needs should be considered a need of 
the revolution.”110 In the same year, Li De married Xiao Yuehua, a nineteen-year-old 
peasant girl from Ruijin, who was illiterate but also pretty and robust. This union was 
undoubtedly not a free one between two equals, but was rather a marriage of convenience 
that had been arranged by the Chinese Communists in order to keep their foreign advisor 
happy. The Chinese sources especially detail Xiao Yuehua’s reluctance to accept this 
arrangement. After her initial refusal was countered with threats of dismissal from her job 
by Party bosses, Xiao agreed to enter into marriage as a part of her revolutionary 
mission.111  
One of the considerations that led to Bo Gu’s decision to find a lover for Li De was the 
fact that to leave Braun alone would make him unequal in the Party, since “all the 
Chinese leaders in Jiangxi Soviet had wives.”112 The fact that most Chinese Communist 
leaders had found what was commonly referred to as their ‘second spring’ during the 
Soviet Jiangxi period stood in stark contrast to the puritanical asceticism principle that 
was then being taught to the common soldiers. In actuality, it was the military officers 
that fundamentally decided whether or not a soldier should have a wife. All Red Army 
soldiers were generally persuaded to give up their personal happiness for the sake of the 
revolution and having a lover or a wife was regarded as a privilege that was allowed only 
to army commanders and party leaders. The recognized superiority of the high-ranking 
officers or Party members finally decided if a soldier could even have a wife, what kind 
of wife he might have and how he would obtain such a wife. The Chinese Communists, 
no matter how hard they tried to get rid of the traditions they labeled ‘feudal’, could not 
help but build their army following a form of traditional patriarchal family organization 
in order to play the role of family head themselves. 
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4.4.6 Love Freedom or Sexual Liberation? 
Compared to later years, relationships between men and women in the Jiangxi Soviet 
were known by the public to be “rather loose”.113 Positive achievements such as gaining 
women’s economic independence and the promulgation of pro-female marriage 
regulations were followed by a more widespread, ‘bottom-up’ sexual liberation wave.  
During this wave, unmarried cohabitation, triangle love affairs, adultery, easy breakups, 
frequent divorce and sexual indulgence were common scenes in daily life. 
In his memoirs, Cai Xiaoqian 蔡孝乾 (1908-1982), a Taiwanese communist and one-time 
minister of the Internal Affair Ministry of the Chinese Soviet Republic, remarked on  
several love triangles among the high-ranking communist members in order to 
demonstrate how intriguing and disordered sexual relations in Jiangxi Soviet were.114 The 
affair of Li Bozhao 李伯钊 (1911-1985), Yang Shangkun 杨尚昆 (1907-1998) and Wang 
Guanlan 王观澜 (1906-1982) was recounted by Cai as a typical example of this disorder. 
Li was first married to Yang when she studied in Moscow. Soon after she arrived in 
Jiangxi, she began living with Wang as a couple. However, she left Wang and returned to 
Yang as soon as he came to the Soviet region. 115 According to Cai, this kind of love 
disturbance was a sign of the discrepancy that existed between marriage legislation and 
daily practice: 
.… Here (in the Jiangxi Soviet) is no such thing as “jiehun”[marriage ceremony], 
neither the official marriage registration (although people were required by the 
Marriage Regulations to register their marriage or divorce in the xiang or shi 
Soviet government). The Communist Party stressed the “fact”. In the Soviet area, 
a man and a woman will be naturally recognized as “husband and wife” as long 
as they live together. It does not matter if they registered or not. 116 
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Such unregulated love and marriage behavior, Cai believed, was caused by a distorted 
tendency towards sexual liberation among the young Chinese communists.  It was a trend 
that came to be called beishui zhuyi 杯水主义 [the glass of water theory], which followed 
a theory of sexual ethics that had been created by Alexandra Kollontai (1872-1952).  A 
Bolshevik feminist from Soviet Russia, Kollontai proposed that “in communist society 
the satisfaction of sexual desires, of love, will be as simple and unimportant as drinking a 
glass of water.”117 As the first official female Ambassador in the world, and as the 
secretary of the Women’s Department of the Comintern, Kollontai became an idol that 
many Chinese female communists endeavored to follow.118 Liu Ying 刘英 (1905-2002), 
a leader of the Youth League trained in the USSR, was cited by Cai as a pious follower of 
Kollontai’s theory: after she lost her husband in 1927, Liu married Wu Xiuquan 伍修权 
(1908-1997) via a third party introduction in Jiangxi, but then declared a divorce two 
days later. In 1935, she and Zhang Wentian 张闻天(1900-1976) became lovers and were 
finally married in 1936.119 
Whatever Cai’s beliefs on the subject, the major disturbances concerning issues of love 
that occurred during the CCP’s early years were more products of the chaotic wartime 
conditions than a result of the Party’s failed marriage legislation or a general moral 
decline. Before the CCP acquired the official recognition of the central government and 
established a stable base in 1937, the consummation and dissolution of marital unions 
between male CCP leaders and local female partisans were usually subjected to frequent 
and unexpected upheaval, caused by military migration and wartime casualties. Liu 
Ying’s first marriage serves as a good example of this fact: she married Lin Wei 林蔚, a 
top Party leader in Hunan in 1927. One week after they were married, Liu was sent alone 
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to Shanghai for a Party mission. As Liu Ying told in her memoir: “Both of us thought we 
could be together soon…who knew that this brief time apart would become a permanent 
separation.” 120  She was informed of Lin’s arrest and execution by the GMD not long 
after he had left her.  
 The marriages consummated during the Jiangxi Soviet period were particularly unstable 
and short-lived. Except for the case of Lin Biao, all ten future marshals of the PRC were 
married at least once during the Jiangxi Soviet period. However, only two of these 
couples had marriages that survived to the end: Zhu De and Kang Keqing as well as Nie 
Rongzhen 聂荣臻 (1899-1992) and Zhang Ruihua 张瑞华 (1909-1995).121  When the 
Red Army retreated from the Jiangxi base, only thirty women were allowed to take part 
in the Long March.  Most of them were the wives of high-ranking Party leaders, like He 
Zizhen and Kang Keqing. This figure shrank to just nineteen women by the time they had 
reached Shaanxi. All the others were left in Jiangxi, captured, executed by the Nationalist 
troops or forced to remarry because of poverty.122 In the midst of a violent and 
unpredictable revolution, therefore, these couples saw little point in maintaining fidelity 
after becoming physically separated.  
4.5 Conclusion 
In the marriage revolution launched by the May Fourth elites, the Chinese cities had 
heard a rising voice that was calling for unconditional marriage freedoms, the rejection of 
traditional matrimony, and even the abolishment of the marriage system altogether. The 
newly formed Chinese Communist Party was viewed by the common people at that time 
as the most distinguished representative of these radical ideas, as exemplified in its 
promise for women’s liberation and its members’ open embrace of Engels’ anarchic 
marriage theories. 
While the Chinese communists promoted the achievement of women’s economic 
independence as an elixir for all their social problems, this elixir turned out not to have 
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been as effective as promised. Chinese women, rural or urban, traditional or modern, 
illiterate or educated were still largely restricted in the domestic sphere by the traditional 
gender conceptions that upheld man’s social superiority even after women had gained 
access to economic independence. The conflict between the socialist marriage ideal and 
traditional Chinese marriage customs was made more intense when the CCP’s marriage 
reform law was introduced to the Jiangxi Soviet by urban-born policy-makers. In the two 
pro-women marriage codes that were promulgated in 1931 and 1934, marriage freedom 
was extended in order to embrace conceptions of free love, ex parte divorce and de facto 
marriage. However, because these new laws violated the deeply-rooted traditional gender 
relations of China’s rural society, where a husband’s domination over his wife was 
ingrained, the implementation of these laws provoked strong opposition among the 
peasant masses.  When this opposition eventually caused an interruption of the recruiting 
schedule of the Red Army, which was universally recognized by the Party as vital to the 
revolution itself, the marriage problem raised serious concern from the temporal and later 
CCP leaders.  
While the common Party members and Red Army soldiers were repeatedly warned not 
get involved in romantic love affairs that might harm revolutionary morale, the marriage 
practices within the Party leadership during this period were a tangled mixture of both 
radical and conservative approaches. On the one hand, with a declared preference for 
consensual union- a marriage ideal recommended by Engels, some CCP members turned 
to relationships of convenience that served to challenge the traditional and ‘feudal’ 
marriage and family systems, cover their secret missions or simply satisfy their natural 
desires; on the other hand, within the Party circles where the traditional patriarchal 
hierarchy was still accepted as the norm, women were constantly assigned as trophies to 
the male political leaders and generals, according to their rank. Also, from this period 
forward the Party began to interfere with its members’ personal lives by applying strict 
censorship to their relationships under the auspices of serving the considerations of 
military safety and the Party’s impression on the local peasants, which then became a 
lasting policy of the Party.  
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The quick collapse of the Jiangxi Soviet regime in 1934 annulled all the cosmopolitan 
marriage reforms and removed the urban-born leadership from the Party’s policy-making 
inner circle. With the rise of a more pragmatic and rural-born Party leadership, the 
schedule of marriage reform was minimized from the CCP’ s pre-1949 agenda of total 
women’s liberation in order to avoid gender conflict and to meet the wartime expediency 
for military recruitment. This change will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5  
5 Making a Marriage for Revolution 
This chapter attempts to examine the marriage policies and practices of the CCP during 
the Yan’an period, from 1935 to 1949. Marriage legislation continued to be enacted by 
the state during this period, and each border area promulgated its own official marriage 
regulations. Due to the fact that a group of officials with rural backgrounds had taken the 
place of the Comintern-supported, urban-born radicals to become the CCP’s policy-
makers, the focus of the Party’s marriage reforms similarly turned away from a dogmatic 
pursuit of Engels’ idealized marriage freedom to a more moderate rejection of the 
arranged marriage system. Many of the more radical articles on freedoms of marriage and 
divorce from the Jiangxi Soviet Laws were tempered in order to accommodate the more 
conservative peasant society in northern China. Nonetheless, the clash between 
progressive urban ideals and conservative rural marriage traditions constantly provoked 
conflict between women’s cadres and peasants.  This conflict forced policymakers to 
constantly adjust their standpoints in order to find a balance between the temporary needs 
of wartime and the long-term goal of women’s liberation. Before the Chinese 
communists were able to establish their nationwide regime in 1949, the Party’s feminist 
marriage reform scheme had to yield to male interests in order to secure gains that were 
deemed more vital to the cause: peasant loyalty to the Communist revolution, guarantees 
of rural military recruitment, and maintaining the morale of the army. Consequently, the 
CCP’s discourse on love and marriage during the Yan’an period changed from one that 
emphasized personal freedoms to one that favored a more puritan, simple and ascetic 
lifestyle, which urged both parties to be self-giving and obedient. Free love was allowed 
only with the Party’s permission and under its direct supervision. People were taught to 
give up their personal happiness and to devote themselves wholeheartedly to 
revolutionary work. However, among the few top leaders and generals who were eligible 
to have wives, brides were arranged as rewards by the Party under the name of 
developing ‘mutual help’.  
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Through a careful examination of the CCP’s marriage policies and practices during the 
Yan’an period, I argue that the marriage policy of the Chinese Communists was not a 
solid or static theory, but was rather a dynamic policy that was designed to meet the 
varied political requirements of the unstable wartime environment.  
5.1 Women’s Work in Yan’an 
During both the Anti-Japanese War of 1937-1945 and the Civil War of 1945-1949, the 
CCP’s policymakers were primarily interested in organizing women with the 
understanding that “the mobilization of women will inevitably lead to the mobilization of 
the people of the whole country.”1 A resolution made by the Shan-Gan-Ning border Party 
Committee in July 1937 indicated that its immediate goals regarding women were to 
establish women’s organizations, train women’s cadres, mobilize women for 
participation in political and productive work, advocate universal elementary education, 
improve literacy and to discuss the daily revolutionary struggle.2 Women’s direct military 
participation included various different activities: military mobilization, including 
political agitation and propaganda; battlefield service, including taking charge of 
outposts, guarding important passes and spying on bandits; providing comfort services 
including a medical group, a washing group and a sewing group that provided clothing 
supply for the army; special services for military families, including regular household 
and field duties as well as school training; and finally self-protection army and 
government bond purchasing.3 
After the CCP acquired the official recognition of the central government and established 
a stable base in Yan’an in 1937, a large number of urban female intellectuals crowded 
into the region.  These intellectuals promoted the women’s rights movement there to a 
new level, which resulted in feminist demands for marriage reform, economic 
                                                 
1  Mao Zedong,“Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Chinese Women’s University (July 20, 1939)”, in Mao’s Road 
to Power, vol.7: New Democracy 1939-1941 , 155-156. 
2  “Shan Gan Ning Bianqu Dangwei guanyu funü zuzhi de jueyi”陕甘宁边区党委关于妇女组织的决议 [Resolution 
of the Shan-Gan-Ning border Party Committee on Women’s Organization, July, 1937], in Zhongguo funü yundong 
wenxian ziliao huibian, vol. 1:1918-1949, 335. 
3  Deng Yingchao, “Shan Gan Ning Bianqu funü yundong gaikuang” 陕甘宁边区妇女运动概况[Overview of the 
women’s work in the Shan-Gan-Ning border area, May 18, 1938], in Zhongguo funü yundong wenxian ziliao 
huibian, vol. 1:1918-1949, 339-343.  
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independence and gender equality becoming top considerations for the CCP’s women 
cadres. A women’s university was founded in Yan’an in order to train the new urban 
arrivals as cadres who would be qualified to do rural women’s work. The CCP’s first 
women’s journal Zhongguo Funü 中国妇女 [Women of China] was established during 
the Yan’an period in order to host open discussions on all sorts of issues regarding 
women. Topics covered by the journal were varied, including: theoretical studies on 
women’s liberation and the movement, the Party’s policies on women, the problems of 
women’s work, the promulgation of marriage laws, new developments in the 
international and national women’s movements, stories about ‘model’ women, biological 
and physiological knowledge, and childcare.4 
In order to avoid unnecessary antagonism between the sexes, the Party divided women 
into several groups according to their class background: bourgeoisie, proletariat, peasants 
and urban poor. Each group’s requirements for marriage freedom were examined by the 
Party, which identified different individual characteristics: for the bourgeoisie, the goal 
was to gain marriage freedom and to modify the Legal Regulations of Marriage; workers 
were looking to focus on gaining the freedom to make marriage decisions; peasants and 
the urban poor were looking to oppose the buying and selling of marriages, crack down 
on marital violence, to gain marriage freedom and to abolish the ‘adopted-daughter-in-
law’ system.5 Based on a careful analysis of each class’ requirements for marriage 
reform, policymakers expected to set a baseline for overall reform that could satisfy 
women’s basic expectations without provoking a gender war. 
Nevertheless, the gender conflict couldn’t help but become increasingly sharp once 
women from urban and intellectual backgrounds were sent into the villages to propagate 
the new marriage regulations. The most provocative issues they raised were not only 
basic feminist demands (such as love and marriage freedom, real gender equality in both 
the domestic and public spheres, and women’s economic independence) but also the 
                                                 
4  Li Jiuwei 李九伟, “Kangzhan shiqi de ‘Zhongguo funü’ de gongxian” 抗战时期的《中国妇女》的贡献[The 
contribution of “Women of China”], Chuban faxing yanjiu, no.3 (2005): 89-91. 
5  “Funü gongzuo dagang”妇女工作大纲 [Outline on Women’s Work, issued by the Central Organization Department 
in September, 1937], in Zhongguo funü yundong wenxian ziliao huibian, vol. 1, 335-339. 
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radical working methods that many progressive woman cadres used. The women’s 
liberation advocated by these activists was paradoxical to the goals of the peasant 
revolution that was then occurring in northwest China. On the one hand, the Party 
encouraged peasant women to fight against their oppressive families in order to achieve 
unprecedented financial independence and individual freedom; on the other hand, the 
Party also needed to accommodate the peasant men who formed the CCP’s primary 
source of army recruitment, many of whom would not welcome such freedoms for their 
spouses and daughters. In a society where men enjoyed absolute gender superiority, 
women’s liberation inevitably conflicted with the local patriarchies and caused general 
resentment toward the Party, even to the point of endangering military recruitment. 
Consequently, in the early 1940s the CCP leadership tightened its policies towards 
women and began to constrain the development of the women’s movement under what 
was called the Rectification Campaign. The Women’s University was closed down, 
female activists were removed from their positions and were severely criticized or even 
subjected to legal punishment and Zhongguo funü stopped publication in March 1941 
after only two issues.6  The focus of propaganda on the women’s movement turned from 
advocating women’s liberation and freedom to focusing on women’s participation in 
production and military recruitment.   
5.2 Marriage Reform through Legislation 
Like the leaders of the Jiangxi Soviet, the new leadership in Yan’an attempted to 
implement their marriage reforms through adopting legislation. Each border area 
promulgated its own marriage regulations in accordance with the local circumstances. 
Although considerable compromises were made in order to accommodate the 
conservative peasant class, the conflicts that the Soviet leaders had experienced between 
men and women, cadres and the people as well as between central orders and local 
practices all continued to frustrate the Yan’an leadership.  Eventually, these clashes 
forced the Party to switch its focus from marriage reform to the participation of women in 
production for the sake of the ongoing war. 
                                                 
6  Zhu Hongzhao, 235. 
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5.2.1 The Marriage Legislation in the Border Area 
Between 1938 and 1949, a number of marriage regulations and their amendments were 
passed in the major Border Areas of Shan-Gan-Ning (Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia), Jin-
Cha-Ji (Shanxi, Ch’ahar, and Hebei), Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, and 
Henan), the Jin-Sui (Shanxi and Suiyuan) and Shandong, as follows:  
I. Marriage Regulations of the Border Area of Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia 
(the Shan-Gan-Ning Border Area), promulgated April 4, 1939;7 
II. Revised Provisional Marriage Regulations of the Shan-Gan-Ning Border 
Area, promulgated March 20, 1944;8 
III. Marriage Regulations of the Border Area of Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia 
(the Shan-Gan-Ning Border Area), promulgated April 23, 1946; 
IV. Marriage Regulation of the Border Area of Shanxi, Ch’ahar, and Hebei (the 
Jin-Cha-Ji Border Area, promulgated February 4, 1943;9 
V. The Provisional Marriage Regulations of the Border Area of Shanxi, Hebei, 
Shandong, and Henan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Border Area), revised version of 
September 29, 1943; 
VI. The Detailed Provisions on the Enforcement of the Provisional Marriage 
Regulations of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Border Area of April 26, 1942; 
VII. The Provisional Marriage Regulations of the Border Area of Shanxi and 
Suiyuan (the Jin-Sui Border Area); 
VIII. The Provisional Marriage Regulations of Northwest Shanxi, promulgated 
April 1, 1941; 
IX. The Provisional Marriage Regulations of Shandong Province, promulgated 
March 16, 1945; 10 
These regulations expressed a universal spirit of marriage rights that were summarized 
into four General Principles, as outlined in a directive published by the Jin-Cha-Ji 
government on July 7, 1941 called On our Marriage Regulations.  These four principals 
were gender equality, marriage freedom (divorce), serious gender relations (monogamy), 
and the priority of the interest of anti-Japanese soldiers.11 
While varying in specific details, all of the marriage regulations in the Border Areas 
identically stressed gender equality in the public and domestic spheres, claiming that  
                                                 
7  Appendix D  
8  Appendix E 
9  Appendix F 
10 Genjudi fazhi wenxian xuanbian, vol.4, 804-890. Translated in Meijer, 285-298. 
11 “Guanyu women de hunyin tiaoli”关于我们的婚姻条例 [On Our Marriage Regulations, July 7, 1941], issued by Jin-
Cha-Ji Administrative Committee, in Genjudi fazhi wenxian xuanbian, vol.4, 816-825. 
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“Man and woman are completely equal in social, political, and economic respects and in 
respect to their position within the family.”12 This definition of equality constituted the 
theoretical foundation for monogamy for the CPP. The principle of free marriage was 
identified in On Our Marriage Regulations as being “free, self-determined, mutually 
willing marriage…established on the matched feelings and will of the two parties.”13 
Following this spirit, each marriage law included several provisions that upheld the free 
consent of the marrying parties, prohibited interference by third parties and prohibited 
marriage by arrangement or by “purchase and sale”. Although betrothal was generally not 
regarded as a prerequisite for legal marriage, some of the regulations contained very 
elaborate provisions on the subject so as to satisfy local customs. For example, in the Jin-
Ji-Lu-Yu area, it was even required that the contract of betrothal be registered and no less 
than seven Articles out of a total of twenty-four were devoted to the question.14 
In contrast to the Jiangxi Soviet period, when family needs were held to be secondary to 
Engels’ socialist ideal, in Yan’an the CCP policymakers emphasized “the spirit of a new 
democratic, dignified family system”, and especially focused on constructing a new 
social order on the basis of monogamy. 15 This monogamous principle along with serious 
gender relations, in this sense, were described by policymakers as constituting the 
necessary premise for marriage freedom, the essential guarantee of healthy offspring, the 
revolutionary social order and the overall future of the Border Area.  Stressing the value 
of monogamy was also the legal basis used by officials to oppose the liberal tendency of 
“beishui zhuyi”杯水主义 [the glass of water theory], consensual adultery, rape and 
promiscuity.16 
In all of the Border Areas the condition for the conclusion of a marriage was the formal 
registration of a contract with the relevant authority, either the xiang or qu [village or 
                                                 
12 “Guanyu women de hunyin tiaoli”, 816. 
13 Ibid. 
14 “Revised Provisional Marriage Regulations of the Border Area of Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong and Henan”, in Meijer, 
Appendix, 295-297. 
15 “Guanyu women de hunyin tiaoli”, 816. 
16 This is the doctrine mentioned above that was popularized in the Soviet Union after the October Revolution, which 
advocated that under the Communist system, having sex should be as easy and simple as drinking a glass of water. 
This theory caused a temporary sexual indulgence among the youth. Lenin once criticized this doctrine as anti-
Marxist and antisocialist. 
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agglomeration of villages] government. However, even the fulfillment of this procedure 
was generally not compulsory: “As long as the relations of husband and wife exist in fact, 
the marriage is certainly not invalid because the prescribed procedure has not been 
complied with.”17 This did not, however, constitute an official recognition of de-facto 
marriage; any marriage that proceeded without either public ceremony or official 
registration was considered not valid and offenders were subject to punishment by the 
local government.  The basic argument was that such marriages corrupted relations 
between men and women and furnished the enemies of the CCP and saboteurs with an 
excuse to spread rumors.18 The marriageable age was set at 20 for men and 18 for 
women, which was identical with the age limit set in the Civil Code of 1931. The only 
exception to this age among the different areas was in Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu, where it was 18 for 
men and 16 for women (Article 11). 
Unlike the provisions examined above, the chapters on divorces in the Yan’an period 
codes demonstrated a radical break from the divorce provisions of the Jiangxi period. 
There was no longer any provision that permitted divorce on the simple grounds of 
request by either party in any of the resolutions. Divorce could only be obtained either by 
mutual consent or by an ex parte application. The applicant would have to list the reasons 
for divorce and address himself (or herself) to the responsible authorities. The acceptable 
grounds for divorce were bigamy, adultery, cruelty, desertion in bad faith, attempt at 
physical injury by spouse, impotence, incurable or contagious mental or venereal 
diseases, uncertainty as to whether the spouse had been alive for a period varying from 
one to three years, or finally conviction of spouse to imprisonment for a certain number 
of years. Besides these universal foundations, there were variations in the individual 
codes of certain Areas that permitted divorce for reasons such as collaboration with the 
enemy (in the Jin-Cha-Ji and the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Regulations), and drug addiction (in the 
Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Regulations). According to the Revised Shan-Gan-Ning Regulations, a 
divorce would be granted “when one party does not engage in a regular occupation and 
                                                 
17 “Guanyu women de hunyin tiaoli”, 824. 
18 “Jin-Cha-Ji Bianqu xingzheng weiyuanhui guanyu hunyin dengji wenti de tongzhi”晋察冀边区行政委员会关于婚
姻登记问题的通知 [Notice from the Jin-Cha-Ji government on the Marriage Registration, May 27, 1943], in 
Genjudi fazhi wenxian xuanbian, vol.4, 829-832, 830. Translated in Meijer 59. 
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warning had no effect, while his behavior endangers the other party’s livelihood” (Article 
8 and 9).  
Apart from the grounds mentioned above, the Yan’an Regulations also allowed “any 
other important reason” to be given as acceptable grounds for divorce “when the 
sentiments and wills [hearts and minds] of the parties fundamentally do not harmonize 
and there is no way of continuing to live together” (Shan-Gan Ning Regulations of 1939 
article 14 and 1944 Article 16). When the laws acknowledged that incompatibility and 
the breakdown of mutual affection were acceptable bases for divorce, the whole spirit of 
marriage was changed; it was no longer just a solid and legal bond, but was instead now 
something that was dependent on the feelings and affections of the individuals involved. 
Nevertheless, not every unhappy couple could obtain an easy divorce, as having ‘no way 
of continuing to live together’ was an inexplicit term that easily led to distorted 
interpretations and indiscreet divorces. On Our Marriage Regulations specifically 
elaborated on this point: 
Marriage must be based on profound love, only then it can work well. 
Fundamental conflicts in sentiments will cause great pain to both parties. 
However, the expression ‘disharmony in sentiments’ only refers to cases where 
it is ‘impossible to continue living together’. Therefore in applying this Article 
you must not grant divorce simply because of an occasional quarrel between 
husband and wife. 19 
Therefore, an easier and more common criterion was introduced by officials in order to 
deal with any divorce application that fell into this more ambiguous category: “the 
comrades of the various levels of government, especially those of the judicial sector 
should understand these problems from the political point of view.”20 Following this 
spirit, the acceptable grounds for divorce were interpreted by officials in the light of the 
class struggle and the anti-feudal front whenever the occasion arose. Political factors such 
as an individual’s class background and political tendencies replaced love or affection as 
the top factors under consideration when a judge was ruling over a divorce. 
                                                 
19 “Guanyu women de hunyin tiaoli”, 820. Translated in Meijer, 63. 
20 Ibid. 
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Policymakers granted certain privileges to some people in order to take care of the 
interests of the military men in service, declaring “Our Regulations are permeated by the 
spirit of the needs of anti-Japanese war, which are beyond everything.” 21 The provisions 
in the Border Area Regulations for divorce among army personnel were very similar to 
those in the Marriage Code of 1934: women generally had to wait four to five years 
before they were permitted to apply for divorce. The Order on Protecting the Army 
Personnel’s Marriage, issued by the Jin-Sui Border Government in 1946 went so far as 
to state that “divorce cases of army dependents should be dealt with great caution, 
generally they cannot be divorced.”22 Another document issued in the same year by the 
administrative office of the Southern Hebei Area supplemented this regulation with the 
statement that “even under the condition that the divorce application of the army 
dependent meets the legal ground for divorce, and the principal refuses to be conciliated, 
the granting of the divorce should be intentionally prolonged.”23 
The Yan’an period, as Delia Davin perceived, served as a laboratory for a transition in 
CCP practice from a feminist approach toward a socialist one. Marriage legislation in the 
Border Areas is of great importance in understanding the development of marriage 
legislation and policy in the People’s Republic.  The social changes and experiments that 
took place there were later to determine the course of Chinese women’s history.24 
5.2.2 Marriage Regulations in Practice 
Introducing marriage reforms to the peasant masses was a difficult and frustrating job. 
Official reorganization in the Yan’an period was generally incomplete in both scope and 
depth. Complicating things was the fact that the distribution of marriage freedoms was 
regionally unbalanced. While in some more progressive areas totally or partially free 
                                                 
21 “Guanyu women de hunyin tiaoli”, 817. 
22 “Jin-Sui Bianqu guanyu baozhang geming junren hunyin wenti de mingling”晋绥边区关于保障革命军人婚姻问题
的命令（April 23, 1946）[Order on protecting revolutionary soldier’s marriage in the Jin-Sui Border Area], in 
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23 “Jinan xingshu guanyu chuli hunyin wenti de jige yuanze”冀南行署关于处理婚姻问题的几个原则（July, 1946）
[Principles on dealing with the marriage problems in the administrative office of south Hebei], in Genjudi fazhi 
wenxian xuanbian, vol.4, 882-883: 883. 
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marriage were popular, in other places arranged marriage still dominated.25 The 
advocates and supporters of free marriage were primarily Party members, Youth League 
members and partisans. Even among the most progressive peasants, the practice of 
marriage freedom was far more reserved and the practices of using a matchmaker as ‘go-
between’ and obtaining familial consent were still considered important, if not 
imperitive.26  
Ineffective as they were, these Marriage Regulations seldom appeared in official CCP 
documents and addresses.  When they were mentioned, the language used to describe 
them was often rather ambiguous. For instance, when Kang Keqing concluded lessons on 
women’s work in Huabei in July 1940, she politely expressed her dissatisfaction with the 
results of marriage reform over the previous three years: 
The marriage problems had been partly solved. Individual cases were properly 
handled. Selling and purchasing marriage, adopted-daughter-in-law, domestic 
violence started to be prohibited in some areas. The Women’s Salvation 
Association [Fujiuhui 妇救会] had helped many women with their unhappy 
marriages.27 
The conservative situation in northern China and the offences of local cadres were cited 
as the primary causes behind this ineffective implementation. As soon as the female 
communist workers had arrived in Yan’an, they realized that they were confronting “a 
region characterized by barren land, sparse population, insufficient food, backward 
culture, a lagging economy and transportation, occlusive social customs and thick feudal 
                                                 
25 For example, in Yangcheng village 阳城村 of Qingyuan county 清原县 in Hebei, from October of 1947 to May of 
1950 92 couples were married. Among them, 72 were arranged, 15 were partially arranged and only 5 were 
considered free. Originally seen in “Qingyuan xian siqu yangchengcun hunyin qingkuang diaocha baogao” 清源县
四区阳城村婚姻情况调查报告 [Marriage investigation on the Yangcheng village of Qingyuan County], Hebei 
archive center, file No. 899-1-43, quoted in Zhang Zhiyong 张志永, Hunyin zhidu cong chuantong dao xiandai de 
guodu 婚姻制度从传统到现代的过渡[From Traditional Marriage to Modern Marriage](Beijing: China Social 
Science Press, 2006), 80. 
26 This kind of marriage was known as a ‘half-free’ marriage: after the two parties were introduced to each other’s 
family head by the matchmaker, a meeting would be held among the family members, especially with the principals. 
Only then would the two parties start their courtship. There were also some cases where the two parties fell in love 
first and then consulted the family for their consent. However, the final marriage decision was in the hands of the 
two principals, instead of these third parties. Another kind of more conservative practice was for the two parties to 
meet once or twice under the arrangement of the families before the marriage decision was made, and the final 
decision was in the hand of the parents. 
27 Kang Keqing, “Sannianlai de Huabei funü yundong”三年来的华北妇女运动 [Women’s Movement in Huabei in the 
Past Three Years, July, 1940], in Zhongguo funü yundong wenxian ziliao huibian, vol.1, 374. (The emphasis is added 
by the author). 
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thoughts.”28 After a couple of years’ work experience, Kang’s perceptions about reform 
developed into a fuller understanding that “the ethics and social customs derived from the 
semi-feudal economy [was] the biggest impediment against the development of women’s 
movement.”29  She argued that liberating women from their feudal oppression required a 
long and tough fight, which was inseparable from the victory of the anti-Japanese war. 
Betrothal gifts, early marriages, adopting daughters-in-law and divorce were the major 
issues in struggle for marriage freedom. According to government reports of 1930-1931, 
the disparity in gender in the population of northwest China was a remarkable 100 
women to every 135 men.30 This scarcity of women in the region made them especially 
valuable, which caused the selling and purchasing of marriages to be a much more 
popular practice in this area than in any other place in China.  It was especially popular 
among the poorest peasant families who expected to realize financial benefits from 
marrying out their daughters. The process of obtaining a wife was still a potentially 
crippling financial blow to a groom’s family. In dealing with cases that were assumed to 
be one of these marriages for sale, the women cadre officers often chose to simply 
confiscate all the betrothal gifts and dowries exchanged by the two families, regardless of 
their protests and without return or compensation.    
Early engagement and marriage had been another very popular practice among the 
peasants, who were too poor to afford an extra daughter or to raise a proper betrothal gift. 
It was common practice for a girl to be sent to her future husband’s household as an 
orphan at a very early age due to the poverty of her natal family. Especially in areas 
frequently swept by the Japanese troops, the families tended to send their daughters to 
their in-law’s houses in less active areas in order to avoid unexpected rape or killing. To 
meet the Marriage Regulations’ stipulation for marriage age, some women cadres 
forcefully sent daughters-in-law who were not older than eighteen back to their natal 
                                                 
28 Deng Yingchao, “Shan Gan Ning Bianqu funü yundong gaikuang” [Overview of the women’s work in the Shan-
Gan-Ning border area,1938], 339. 
29 Kang Keqing, “Sannianlai de Huabei funü yundong” [Women’s Movement in Huabei in the Past Three Years, July, 
1940], 370. 
30 For original data see Min shangshi xiguan diaocha baogaolu 民商士习惯调查报告录[Report on investigations into 
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families and annulled their underage marriages. Tragedies happened sometimes. In one 
instance, a daughter-in-law who had been living with her mother-in-law for many years 
and was treated like a close family member was forced to return to her poorer natal 
family, where she did not even get enough food to survive. Her mother-in-law went 
insane over missing her.31 
The threat of divorce was used by the women cadre leaders as a main motivator in 
dealing with family conflicts. In some districts of Jin-Cha-Ji, measuring the number of 
divorce cases was used as an important standard for evaluating the cadre’s work. Divorce 
even became fashionable in some villages. The village authorities encouraged women to 
sue for divorce whenever their conditions met the acceptable grounds listed in the divorce 
regulations. In some areas, couples with a pronounced age gap were even divorced 
against their will.32  
The feminist tendencies of local woman cadres were the primary causes of these 
examples of abuses of power. For example, Cai Chang 蔡畅(1900-1990) who was 
secretary of the CCP’s Central Women’s Movement Committee and the Chairman of the 
All-Women’s Federation of the PRC, pointed out  in 1943: 
Many of our female Party members and cadres lack the spirit of seeking truth 
from facts and the viewpoint of the masses. Their work is neither in-depth nor 
steadfast enough. Although those intellectual  cadres always speak of the slogans 
such as ‘marriage freedom’, ‘economic independence’, ‘against the suppression 
of the four systems’, they actually know nothing about how to put them into 
practice…when dealing with women’s family problems, they often take the side 
of wife and daughter-in-law, blaming husband and parents-in-law. This made our 
woman’s work isolated from the social support…  ”33 
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32 Ibid. 
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This critique was repeated by Tian Xiujuan 田秀涓(1917-2006), the director of Jin-Cha-
Ji Women’s Salvation Association in 1945. In her summary on women’s work before 
1943, Tian attributed the stagnation of the movement in the early 1940s to the impractical 
working methods of the local cadre authorities.  She concluded that “for the majority of 
the peasant masses whose first concern is survival, the overemphasis of liberating women 
from their suffering marriages could not help but alienate the masses from the Party.”34 
The peasant population’s rising resentment towards marriage reform forced the Party to 
transfer the focus of its propaganda in 1943. The participation of women in economic 
production was recognized by the Party as “women’s biggest contribution to the anti-
Japanese war, and their best work,” and further stated that the primary work of women’s 
associations should be to “organize women’s individual and collective production.”35 
After the change in focus, marriage reform was not considered a central issue anymore by 
Party officials and it was excluded from further wartime businesses. Cai Chang told her 
American interviewer:   
“Our slogans in the rural districts are no longer ‘free marriage’ and ‘women’s 
equality’, but ‘save the babies’ and ‘for a prosperous family.’ We made a 
mistake when we emphasized women’s rights to such an extent that we 
antagonized the peasants. The conflict between men and women weakened the 
united struggle against the Japanese enemy and against the landlord. Besides, 
equality of women and freedom of marriage cannot be secured in this 
manner.”36 
5.3 Socialization, Love, and Marriage in Yan’an 
After the establishment of the United Front, thousands of passionate young people 
crowded into Yan’an from around the country, expecting to contribute to the anti-
Japanese war, and the Communist Revolution. Among these, about thirty percent were 
educated young women from all walks of life.37 Their arrival at Shaanbei injected fresh 
modern blood into this barren, conservative and traditional rural society, and inevitably 
attracted the interest of men there, and consequently provoked the resentment of the 
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senior women cadre leaders. Filled with the romanticized idea of revolution, these young 
people tried to reform the conservative, closed and seemingly backwards Chinese peasant 
society into a progressive, open and modern one that emulated the “progressive” West. 
How to bring love into the marriage context of the rural society became one of their first 
challenges. 
Talks about love and marriage among the Chinese communists were going on throughout 
the Yan’an period. With the Rectification Campaign that started in 1941 as a turning 
point, public opinion regarding cross-gender socialization, free love and marriage 
freedom became increasingly conservative.  As outlined above, this change reflected a 
shift in the Party to fit the social context of rural northwest China and to compromise 
with the more urgent need for wartime recruitment. Caught between the contrasts 
between modern ideas of romanticism and freedom with more conservative rural social 
realities on the ground, many people began to feel confused and frustrated in dealing with 
their personal lives and Party service. How to find a balance between modern ideals and 
traditional society became a central concern of every marriage discussion.  
5.3.1 Cross-gender Socialization in a Puritan Society 
Unlike the Jiangxi Soviet era, where the relationships between men and women were 
“rather loose” and people could “live together as a couple at will”, the social lives of 
most communists and soldiers during the Yan’an period was much more puritan. 38 The 
morale and discipline of the Red Army from its founding until 1949 had been based upon 
a policy of total abstinence from women for male soldiers. Edgar Snow was told by an 
army officer that “General opinion is very strongly against anyone playing with women. 
In our army men are taught a stern moral code…An army with socialist ideals won’t dirty 
its own nest.” 39 The officer said he had never had a case in five years where a soldier got 
a local girl into trouble. In Yan’an, most female cadres, married or unmarried, lived under 
strict gender segregation in the dormitories of the Women’s Section of the former Red 
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Academy or within their work departments.40 According to a report by Harrison Forman, 
an American visitor living among the Communists in Yan’an during the last year of the 
anti-Japanese war: 
Most of Yan’an University’s thirteen hundred students are married. However, 
school regulations forbid husbands and wives to live together, except on 
Saturday nights when special “Guest caves” are made available by the school 
authorities. “Keeping them apart during the week not only enables boys and 
girls to study better, with fewer distractions, but at the same time sweetens love 
between married couples,” I was told by Chow Yang [Zhou Yang], the president 
of the university. When I questioned the students about this rule they would not 
discuss it.41 
In these puritanical circumstances, individual desires regarding love and marriage were 
easily marginalized by the demands of serving the public good. Not only was sexual 
behavior outside of marriage considered by the state to be heinous and was often 
officially defined as a “conspiracy composed by the nation’s enemy to contaminate our 
countrymen and to disturb the democratic order.”42  Under such circumstances, even 
innocent contact between the sexes could attract scandal and gossip.43 
Young people were generally encouraged and expected not to talk about love [谈恋爱
tan lian’ai]. In a speech at the opening ceremony of the Women’s University, Mao 
Zedong suggested “the comrades making up the teachers and staff of the Women’s 
University set their minds to their work, and be resolved to work for a long time.”44 
During wartime, love was considered taboo for the men and women serving at both the 
front and in the rear areas. Exposed lovers would be severely criticized in public for their 
‘petit bourgeois tendencies’, forced to admit their mistake and to profess their willingness 
to break up.45 The only way to secure a romantic relationship that had occurred was to 
apply to the Party for permission, though this was often difficult to obtain if the match 
was not intentionally arranged by the Party. According to the memoirs of Mo Wenhua 莫
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文骅 (1910-2000), the deputy director of the Political Department of the Eighth Route 
Army, in order to avoid being distracted from their studies the students in Kangda 抗大 
[the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University] were prohibited from falling in love 
and getting married by school regulations. A school leader once violated this regulation 
by getting married to a student without reporting it to the Party in advance. He was 
subsequently removed from his position and demoted on a written order from Mao 
Zedong.46 
Nevertheless, before the Rectification Campaign entered a Party-wide stage in the spring 
of 1942, the political circumstances and public opinion in Yan’an were relatively free, 
open and less politicized. 47 An open forum on how to socialize between the two sexes 
without provoking scandals was held in late 1941.  The paper Jiefang Ribao 解放日报 
[Liberation Daily] contributed a special column in order to discuss this question on 
December 13, 1941.  The column called for answers to the question “what was cross-
socialization in the New Democratic Society”?48 Nine participants gave their opinions on 
socialization in Yan’an, recognizing that ideal socialization in a socialist society should 
be a completely free and equal communication between the two sexes, which should be 
established on the basis of women’s equal participation in production. The forum took 
particular note of the problems introduced by the bourgeoisie: on the one hand, a few 
young men who came from the big cities were known to treat women like play toys, 
dating different pretty girls every day. Some young women, on the other hand, were very 
particular about their friends and only chose to associate with those who could satisfy 
their material needs. In rural circumstances, where free love was regarded as equal to 
licentiousness, the forum warned that this tendency could easily harm the Party’s 
reputation and provoke misunderstanding and antagonism from the local population. 
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The forum tried to advocate a healthy and normal socialization between the two sexes 
that was comradely, serious, and wide-ranging and trans-class in nature.  In reality, 
however, having a normal social life in Yan’an was more difficult than the easy solutions 
offered by the forum suggest, due to the unpredictable wartime conditions where 
individuals were constantly required to sacrifice their personal needs for the greater good 
of the war and the revolution. The burdens of study and work, limited transportation, and 
economic difficulties left people little room to think about socialization.  
The fundamental reason for the difficulties concerning socialization lay in the 
disproportionate ratio between men and women in Yan’an. Among the 4000 survivors of 
the Long March who arrived in Shaanbei, only 50 were female. From the end of 1937 to 
early 1938, the sex ratio of men to women rose slightly to 30:1, reached 18:1 in 1941 and 
finally settled at 8:1 in the summer of 1944.49 Despite the fact that women were in the 
vast minority, many married females in Yan’an were very possessive about their partners. 
When Helen Snow first arrived in Yan’an in 1937 she encountered a conflict between the 
senior women cadres and the population of new arrivals from the big cities. Most of these 
women were the wives of the high-ranking Party and military men and were themselves 
veterans of the Long March.  Snow found that these women were in fear of losing their 
husbands to the younger, prettier and better educated urban girls. Led by Agnes Smedley 
and Ding Ling, these young partisans attempted to introduce some modern urban 
socialization practices such as ballroom dancing into Yan’an’s social life.50 Their 
attempts ended with Smedley’s reluctant departure at the end of 1937, and Ding Ling’s 
temporary dispatch to the front, leading to accusations of her ‘bourgeois tendency’ in the 
coming Rectification campaign. 
This kind of open discussion on cross-gender socialization and love was definitely novel 
and bold for the local masses and especially for those Chinese with a northern and rural 
background, where most couples still met each other for the first time on their wedding 
day. The arrival of groups of urban young partisans in Yan’an in the late 1930s and early 
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1940s, and their vague anarchist ideas of ‘free love’ rapidly intensified the antagonism 
between the conservative local population and the progressive reformers. As the 
Rectification Campaign entered into its full term in the second half of the 1942, formal 
talks regarding gender relations were intentionally avoided by the CCP, and they 
subsequently disappeared from public attention altogether.   
5.3.2 The Politicized Discourse on Love and Marriage 
In the official discourse of the CCP, love and marriage were always considered 
subordinate to Party work. On March 2, 1942, Deng Yingchao published an article 
entitled “Nannü qingnian wenti” 男女青年问题（Questions on Young men and Young 
women）in the paper Xinhua ribao 新华日报 [New China Daily] in order to give official 
advice on what was appropriate regarding love and marriage. She pointed out that it was 
very important for Party members to have correct views on love and marriage not only 
for the sake of an individual’s personal life and happiness, but also for the development 
of social advancement and revolutionary work. The so-called ‘correct’ viewpoint on love, 
according to Deng, included two major points: first, a love relationship must be 
established on the basis of mutual will and matched personalities. This match required 
that the two parties’ mutual affection surmount sexual attraction, that their common 
interests still served the public good and that the couple have lasting devotion to each 
other. Second, although love and marriage were important and necessary parts of one’s 
life, the quest for free socialization, love and marriage should not impede one’s 
revolutionary work, studies or health. The bourgeois tendencies to seek passionate love 
and irresponsibility should be opposed and the individual should not sacrifice politics and 
revolution for love and marriage.51 In other words, work first and love second! 
These kinds of principles also applied to the mate-selection criteria. In the same article, 
Deng Yingchao advised young people to select their mates carefully by examining a 
prospect’s political beliefs and thoughts in order to ensure they were in accordance with 
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the Party’s political and revolutionary requirements. The best match, according to Deng, 
should be one in which the two parties have common ideals and beliefs so that they could 
work together to achieve their life and work goals. Of course, she admitted that not 
everyone would be lucky enough to find a perfect match. The best choice for those that 
were less lucky was to make a choice from among the prospects with clean and reliable 
political backgrounds, which had a clear desire for advancement.52 
Ding Ling mentioned in her “Thought on March 8th” that people were taught to look for 
marriage prospects based on 1) political purity,  2) age and physical compatibility,  3)and 
finally ‘mutual help’. However, she also suggested that most of the officially sanctioned 
mate-selection criteria made no practical sense in contemporary Yan’an: “Even though 
everyone is said to fulfill these conditions—as for (1), there are no open traitors in 
Yan’an; as for (3), you can call anything ‘mutual help’, including darning socks, patching 
shoes and even feminine comfort—everyone nevertheless makes a great show of giving 
thoughtful attention to them”.53 
While people were taught to reject the traditional idea of mendi 门第 [matched family 
background], matching individuals’ class background was particularly emphasized by the 
CCP’s marriage advisers for the sake of the revolution. During wartime, it was dangerous 
to have a life partner from a different background as evidenced by numerous reported 
cases in newspapers like Jiefang ribao [Liberation Daily], and Jinchaji ribao 晋察冀日报 
[Jin-Cha-Ji Daily].   In one common example, a landlord’s daughter would conspire to 
marry a poor peasant in order to penetrate and breach the Party organization or to find 
shelter for her and her family.54 The poor peasant man who engaged or married such a 
woman because of her good looks, education or dowry was forced to self-criticize his 
insubstantial stance and to divorce his wife immediately. One such a case was reported in 
the early 1940s in the village of Hanjiayu 韩家峪 in the Quyang 曲阳 area. After hearing 
the news of impending land reform, a landlord named Zhang Laiyu married his daughter 
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to Zhang Qingtai, a CCP member of poor peasant origins. When the working group heard 
this news, they offered Zhang two choices: keep the marriage and large dowry and be 
recognized as the protector of a landlord and enemy of the masses or divorce the bride 
immediately and return to the embrace of the Party. After serious self-rectification, Zhang 
realized his mistake, drove the bride out of his house and surrendered the dowry to the 
local peasant organization.55 
As in traditional Chinese society, where finding a partner with a matched family 
background was supposed to provide the bride with better insurance against poverty, 
domestic violence and political persecution, a progressive Party member from the poor 
peasant class was regarded as the safest prospective spouse because such a person could 
protect his or her family from the CCP’s constant political maneuvering. The transition 
that had occurred in women’s mate-selection criteria was summed up by a Hebei cadre 
member as follows:  
Today, women no longer pick their future husbands among the wealthy men, but 
tend to choose those who are politically progressive and capable of doing good 
work; Benefited by the land reform, those who obtained good labor capacity and 
good personalities are preferred[by women] to those from the exploitative 
class.56 
The politicization of the social circumstances in the CCP’s border areas led to a similar 
politicization of love and marriage views, through which political ideology, or more 
precisely, loyalty to the Party became the paramount consideration in mate-selection 
criteria. When journalist Zhao Chaogou 赵超构 (1910-1992) visited Yan’an in 1944, he 
found that people’s love and marriage practices in Yan’an were standardized by the Party, 
which outlined its views in teaching a ‘correct love view’ and the ‘correct mate-selection 
criteria’.  As Zhao perceived at the time: “it seems no big difference whom you marry 
[since] all people had been stereotyped by the Party’s doctrines, and individual difference 
had diminished…The only conditions one can take into consideration when making a 
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marriage choice are age and appearance…Of course, this will save us a lot of trouble 
from making selections.”57 
5.3.3 The Rectified Official Discourse on Love and Marriage 
The open discussion on love and marriage that had come to its peak in early 1942 came 
to a sudden stop when Mao Zedong gave his “Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature 
and Art” to the literary and art workers in May of that year. In this well-known speech 
Mao set the basic tone of the CCP’s attitude toward intellectuals and their works:  “in a 
class society there can be only class love”, those who were seeking “a love transcending 
classes, love in the abstract and also freedom in the abstract, truth in the abstract, human 
nature in the abstract” “have been very deeply influenced by the bourgeoisie” and 
“should thoroughly rid themselves of this influence and modestly study Marxism-
Leninism”.58 In February 1943, Ou Mengjue 区梦觉 (1906-1992), a member of the 
Central Women’s Movement Committee of the CCP (1941-1943), published an article in 
Jiefang ribao to inject the new spirit of the Rectification Campaign into the love and 
marriage theme. In this article, Ou demanded that women cadres in Yan’an, especially 
those with bourgeois backgrounds, switch their concerns from trivial personal issues such 
as marriage and divorce to more significant issues such as the revolution and the war. She 
demanded that personal emotions like friendship and love were always secondary 
compared to the needs of Party. Ou especially criticized those “weak” women who put 
more faith in friends and lovers than in the Party, and selected their lovers or life partners 
based on personal compatibilities instead of harmonized political adamancy. 
Furthermore, she criticized wives who often expected attention from their husbands who 
were working for the Party and those who were incapable of balancing domestic 
housekeeping and Party work. To conquer these negative feelings, Ou suggested that 
women cadres always put the CCP’s interests first and resolve personal problems through 
thinking about Party interests. For example, love and marriage should be allowed only 
under the condition that it would not impede Party work in any way. For a woman, she 
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argued that a choice should be made between being either a good wife and wise mother 
or a good politician; the two could not co-exist simultaneously.59 
Such a strong emphasis on the priority of the Party’s work and the adversities of marriage 
created great pressure on the women in Yan’an as they struggled to balance public 
service with private lives and to preserve the precarious equalities they had achieved in 
the public sphere. This concern was intensified as the war drew to a close and as many 
demobilized soldiers and work cadres returned to the home front, demanding to re-take 
positions that had been held by women. A large number of married CCP women were 
persuaded to withdraw from their leadership positions in order to cede them to male 
candidates who would ‘not be distracted’ by their domestic duties. This could not help 
but provoke strong despair and depression among these women, aggravating the already 
intensified problems in gender relations. 
Ding Ling complained in 1942 that “all kinds of women comrades are often the target of 
deserved criticism” because of their inevitable inclination to become “backward” [luohou
落后].60 Marriage was believed to be the original sin behind all backwardness, once 
public opinion reached a consensus that under no condition should people’s public 
service be impeded. Few women in Yan’an could escape from being publicly derided as 
‘Noras who have returned home’ once they got married and had children. Those who 
gave up public work and returned home to be a full-time housewife were particularly 
detested by the radical female activists.  These women were subject to severe criticism 
and were referred to in such terms as “the dregs of Yan’an women” who “lacked the 
resolution and confidence to create her own fate, and spent all her life on raising several 
children.”61   
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In these circumstances, the women in Yan’an were unexceptionally engaged in a 
desperate effort to get rid of their gender identities by behaving progressive and 
remaining single. Like one journalist who visited Yan’an in the early 1940s perceived:  
the female comrade’s ambition is usually stronger than that of the males. In 
order to avoid being criticized as ‘weak’, they were particularly eager to 
demonstrate their strong minds and progressiveness...these women comrades 
tried in every way to get over their feminine side: they could engage in an 
earnest open discussion on the Party and state affairs; although love and 
marriage were inevitable for them, they seemed very reluctant to talk about 
them, not to mention the topics about makeup, clothing and fashion. 62 
When a woman cadre was jeered at with the criticism “you are nothing like a woman”, 
she refuted immediately: “Why must I be like a woman?”63 
Outside of these women’s expectations, however, their progressiveness and devotion 
were not appreciated by the Party. In a women’s colloquium held in March of 1945, 
Zhang Yun 章蕴 (1905-1998), the minister of the Women’s Department of the Suzhong 
area (Jiangsu province) blamed the gender tension that existed on these female cadres.64 
The first fault Zhang pointed out was the unrealistic political ambitions of some women 
and their pessimism at the failure of such ambitions, which in return further blinded them 
to the real situation. The real situation, as addressed by Zhang, included two “facts”: first 
that women should recognize that they are biologically inferior to men due to the 
disadvantages caused by marriage and childbearing, which would more or less impede a 
woman’s political career. She argued that because women were naturally incapable of 
competing with men on the battlefield, it was impossible for them to assume leadership 
during wartime. Therefore, Zhang persuaded women to give up competing with men for 
leadership when wartime conditions required a rapid reduction of women’s political 
duties at all levels. Secondly, Zhang demanded that women recognize that in the rural 
social context of northwest China, the population was not prepared to accept woman’s 
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leadership because of the popular conception of men’s superiority to women, which was 
still deeply rooted in local people’s minds. Until peasant women were well-organized 
into a competitive force, men’s conceptions about women could not be expected to 
change. Under the condition that ‘feudal thoughts’ still occupied the minds of most men, 
it was impossible for them to take orders from a woman, no matter how progressive she 
might be. Only after Chinese women had risen as a force and when the majority view on 
women was automatically transformed, could women seize high leadership positions with 
the support of the masses.  
The second fault Zhang pointed out for women comrades was their groundless fear of 
marriage. This fear, according to Zhang, mostly came from incorrect views on marriage 
that antagonized women’s domestic and political duties, which led to a contradiction 
between their political ambitions, worries about family and their natural sexual and 
emotional needs. Again, Zhang acknowledged that a marriage meant both happiness and 
catastrophe for a woman comrade, but insisted that it should not become an excuse for 
celibacy, which went against human nature. The solution Zhang suggested was to “take 
things as they come, and not fight them off.”65 That is, people needed to accept the 
biological divergence between men and women as a fixed natural law, while keeping the 
importance of progress in mind by recognizing that the need for consensual love and 
marriage was inborn. In other words, women should give up on unrealistic political 
ambitions and assume their natural duties as wives and mothers. 
From Zhang’s advice, one can easily trace the transition of the CCP’s gender discourse in 
the mid-1940s. The language Zhang employed was much less radical than the one used 
by Ou Mengjue, who earlier had upheld women’s wholehearted devotion to work and 
equal competition with men in the work field. In this renewed gender discourse, women 
as a whole were politely persuaded to accept their biological limitations as giving them 
an irreversible inferiority to men, to accept marriage as a natural duty and to voluntarily 
give up competing with men for Party leadership at all levels. The revolution required a 
stable and peaceful home front constituted by harmonious families. This was not only a 
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compromise to the Party’s wartime conditions, but also to the social realities of northwest 
China.   
5.4 Red Marriage: The Romanticized Revolutionary 
Marriage Pattern 
Since the Jiangxi Soviet era, it had been a tradition in the CCP that all Party members 
must first obtain permission from the official organizations before engaging in marriage 
or divorce. This tradition was expanded to cover any love relationship during the Yan’an 
period, which effectively sanctioned the Party’s, and later the Communist state’s, open 
interference with individual’s marriage for the sake of national security. Furthermore, the 
CCP went beyond merely permitting or dissolving relationships and marriages, and began 
actively engaging in matchmaking and background investigation. 
5.4.1 Love on the March: The Marriage Stories of the Red Soldiers 
Soon after arriving in Shaanbei in November of 1935, the Red Army began to experience 
a wave of ‘red marriages’- a term used specifically to refer to the marriages of high-level 
CCP and military leaders. Mo Wenhua, the deputy director of the Political Department of 
the Eighth Route Army, recalled that when the Red Army arrived in Shaanbei, many Red 
Army cadres were in their thirties, single, widowed, divorced or forever separated from a 
spouse by war.66 Once they had settled down, these veterans were eager to look for new 
wives; as Mo explained, “since the Red Army had found its home, wouldn’t its cadres 
want a home too?”67 Before the urban women began to arrive in Shaanbei, the few female 
Long March survivors and the local women cadres formed the primary pool of potential 
brides, although their scarcity meant that not everyone could find a satisfactory match. 
For the sake of army morale and social stability, most matches were arranged by Party 
leaders at different levels so as to show concern for its hard-working cadres on the one 
hand, and to balance the disparity between supply and demand, on the other. Mo Wenhua 
mentioned in his memoir that Luo Ronghuan 罗荣桓 (1902-1963) was a kind General 
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who cared about his subordinate’s marriages. In order to find them wives, he not only 
played the role of matchmaker, but also actively sought out new brides. At his request, 
more than ten women were collected and sent to Yan’an, all to be married to senior 
leaders.68 
However, due to the disparity in numbers of men and women, not every man could be 
allowed to marry.  Therefore, this privilege was largely decided by military rank. While 
this fact does not appear in the official record, it was well known among the veterans that 
there were certain prerequisites for marriage, including that the applicant must be over 
twenty-five years of age, have been in service for at least eight years and most 
importantly, to have reached a minimum rank of colonel [tuanzhang 团长].69 The first 
batch of grooms to be married under the auspices of the Party were thus high-rank party 
cadre leaders and generals, including Liu Shaoqi 刘少奇 (1898-1969), Zhang Wentian 张
闻天  (1900-1976), Xie Juezai 谢觉哉 (1883-1971), Song Renqiong 宋任穷 (1909-
2005), Luo Ronghuan 罗荣桓 (1902-1963)，Tan Zheng 谭政（1906-1988）and several 
others.70 Their brides were primarily female veterans of the Long March who remained 
single. The senior CCP leaders and their wives played the roles of matchmaker in setting 
up these unions. For example, Xie Fei 谢飞 (1913-), who was working for the Security 
Office in Ruijin during the retreat from Jiangxi, was matched by Deng Yingchao to Liu 
Shaoqi at the end of 1935 in Wayaobao. This was Liu’s third marriage, but Xie’s first. 
She recollected the experience in her later years: “One day, Deng Yingchao showed me a 
                                                 
68 Mo Wenhua, 350. 
69 Huang Renke ,89. It seems these qualifications were not fixed, but varied in different areas. For example, according 
to the regulations of the 359 brigade that resided at Mizhi of Shannxi province, anyone who was over 28, with a rank 
of colonel or higher was qualified for marriage. See Zhu Hongzhao, 243. 
70 Liu Shaoqi was Party Secretary in North China when he married Xie Fei in December 1935.They divorced in 1939 
when Liu was promoted to run the Central Plains Bureau. Zhang Wentian was General Secretary of the Communist 
Party of China from 1935 to 1945. Xie Juezai was the Minister of Domestic Affairs of the Democratic Central 
Government of Workers and Peasants in 1935, and then the President of the Supreme People's Court. His marriage to 
Wang Dingguo was his second marriage. Song Renqiong was a general in the Red Army and the Commissar of the 
28th corps after the Long March. During the Sino-Japanese War, he was the vice director of the political department 
of the 129th Division. Luo Ronghuan served as the security chief for the Chinese Red Army during the Long March 
and later became the director of the political department of the Military Commission of the Rear and the Political 
director of the 115th division of the Eighth Route Army. His marriage to Lin Yueqin was his second marriage. Tan 
Zheng was the political director of the 1st division of the Red Army in 1935, and then the vice director of the 
General Political Department of the Central Military Commission. His marriage to Wang Changde was his second 
marriage. 
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letter from Liu Shaoqi. In this letter, he reminded Deng of her promise to be his 
matchmaker. He told her that he had found the lady of his heart - me. He asked Deng to 
match us.” 71 Xie accepted this match, although she and Liu had met only once during the 
Long March.  
While most of these matches were arranged by the Party in the groom’s favor, the brides 
were seldom reluctant. As Wang Dingguo 王定国 (1913-) admitted, though her marriage 
to Xie Juezai, then thirty years her senior, was “completely arranged by the Party for the 
sake of the Revolution”, she accepted this arrangement as an expression of “giving love 
to the Revolution”.72 
5.4.2 The Match the Party Dissolved 
In the first month of 1937, the central government of the CCP moved to Yan’an and 
settled there for the following ten years until the outbreak of the civil war in 1945. Since 
the establishment of the Second United Front in 1937, a large number of urban women 
and students had crowded into Yan’an in pursuit of their revolutionary ideals. The arrival 
of these younger, prettier and smarter women brought a wave of divorces from the end of 
the 1930s to the early 1940s. In the face of these much younger, prettier and lively urban 
girls, the more senior female veterans began to lose the devotion of their husbands. As 
Ding Ling observed in 1941, even those women who were “capable of working to 
sacrifice their careers for the joys of motherhood” had no way of escaping the tragedy of 
‘backwardness’ (i.e. divorce) when they lost their last traces of attractiveness, which had 
been an invariable pretext for a husband to sue for divorce.73 Although the Party had the 
final power to grant or deny a divorce, the decision on whether a divorce would be 
granted was actually decided by the rank and political position of the principals. Among 
the numerous divorce proceedings that occurred, two cases were particularly 
                                                 
71 Huang Jinqi 黄进琪,“Changzheng yingxiong, Hainan nüjie: ji hongjun nüzhanshi Xie Fei de chuanqi rensheng” 长征
英雄-海南女杰：记红军女战士谢飞的传奇人生 [The Legend of Xie Fei], Shiji Caifeng, no.12 (2009): 33-39. 
72 Jiang Wei 蒋魏 and Xue Yang 雪扬, Yan’an nüxing fengjing 延安女性风景[Women in Yan’an] ( Beijing: Zuojia 
chubanshe, 1996), 170-171. 
73 Ding Ling, “Thought on March 8”, 131. 
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representative of this group; one was Mao Zedong’s divorce from He Zizhen and the 
other was Otto Braun’s divorce from Xiao Yuehua. 
When the ten-year marriage of Mao Zedong and He Zizhen came to an end in 1937, He 
had been pushed to the edge of mental collapse by frequent childbirth and Mao’s 
numerous extramarital affairs. In retrospect, it seems this divorce was inevitable due to 
her unstable mental condition and her ‘backwardness’. When speaking to American 
reporter Helen Snow, Kang Keqing once used her as an example of how a woman’s 
revolutionary work could be dragged down by childbearing.74 After the divorce was 
sanctioned by the Central Government, He Zizhen went (or was sent) to Russia for 
medical treatment at the end of 1937. She narrowly escaped a German air attack in 1941 
and returned China in 1948, long after Mao Zedong and Jiang Qing had been married. 
Another well-known divorce case was the one between Otto Braun and Xiao Yuehua. 
This marriage ended in 1937 with a Party-approved divorce. Although most Chinese and 
a few Western sources insist that it was Xiao who filed for divorce because she could not 
bear Braun’s constant beating, Helen Snow gave a passionate alternate account, noting 
that it was actually Braun who had requested the divorce after growing tired of his 
marriage.75 The pretext, as usual, was a charge of ‘backwardness’. Although almost all 
the senior Yan’an women stood on the side of Xiao Yuehua, the men in power generally 
supported Braun and finally granted him the divorce. Shortly thereafter, Braun declared 
his love for Li Lilian, a pretty Shanghai actress who had just arrived in Yan’an. The two 
were married in April, 1938. This marriage, however, came to an end in August, 1939 
when Braun was suddenly recalled to the USSR. 
He Zizhen and Xiao Yuehua were not the only wives who were deserted by their high-
ranking CCP husbands. More than a few wives shared the same misery. Xie Fei, after a 
four-year marriage to Liu Shaoqi, was sent by the Party to work in southern China in 
                                                 
74 Helen Foster Snow, Inside Red China, 189. 
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1939.  This geographical separation subsequently became grounds for divorce.76 Jin 
Weiying, the ex-wife of both Deng Xiaoping and Li Weihan, was sent to a sanatorium in 
Russia in 1938.  She was killed during German air-raids in late 1941 together with Liu 
Quanxue, the wife of Bo Gu who was exiled to Russia at the same time.  
Soon after getting rid of their old wives, these divorced husbands were able to find new 
wives among the aforementioned new arrivals. Unlike the marriages that were 
consummated in the Jiangxi Soviet and in Wayaobao that were often de facto and short-
lived due to wartime conditions and anarchist tendencies, marital relationships founded 
during the Yan’an period tended to last, and were trumpeted as “classic revolutionary 
love” by the biographers of CCP heroes or heroines.77 Three reasons help to explain this 
phenomenon. First, the relatively peaceful conditions in Yan’an and the rapid Communist 
victory reduced military casualties among the top leadership circle. Second, given the fact 
that northwest Chinese society was less tolerant of divorce and remarriage, the CCP 
leaders had to constrain their sexual behavior for the sake of Party reputation. Finally, as 
the Party leadership became more advanced in age, they were less inclined to seek new 
lovers. 
5.4.3 Failed Trophy: The Huang Kegong Incident 
Among the young women who arrived in the border areas in the early years of the United 
Front, many were educated feminists who believed in modern concepts like open 
socialization, free love, gender equality within marriage, and celibacy. On arriving in 
                                                 
76 In the biography Huang Jinqi wrote for Xie Fei, it claims that she was ordered by Liu Shaoqi to go to South in 1940 
in order to send a letter to Xiang Ying, the commander of the New Fourth Army.  Liu then lost contact with Liu due 
to the Japanese troop’s blockade. However, according to Liu’s sixth wife Wang Guangmei, it was Xie who sought a 
breakup due to her political ambitions. Half a year later, Liu married a sixteen-year old nurse named Wang Qian 
whom he divorced in 1947. He was matched to Wang Jian by Zhu De, but divorced her very soon after due to her 
mental condition. A couple of years later, Liu married Wang Guangmei, his sixth and last wife.  
77 See Kong Qingdong, “Shida yuanshuai de qingyuan” [Love stories of the Ten Marshals]. Yang Wenyu and Ma  
Xiaoxiao, Hongse Hunyin Dang’an I, II [The Archives of Red Marriage Vol. 1-2]. Zhu Hongzhao, Yan’an richang 
shenghuo zhong de lishi (1937-1947) [History in the Daily Life of Yan’an, 1937-1947]. Mei Jian梅剑 ed., Yan’an 
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Nüxing fengjing [Women in Yan’an]. Huang Renke, Luyi ren: hongse yishujia men [The Red Artists in Lu Xun Art 
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considered to be such personal and private issues that they were seldom mentioned by the official historians, and 
were only told to the biographers who managed to obtain the opportunities to interview the heroes or heroines of 
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Yan’an, however, they were seldom in full control of their own love and marriage 
practices. As Ding Ling pointed out, women in Yan’an needed to get married lest they 
become a target for rumors and slanderous gossip: “they can’t afford to be choosy, 
anyone will do: whether he rides horses or wears straw sandals, whether he’s an artist or 
a supervisor.”78 Their love, marriages, careers and futures were largely at the mercy of 
the Party, which could either easily arrange a match, or dissolve one under the name of 
the revolution. Under wartime circumstances, few women could avoid becoming the 
‘trophy wives’ of successful military men. 
In the autumn of 1937, a love affair occurred in Yan’an that eventually attracted 
nationwide attention. Huang Kegong 黄克功, the captain of the Sixth brigade of the 
Kangda [the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University], shot and killed his ex-
girlfriend. Huang was a peasant-born military commander who had joined the Red Army 
as a child. As a former brigadier of the Red Army, he was highly respected by his 
soldiers and comrades. When he first met Liu Qian 刘茜 he was in his mid-twenties, an 
age when most Chinese men became husbands and fathers. Liu Qian was a very young (it 
was said she was only 16) and pretty city girl from Taiyuan. She studied in Kangda and 
came to know Huang as her instructor when they fell in love. Within a couple of weeks, 
they declared that they were verbally engaged but, not long after, Liu tried to back out. 
This was intolerable for Huang, who took it as a betrayal and shame that no man could 
bear. On their last meeting alongside the Yan River, Huang shot Liu in the head after she 
refused his plea for reunion. Although Huang Kegong tried to cover up his crime by 
destroying and fabricating evidence, he was soon arrested and charged with murder. He 
admitted to the murder but did not accept guilt, confessing that he blamed Liu for 
“tampering with the love of the revolutionary serviceman, and playing around,” and 
claiming that her decision to break up with him was “a humiliation to his reputation.”79 
                                                 
78 Ding Ling, “Thought on March 8”, 130-131. 
79 “Huang Kegong’s Statement of Confession”, for the original record of this case see Shaanxi Provincial Archive: 
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How Huang Kegong should be punished became a widely debated topic. Although most 
female cadres and students demanded he receive the death penalty, the general public 
believed that Huang should be absolved.  There were two main reasons commonly cited 
for this belief: first, that Huang was an outstanding military commander who many felt 
was needed for the Anti-Japanese War (Huang himself openly expressed a wish to atone 
for his crimes by fighting to death on the battlefield). Second, that Liu Qian had allegedly 
abused and betrayed Huang’s love, which had been publicly declared, and so she bore 
responsibility for her own death. 
The final decision on Huang’s sentence fell to Mao Zedong, the supreme leader of 
Yan’an. In a letter to the judge of the Supreme Court on October 10, 1937, Mao stated 
that: 
Although Huang Kegong had a glorified revolutionary past, he should be 
punished by the death penalty for the unforgivable crime he committed...Huang 
had lost his standing as a Party member, a revolutionary, and a human being by 
committing such despicable, merciless criminal behavior. If he was spared from 
his crime, we have nothing to teach the Party, the Red Army, the revolutionaries 
and the commoners since the Party members and the soldiers should have 
obeyed the laws more strictly than the commoners. Therefore, Huang must be 
punished with the death penalty.80 
This letter was read aloud during Huang’s final sentencing in the public trial of October 
11, 1937. The Supreme Court of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Area convicted Huang of 
five crimes: murder, treason,81 breaking the Marriage Law,82 violating an individual’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Bainian Chao, no.1 (2009), 46-50; Jin Tiequn 金铁群. “Panchu Huang Kegong Sixing” 判处黄克功死刑 [Huang 
Kegong’s death sentence], Yan’an wenshi ziliao, no.5 (August 1989): 75-91.  
80 Mao Zedong, “An open letter to Lei Jingtian and Huang Kegong”, quoted in Yang Wenyu and Ma Xiaoxiao, vol. 1, 
249. 
81 The judges convicted Huang on the basis that his murder of Liu Qian, a progressive revolutionary comrade, violated 
revolutionary discipline and demolished the revolutionary unity, which was in fact a traitor’s behavior that helped 
the Party’s enemies.  
82 According to the Marriage Law of the Shaan-Gan-ning Border Area, the legal age for marriage was 18. Since Liu 
was only 16, Huang was found guilty of forcing a minor to marry and violating another’s marriage freedoms. 
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free will, and destroying and fabricating evidence.83 Huang was executed immediately 
after the trial and thereafter Zhang Wentian gave a closing address on “Democracy, Law 
and the Communist Love View” [minzhu, fazhi yu gongchanzhuyi lian’ai guan 民主，法
制与共产主义恋爱观]. In this speech, Zhang made three points as the lesson that people 
should learn from Huang Kegong’s case. Firstly, he claimed that Huang Kegong deserved 
his punishment for his violation of Liu Qian’s freedoms of love and marriage. Secondly, 
he suggested that it was best for young people not to fall in love, so as to avoid wasting 
their energies at a time when the Chinese nation was in great danger. Thirdly, he repeated 
that the most important criterion for a revolutionary life-partner was a matched ideology 
and belief in communism. The fault of Huang Kegong and Liu Qian, according to Zhang, 
was their incorrect views on love.84  
Understanding Huang Kegong’s case requires a deeper exploration of the contemporary 
social context in CCP China. Behind Huang’s fury toward his breakup with Liu was the 
huge discrepancy between the progressive urban idealist young woman and the 
traditional rural-born army man. Most city girls who were involved in love affairs were in 
their late teens and early twenties, often had a high school education and grew up under 
the influence of the Western romanticism, May Fourth anti-traditionalism and the 
anarchical pursuit of freedom.  Their ideals were worlds apart from the realities they later 
found in Yan’an. This different mindset is suggested in one ‘love talk’ that was recorded 
by Chen Xuezhao 陈学昭 (1906-1991) during her stay in Yan’an: 
Saturday evening was the only time lovers were allowed to be together: 
Woman: Why not go to the gate tower to enjoy the moon? 
Man:   What’s so fun about the moon? I’d rather stay home eating peanuts. 
Woman: Let’s have a walk alongside the Yan river! 
Man:   Come on…You guys ran alongside the Yan river every day, aren’t you tired            
of it?  
                                                 
83 “Shaan-Gan-Ning Bianqu gaodeng fayuan xingshi panjueshu” 陕甘宁边区高等法院刑事判决书：刑字 2 号 
[Judgment of Criminal Conviction by the Supreme Court of Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Area: Xingzi No.2 ], in Zhu 
Hongzhao, 292-293.  
84 This speech was originally recorded in Shu Yan舒湮, Zhandou zhong de Shanbei  战斗中的陕北[Shannbei in 
Fighting]( Wenyuan chubanshe, 1939) , 40-41. Quoted in Zhu Hongzhi, 287. 
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Finally, the man went to the restaurant alone for some wine.85 
Their different family backgrounds, life experiences, and education levels made 
communication between these two lovers difficult, if not impossible. However, the 
fundamental problem of these ‘revolutionary lovers’ was their incompatible marriage 
conceptions. Such observations were mentioned in more than a few contemporary 
sources. Chen Xuezhao, for example, specifically described the thoughts of the average 
army hero: 
Although he knew that man and woman are equal, that man should pay respect 
to woman, and that man should help liberate woman, it kept slipping his mind. 
What did come to mind was his rural childhood memory about men’s marriage 
by capture, or by adoption…how could a woman say ‘No’ to a man’s love?! 86 
This kind of cultural divergence went to extremes in the case of Huang Kegong and Liu 
Qian. As a city girl in pursuit of romantic and spiritual love, Liu could not tolerate her 
future husband’s illiteracy, bad-temper, authoritarianism and overall peasant nature. In 
the letters she wrote to Huang, Liu repeated that what she wanted in a partner was neither 
marriage nor any form of financial support, but rather a spiritual love that was based on 
matched ideologies, which should be beyond material matters. For an army man like 
Huang, this thinking was not only perplexing but ridiculous.  As Chen Xuezhao 
concluded: 
The elder military cadres in the Eighth Route Army, from colonels to soldiers, 
usually remain single after several-years of service on the battle field…Many of 
them have little contact with the capitalist society, nor its women. So its no 
surprise that they are short of love experience, knowing nothing about the love 
games the bourgeois women like to play. Once they fall in love, their way of 
love would be very crude, very intense, and sometimes, very tragic.87 
Behind the crude, intense love of Huang, who expected a quick marriage to Liu, was the 
deeper notion of obtaining a ‘trophy woman’. It had long been a dynastic tradition for the 
ruler to bestow beautiful women on generals and soldiers as rewards for battlefield 
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victories. One contemporary folk song reveals that during the Yan’an period, having an 
educated urban wife held a certain caché:  
Who says our Eighth Route Army Soldiers have no wives? 
When the revolution succeeds,  
Everyone will have a foreign-educated [woman] [yang xuesheng 洋学生]!88 
The idea of a foreign-educated wife for each army man might have been unrealistic, but it 
was in fact a rather alluring slogan for army recruitment. According to Chen Xuezhao’s 
observations, before the formal promulgation of the Marriage Regulations in each border 
area the phenomenon of abusing women was rather common among servicemen, and the 
women’s associations could do nothing about it. In her travel log, Chen told a tragic story 
of a high-ranking commander who decided to marry a young urban woman whom Chen 
knew well. In order to persuade this reluctant girl to be his bride, the commander stayed 
by her bed every night and refused to leave.  One day, this girl told Chen that she had to 
marry that man for the sake of revolutionary work. Seven months later, when she was 
five-months pregnant, she was kicked out by her husband who wanted a more fashionable 
wife.89 There was a popular saying in Yan’an among those who obtained a good 
battlefield record: “As the ones risking our lives to conquer the world, don’t we deserve a 
wife?”90 Possessed by this kind of thinking, it was no wonder that as “an arrogant young 
serviceman with glorious fighting record”, Huang was sure that Liu would marry him 
from the day they met.91 
The fact that people sympathized with Huang the perpetrator, rather than with Liu the 
victim, demonstrates how this rationale was widely accepted by the public. Since Huang 
and Liu had publicized their love relationship, they were already considered a couple via 
de facto marriage, and thus the husband who killed his betraying wife was innocent. In 
the patriarchal rural society, being ‘dumped’ was a humiliation no man could bear.  As 
Huang admitted during his trial, fear of losing face was his main reason for killing Liu. 
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Furthermore, the fact that Huang’s death penalty was declared as an order of the Supreme 
Leader, rather than as a legal sentence, indicates that Yan’an in the late 1930s was still far 
from being strictly under the rule of law; public respect for the law was established on the 
basis of the authorities of individual lawmakers and executors, but not necessarily on the 
legal sanction of the law itself. In a patriarchal society, the law was mutable and 
inconsistent, changing with the transition of rulers. In the end, people on all sides were 
satisfied with the way the CCP dealt with the Huang Kegong Incident and it was deemed 
“a good legal example for the future new China.”92 
5.4.4 ‘Mutual Help’ and the Party-arranged Match 
Marriage conflicts between the predominantly rural military men and urban young 
women reached its peak around the time of the Huang Kegong case. From that point 
forward, with the adjustment of the CCP’s official discourse and the promulgation of the 
Marriage Regulation in each border area, a more assuasive method was employed by the 
Party in dealing with these kinds of love affairs. Ding Ling mentioned in her “Thoughts 
on 8 March” that the marriages of young women cadres were often made in response to 
sweet talk from men about ‘mutual help’. The term ‘mutual help’ was an inexplicit one 
and its definition ranged from performing activities like darning socks, patching shoes or 
even offering feminine comfort.93 Few official documents ventured to define the term, 
but from the “red marriage stories” told by the CCP’s propagandists and from interviews 
of different brides, it seems that the term ‘mutual help’ was used first in the border areas 
and then in the larger Communist State to imply a Party-arranged match between a male 
leader and a young woman. 
Women in the CCP liberated areas were largely in a position of waiting to be chosen by 
men, especially by those in high positions. It had been well established that whenever a 
male leader demonstrated his interest in a particular woman, a match would be easily 
arranged for this leader, so long as the woman could pass a background check. After she 
was officially approved as politically clean and reliable, her senior leader would invite 
                                                 
92 This comment was originally given by Li Gongpu (1902-1946), a left-wing democratic activist who was assassinated 
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her to a talk, where she would be asked to either enter into a love relationship with the 
leader in question, or to enter into a ‘mutual help’ relationship. If the woman’s consent 
could be attained, the match would be immediately announced to the public, followed by 
a simple wedding. If she refused the match, another round of ‘sweet talks’ would be 
arranged and would continue until she either agreed or until the male gave up. In the 
course of making a match, obtaining the woman’s official consent was considered vital 
and necessary. Therefore, a potential bride could be pushed spiritually but not physically. 
The official matchmakers assigned to such missions were usually excellent propagandists 
who could effectively talk about how badly a woman was needed by the Party and for the 
Revolution. The young woman was persuaded to accept the Party’s arranged match as a 
contribution to the Revolution, as a way to prove her loyalty to the Party and as a way to 
show respect for the senior CCP leaders. 
Another example of this phenomenon is the story of Ms. Ren, who was the wife of an 
army corps commander named Liang.  When interviewed in 2006, Ren said that she first 
met her husband in the Dongbei front. At that time, she was in her late teens and was 
working as a nurse on the battlefield. “It’s funny”, Ren recalled about their brief first 
encounter, “at the time I met him, I thought he was a cook because he served me a bowl 
of hot noodle soup in person.” Two months later, she was asked to participate in a 
‘mutual help’ relationship with Liang, in order to take care of his health. They began to 
get to know each other from then on.  Although everyone else seemed to realize that 
Commander Liang was interested in her, Ren herself was too young to think about love. 
After an exhaustive investigation into her background, family and personal history, Ren 
was considered politically qualified to be a revolutionary partner of a PLA commander. 
However, Ren did not want to marry a man who was fourteen years her senior: “I never 
said ‘yes’ although the Party organization [zuzhi 组织] tried to persuade me to say it.” 
The fact that she had many suitors at that time made her feel like she had a choice, but the 
result of her opposing the Party’s arrangement was horrible: “I was criticized by all the 
people all the time.” Finally, she consented to the marriage on the condition that she 
would go to study in a medical school after the wedding. Soon after their application was 
granted by the deputy director of the Political Department of Liang’s corps, they got 
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married and became ‘revolutionary partners’. Fortunately, Liang proved to be a good 
husband who respected his wife’s decisions.94 
The marriage story of Ms. Ren and her husband illustrates a common model of the CCP’s 
daily marriage practice. As Ren concluded, this model often included three necessary 
steps: the Party’s arrangement (often at the request of the man), the development of the 
love relationship, and the woman’s background check. “This kind of investigation is very 
strict,” Ren told me, “if the result of the investigation is negative, the marriage 
application would be immediately declined no matter what the rank of the applicant.” 
Although the Party preferred to play the role of matchmaker, at times it also had to switch 
to the role of match-breaker when the woman was considered by the Party to be 
unqualified as the wife of a leader. When this kind of failure occurred, the woman would 
be transferred to another position in a different location or sent to perform undercover 
work in the GMD region. When such a decision was declared, it was inarguable and 
compulsory. According to Ren’s recollection, among the nineteen girls whom she 
personally knew had love relations with high-ranking servicemen, most were declined for 
marriage and were subsequently purged [qingxi 清洗] due to their failure to pass a 
background check. The only exception to this rule was the marriage of Mao Zedong and 
Jiang Qing. Although Mao was the supreme leader of the CCP, his marriage application 
provoked a debate among high-ranking party leaders due to Jiang’s disreputable 
background as an actress. The sanction of the match was finally granted under Mao’s 
insistence and He Long’s claim that he would shoot anyone who continued to make a 
fuss over the trivial issue of “taking a woman”.95  
Practically speaking, if celibacy was not a choice that they were allowed then hypergamy 
to a senior leader was an appealing alternative for many young women.  This was 
especially true in a patriarchal and hierarchal society such as Yan’an, where living 
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entered  Zhongshan Medical College in 1958, and studied six years to get her degree in medicine. Ms. Ren described 
her marriage as a very happy one. After her husband passed away, she spent fourteen years compiling and editing his 
works.  
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allowances were differentiated according to political rank.96 The few high-paying 
positions available for women were in actuality only open to the wives of high-ranking 
leaders. Like their contemporary urban sisters who willingly traded their independent 
personalities for the luxury bourgeoisie lifestyle, many female communists utilized 
hypergamy as a social ladder, which could lead to high political positions and better 
living standards. Under the label of entering a ‘revolutionary marriage’ that rejected 
romantic love and replaced it with passion for the communist revolution, adopting 
marriage politics that were oriented by utilitarian purposes had become a popular survival 
strategy for women who were forced to give up their dream of romance and love in 
exchange for political security. 
5.5 Conclusion 
From the Jiangxi to the Yan’an periods, the CCP’s marriage policies and practices 
experienced a transition from openly embracing free-consensual unions to a return to 
monogamous marriages. Behind such transitions was the growing awareness of the 
Chinese Communists about the difficulties in making marriage reforms fit the social 
context of rural China, as well as the complications of the CCP’s wartime need for 
military recruitment, expansion and survival. Learning from its ineffective promulgation 
of the Marriage Regulations in the Border Areas, the CCP’s policymakers had come to an 
apparent conclusion: because the interests of the two sexes always followed a pattern of 
waxing and waning, the expansion of women’s interests could only be established on the 
contraction of men’s interests.  Therefore, before the Communist Party could be able to 
utilize the power of the state machine to transform the traditional Chinese social context 
along the socialist ideal, any effort  aimed at changing the existing marriage system could 
possibly lead to antagonism between the sexes, and would therefore put the Party’s 
reputation and general peasant support at risk. This recognition on the one hand brought 
on an immediate shift in the focus of CCP women from pursuing marriage freedom and 
gender equality to advocating women’s participation in production.  On the other hand, it 
                                                 
96 Taking the food supply system of 1944 for example, the standard of meat supply was four jin (catty) per month for 
high-ranking leaders, and two jin per month for the ordinary cadre member. See Zhao Chaogou, 75-76. 
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resulted in a rapid decline of the women’s movement in Yan’an: women’s 
progressiveness and ambitions, which had once been their pride, was now their mistake. 
Upheld by the Party’s official discourse and administrative system, the “revolutionary 
marriage” model had become the standardized love and marriage practice of CCP 
members by the end of the Yan’an period. From the time of the Rectification Campaign 
onward, people learned to always put their Party service as first priority, and to always 
keep in mind the paramount importance of ensuring a correct political ideology, a clean 
personal background and ‘comradeship’ in considering any ‘revolutionary match’. For 
the high-ranking party officials and army leaders who were acquiesced by the Party, the 
privilege to pick up desired trophy wives was more often an outcome of Party-arranged 
‘mutual help’ than that of actual love between a pair of matched souls. For the wives of 
such leaders, no matter if they were senior veterans or young urban arrivals, their 
marriage was a ‘revolutionary task’ assigned by the Party, which they had no real power 
to decline.  
Regarding marriage, Yan’an women were largely forced into a passive position of 
waiting: to be selected, to be introduced, to be proposed to, to be married and eventually, 
and somewhat inevitably, to be divorced. In a patriarchal society where women had been 
treated as the property of men, as physical trophies and gifts, for over two thousand years, 
the only thing a woman could utilize in exchange for social recognition or to be 
considered a man’s equal, was her love and her marriage.   
As soon as the socialist state was founded in 1949, the Chinese Communists started a 
new round of efforts to reform Chinese marriage.  During this process, the “revolutionary 
marriage” model was upgraded through the nationwide establishment of the danwei 单位
[work unit] system and was transformed from being a Party tradition into becoming a 
national marriage practice. This transformations process will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 6  
6 Making A Revolutionary Marriage 
The founders of the People’s Republic of China were pious students of Karl Marx, and 
believed that the marriage system, as part of the social superstructure, should change in 
accordance with the economic infrastructure. As soon as China’s socialist state was 
founded in 1949, the Chinese Communists started to reconstruct their marriage system. 
When the new marriage law was promulgated in 1950, the marriage reforms that had 
been tested in the Border Areas were expanded across the nation. By the time the 
marriage campaign came to an end in 1953, most Chinese people had become devoted 
adherents to these marriage freedoms. However, local archives in China suggest that the 
process actually met with considerable resistance, which resulted in a range of 
compromises between the state and its people. 
The New Marriage Law was accompanied by a socialist discourse on love and marriage, 
in which romantic love was officially excluded from considerations of matrimony and 
was replaced with the importance of matched political ideals, revolutionary passions and 
loyalty to the Party. At the same time, through the establishment of the danwei 单位 
[work unit] system, the socialist State began to impose systematic control over its 
citizens’ personal lives. In this system, marriage was not simply a matter of establishing 
the matched criteria outlined above, but was also a complicated process of application, 
investigation, obtaining permission and registration. Revolutionary marriage, once a 
wartime expedient, was now developed into a social policy that could be applied to all 
Chinese people. 
This chapter examines the CCP’s women’s rights rebuilding and marriage-reforming 
programs in the first three years of the People’s Republic. My argument is that although 
the Chinese Communists intended to destroy China’s social traditions and replace them 
with socialist models within a short period, theirs was actually an impossible mission 
since the CCP leaders themselves were actually a part of the very traditions they were 
trying to destroy. Compared to the dogmatic socialist doctrines, Chinese social traditions 
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surrounding marriage practices were much more flexible and adaptive. This paradox 
inevitably led to a hybrid society: under the coverage of the progressive socialist slogans 
were the old traditions and customs that timely adapted themselves to the new social 
contexts. It is not so much that the CCP ideals changed Chinese society - rather, Chinese 
society transformed itself to fit the CCP ideal. 
6.1 The Marriage Law of 1950 
On May 1, 1950, the People’s Republic of China promulgated a new marriage law. This 
was considered by leaders as a necessary step towards abolishing the old productive 
relationships and superstructure and establishing new ones along socialist lines.1 Chen 
Shaoyu 陈绍禹 (1904-1974), the chairman of the Commission of Legislative Affairs of 
the Central People’s Government made a prediction about the change: 
With a view to increasing the productive forces of the new society in the political, 
economic and cultural field, and loosening the fetters that have impeded their 
development, it is necessary that, together with the reform of the total social 
system, the men and women, and especially the latter, be liberated from the 
bondage of the old marriage system and that a completely new system be 
established in conformity with the new social development.2 
Other than liberating Chinese men and especially women from the thousand-year-old 
“barbarian, and backward” old marriage system, the lawmakers sought to establish a 
series of new marriage institutions, family relations, social life options and social norms 
in order “to accelerate the collapse and death of the old feudal marriage system, to 
guarantee the growth of new democratic marriage system and  new-style families, to 
make contributions for China’s socialism, and to promote social productivity.”3 
                                                 
1  Ma Qi 马起, Zhonghua Remin Gongheguo hunyinfa gailun 中华人民共和国婚姻法概论 [Introduction to the 
Marriage Law of People’s Republic of China](Wuhan: Hubei renmin chubanshe, 1957), 3.  
2  Chen Shaoyu, “Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo hunyinfa qicao jingguo he qicao liyou de baogao”关于中华
人民共和国婚姻法起草经过和起草理由的报告 [Report on the Drafting of the Marriage Law of PRC], in 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo minfaziliao huibian 中华人民共和国民法资料汇编[Collections of the Civil Law of 
PRC], ed. Zhongguo renmin daxue minfa jiaoyanshi [the Civil Law teaching and research group of Renmin 
University of China] (Beijing: China Renmin daxue chubanshe, 1954) , 254-299. Translated in Meijer, 78. 
3  “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu baozheng zhixing hunyinfa gei quandang de tongzhi” 中共中央关于保证执行婚姻
法给全党的通知 [The CPC’s Notice on the Implementation of the Marriage Law], in Zhongguo funü yundong 
wenxian ziliao huibian: vol.2, 1949-1983, 44. 
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Cooperating with the All-China Democratic Women’s Federation,4 the Communist 
legislators spent a year and a half working on the new Marriage Law, researching a 
variety of materials including marriage data collected from cities and villages, the 
marriage regulations of the Soviet and Border areas, the marriage laws of the Soviet 
Union and those from the New Democratic Eastern European countries.5 Its spirit was 
consistent with the past marriage regulations of the CCP: abolishing the feudal marriage 
institution, promoting marriage freedom and gender equality and protecting women’s 
interests. 
The Marriage Law of 1950 included eight chapters: General principles (Articles 1-2), The 
Marriage Contract (Articles 3-6), Rights and Duties of Husband and Wife (Articles 7-12), 
Relations between Parents and Children (Articles 13-16), Divorce (Articles 17-19), 
Maintenance and Education of Children after Divorce (Articles 20-22), Property and 
Maintenance after Divorce (Articles 23-25) and By-laws (Articles 26-27). The first 
Article of the General Principles (Chapter I) gave an explicit and broad definition of the 
so-called “feudal marriage system”: a system based on arbitrary and compulsory 
arrangements and the superiority of man over woman, which ignored the children’s 
interests.6 As the scale of the feudal marriage system was expanded to include gender 
inequality and parental authority over children, this definition was actually an 
announcement of the official rejection of the traditional Chinese family system, as 
characterized by Confucian notions of patriarchal hierarchy and filial piety. The second 
article went even further to enumerate feudal marriage practices that fell outside of 
arranged marriage: bigamy, concubinage, child betrothal, interference with the 
remarriage of widows and the exaction of money or gifts in connection with marriages.7  
                                                 
4  Long before the People’s Republic of China was declared in the October 1949, its founders had decided to establish a 
nation-wide women’s organization in order to centralize the leadership of the women’s movement and to meet the 
requirements of a larger democratic women’s movement. In March of 1949, a national Congress was assembled to 
declare the establishment of the All-China Democratic Women’s Federation. As an executive agency of the Chinese 
Communist Party, this organization served to reconstruct Chinese women in accordance with the socialist model. It 
was renamed the Women’s Federation of the People’s Republic of China in 1957. In 1978, it was renamed again as 
the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF). 
5  Deng Yingchao, “Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo hunyinfa de baogao” 关于中华人民共和国婚姻法的报告 
[Report on the Marriage Law of PRC], May 14, 1950, in Zhongguo funü yundong wenxian ziliao huibian, vol.2, 50. 
6  Appendix G. “The Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1950” 
7  Ibid. 
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Chapter II was devoted to legalizing the Marriage Contract, which included four different 
articles. The concept of requiring complete willingness on the part of the two parties was 
repeated, while compulsion and any third party interference were forbidden. The age for 
legally entering into a marriage contract was set at 20 for men and 18 for women. 
Marriage between lineal relatives was prohibited, as was marriage between collateral 
relatives by blood, as measured up to the fifth degree of relationship; other prohibitions 
were imposed on marriages to individuals who were generally deemed as unfit for 
marriage: the sexually impotent, those with venereal diseases, sufferers of mental 
disorders, or leprosy. Official registration of any marriage contract was required, and a 
marriage certificate would be issued only when a marriage was found to be in conformity 
with the provisions of the law. 
The New Marriage Law gave the conjugal family unprecedented legal attention and 
protection. On the basis of a total rejection of the old system, the General Principles 
offered a new substitution: the New-Democratic marriage system, which was based on 
the free choice of both partners, on monogamy, on equal rights for both sexes, and on the 
protection of the lawful interests of women and children. These principles were further 
specified in Chapter III: Rights and Duties of Husband and Wife. They defined the rights 
and duties of the couple, where a husband and wife are duty- bound to live together and 
are held jointly responsible for the living expenses and management of the household. 
Similar articles appeared in the New Marriage Law with more detailed stipulations. 
Article 7 emphasizes the equal status of the two parties in their home as well as their duty 
to live together, which enhanced the concept of domestic gender equality to the legal 
level. Article 8 went even further to set up a correlation between marriage, family and 
society: “husband and wife are in duty bound to love, respect, assist and look after each 
other, to live in harmony, to engage in productive work, to care for the children and to 
strive jointly for the welfare of the family and for the building up of the new society.”8 
Therefore, the duties of the spouses culminated in their joint struggle for the foundation 
of the new socialist society. The law required this duty from all Chinese citizens; any 
                                                 
8  Appendix G: The Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1950. 
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politically backward spouse would be assisted by his or her mate back to the correct path. 
In this way, love was given an ideological basis: support indeed meant not only in a 
material sense, but also especially in a moral and ideological sense. The duties of spouses 
towards one another were parts of their broader social duties as good citizens of the new 
community. This slogan-like article, in fact, imposed the public social ideal of asking 
citizens to “engage in productive work and strive for the building up of the new society.”9  
Therefore, that which should have been a voluntary mission for each individual and his or 
her family became a compulsory duty. In this sense, social requirements and family 
needs, the personal and the public, the individual and the collective were all mixed up 
under the roof of the big family of the socialist society. The rest of the articles in chapter 
III (Articles 9-12) further stressed the equality of husband and wife: equality in their 
choice of profession and their participation in societal activities; equal rights of 
ownership and management of the family property; and the recognition of the right of 
spouses to inherit from each other’s estates. 
Two chapters (IV and VI) were used to regulate the relationship between parents and 
children, both in marriage and after a divorce. Parents and children were bound to support 
each other and inherit from each other. Children born out of wedlock would enjoy the 
same rights as children born in lawful unions. A husband and wife equally shared the 
duty of supporting and educating their children, even after the couple was divorced. If an 
agreement on the guardianship could not be reached between the two parties, they should 
wait for the decision of the People’s Court, which  would be made in accordance with the 
interests of the child. These two chapters distinguished the theme of family by detailing 
familial relationships and the specific legal duties of each member: husband, wife and 
child. 
Chapter V was devoted to divorce and included three articles (17-19). Article 17 
regulated the general divorce: when both husband and wife desired a divorce, it should be 
granted with an official divorce certificate. In the event of either the husband or the wife 
alone insisting upon divorce, one may be granted only when mediation by first the district 
                                                 
9  Ibid. 
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People’s Government and then the state’s judicial organ had failed to bring about a 
reconciliation. Article 18 specified that under circumstances where the wife was with 
child, the husband was not allowed to apply for a divorce. Article 19 was established 
specifically for cases of divorce for military personnel.  This article was infused with the 
spirit of the wartime marriage regulations on the issue, as examined above. The consent 
of any member of the Revolutionary Army who was on active service and who 
maintained regular correspondence with his or her family had to first be obtained before 
his or her spouse could apply for a divorce. Without the consent of the military personnel 
involved, there was only one circumstance under which a divorce would be granted to the 
spouse: when there was no correspondence for a subsequent period of two years from the 
date of the promulgation of the Marriage Law; or two years prior to the promulgation of 
the law and one year subsequent to the promulgation of the present Law. 
From late 1950 to 1953, several directives were issued by the central government 
complementing Article 19, which sought to further maximize the protection of the marital 
interests of servicemen for the sake of the ongoing warfare both inside and outside of 
China.10 Basically, these directives ruled that the wife’s application for divorce should 
not be easily granted without the consent of her husband, regardless of whether he was 
demobilized, disabled or in service. Only under the conditions that the husband had a 
tendency towards severe domestic violence, if he was sexually disabled, or when all 
efforts at reunion had failed could a divorce be granted.11 This principle also applied to 
the engaged couple: a fiancée could not cancel her engagement to a serviceman without 
his consent, even under the circumstance when this cancellation was brought about 
before the man joined the army.12 No divorce should be granted to the wives or fiancées 
                                                 
10 This sort of quasi-law directive was often jointly issued by the Ministry of Justice, the General Political Department 
of the Military Commission of the Central Committee, the All-China Women’s Federation, the Supreme People’s 
Court, the Commission on Legislation Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs,the Ministry of Justice and the local 
People’s Court. 
11 Under circumstances where the husband disagreed with the wife’s divorce application, the local government, 
political associations and related work units were all responsible for persuading the wife to give up her application. If 
no hope of reconciliation could be found, these official powers were expected to obtain the husband’s consent. If 
even this effort did not succeed, the local People’s court would employ Article 17 of the Marriage Law to judge the 
case. 
12 “Guanyu geming junren hunyin wenti zuotanhui jiyao” 关于革命军人婚姻问题座谈会纪要 [Meeting summary on 
the revolutionary soldiers’ marriage problems]. File of the Department of Justice, no. 820( Dec. 15, 1952). Beijing 
Archive center: file No. 2-4-19. 
  
202
of the People’s Volunteer Army (PVA) who plead for a divorce on the grounds of lost 
contact with their partner. Parties wishing to do so were expected to wait until the Korean 
War was over, and all captives had been returned. Only then, it was argued, could it be 
decisively confirmed whether or not their partners were alive. If the spouse was found 
alive, the divorce had to wait for consent.13 In cases where the two parties suing for 
divorce were both currently employed in the military, the methods presented in Article 19 
were not to be adopted, so as to ensure that no party would be harmed. In such cases, 
judgment was decided by the political department of their army, and executed by the 
local court.14 A notice issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in December of 1952 
contributed in particular to the law as it regarded adultery involving the wives of 
servicemen, which had been a very serious phenomenon in many places. Two methods 
were offered in dealing with such matters: the local government was instructed to 
convince their cadres and people through state education to pay the greatest respect to the 
soldiers’ families, and the wives of active servicemen were expected to learn about the 
glories of being the life partner of a soldier; as for those who seduced the wives of 
servicemen and convinced them to commit adultery, conviction in such cases was legally 
punished as rape. Although these regulations were made with the wartime spirit, so as to 
avoid influencing the morale of the soldiers at the front,15 many such stipulations 
remained in place until as late as the 1980s.16  
Meijer believed that the Marriage Law had a dual function: “It was an instrument for the 
transformation of society and it regulated marriage and the method of solving disputes 
arising from marriage. These two functions naturally run parallel: by solving disputes the 
                                                 
13 “Guanyu chuli zai chaoxian zhanzheng zhong beifu huo shizong zhi geming junren hunyin anjian de lianhe tongbao” 
关于处理在朝鲜战争中被俘或失踪之革命军人婚姻案件的联合通报 [The United Notice on the marriage cases 
of the Revolutionary army men who are arrested or missing in the Korean War], issued by the Department of Justice, 
the Supreme People’s Court and the Political Department of the Military Commission, no. 3714( Oct.17, 1952/). 
Beijing Archive Center: File No. 2-4-19. 
14 “Guanyu geming junren hunyin wenti zuotanhui jiyao”. 
15 “Guanyu jiuzheng pohuai xianyi geming junren de hunyin wenti” 关于纠正破坏现役革命军人的婚姻问题 [Notice 
on how to correct the problem on destroying the servicemen’s marriage], issued by Xie Juezai, 1952/12/12, Beijing 
Archive Center: File No. 2-4-19. 
16 “Baohu junhun shi woguo yixiang zhongyao de falü zhidu” 保护军婚是我国一项重要的法律制度 [Protecting 
serviceman’s marriage is an important law of China], Jiefangjun bao (Oct. 20, 1980). 
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policy is implemented in a particular case.”17 This spirit was elaborated in the last chapter 
(VIII: By-laws). The penal code was emphasized in Article 26 by the claim that “persons 
violating this Law shall be punished in accordance with law.”18 In cases where 
interference with the freedom of marriage had caused death or injury, the person guilty of 
such interference bore responsibility for the crime under the law. Article 27 authorized 
the local governments of the regions inhabited by national minorities to enact certain 
modifications or supplementary articles when implementing the Marriage Law, in order 
to maintain conformity with the actual marriage conditions in these areas. 
6.2 Promulgation and Implementation: 1950-1953 
Right after the Chinese government officially promulgated the Marriage Law, a 
nationwide propaganda movement was launched from the top down.  The movement was 
joined by several nongovernmental organizations, including the All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions, the Central Committee of the Youth League, the All-China Federation of 
Democratic Youth, the All China Students Federation and the All-China Democratic 
Women’s Federation.19 The four-year implementation period from 1950 to 1953 could be 
roughly divided into two stages: 1950-1951, and 1952-1953.  
6.2.1 1950-1951: A Disappointing Beginning 
While the ultimate goal of this new marriage law was to construct a new type of marital 
and familial relationship that was in accordance with socialist moralities, in the first year 
of its promulgation the focus of the law was on adjusting ‘feudal marital relations’. As 
was suggested by the central government, various methods were adopted by the state’s 
propaganda organ in order to “deeply penetrate into the masses”, including literature, 
broadcasting, discussions, and art performances.20 The goals at this stage were to remove 
                                                 
17 Meijer, 70. 
18 The Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1950. 
19 “Quanzong, tuanzhongyang , qinglian, xuelian, fulian guanyu yonghu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo hunyinfa gei 
gedi renmin tuanti de lianhe tongzhi” 全总、团中央、青联、学联、妇联关于拥护中华人民共和国婚姻法给各
地人民团体的联合通知 [Notice to the Local People’s Organizations about supporting the Marriage Law of PRC], 
issued on April, 30, 1950, in Zhongguo funü yundong wenxian ziliao huibian, vol.2, 48-49. 
20 “Guanyu yonghu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo hunyinfa gei gedi renmin tuanti de lianhe tongzhi” [Notice to the 
Local People’s Organizations about supporting the Marriage Law of PRC], in Zhongguo funü yundong wenxian 
ziliao huibian, vol.2, 48-49.  
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old thoughts from people’s minds and to promote public understanding of the new 
Marriage Law. 
According to the All-China Democratic Women’s Federation’s annual summary, the 
first-year of the Marriage Law’s implementation achieved “significant success 
nationwide”, and the public consciousness of the new law had been rapidly improved. 
The group was particularly satisfied with the fact that more and more young people dared 
to challenge their parents’ authority in making marriage decisions for them: 
In general the parental arranged marriage had been gradually transformed into a 
transitional form in which the principals’ consent to their parents’ arrangement is 
necessary. In some earlier liberated districts where the working circumstance are 
more progressive, the marriage gradually developed into the stage of self-
willingness; in the most progressive villages, marriage freedom had been 
completely implemented.21 
Women’s enthusiasm for marriage reform was another success that was noted by the 
report. With the support and help of the People’s Court, many women managed to get rid 
of the shackles of the old feudal marriage system.22 The unprecedented increase in 
marriage lawsuits was often cited in local reports as the proof of this success. For 
instance, Yu county in Shanxi province reported 135 marriage cases within the one 
month period starting in September of 1950, which comprised 97% of the total civil cases 
this county reported in the month. According to one reporter, “the rapid growth of 
marriage cases demonstrated the rise of common people’s marriage consciousness, 
women in particular, since most of these cases were sued by women.”23 
While the first year of the propaganda movement brought major public attention to the 
social transition that the Communist Government was trying to launch, the actual 
progress that the new law achieved in transforming Chinese marriage fell far short of the 
                                                 
21 “Yinian lai fulian xiezhu zhengfu guanche hunyinfa de zongjie”一年来妇联协助政府贯彻婚姻法的总结[Summary 
on the Women’s Federation’s cooperating work in implementing the Marriage Law from 1950 to 1951], in 
Zhongguo funü yundong wenxian ziliao huibian, vol.2,107-111:107. 
22 Ibid. 
23 “Shanxi hunyin qingkuangde jige juli”山西婚姻情况的几个举例 [Marriage conditions of Shanxi], in Hunyin wenti 
cankao ziliao huibian 婚姻问题参考资料汇编[Reference on the Marriage Problem], ed. Zhongyang renmin zhengfu 
fazhi weiyuanhui [the Commission of Legislative Affairs of the Central People’s Government] (Beijing: Xinhua 
shudian, 1950), 8. 
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expectations of the Party and of the women’s associations. The Women’s Federation had 
to admit in June of 1951 that, “the implementation of the marriage law is not without 
questions…there are still many difficulties and problems.”24 The problem that evoked the 
most serious concern from the Federation was the tendency to prosecute more women 
than men. According to incomplete statistical data that was published by the Government 
Administration Council in September, 1951, a total of 1245 women in Shandong 
province had committed suicide within the first year of promulgation; in the district of 
Zhongnan, more than 10,000 women were murdered or seriously abused in relation to 
their marriage.25 
In the official discourse, local cadres whose minds were dominated by the “remnants of 
feudal thoughts” were blamed for the ineffective implementation of the law, although the 
central government had shown considerable concern about the cadres’ misadministration 
from the very beginning. In an official Notice from the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) to all Party members that was issued on April 30, 1950 
upon the promulgation of the Marriage Law, the misbehavior of local Party members was 
condemned: 
Under the influence of feudal thoughts, some members of our Party, especially 
those working in the qu and xiang governments and those in the lower judicial 
departments, are inclined to tolerate such illegal behaviors as interfering with 
people’s marriage freedom, abusing women and children. Failing to legally 
punish the wrongdoers, some local governments provided no legal and real 
protection to the victims. Sometimes, such misdemeanors were committed by the 
cadres themselves. These are all wrong.26  
Based on this official concern, extra emphasis was attached to the importance of training 
and education on the cadres.  In addition, nongovernmental organizations like the 
Women’s Federation and their branches at all levels were asked to assist and supervise 
                                                 
24 “Zhongyang renmin zhengfu zhengwuyuan guanyu jiancha hunyinfa zhixingqingkuang de zhishi”中央人民政府政
务院关于检察婚姻法执行情况的指示[Directive of the Administration Council of the Central People’s 
Government on investigating the implementation of the Marriage Law], in Zhongguo funü yundong wenxian ziliao 
huibian, vol.2, 121-122. 
25 Ibid. 
26 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu baozheng zhixing hunyinfa gei quandang de tongzhi”中共中央关于保证执行婚姻
法给全党的通知[The CPC’s Notice on the Implementation of the Marriage Law], in Zhongguo funü yundong 
wenxian ziliao huibian, vol.2, 44. 
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the local People’s Governments and courts in dealing with marriage cases.27 The CPP 
officially declared that, “any Party member who interfered with marriage freedom and 
thus caused the death or injury of the interfered would not only be punished by civil and 
legal legislation, but by the discipline of the Party.”28 
No matter how much emphasis was put on the importance of cadre education, in the first 
year of the implementation of the new regulations, local transgressions by Party members 
were still the most frequently mentioned topics regarding the Marriage Law. In a 
directive issued by the central government in February, 1953, the Party openly admitted 
that “the implementation of the Marriage Law nationwide is uneven.”29 Whereas in some 
regions the ‘feudal marriage customs’ had been successfully destroyed by those cadres 
that had implemented the Marriage Law carefully and correctly, in most areas of China, 
the local government leadership and cadres failed to implement the Marriage Law 
correctly and seriously. Some of these groups even openly resisted the Marriage Law by 
upholding traditional customs and interfering with individual marriage freedoms. As the 
result of such maladministration, the practice of arranged marriage was still popular, 
women were still constantly oppressed and abused, and related suicide and homicide 
cases were still common.30 The Women’s Federation divided this kind of wrongdoing by 
the local cadres of qu and villages into five types: 1) interfering with marriage freedom 
by declining reasonable divorce applications and even threatening the female applicants 
with beatings and public shaming; 2) granting divorce easily without investigation, 
reconciliation, and education; 3) dealing improperly with divorced women’s property and 
child custody; 4) ignoring the implementation and official propaganda of the Marriage 
Law, and therefore being incapable of providing help and support to those looking for 
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marriage reform; 5) misleading local people into understanding that the marriage law was 
simply a divorce or a woman’s law.31 
These “cadres of a different nature” were defined by Meijer as groups of men “who had 
made their careers in the movement for land reform and who had enjoyed the brutality of 
the elimination of the landlord class. Tough people, they were often corrupt and overly 
fond of the power now placed in their hands. Against the abuses of these new village 
bosses the people had no means of defending themselves.”32 As direct but unprofessional 
executors of the new law, these cadres’ personal understandings and interpretations of the 
Marriage Law actually decided local people’s attitudes toward the law itself. As pointed 
out by the Women’s Federation’s report, for those citizens whose minds were possessed 
by patriarchal ideas about male superiority and female inferiority, the greater authority of 
a husband, parental order and the concept of remaining faithful to one’s husband until 
death, the granting of greater marriage freedoms to women would lead to “great disorder 
[because] no good people will ask for divorce and divorce is indecent…once the poor 
peasant’s wife sues for divorce, the husband will lose everything, both wife and 
money.”33 Some of these citizens, therefore, became the most merciless prosecutors of 
women. For instance, in the Huoqu County of northern Anhui, many women were 
murdered through abusive relationships in 1950. Yet, the cadres of the local Women’s 
Federation not only failed to take any action to prevent such abuse, but they also 
criticized the victims as being “out of their minds, death served them right!”34 Some 
judicial organizations were also responsible for such violence through their intentional 
delay of sentence or through a much tempered penalty. This developed into a very 
misleading belief among men that “beating one’s wife to death is nothing, it is only worth 
two years in prison.”35      
In the official state documents, local cadres’ intentional or unintentional abuses were the 
major reasons cited for the ineffective implementation of the new marriage law. Whereas 
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in reality, the source of the conflict was the fact that the very ideas on which the Marriage 
Law was based encountered considerable resistance among the people. In traditional 
Chinese values, marriage was considered a domestic matter that excluded any possible 
administrative or judicial involvement. The general belief was that all problems regarding 
a marriage should be solved within the circle of family members, primarily overseen by 
the family head or the senior relatives of the husband. As a popular Chinese saying goes: 
‘domestic shame should not be made public’.  Anyone who attempted to interfere with 
other people’s family matters would be deeply resented by the public at large. From this 
perspective, the government’s implementation effort was no different than an attempt to 
impose totalitarian control over the family. Liang Hong 梁虹, the vice dean of the 
Women’s Federation of Yunnan reported: “the masses misunderstood the Marriage 
campaign as a political struggle against husband and mother-in-law…all the suffering 
wives and daughters will ask for divorce…such beliefs caused popular panic and 
resistance among the masses, many of them even tried to hide and escape from the 
working cadres.”36 
The violation of traditional Chinese family privacy, however, is not the only reason for 
widespread popular objection to the marriage law. What worried the people most was not 
the freedoms that it granted an individual to marry, but rather the freedom it gave for one 
to seek divorce. In a caihun 财婚 [monetary marriage], a family might have to spend a 
considerable sum of money in order to acquire a daughter-in-law. Once divorced, 
according to the New Marriage Law, the family of the husband might not only lose the 
wife and her portion of his property, but also the custody of their children without any 
compensation. For those husbands who had spent money on their betrothal, divorce might 
mean  lifelong loneliness and, most fearfully, a break in the family line.  
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6.2.2 1952-1953: An Urban Success 
Disappointment with the first year of the law’s promulgation did not shake the State’s 
determination to reform Chinese marriage. In September of 1951, the Central government 
initiated a nationwide investigation of the Marriage Law’s implementation. The main 
purpose of this investigation was to inspect the serious cases of maladministration that 
had led to the death of many women.37 Based on local reports that were submitted at the 
end of 1951 and early 1952, the Government Administration Council of the Central 
People’s Government appointed March of 1953 as a “propaganda month for the Marriage 
Law.”38  
In order to avoid repeating the wrongdoing that occurred in the first year, the central 
government urged promulgators of the law to recognize that unlike land reform, which 
required a violent, impetuous attitude and class struggle mentality, marriage reform 
required the adjustment of personal thought, which demanded long-term, careful and 
patient work to gradually remove outdated marriage thinking from people’s minds. 
Therefore, the cadres were asked to adhere to the principle of education, rather than 
coercion, so as to destroy the feudal marriage system without disturbing general gender 
relations and family relations.  
According to local reports, this campaign was more effective in reforming Chinese 
families, especially those living in urban areas. This second marriage campaign, which 
lasted from December 1952 to April 1953, was divided into three stages.  The first of 
these lasted from late 1950 to mid-1951 and was a continuation of the first year of the  
Marriage Law.  The focus was on opposing arranged marriage and domestic abuse. The 
second stage of the campaign covered the second half of 1952 and focused on improving 
women’s social status, and participation in economic production.  The final stage ran 
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through 1953 and primarily worked to promote harmonious marital and familial 
relations.39 
Following the instructions of the central government, the training of qualified cadre 
leaders was a vital step of this movement. While getting more training in their 
propaganda skills, local leaders were constantly checked for signs of a precipitous mood. 
A local reporter from Beijing observed that although some cadres used punishment more 
than education, criticism more than praise, picking more bad models than good ones, 
discretionarily distorting the definition of ‘abuse’, and exaggerating the boundary of 
‘problem’, all these wrongdoings were “timely criticized and prevented”.40 From top to 
bottom, the nature, purpose, guideline, policies, and methods of the movement were 
clarified to the cadres at all levels in specific detail, so as to make their members 
understand what kind of problems should be solved, and exactly what they should and 
should not do. Three strategies were most effective in winning people’s support: first, by 
realizing the thinking of the masses at every stage and pushing the movement forward 
through solving their questions one by one; second, by erecting good models for the 
masses to follow in a timely manner; finally, by trying to keep the name of the offender 
from the public.41 During the movement, parents were talked out of making marriage 
decisions for their children when not otherwise consulted. Meetings for contentious in-
laws were regularly held.  Occasional public trials of ‘bad mothers-in-law’ who violently 
abused their daughter-in-law were held to show people that abusing women was against 
the law. Housewives were educated about gender equality, women’s economic 
independence and the glory of labour. Since the cadres managed to avoid the use of 
violence, and stick to more mild methods of education, in the words of one report, they 
were able to “overcome the precipitous thoughts that intend to solve all the problems in 
one movement, and criticize the mechanical adoption of the ‘confession’ and ‘denounce’ 
methods of the past movements.”42  As a result, common people’s acceptance of the 
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Marriage Law was made much more expedient. The demand for compulsory participation 
in propaganda meetings was replaced by voluntary participation, which gave people the 
freedom to decide on their own participation. ‘Free will’ was emphasized by authorities 
as a necessary element in the new phase of public instruction.  For example, if a model 
couple were to give their marriage story in public, the personal consent from not only the 
main couple but any other parties that were mentioned in the story should be obtained 
beforehand. As a result, people at all levels of society gained a much better understanding 
of the Marriage Law. 
According to a September 1954 report from the Civil Affairs Bureau of the People’s 
Government of Beijing, under the hard work of a well-trained propaganda force of 
29,000 cadres and 14,000 activists, 80% of the adult population in the factories, 
government departments, schools, streets and villages was involved in this campaign. The 
marriage system in the municipal area of Beijing was reported to have experienced a 
fundamental transition: marriage freedom had been basically achieved by young people, 
cases of the abuse of women had decreased significantly, more and more adult women 
participated in production and having a democratic and harmonious family had become 
the common wish of the masses. Most importantly, public opinion was transformed to be 
in favor of marriage freedom, and to spontaneously criticize the arrangement, buying or 
selling of a marriage.43 
To test the result of this campaign, some danwei were selected for a final investigation. 
According to a 1953 report of the Marriage Law Implementation Committee of Beijing 
[Beijing shi guanche hunyinfa weiyuanhui 北京市贯彻婚姻法委员会], the selected 
testing units were divided into four groups: industrial enterprises, schools and 
universities, urban sub-districts [jiedao 街道], and villages.44 The data was collected and 
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calculated in terms of three periods: before liberation in 1949, from 1949 to the eve of the 
promulgation of the Marriage Law and from the promulgation of the Marriage Law to the 
present.45 The investigation revealed that the idea of marriage freedom had been well 
accepted by urban residents, school teachers and students who demonstrated clear 
preference for a self-determined marriage.46  However, among the factory workers and 
students who had a rural background, as well as the village populations, a partially-
arranged marriage was much more popular.47 Many children were not confident enough 
to choose life partners by themselves. Their marriages were often still arranged by their 
parents, albeit with their own consent. Unlike traditional marriages, when the new couple 
always met for the first time on their wedding day, couples in the new era were often 
allowed to see each other once or twice before the wedding. 
Moreover, many people still regarded money as the proper foundation of love and 
marriage. As reported by a local police station, some girls listed economic conditions as 
the top criteria they looked for in a potential spouse; when getting married, they 
requested gifts and persisted in holding feasts and using bridal sedans, which were often 
beyond the groom’s economic means. The cost of a wedding and gifts for bride ranged 
from 100 to over 300 yuan, when the average monthly income of a groom was 30 to 40 
yuan.  Therefore, marriage debt was still a common occurrence.48  
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Nonetheless, investigators perceived that the idea of marriage freedom was easier for the 
commoner to accept than was the concept of gender equality. Not only were traditional 
thoughts that reflected gender inequalities still popular, but domestic violence and abuse 
were also still very common.49 The reason for this, as explained by the investigators, was 
that marriage freedom primarily dealt with issues regarding young people who were 
inclined to accept new things with less resistance. Gender equality, however, was an issue 
that involved every member of society, as well as “the customary force of hundreds and 
thousands of people”, and was thus an issue which required a long-term solution, with 
women’s economic and political liberation and independence at its center.50   
6.2.3 Marriage Problems after 1953 
At almost the same time that the Marriage Law was officially declared to be a success, 
new problems regarding love and marriage arose.  A September 1954 report from the 
Civil Affairs Bureau of the People’s Government of Beijing pointed out a dangerous 
reflux of the old customs: 
…due to the uneven development of the (marriage) movement, and the 
discontinuity of the propaganda after the campaign of 1953, the new morality and 
customs have not been further developed and consolidated. Not only has arranged 
marriage not been terminated, but the suicide cases caused by family feuds 
continue to appear. In some areas, after the old marriage system had been 
overthrown the creation of new thoughts has been delayed, leading to the 
incorrect marriage views that worship money and material hedonism. The feudal 
idea of “matched gates” and “parental order” returned to the minds of some 
parents who refused to let their children choose life-partners for themselves, and 
declined all the suitors they thought not rich enough; early marriage was serious 
in some regions.51 
This problem of the recurrence of the old ‘feudal customs’ seemed to become worse in 
the 1960s. An investigative report in 1962 pointed out that “adopted daughter-in-law and 
early marriage [customs] reappeared in the rural area of Beijing [and] in some areas, with 
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the support of the local cadres, parents arranged or interfered with children’s marriage, 
widow’s remarriage was restricted.”52 A more popular phenomenon was the emergence 
of an adapted form of buying and selling marriages, in which the bride and her parents 
requested gifts and large amounts of money, as well as luxurious wedding feasts in return 
for accepting a marriage proposal. In the countryside, girls generally looked down on the 
‘glorious agricultural laborers’ and showed a reluctance to marry farmers, preferring 
instead cadres or industrial workers. This phenomenon again caused the population of 
rural men to feel frustrated and is a fact that is often attributed as partly responsible for 
the general population shift to the cities. This situation was worsened by the famine that 
occurred in the winter of 1960 and the spring of 1961.  Many women of the affected areas 
of Hebei and Shandong left their hometowns and married farmers from the outskirts of 
Beijing. Such marriages were often accomplished in a very short time (several days) after 
the introduction by a matchmaker or friends and relatives, which brought difficulty and 
confusion for marriage and household registration.53 
The official authorities determined that all of these problems were an outcome of the 
discontinuity of the Marriage Law movement. Regular propaganda education and 
government inspections were suggested as solutions to these problems. Responding to 
this request, the danwei and the Party organization strengthened their control and 
investigations of their workers and members. 
6.3 Love and Marriage Disturbance 
The promulgation of a socialist marriage law was the first step on the CCP’s social 
revolution agenda. The transition of social customs and people’s thoughts could not be 
achieved easily and the effort required a lasting and constant effort by both official and 
unofficial means. Although the nationwide marriage law campaign came to an official 
end in 1953, investigations in later years showed that the transition of marriage 
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conceptions from old to new required a much longer time than three years. As what had 
happened immediately following the May Fourth movement, the first decade of the 
socialist state saw the rise of a new round of nationwide disturbance over issues of love. 
People were largely confused about what to do and not to do under the socialist context, 
where both ‘feudal traditions’ and ‘bourgeois tendencies’ were officially out of favor. 
Stories of easy marriages, divorces, adultery, love affairs, pre-marital sex and illegitimate 
children were widespread fodder for gossipmongers. 
6.3.1 The Chaotic Love 
After the end of the nationwide marriage campaign in 1953, the Chinese propaganda 
organs proudly declared their achievement of the complete overthrow of the feudal 
marriage system in most of China. However, local archival sources show that municipal 
governments, especially in urban China, were still concerned with incorrect public 
attitudes on love that led to frivolous marriages and divorces, general moral degradation 
and distraction from production. A 1954 report mentions that “men in the factories are 
only concerned with women’s appearance and women concerned only with men’s 
income.”54 Misunderstanding about marriage freedom had a negative impact on 
production and the comity among workers, and could even cause divorce and suicide. 
Marriage and divorce were perceived as being too easy: people met, took a walk in the 
park, went to a cinema, and married forthwith. If things did not work out well, they 
divorced. Some young lovers were known to commit such intimate behaviors as kissing, 
embracing in public or even sleeping together during the daytime.55 
In 1955, an investigation was conducted among the workers of the Beijing Agricultural 
Machinery Factory and the Beijing Xinhua Printing Plant.56 Both factories had more male 
than female workers, and most of these were single with rural origins. Although the 
official discourse claimed that the Marriage Law campaign had been effective among the 
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worker population, the investigation revealed that in actuality “the education towards the 
workers in these two factories was far from sufficient, especially concerning the correct 
view of love and marriage.”57 Many young workers were found to be depressed and 
distracted from their work. For example, 16 young workers from among the 126 from the 
Beijing Agricultural Machinery Factory whose age was under 25, had started to ‘talk 
love’ [tan lianai 谈恋爱] though they were younger than 18. From 1951 to 1954, 113 
workers got married; among these, 24 were married earlier than the legal age. Many 
workers in love were criticized for being dreamers who might stare at their lover’s photo 
or read love letters for hours, thereby losing their concentration at work; others lost their 
ambitions for political and technical improvement due to an early marriage and the birth 
of children. 
In the Xinhua Printing Plant, it was reported that ‘bourgeois thought’ had heavily 
impacted the workers. The worship of money, indiscreet sexual relations, ‘love mania’, 
and easy marriages and divorces were all popular among the young workers. From 1953 
to 1954, there were 27 cases involving pre-marital sex, which led to 15 pregnancies; 
among the 15 divorce cases, 11 were attributed to adultery. These disorders not only 
caused health problems for the workers, but also distracted their attention and energy 
from their daily production, which sometimes even led to serious accidents.58 
Love relations on the campus were even more chaotic. Sexual behavior and liumang 
xingwei 流氓行为 [hooliganism] were common among the students.59 To deal with these 
problems, many universities and colleges made regulations in order to restrict love affairs 
on campus. Students were prohibited from getting married during their degree term; 
cohabitation of a student and his or her spouse was not permitted on campus; once a 
female student got pregnant, she was suspended for one year; children of the student were 
not permitted to be fostered on school grounds. Some colleges made the regulations even 
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more rigid by demonstrating a zero tolerance for student love affairs. Any convicted 
violator could be expelled, in some cases.60 
6.3.2 ‘Love the New and Loathe the Old’ 
According to the statistics of the Civil Court of Beijing for the first half of 1954, among 
the 380 divorce cases heard by the court, 136 concerned the CCP cadres. These 
individuals claimed lack of progress, personality changes, inconsiderate marriage 
decisions, a lack of love and physical or biological inability as grounds for divorce. 
However, the court found that all of these grounds were false excuses, covering the real 
issue which was the unspoken and outdated principle ‘love the new and loathe the old’, 
which was especially disadvantageous for rural-born wives. In order to achieve their 
divorces, some cadres even used their political power to push judges to rule in their favor. 
The court rulings considered this abuse to be grounded in the failure of the earlier 
marriage movement to infuse the cadres with new and lawful marriage virtues.61 
Compared to the vigorous performance of the Marriage Law’s promulgation, the Party-
state seemed incapable of controlling its cadres’ abuses of marriage freedom. In some 
areas, the practice of ‘changing wives’ [huan laopo 换老婆] even became a Party-
organized collective behavior within the local leadership circle. A contemporary observer 
remembered how such a ‘fashion’ swept the county in which he lived: 
Among the members of the county committee, except one district magistrate, all 
the county leaders changed their wives, including two county officials, two 
county secretaries, seven district secretaries and six district magistrates… Love 
and marriage arranged by the party-organization [zuzhi 组织] was so popular 
that ordinary people believed the organizations were distributing wives to the 
cadres from on high.62 
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Behind this ‘changing wives’ fad, the ‘trophy wife’ ideal continued to dominate CCP 
cadres and the armed services.   As mentioned in the previous chapter, ‘getting wives for 
poor peasant men’ had been one of most persuasive slogans that the CCP used to 
convince the rural population to support the revolution. Long before the final triumph had 
been achieved, many cadres started to plan for their new urban life.  As reflected in the 
attitude of one senior cadre leader over breaking up with his rural girlfriend: “as the 
victory of the revolution is coming soon, who still wants a countrified peasant cadre 
member? Once we enter the cities we can pick and choose from among the educated 
women!”63 After the founding of the PRC, these people felt that the time had come to ask 
for their reward, which also helps to explain why the Party-state seemed so powerless 
when dealing with such cases. It was, after all, precisely what the CCP had promised.  
6.3.3 Wife as a Deserved Trophy 
Immediately after the CCP seized national power its servicemen began asking for wives. 
For the new PRC, the servicemen’s marriage was more or less a national security issue, 
especially when this demand was from those garrisoned in the newly liberated border 
areas, and those who were currently fighting at the Korean front. For the sake of military 
morale, the local administrative and military authorities were frequently urged by the 
central government to best protect servicemen’s marriage interest by declining divorces 
and arranging marriages.  
In the case of an organization-assigned military marriage, refusal on the part of the 
potential partner was seldom allowed. Sometimes, such ‘assignments’ came in the form 
of violent coercion. For example, a veteran of the Eighth Route Army and his reluctant 
bride were locked together in one room by his commander for ‘a love talk’ until the girl 
gave up.64 In most cases, the marriage arrangement took the form of an administrative 
command that the bride-to-be must obey. Any hesitation or reluctance would provoke 
fierce criticism or even administrative punishment by the authorities. For example, when 
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a young military surgeon named Dr. Wang was informed that she had been promised to a 
vice battalion commander, she told the organization that she needed time to think over 
the many differences between them: she was less than twenty at that time and the man 
was more than ten years older; she was a medical school graduate, and he was illiterate; 
he was not good-looking and had a bad temper. However, her request incurred immediate 
criticism from the authorities: 
You think he is old? The older he is, the longer is his revolutionary history! You 
think he is too swarthy? He has a very red heart! If such a good comrade does not 
deserve your love, then who does? A bourgeois exploiter? They do have a white 
face, but that’s the symbol of their unhealthy thoughts. Without these dark-faced 
comrades fighting to win the state power, how can you have a good life? 
Comrade, don’t let the bourgeois vainglory confuse your concept of right and 
wrong. That is it! You two will marry on August 1st !65 
Like many of her girlfriends who were ‘assigned’ to the commanders and leaders at 
different levels, Dr. Wang dared not refuse the order, married the dark-faced commander 
and stayed with him for the rest of her life. In these stories, men’s desire for wives and 
women’s pursuit of political progress reached an awkward balance. While the husband 
thought of his assigned wife as a reward, the wife was convinced by the socialist 
marriage doctrine to regard marriage to her husband as a revolutionary duty. 
Despite her lack of power in the decision, Dr. Wang acknowledged that she was more 
fortunate than many of her contemporaries, at least in terms of her living conditions and 
the many privileges that she had enjoyed which were available only to high-ranking 
military commanders and their families. According to Ms. Yue, another of my 
interviewees, whose husband was a division commissar, the monthly income of her 
family in the 1950s and 1960s was over 100 yuan, which was much higher than the urban 
average of 10-20 yuan. Other than the comforts of housing, free healthcare, the free 
service of a private nanny, cook and guard (who were all paid by the army as soldiers), 
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her family was among the few who always had enough food to live comfortably, even in 
the years when living supplies were extremely scarce.66  
My interview with Ms. Feng, a 1950s graduate of a finance and economic college in 
Beijing where she befriended with many army wives, demonstrated how such a “Party-
arranged match” was viewed by their ordinary contemporaries: 
Those whose marriages were arranged by zuzhi [Party organization] led much 
better lives than us commoners in terms of living conditions… Some couples 
were obviously not perfectly matched, the age gap was as big as twenty or thirty 
years, but it was impossible for a girl to disobey a decision of zuzhi[Party 
organization]: she must accept it without resentment… anyway, people at that 
time were very naive, knowing nothing about love. Once they were matched 
together, they could spend a life together no matter if they were happy or not. 
Besides, their marriages were blessed by a much better material life!”  
Among these Party-arranged army wives, the thousands of girls who were recruited and 
sent to marry garrison soldiers in Xinjiang in the 1950s were the most unfortunate. The 
state had to solve the problem of finding the promised brides for the 200 000 soldiers 
who were garrisoned in the newly liberated border area of Xinjiang from the early 1950s.  
At the request of General Wang Zhen 王震 (1908-1993), more than 40 000 young 
women had been recruited and sent to Xinjiang in the name of “constructing the new 
borders”. Eight thousand girls from Hunan were among the first batch to be sent. Most of 
them were immediately ordered to marry the commanders of the garrison troops of 
various levels, and spent their best years or even their entire lives in that barren desert. 67 
6.4 Marriage as a Social Control 
Other than better training among the cadres and more effective promulgation efforts, the 
relative success of the second Marriage Law campaign should be attributed primarily to 
the implementation of the danwei system, and secondarily to the timely development of a 
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new discourse on love and marriage. While the former imposed procedural and 
compulsory controls on individual marriages, the latter convinced people to accept State 
control over their personal lives as being simply a part of a citizen’s duty. 
6.4.1 The Danwei system 
A danwei is “a hierarchy of state-owned workplace units, including schools, factories, 
hospitals, government agencies and the like.”68  It is the principal territorial form the 
socialist state has employed since 1949 in order to organize the majority of China’s urban 
population.69 This system provided a superior standard of living to the urban population 
through such measures as granting secure jobs, affordable housing, inexpensive medical 
care, a range of subsides for everything from transportation to nutrition and generous 
retirement pensions. However, obtaining these benefits came at the cost of tight 
restrictions and systematic social control over an individual’s public and personal 
activities, including rights to job transfer, housing assignments and marriage decisions. 
The mechanism of a danwei, as Andrew G. Walder perceived, “places constraints on 
citizen behavior by the system of surveillance and political control… stresses the positive 
incentives offered for compliance. [In this way,]…political loyalty is rewarded 
systematically with career opportunities, special distributions, and other favors that 
officials in communist societies are uniquely able to dispense.”70 
According to the marriage registration requirements, in order to register a marriage 
certificate with the danwei, a couple needed to bring forth a written introduction letter 
and related documents that had been signed by their unit leader or by the local police 
station if the principal was unemployed.71 To get married, the two parties had to first seek 
the approval of the authorities of their danweis. If they did not acquire danwei approval, 
the local marriage registration office would not allow them to register the marriage. In the 
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large cities, it was this step, rather than procedures in the marriage registration office, that 
was the crucial obstacle to getting married.  
Unit authorities could object to or cause delays in a marriage on a variety of grounds. 
Political unreliability was the most often raised official objection to a marriage from the 
danwei leaders. Considerations in such cases could include past political mistakes 
committed either by the individual or their family members, having a bad class 
background or even having relatives overseas. In most cases, the couple would be 
advised to think it over and consider the risks to their future.72   
In most civilian cases a persistent couple might eventually be allowed to marry, in spite 
of danwei pressures.  However, Party members, people who worked in high security 
danweis, or individuals in the army had considerably less latitude to pursue their own 
love interests. To regulate the marriage behavior of the ‘vanguard of the Revolution’, a 
specific qualification list was issued by the central government in October of 1950. In 
general, the marriage application of an army man in active service would not be 
permitted if he was not any one of the following: 1) a battalion commander or higher; 2) 
a company leader with at least six-years’ experience as a company or platoon commander 
(or equivalent); 3) a commander or soldier of the Red Army who had joined before 1938; 
4) a platoon leader (or equivalent) with at least seven-years’ experience. Even after a 
serviceman’s qualifications for marriage were recognized, his marriage application might 
still be declined if his bride-to-be failed to meet the following qualifications: 1) clean 
background; 2) politically innocent; 3) having more than one year of working experience. 
These qualifications varied according to the groom’s military rank. For example, those 
engaged to a Red Army soldier must 1) have a clean background; 2) be politically 
innocent. The wife of an army leader at the level of the company or platoon must 1) have 
a clean background; 2) be politically innocent; 3) be economically independent, or 
capable of independent life. If the groom-to-be worked in a high security danwei, or was 
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at the same level as a division commander, the bride must be the member of either the 
CCP or the Youth League, with more than one year of work experience.73   
For ordinary people, the official marriage age was of the greatest concern. Although the 
Marriage Law stipulated that the legal age for marriage was 20 for men and 18 for 
women, the official propaganda strongly recommended an even later marriage age, 
presumably 25-27 for men and 23-24 for women. Alternatively, at least one party in the 
proposed union had to have obtained some form of stable economic independence so that 
the couple (and the wife in particular) could avoid being distracted from work by the 
demands of childcare.74 If a couple was regarded as being too young, the unit authorities 
would possibly persuade them to wait until they had passed the required ages. Any delay 
imposed by the danwei was usually considered the end of the matter, since couples 
depended on danwei authorities for access to housing, schools and job opportunities. If 
the couple had been sexually involved and the woman became pregnant, the authorities 
might approve an early marriage, although it was also possible for them to demand that 
the woman get an abortion and subject both partners to criticism meetings. If an early 
marriage had been approved by the danwei, the marriage registration office would 
seldom refuse to issue the couple a marriage permit. 
Even if a couple had satisfied the marriage requirements for age and background, and had 
earned the consent of their unit leaders, they might still have to delay their marriage due 
to other practical considerations. For example, unless one gained the approval of one’s 
danwei, he or she could not freely transfer to a different unit.  Such a transfer required an 
individual to complete a series of complicated procedures that often made transferring a 
long, painful and intolerable process. If a couple belonged to two different danweis in 
different locations, their marriage would require a long-term separation. 
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Another issue of concern to the couple at the marriage age was finding housing. Since 
most housing was assigned by the danwei authorities according to the age, experience, 
title, achievements, needs and even the personal relations of each individual, it was 
hardly possible for a young couple without outstanding performance reviews to be 
granted a place to live before or shortly after they get married.  This difficulty left the two 
parties no choice but to delay the wedding if they did not want to live with the groom’s 
parents and share one roof with any of his unmarried siblings.  
In many ways, the danwei system entitled its leaders, or the leaders of each Party branch, 
to assert their direct and effective official intervention over the most personal issues of 
their employees, and therefore control any undesired marriages. As Whyte and Parish 
concluded, “throughout the post-1949 period average marriage ages were rising for both 
urban men and women, so that by the 1970s the average marriage age for both sexes was 
about five years later than in the period before 1949.” 75 This delay was largely caused by 
consistent pressure from the government and the “alterations in the opportunity structure 
facing young people and the extent to which they can draw on resources independently of 
their parents.”76 Given the constraints presented by the official ban on school romance, 
the official late marriage policy, the state labor assignment system and gender segregated 
working conditions, it was fairly common for young people to wait until they were 
assigned work by their danwei before they begin to seriously consider finding a partner.  
6.4.2 Renewing the Definition of Love and Marriage 
Except for people in the border areas who had been familiar with socialist values, most 
Chinese people were under the control of two very different kinds of love and marriage 
conceptions. The big cities and their large populations were under the influence of the 
May Fourth spirit, which included Western ideas on romantic love, open socialization 
and marriage freedom that had been well accepted by the intellectuals, and were at least 
known to other urban residents. For most rural Chinese, however, the traditional arranged 
marriage system was still the only way to get married. How to create a new discourse that 
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followed the spirit of the ongoing Marriage Law campaign to replace the feudal and 
bourgeois love discourses became a vital duty of China’s communist propagandists.  
While Engel’s ‘free consensual union’ had been an ideal that was radically pursued by 
the Chinese communists, who had learned from over two-decades of marriage reform 
experience, the current CCP policymakers had developed a recognition that a correct love 
must be a love that could lead to a lasting and happy marriage. Love without marriage, in 
most minds was considered a cause of moral decline or licentious behavior. Therefore, 
most discussions about love were at the same time discussions about marriage, which 
suggested that young people get married without unnecessary delay if the two parties had 
established a good mutual understanding and mutual love.77  
To create a socialist discourse on love, the first step for the CCP leaders was to officially 
reject earlier discourses that had been created by Confucian scholars and ‘bourgeois 
intellectuals’. Citing Engels’ teachings, the CCP asserted that there had never been real 
love relations in Chinese history prior to the Communist era, because “women in an 
inferior and suppressed position were incapable of setting up any equal and beautiful love 
relation.78 The feudal marriage system was therefore rejected for its ‘buying and selling’ 
nature, and the bourgeois model for the fact that it hid the trade between beauty and 
money behind a lie of affection.79    
Unlike the New Culturalists of the 1920s, who endeavored to define love as a sublime 
natural human impulse that had to be balanced with reason and morals, communist love 
advisors sought to define ‘correct’ love. While the moralists of the May Fourth era were 
wrestling with how to control human sexual desire through a respect for spiritual love, 
the first and last purpose of socialist propaganda was to help young people rid themselves 
of ‘incorrect love’ and marriage values that were embedded in ‘feudal customs and 
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bourgeois thoughts’, in order to establish ‘correct’ socialist values in their place. A 
‘correct love’, according to an advisor in Zhongguo funü 中国妇女 [Women of China], 
must have two qualifications: first, it should be established on the basis of a revolutionary 
view of life that was centered on “serving for people”; second, it should emerge between 
two people of matched political ideals, only when their love could be lasting and strong. 
Any love between people of unmatched political values, such as progressive 
revolutionary and anti-revolutionary, was not really true love but was in reality only an 
illusion.80 
Cheng Jinwu 程今吾, a senior educationalist and a member of the CCP’s Propaganda 
Department, was invited to give advice on how to develop a ‘correct’ love relationship. 
Cheng pointed out that in order to accomplish a ‘correct’ love, people first had to 
overcome three bad inclinations: First, the conservative ideal of gender separation 
prevented young people from speaking about their love or even having normal 
socialization with those of the opposite sex; second, unrealistic love fantasies that made 
people expect love at first-sight; third, the delusional and extreme bourgeois style ‘love 
mania’ that extolled the benefits of unconditional love freedom. The most effective 
weapon one could utilize to fight against these tendencies, Cheng suggested, was “a love 
value that is consistent with the view of revolutionary life”.81 Ideally, a ‘correct’ love 
should proceed as follows: the two parties happen to know each other from their studies 
or work. In the process of mutual help and working cooperation, they cultivate matched 
political thoughts and common interests, and eventually develop a marriage-oriented love 
relationship.82  
While exploring exactly how to build a love on the basis of a revolutionary view of life, 
people often wondered whether love or work were more important.  Ding Ling and a few 
others admitted that love was a matter that could greatly influence an individual’s life and 
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openly encouraged young people in their pursuit of it.83 Most relationship advisors, 
however, insisted that love should never be allowed to surmount revolutionary work, just 
as personal interests should never go beyond the public interest. The best way to deal 
with love and work, they suggested, was to combine love with work, while always 
putting work first.84 
Following Engel’s teachings, which recognized love as “a matter of hierarchy and class 
struggle”, the Chinese socialist moralists prefaced complementary political ideals and 
class standing as the basis for any love relationship. Specific official directives were 
issued in August of 1950 for the division of classes in rural areas. Article 12 was 
specifically concerned with the issue of inter-class marriage.85 For example, if a daughter 
from a landlord, rich peasant or capitalist family married into the family of a poor peasant 
or worker from before the liberation she could not change her class identity to worker, 
peasant or poor peasant until there was evidence to show that she had supported herself 
through labour for at least one year. Class standing became so vital a criterion in the 
1960s that it was used as “a barometer of character.”86 
While mutual respect, mutual affection and gender equality were also recognized by the 
communists as important conditions for a ‘correct’ love relationship, they were generally 
secondary considerations. All other contemplations of appearance, status, and property 
should be totally rejected, according to the new moralist viewpoint. For example, one 
reader who wrote to a local paper to complain about how ugly and short her soldier 
husband-to-be was faced criticism for over-reacting and being in possession of bourgeois 
tastes.87 In another case, a girl who chose to marry a volunteer soldier who might 
potentially have to work as a peasant after demobilization rather than a PLA lieutenant 
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that had been introduced to her by her parents was praised for her “liberation from the 
bourgeois and feudal marriage view and upholding the Communist marriage view.”88  
Surprisingly, a prospective partner’s educational level, which had topped the criteria list 
before 1949, was no longer a fixed standard of worth. Marriage between intellectuals and 
workers or peasants was officially encouraged under the premise of political 
progressiveness. Official doctrine taught that the educational gap between couples could 
be overcome by common communist ideologies and couples who dared to challenge this 
gap were often praised as models for successfully eliminating their discrimination 
towards the working class. For example, Wang Yuling, a young female typist and high-
school graduate wrote a letter to Zhongguo funü in 1959 that discussed her confusion 
over declining her boyfriend’s marriage proposal despite her feelings of love for him. The 
reason she gave was simple: while he was a Party member, he was a poorly educated 
driver and did not match her ideal criteria of being highly educated, fully employed and 
in a good political position. Frustrated and upset, Wang wrote to the journal for advice on 
whether or not she should rethink his proposal.  
This letter attracted more than one thousand responses from across the country, seven 
hundred of which criticized Wang for her bourgeois inclinations. The editor of Zhongguo 
funü concluded from these letters that “most young people in our country had learned to 
use communist principles to deal with marriage and family problems. They managed to 
get rid of the bourgeois bias on property, status, and their discrimination against the 
working class.”89 
There were, however, other points of view. One response from a reader named Wu Meide 
became another target of criticism. In this letter, published in December 1959, Wu 
expressed great sympathy for Wang Yuling and believed that for several reasons a young 
woman should be given full freedom to select her own life partner: on the one hand, 
women customarily had higher expectations for their husbands based on political and 
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educational levels as well as on his social status, which was a result of thousands o years 
of feudalism and which could not be changed overnight. On the other hand, Wu argued 
that Wang’s preference for a better husband who could help her improve her 
circumstances could not simply be defined as being a ‘bourgeois’ thought. Moreover, Wu 
noted that a harmonious family required compatibility, and from this perspective Wang 
and her boyfriend were not well-matched. Despite his good reputation, their hobbies and 
interests were fundamentally different, and such a disparity could only grow wider 
through marriage. Finding a life partner was not as simple as electing a working model, 
Wu insisted, and looking only for a partner with progressive thoughts and a good work 
ethic was far from enough to make a happy family. Therefore, she claimed that Wang 
Yuling should be encouraged to pursue another love that better matched her ideals.90   
Wu Meide’s opinion attracted its own batch of criticism from all walks of life. For most 
readers, Wu’s letter was a ‘feudal-oriented’ admittance of men’s superiority and women’s 
inferiority: by encouraging women to find a superior husband, and by advocating 
women’s dependence and reliability, Wu not only challenged the gender equality 
principles of the new society, but she also downplayed women’s autonomy or 
advancement, and ignored all the help that a woman could get from modern Chinese 
society.91 The editor of Zhongguo funü, however, sensed an even more basic error in 
Wu’s opinion: it demonstrated ‘bourgeois tendencies’. Wu’s opinion that only a couple 
with common interests and hobbies could enjoy effective communication was considered 
to “obscure the difference between proletarian love and bourgeois love.”92 Moreover, the 
editor pointed out that Wu erred in assuming that it would be impossible for Wang’s 
boyfriend to advance his level of education. For a couple whose love was established on 
the basis of common political thought, the editor believed, close communication could 
naturally develop. It seems that this discussion did help Wang Yuling to make up her 
mind, and the editor announced that Wang and her boyfriend were married in the end.93 
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In contrast, Zhongguo funü published another love story in December of 1959 about a 
female university graduate and a PLA soldier with only an elementary school education. 
The two were wed in 1956 and proceeded to live a happy married life. Their love, the 
paper said, was based on pure communist ideals, as the heroine of the story commented: 
“I love him for his high political consciousness, loyalty to the Party, critical thinking and 
strict self-discipline; he loves me for my good family background, progressive 
inclination, being a good learner, hard work, good temper, and simple lifestyle.” 94 Such a 
marriage was put forth as an example of a model combination of intellectual class and 
working class and perfectly realized the common advancement of the couple. 
While the public media kept urging intellectuals to set up a “love union with worker and 
peasant”, Ding Ling suggested that such a union might be unnecessary if there were no 
common ground between the two parties in life, work and thought.95 Wang Dingchang, 
another dissident, went even further to argue that a comradeship that was established 
through a matched political ideal could never take the place of one established through 
mutual love (although he acknowledged that matched political ideals should be the 
precondition of any love relationship, and that no love should interfere with one’s 
work).96 However, this kind of public commentary began to disappear once the state 
made a radical turn to the political left and began to identify any dissidents as being 
‘counter-revolutionaries’ and ‘rightists’. 
6.4.3 Love and Marriage in the Socialist Context 
Socialist marriage legislation, the danwei system and the introduction of the ‘new love 
discourse’ brought many fundamental changes to Chinese marriage thinking. The 
immediate perceivable transition that was brought on by the introduction of the new 
discourse was a change in the use of language. The term ‘comrade’ started to be used in 
place of companion, which signified the fundamental transition of women’s domestic 
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status and family relations. A wife working in one factory broke into tears when she 
learned that her husband had called her ‘comrade’ instead of ‘my wife’ when talking to 
another, because this acknowledged her independence and recognized her as another 
breadwinner.97 In the urban areas, airen 爱人 [lover] became the new appellation that a 
couple used to refer to each other. This gender-neutral term signified not only the 
equality between husband and wife, but also distinguished the marriage as a union 
between two lovers.  Airen subsequently became a term that could only be used to 
describe a couple, and could not be applied to unmarried lovers.  
The state-controlled propaganda machine soon turned public opinion into an echo of the 
official discourse. The readers’ forum held by the main-stream journals became a 
showcase for this kind of trend-setting opinion. In November of 1955, Zhongguo funü 
published a story about the marriage-related tragedy of Liu Lequn and the adulterous Luo 
Baoyi.98 Liu was a hard-working Beijing high school teacher and active Communist Party 
member. Her husband Luo was a senior Party member who had joined in 1939 and who 
was then working as section chief of the Commercial Bureau. According to Liu, she was 
introduced to Luo in 1946 and was soon thereafter infatuated by this “very passionate, 
smart and able-minded” man who treated her with care and consideration, and gave her 
love letters and generous gifts. At Luo’s insistence, the two were married after a brief 
courtship in April of 1946.  In the beginning, they were both satisfied with this marriage 
and Luo had often boasted that “all the comrades admired me for my luck of finding a 
young, pretty, well educated, and a party member wife.”99 Liu was also pleased to find 
that her husband lived up to every one of her ideals. Their happiness lasted for five years 
but went sour in 1952, when Luo fell in love with Miss Wang, a young and cheerful 
university graduate. When Liu was pregnant with the couple’s third child, Luo sued for 
divorce on the grounds that “his wife is a workaholic, reading all the time, knowing 
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nothing about play, boring as a chump.”100 Liu refused and reported his adultery to the 
supervisor of his working unit.  Although Luo was officially criticized, he maintained his 
liaison with Wang and forced Liu to grant the divorce. In the end, Liu decided to formally 
sue Luo for adultery and spousal abuse. 
The four issues of Zhongguo funü (1955.12-1956.3) that followed the publication of the 
story contained a wide discussion about Liu and Luo’s marriage problems.101 It is no 
surprise that Luo and his mistress were harshly criticized and most readers believed that 
the breakup was mainly caused by Luo’s bourgeois and individualist thoughts, his pursuit 
of the bourgeois lifestyle and his profligate behavior. His mistress Miss Wang was 
criticized as being ‘extremely immoral’, dominated by bourgeois thoughts of vanity and 
selfishness and for trying to gain at another’s expense.102 Liu was also blamed by some 
readers for “neglecting her husband and family life.”103 However, in a conclusion that 
was published in 1956, the editors suggested that Liu should not be blamed since the first 
duty of a woman in the new society should be her work. Luo’s complaint, meanwhile, 
was based on his pursuit of a degraded and immoral ‘bourgeois’ lifestyle, which should 
not be satisfied lest Liu become the captive of ‘bourgeois’ thoughts.104 
Some readers went even further in questioning the Liu and Luo love story. Both partners 
were criticized by some readers for adopting ‘bourgeois’ marriage views. One reader 
pointed out that their basis for love was rather weak, as the man only thought about 
physical appearance and education, while the woman was merely satisfied with his 
passion, intelligence, ability and generosity in lending her books, quilts and stamps, not 
to mention the matter of his romantic love letters. The reader claimed that Liu was 
infatuated by Luo’s ‘bourgeois’ solicitude without realizing his ‘bourgeois’ nature; as 
revolutionaries, they should both have integrated family life and revolutionary work. 
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Finally, the critic stated that only love that was established on the basis of political 
mutual help, mutual encouragement and common advancement could allow a couple to 
live happily ever after.105 
In sum, all the readers agreed that the fundamental problem with Luo, Liu and Wang was 
their ‘bourgeois’ inclinations: individualism, romanticism, vanity and selfishness.  These 
characteristics were all considered to be in contradiction to the values of the Communist 
Party, its members and its revolutionaries. Therefore, in the words of one reader, the 
family role was directly connected to the political role: 
Luo is not only a disloyal husband, but an unfaithful Party member. Every word 
and move of a Communist Party member should meet the supreme principle of 
the proletarian interest. In this sense, the problem of life could not be separated 
from the political problem. If a Party member cannot correctly handle the 
relationship between personal and collective life, and allows bourgeois and 
individualist thoughts to dominate his words and behaviors, it is inevitable that 
he will commit a political mistake and bury himself.106  
Readers unanimously suggested that the involvement of the Party-state was the best 
solution to such problems.  As Xie Xuegong, a secretary of the Party Branch of the 
Foreign Trade Department explained,  
The Party will never interfere with a Party member’s normal life and his right in 
dealing with his life. But if his life violates communist virtue, discipline and law, 
and blemishes the reputation of the Party, not only should Party organizations 
enforce the interference, but also the masses have a right to intervene.107 
A penitent husband and reader of Zhongguo funü confessed that he had once tried to 
divorce his simple-looking and poorly-educated wife. Only the criticism and education of 
the Party and of his comrades had finally saved his marriage and made him realize how 
selfish he was being: “as our country is walking toward socialism, and everyone is 
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devoted fully to the country’s construction, how can I pursue my own personal 
happiness?” 108 So he corrected his attitude and repaired his relationship with his wife.  
The case of Luo and Liu demonstrated the depth to which people accepted the principles 
of the new marriage discourse as a standard for both their public and private lives. 
Through the official intervention of the Party-state, each family and each individual was 
politicized as either a cell of the socialist society, or as an element of the collective, but 
not as an individual that was capable of affection, emotion and romance. Gerald Clerk, an 
American journalist who visited China in the early 1950s observed “China is undergoing 
a severe diet of moral reformation”: 
There is prudery, a somber “asexual” quality even in the relations between young 
people. China’s earnest young men and women do not indulge in cheek-to-cheek 
dancing; nor do they walk arm in arm through a park. Even in quiet restaurants, 
where they might be expected to reveal a soulful eye for one another, they appear 
more preoccupied with work projects than with personal affairs. The Chinese still 
smile, but, especially among the young in China, today all of life is serious and 
sober; and romance can be given little attention in the broader scheme of building 
a nation…109 
6.5 Restricted Marriage Freedom: Love and Marriage 
Practice in Daily Life 
For most ordinary Chinese people, meeting and becoming familiar with potential spouses 
was a matter that was easier said than done. Young people in China confronted a number 
of obstacles in trying to find a spouse. The biggest of these was the continuing influence 
of traditional cultural mores and expectations. The new socialist state had inherited the 
puritan spirit of wartime Yan’an and in an atmosphere of continuing suspicion and 
segregation, people were hesitant to express their affections openly, fearing that they 
would become subject to gossip and rumor. It was not unknown for the Youth League to 
discourage its members from openly fraternizing with the opposite sex for fear that this 
might harm the reputation of the organization and draw official attention to their affairs in 
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a derogatory way.110 Maintaining a good reputation was particularly essential for the 
Chinese female, since her virginity was still largely worshipped as sacrosanct by the 
Chinese male. Therefore, regardless of their daughters’ personal feelings, parents often 
kept girls at home and prohibited them from attending any meetings or taking part in 
activities that might expose them to the attentions of members of the opposite sex. In 
defense of their actions, parents argued that when young people get together “nothing 
good can happen” and that young people “may not behave properly and may even ruin 
family reputations.”111 Therefore, as Whyte and Parish observed:  
Although China has won the acceptance of the freedom of mate choice, it did not 
develop an American-style dating culture that can provide opportunities for 
young males and females to mix fairly freely and to explore romantic 
relationships in a relatively casual atmosphere, with no long-term commitments 
expected, and this experience is seen as important in making possible eventual 
choice of a mate. Young people in China, therefore confront a number of 
obstacles in trying to find a spouse.112 
For both urban and rural Chinese, any public sign of pairing off was not generally seen as 
a preliminary and casual stage of romance, but rather as indicating a serious commitment 
that was expected to lead to marriage. Once two people had been publicly identified as a 
couple, any breakup between them would subsequently become very difficult and subject 
to moral criticism. 
The second major obstacle facing Chinese youth looking for love came from the gap 
between theory and practice. While young people were theoretically encouraged to 
pursue their individual love and happiness, in practice, both danweis and schools frowned 
upon love relationships in the workplace or on campus. Given the potential distraction a 
love affair could be from an individual’s work or studies, most schools, universities, and 
danweis prohibited love affairs and publicly criticized students and apprentices who did 
not obey the rules.  
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For many Chinese people who were neither students nor apprentices, the biggest obstacle 
to finding a partner was the considerable occupational segregation of the sexes. For those 
groups living under more strictly enforced segregation, such as women textile workers 
and nursery school teachers or male coal miners, there were few potential mates close at 
hand. The highly involved and inclusive nature of danweis and their activities helped to 
reinforce this isolation, while the absence of facilities or institutions for socialization, 
such as dance halls and restaurants, meant that individuals did not have the time or 
opportunity to meet eligible partners on their own. In the 1950s and early 1960s, it was 
not uncommon for danweis to hold dances and parties of various types, and even the 
occasional ‘mixer’ - parties jointly sponsored by a unit with extra males and a unit with 
extra females that were aimed specifically at fostering romance. In later years, such 
activities were seen as ‘bourgeois and decadent’, and they were rarely held after the 
beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. 
In the face of such obstacles, many Chinese youths came to rely upon third-party 
assistance to help find a potential spouse. According to Whyte and Parish’s field research 
in the late 1950s, 56% of the surveyed couples had met directly, while 44% had relied 
upon introductions from others. Of these latter cases, almost half had involved 
introductions that were arranged by parents, while the remainders were based upon 
introductions provided by friends or coworkers.113  
In the official love discourse, only those marriages that had been initiated and concluded 
without the intervention of a third party could be considered a true self-determined 
marriage.114  In daily life, however, the predominant models in operation in rural areas 
continued to combine elements of the old and new ideological models, and even in the 
more progressive urban areas, initiation by third parties and parental consent were the 
most acceptable norms of behavior. Such compromises were officially encouraged at the 
beginning of the Marriage Movement. For example, one report that was published in 
Zhongguo funü in 1953 presented a model xiang in implementing the marriage law. The 
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author mentioned that more than twenty girls who had been betrothed under parental 
arrangement before 1949 decided afterward to closely examine the condition of their 
fiancé and potential in-law families.  Some even went so far as to talk to their fiancés in 
order to see if they met the personal standards of the individual women. These standards 
at this time included being good at production, a good worker, a good learner, a Party 
member or member of the Youth League, or at least having been an activist or serving in 
the militia. Sometimes, the girl would even examine her potential husband’s education 
level with a textbook and a quiz. 115  From the tone of the author, this kind of marriage 
had been recognized as tantamount to marriage freedom. 
The strong influence of filial tradition, the continuing gender segregation and the 
puritanism advocated in the official Party line, all comprised the critical elements that 
prevented young Chinese people from cutting themselves off from the old marriage 
patterns. Like it had been for their urban predecessors in the 1930s, when marriage 
freedom was first introduced to the educated youth in the 1950s, disobedience to one’s 
parents over the issue of marriage was still a painful process to undertake; it was a 
prospect that left one full of guilt and a sense of betrayal, even after many individuals had 
obtained their economic independence. Those young men who dared to reject an arranged 
marriage were often disturbed by the accusation of being an ‘unfilial son’.  As one reader 
of Zhongguo qingnian complained in 1963, “Am I an unfilial son because I turn my back 
on an arranged marriage?...the problem weighs heavily on my mind [and] I cannot 
concentrate on my studies and work.”116 
While people were officially encouraged to weed out personal considerations of a 
prospective spouse’s external status criteria (such as income and political position) in the 
process of making a marriage decision, in the highly bureaucratized distribution system 
that controlled urban resources in China at the time, people with political power, 
positions as ‘gatekeepers’ or those from families with parents in such roles inevitably 
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became more desirable as prospects, regardless of their personal qualities. For most 
young people in the 1950s and early 1960s, determining how to pick a promising partner 
was the most important consideration, while listing personal criteria, particularly for 
women, was downplayed as this involved betting on a person’s future. Futures were to be 
made along two paths: one political and the other professional. Some individuals were 
eager to find a partner who was more likely to have a bright political future, which meant 
looking for political activists, individuals who held offices in the Communist Youth 
League (or various other youth and student organizations) or someone who had been able 
to join the Communist Party or the People’s Liberation Army. Others might focus instead 
on finding diligent and intelligent individuals who were likely to go on to university and 
to promising careers as skilled personnel or intellectuals.117  
6.6 Conclusion 
Marriage, in the Marxist lexicon, is a flexible term that can only be defined under a 
specific social system, as it is shaped by the social productivity of each individual society 
and under the influence of superstructures such as political institutions and political 
thoughts. To establish a marriage institution that could best fit the socialist infrastructure, 
the new Chinese Party-state launched a three-year nationwide propaganda campaign in an 
attempt to promulgate a marriage law that would indoctrinate Chinese people with the 
ideal of a ‘revolutionary marriage’.  In the spirit of the Marriage Law of 1950, such a 
marriage was “a legal marital union based on the love of the two sexes who have free 
wills to live and work together, which is normally confirmed by the State and creates 
rights and duties for the partners towards each other and society.” 118 
Implemented together with the new marriage law was a renewed love and marriage 
discourse through which the Party-state tried to preach a kind of moral proletarian 
heroism: in a socialist marriage, seeking a companion simply to share one’s lives together 
was no longer possible- the wife and the husband are ideally staunch comrades who 
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emulate each other and find the height of matrimonial happiness in mutual criticism and 
self-criticism. If problems do arise between these ideal spouses they will be easily and 
correctly solved by the application of proletarian principles.119 This ideal was 
contextualized through the hierarchal danwei system that was widely established in the 
urban areas, and through the millions of Party-trained cadres who composed the elite 
among local authorities. The marriage system under the socialist context, in this sense, 
was in fact a component of a bigger social control network that was comprised of every 
individual, family, street, danwei, and all other administrative units. What tied them 
together was the socialist marriage discourse.  
Gerald Clerk described the Communist approach to reform Chinese marriage as “to slip 
new wine into old familiar bottles”: 
In former days, the vast majority of marriages among peasants were prearranged 
by parents; bride and groom met the first time during the wedding ceremony. 
Love, in the conventional Western sense, was not a factor. Now it is the Party, 
through the mechanism of persuasion and propaganda, that tacitly selects the 
partners.120  
While the Party-state anticipated a quick revolution in the marriage system, the 
realization of this ideal was hampered by the constant incompability of “wine and bottle”.  
The ongoing ‘love disturbance’ among  urban youth, local cadre leaders’ intentional 
abuses of marriage freedom, servicemen’s  demand for ‘trophy wives’, and ordinary 
people’s utilitarian use of the new marriage discourse demonstrated what was needed for 
the transformation of Chinese marriage institution was not only a rapid top-down legal 
revolution, but also a gradual bottom-up social evolution.  
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Final Conclusion 
The Chinese marriage system experienced a three-step transition within the half-century 
period from the late nineteenth century to the mid- twentieth century: the rejection of 
traditions, the embrace of ideals and,  at last, a return to realities. Although Chinese 
marriage institutions had undergone many changes in terms of definition, purpose, 
institution, politics, procedure, and legislation, in the early 20th century most people still 
married according to the established tradition by which the child was legally and morally 
required to accept the life partner arranged by his or her parent at the matchmaker’s 
recommendation. This lack of freedom seemed rather absurd and backward to those 
Chinese engaged in a persistent pursuit of China’s modernization. The first generation of 
Chinese marriage reformers were among the patriotic intellectuals who endeavored to 
improve the Chinese race through training women to be the good wives of patriotic 
husbands and wise mothers of future Chinese soldiers. To guarantee young people’s 
marriage freedom while maintaining the parental authority, these moderate social 
reformers suggested a middle course between the progressive free-choice model and the 
customary parental-arranged practice. For the good of the children, parental supervision 
and examination were encouraged to moderate the harm supposedly caused by impulsive 
love passion. After all, they insisted, the first and last purpose of a marriage was to 
establish a harmonious family whose members could best serve their country.  
Such precautions however, were submerged by the marriage revolution launched by the 
May Fourth radicals. To replace the Confucian discourse on marriage, a brand-new 
marriage discourse was constructed by the intellectuals who intended to modernize 
Chinese marriage around the theme of free love. Marriage, in this discourse, was defined 
as a consummation of the love of two individuals. In the spirit of marriage freedom, 
young people were encouraged to resist family interference and to freely pursue their true 
love of matched souls through open socialization. In the big cities, simple weddings 
became a fashion among those who celebrated their marriage more as a personal event 
than a family occasion.  
  
241
Founded in the “Golden Age” of the May Fourth era, the CCP claimed to be the 
representative of the most progressive political and social trends of its time. In terms of 
marriage thinking and practice, many members of the early CCP were the enthusiasts of 
unconditional love and “free-consensual union”, a socialist marriage model Engels 
proposed as a final replacement of the marriage system. However, the early CCP leaders’ 
ambition of promulgating a socialist marriage code in the Jiangxi Soviet suffered such a 
total defeat that the later Yan’an leadership had to figure out a more realistic social 
reform plan that could accommodate the more conservative social context of North 
China. The marriage discourse they constructed was a flexible combination of socialist 
ideals and Confucian traditions: each individual, both man and woman, was requested to 
submit his or her personal interest to that of the CCP for the sake of revolution. In terms 
of social control, the CCP was by no means inferior to the dynastic rulers. On behalf of 
the national interest of China and Chinese people, the CCP could act like the traditional 
family heads that were officially and legally authorized to arrange their children’s 
marriage at will, to either assign a marriage to an individual as a “revolutionary mission”, 
or to force its socialist reform agenda on the Chinese people as a whole. After 1949, this 
discourse was promoted through the nation-wide establishment of the danwei system, 
with which the socialist Party-state effectively enforced a reform that brought many 
fundamental changes to Chinese marriage.  
Based on a historical examination of the relationship between state and individual, 
Lucian W. Pye concluded that no regime has ever outdone the Confucian and Chinese 
Communist state in ascribing moral virtues to the state, as they both went all out in 
extolling the importance of rulers and society and in minimizing the rights of individuals. 
“At the core of Chinese ethics and morality”, Pye pointed out, “there has always been the 
ideal of depressing self-interest and glorifying self-sacrifice for the collectivity.”1  
Pye’s perception is insightful at least in regards to marriage. For Chinese, marriage is 
more a responsibility towards family, society, community, and state than a choice for the 
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individual. In the Confucian era, around the paramount principle of filial piety, the 
marriage system served as a means of social control through which the dynastic ruler 
could institute his hierarchal control over his people as a father over his children. The 
most widely extolled moral value of an individual was to unconditionally obey his or her 
parents, superiors and rulers. In the modern era, the individual was increasingly expected 
to submit his or her personal interests to the greater good of the Chinese nation-state 
under the principle that “the individual has no freedom, only the group has freedom”. In 
the agenda of the late-Qing reformers and Republican revolutionaries, China’s national 
salvation was the first priority and became the fundamental cause for all the social 
reforms. Their proposal that Chinese parents’ withdraw from involvement in their 
children’s marriages was not about individual freedom or human rights, but a political 
strategy intended to strengthen Chinese race.  
In the May Fourth era, individualism and liberalism were embraced by Chinese 
intellectuals with unprecedented enthusiasm, which eventually led to a theoretical 
triumph in terms of emancipating Chinese marriage from the elder generation’s 
manipulation. However, behind this enthusiasm was an eagerness to reconstruct China’s 
modern image, and to address the fate of the nation: the implication being that it was 
selfish and immoral for anybody to enjoy personal happiness without making a 
contribution to his or her country.  
Chinese women actually became the biggest consumer of this discourse. It had been a 
social consensus since the late nineteenth century that women, as a whole, were the 
primary victims of the traditional marriage system and so should have been the greatest 
beneficiaries of a modernized marriage system. However, in the varied social reform 
projects constructed by the political parties in the modern era, women’s liberation and 
individual happiness were similarly preconditioned by their support and service to the 
Chinese revolution. Unlike their feminist sisters in the West, from Qiu Jin to the women 
of Yan’an, the most glorious goal was neither the freedom to love and to marry nor social 
gender equality, but formal recognition of their equal participation and contribution to 
Chinese revolution, which could often come at the price of giving up their gender 
identity.  
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In this sense, the Chinese Communist Party’s “revolutionary marriage” discourse was not 
the Party’s unique creation, but a flexible re-interpretation of Confucian ethics in 
accordance with a social context filled with radical nationalism. Labeling itself the only 
savior of the Chinese nation, the CCP assumed the roles once played by the dynastic ruler 
and family head, whose superiority and authority over their subordinates had been 
officially, legally and ethically recognized by Chinese society for thousands of years. 
When people accepted the CCP’s leadership in China’s national salvation, they at the 
same time consciously or unconsciously recognized the Party’s control over their 
personal lives under the name of devotion to the ongoing revolution.  
To a certain extent, the revolutionary marriage model was subject to the contemporary 
Chinese social context. By the time the CCP was able to utilize the state machine to 
promote its social reform agenda on a national scale, individualism and liberalism had 
long been known to the Chinese. However, the prevailing urban love disturbance, the 
unpopularity of the Nanjing government’s Marriage Law, and the intensive gender 
conflict provoked by the CCP’s pro-women marriage regulations in the 1920s to 1930s 
demonstrated that these ideologies were a poor fit in the social context of China in the 
early twentieth century when a majority of the population still got married in the old 
ways. For them, compared to the “exotic” customs, the lifestyle offered in the CCP’s 
social blueprint in the 1940s were familiar and socially acceptable. 
Regarding the Chinese marriage system, moreover, there is always a gap between li 
[principles] and su [customs], which was most often seen in the contradiction between the 
written policies or legislations and the daily practice. No matter how many laws and 
policies were made to regulate people’s marriage behaviors, and how harshly measures 
were promulgated, the regime was ultimately forced to make compromises in the name of 
social order and stability.  
The marriage system that finally achieved nationwide recognition in China was actually a 
hybrid of progressive ideals, traditional customs and daily experiences. Ideally, it is a 
personal matter about love and sex, freedom and choice, equality and match, 
responsibility and devotion. Customarily, it is a family matter about control and 
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compliance, hierarchy and order, interest and politics, chastity and reputation, ritual and 
moralities. In daily practice, it is a matter of practical thinking and rational calculation, 
official permission and social recognition with the critical involvement of family, 
community, neighborhood and state. In the form of “revolutionary union”, Chinese 
marriage was propagandized ideally as a bond of love between two revolutionaries, 
implemented officially as a social control project to secure the services for the socialist 
Party-state, and practiced individually as a means to secure the continuance of the family 
line. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Love and Marriage of the Ten Marshals of PRC1 
 Name 
Married/ 
engaged Age   
(wife vs.husband) 
Years Ending 
Zhu De 朱德 1886-1976   
First 
(arranged) 
Ms. Liu 21  vs.19 1905-1906 left without divorce 
Second Xiao Jufang       
萧菊芳 
18 vs. 26 1912-1919 died of illness 
Third  Chen Yuzhen   
陈玉珍 
21 vs. 33 1919-1927 lost contact and separated 
Fourth He Zhihua        
贺治华 
19 vs.34 1920 (1922)-
1926 
divorced 
Fifth Wu Ruolan       
伍若兰 
24 vs. 42 1928- 1929 killed by GMD 
Sixth Kang Keqing     
康克清 
17 vs. 43 1929-1976  
Peng Dehuai 彭德怀 1898-1974 
First 
(Engaged)      
Zhou Ruilian     
周瑞莲 (cousin)  
 1918-1920 suicide 
                                                 
1  This table is made with reference to Kong Qingdong孔庆东, “Shida yuanshuai de qingyuan”十大元帅的情缘 [Love 
stories of the Ten Marshals], in Kong Qingdong, Kuaizhi yingxiong 脍炙英雄[Heroes in Praise] ( Beijing: Chang’an 
chubanshe, 2009), 212-270. Yang Wenyu 杨闻宇 & Ma, Xiaoxiao 马萧萧, Hongse Hunyin Dang’an 红色婚姻档案
I, II [The Archives of Red Marriage, vol.1, 2], Beijing: Kunlun chubanshe, 2005. 
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Second Liu Kunmo      
刘坤模 
12 vs. 24 1922-1928 remarried 
Third Pu Anxiu         
浦安修  
20 vs. 40 1938-1962 divorced 
Lin Biao 林彪 1906-1971 
First 
(arranged) 
Wang Jingyi       
汪静宜 
7 vs.7 Never married lifelong single  
  Second Zhang Mei         
张梅 
20 vs. 31 1937-1942 divorced 
Third Ye Qun           
叶群 
25 vs.36 1942-1971  
Liu Bocheng 刘伯承 1892-1986 
First 
(arranged) 
Cheng Yizhi       
程宜芝 
16 vs. 18 1910-1912 lost contact 
Second Wu Jingchun       
吴景春 
 1930-1932 lost contact 
Third Wang Ronghua     
汪荣华 
19 Vs.44 1936-1986  
He Long 贺龙 1896-1969 
First 
(arranged) 
Xu Yuegu         
徐月姑 
17 Vs. 10 1906-? died of illness 
  Second Jian Xianren       
蹇先任 
20 Vs. 33 1934- divorced 
   Third Xue Ming 薛明     26 Vs. 46 1942-1969  
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Chen Yi 陈毅 1901-1972 
Lover       Hu Lanqi          
胡兰畦 
 1922- Marriage application declined 
by the Party  
First   Xiao Juying       
萧菊英 
19 vs. 29 1930-1931 suicide 
Second Lai Yueming       
赖月明 
18 vs.31 1932-1934  lose contact 
Third         Zhang Qian        
张茜 
18 vs. 39 1940-1972  
Luo Ronghuan 罗荣桓 1902-1963 
First 
(arranged)   
Yan Yue’e         
颜月娥 
19 Vs.17 1919-1927 unilateral divorced 
Second Lin Yueqin        
林月琴 
23 vs. 35 1937-1963  
Xu Xiangqian 徐向前 1901-1990 
First  
(arranged) 
Zhu Xiangchan     
朱香婵 
 1921-1924 died of illness 
Second   Cheng Zunxuan   
程训宣 
18 vs. 28 1929 - 1932 executed in the rectification 
movement of 1932 
Third Wang Jing         
王婧 
 1940-1943 divorced 
Fourth Huang Jie         
黄杰 
 
36 Vs. 45 1946- 1990  
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Nie Rongzhen 聂荣臻 1899-1992 
First 
(arranged) 
Long Shengxian   
龙升贤 
18 vs. 16 1915-1919 Seperated but never remarried 
   Second       Zhang Ruihua    
张瑞华 
18 vs. 28 1928-1992  
Ye Jianying 叶剑英 1897-1986 
First 
(arranged)   
    
Second Feng Hua         
冯华 
 1924  
Third Zeng Xianzhi      
曾宪植 
18 vs. 30 1927-1931 separated 
Fourth Wei Gongzhi       
危拱之 
32 vs. 40 1937- divorced 
Fifth   Wu Bo            
吴博     
 1940-  
Sixth     Li Gang          
李刚 
 1948-1955 divorced 
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Appendix B: Marriage Regulations of the Chinese Soviet Republic2 
 (Promulgated 1st December 1931) 
Chapter One. General Provisions 
Article 1. The principle of freedom of marriage between man and woman is established 
and the entire system of marriage arranged by persons other than the parties themselves, 
forced upon the parties, or contracted by purchase and sale, is abolished. The practice of 
taking a 'foster daughter-in-law' is forbidden. 
Article 2. Monogamy is enforced; polygamy and polyandry are forbidden. 
Chapter Two. Contracting Marriage 
Article 3. The contracting age for marriage is fully twenty years for men and fully 
eighteen years for women. 
Article 4. For a man and a woman to contract marriage, the consent of both parties is 
necessary. Coercion exercised by either party or by a third person is not permitted. 
Article 5. For a man and a woman to marry a person of blood relationship within the fifth 
generation is forbidden. 
Article 6. Persons suffering from venereal disease, leprosy, tuberculosis, and suchlike 
dangerous contagious diseases are forbidden to marry, unless it is considered permissible 
after medical examination. 
Article 7. Persons suffering from mental disease or paralysis are forbidden to marry. 
                                                 
2  Originally collected in Zhongguo xin minzhuzhuyi geming shiqi genjudi fazhi wenxian xuanbian, vol.4 中国新民主主
义革命时期根据地法制文献选编[Selected Legal Documents of the Revolutionary Bases during China’s New 
Democratic Revolution], eds. Han Yanlong and Chang Zhaoru (Beijing: China Social Science Press, 1984),789-791. 
Translated in Meijer, 281-282. 
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Article 8. To contract marriage the man and the woman are required to approach together 
the hsiang or municipal soviet to register the marriage and receive a marriage certificate. 
Marriage presents, whether in money or goods, and dowries are abolished. 
Chapter Three. Divorce 
Article 9. Freedom of divorce is established. Whenever both the man and the woman 
agree to divorce, the divorce shall have immediate effect. When one party, either the man 
or the woman, is determined to claim a divorce it shall have immediate effect. 
Article 10. When a man and a woman divorce, they are required to register the divorce 
with the hsiang or municipal soviet. 
Chapter Four. Care and Custody of Children after Divorce 
Article 11. The man is to raise the children born before the divorce. If both the man and 
the woman wish to raise the children, they shall be entrusted to the woman. 
Article 12 . Small children who are being nursed shall during the period of their nursing 
be raised by the woman. 
Article 13. If a child has received land, the land goes with the child. 
Article 14. When the children have reverted to the woman's custody, the man shall be 
responsible for two-thirds of their living expenses until they are sixteen years of age. 
Payment shall be either in money or by way of tilling the land the children have received 
[at land reform]. 
Article 15. In the case of the woman marrying again and her new husband being willing 
to care for the children [of her earlier marriage], the father may be discharged of his duty 
to provide for their living expenses. 
Article 16. A new husband who has agreed to care for [his wife's] children [by an earlier 
marriage] must register this matter with the hsiang or municipal soviet. After registration 
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he shall be responsible for caring for the children until they reach adulthood. He shall not 
relinquish his duties [before that time] nor maltreat the children. 
Chapter Five. Arrangements Concerning the Property of the Man and the Woman 
After Divorce 
Article 17. The man and the woman shall each dispose of the land and property which 
they individually had acquired and settle the debts they had incurred individually. If the 
marriage has lasted one full year the increase of property gained by management of the 
man and the woman in common shall be divided equally between them; if there are 
children it shall be divided equally per capita. 
Article 18. The man shall be responsible for the settlement of common debts incurred by 
the man and the woman during the time of cohabitation. 
Article 19. If after divorce both the man and the woman are unwilling to leave the house 
they inhabit, the man shall sell part of his house to the woman to live in. 
Article 20. After divorce, until the woman marries again, the man must support her or till 
the land for her. 
Chapter Six. Care of Children Born Before Registration of Marriage 
Article 21. The man shall bear two-thirds of the living expenses of children born before 
registration of his marriage, if it is clearly proved that the children are his. The Articles 
11-15 of Chapter Four shall be applicable. 
Chapter Seven. Additional Provisions 
Article 22. Whosoever contravenes this law shall be duly punished according to the 
criminal law. 
Article 23. These Regulations will be enforced as from the day of promulgation. 
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Appendix C: Marriage Law of the Chinese Soviet Republic3 
(Promulgated 8th April 1934) 
Chapter One. General Provisions 
Article 1. The principle of freedom of marriage between man and woman is firmly 
established and the entire system of marriage arranged by persons other than the parties 
themselves, forced upon the parties, or contracted by purchase and sale, is abolished. The 
practice of taking a 'foster daughter-in-law' is forbidden. 
Article 2. Monogamy is enforced; polygamy and polyandry are forbidden. 
Chapter Two. Contracting Marriage 
Article 3. The contracting age for marriage is fully twenty years for men and fully 
eighteen years for women. 
Article 4. For a man and a woman to contract marriage, the consent of both parties is 
necessary. Coercion exercised by either party or by a third person is not permitted. 
Article 5. To contract marriage with a person of blood relationship within three 
generations is forbidden. 
Article 6. Persons suffering from venereal disease, leprosy, tuberculosis, and suchlike 
dangerous contagious diseases, are forbidden to marry, unless it is considered permissible 
after medical examination. 
Article 7. Persons suffering from mental disease or paralysis are forbidden to marry. 
Article 8. To contract marriage a man and a woman are required to to register the 
marriage with the Soviet of the hsiang or municipal ch’ü together and receive a marriage 
certificate. Marriage presents, whether in money or goods, and dowries are abolished. 
                                                 
3  Originally collected in Genjudi fazhi wenxian xuanbian, vol.4, 792-795. Translated in Meijer, 283-284.  
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Article 9. In all cases of a man and a woman cohabiting, whether or not they have 
registered marriage, they shall be considered to have contracted marriage. 
Chapter Three. Divorce 
Article 10. Freedom of divorce is established. When one party, either the man or the 
woman, is determined to claim a divorce, divorce may immediately be effected. 
 
Article 11. Wives of soldiers of the Red Army when claiming a divorce must obtain the 
consent of their husbands, but in areas where communication by letter is easy and where 
the husband has not returned home nor communicated by letter for two years, the wife 
may approach the local government and request registration of the divorce, In areas 
where communication by letter is dificult, and four years have elapsed since the husband 
last communicated by letter or since he last returned home, the wife may approach the 
local government and request registration of the divorce. 
Article 12. When a man and a woman divorce, they must register the divorce with the 
soviet of the hsiang and the municipal ch’ü. 
Chapter Four.  Arrangements Concerning the Property of the Man and the 
Woman After Divorce 
Article 13. After divorce the land and property originally owned by thc man and the 
woman and the debts originally incurred by them shall be disposed of by themselves. If 
the marriage has lasted one full year the increase of property gained by management in 
common will be divided equally between the man and the woman. If there are children it 
shall be divided equally per capita.To settle common debts incurred by the man and the 
woman, during the time of cohabitation shall be the responsibility of the man. 
Article 14. When after divorce the woman removes to a village in another hsiang she 
shall receive land in accordance with the rate of allocation prevailing in that hsiang. If in 
the new village there is no more land to be allocated, the woman shall retain the land she 
originally owned. The way of disposing of that land, whether by renting it out, selling, or 
exchanging it with another person, shall be freely decided by the woman herself. The 
above-mentioned provisions on the distribution of land and disposal thereof shall be 
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applicable in full to the children [of the marriage] if it has been decided that such children 
shall revert to the mother's custody and they accompany the mother on her removal. 
Article 15. If after divorce the woman lacks the capacity to perform work and has no 
definite occupation and therefore cannot support herself, the man, unless she has married 
again, shall assist her by tilling her land or by otherwise supporting her. But if the man 
himself lacks the capacity to do manual work or does not have a definite occupation and 
cannot support himself, this provision does not apply. 
Chapter Five. Arrangements for Childrn after Divorce 
Article 16. Children born and conceived of the marriage before divorce shall revert to the 
woman's custody. If the woman does not wish to take custody of them, they will revert to 
the man's custody, but the wishes of an elder child shall be respected. 
Article 17. The man shall bear two-thirds of the living expenses of each child reverting to 
the woman's custody until he or she attains the age of sixteen. Payment shall be either in 
money or by way of tilling the land distributed among the children. 
Article 18, Should the woman marry again and the new husband wishes to care for the 
children, the father may be exempted from further bearing the responsibility for 
supporting the children as provided in the last preceding article. A new husband who has 
agreed to care for the children must register this matter with the soviet of the hsiang or 
municipal ch’ü. On registration he must accept responsibility for caring for them until 
they reach adulthood. He shall not relinquish his duties [before that time] nor maltreat the 
children. 
Chapter Six. Children Born Out of Wedlock 
Article 19. Children born out of wedlock shall enjoy all the rights granted to legitimate 
children by this Marriage Law. To maltreat or abandon such children is forbidden. 
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Chapter Seven. Additional Provisions 
Article 20. Whosoever contravenes this law shall be duly punished according to the 
criminal law. 
Article 21. This law shall be enforced as from the day of promulgation. 
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Appendix D: Marriage Regulations of the Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia Border Area4 
(Promulgated 4th April 1939) 
Chapter One. General Provisions 
Article 1. These regulations have been drawn up fundamentally in the spirit of democracy 
and take account of the circumstances prevailing in the Border Area of Shaanxi, Gansu, 
and Ningxia. 
Article 2. Marriage of a man and a woman is based on the principle of the free will of the 
parties. 
Article 3. Monogamy is enforced; concubinage is forbidden. 
Article 4. Marriages arranged by other people, contracted under coercion, and marriage 
contracted by way of purchase and sale are forbidden, as is the practice of taking a ‘foster 
daughter-in-law’ or a ‘foster son-in-law’. 
Chapter Two. Contracting Marriage 
Article 5. For a man and a woman to contract marriage, the wish of the parties themselves 
to do so is necessary and there shall be two persons to witness the marriage. 
Article 6. The contracting age for marriage is fully twenty years for the man and fully 
eighteen years for the woman. 
Article 7. When contracting marriage the man and the woman shall request the 
government of the hsiang or the municipality to register the marriage and to issue a 
marriage certificate. 
                                                 
4  Originally collected in Genjudi fazhi wenxian xuanbian, vol.4, 804-806. Translated in Meijer, 285-287. 
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Article 8. Marriage is forbidden if one party is: (1) a linear relative by blood of the other; 
(2) suffering from venereal disease, leprosy, mental disease, paralysis or suchlike 
incurable disease as is attested by a physician. 
Article 9. While one of the parties has a spouse and is not divorced, he or she shall not 
contract marriage for a second time. 
Chapter Three. Divorce 
Article 10. When both the man and the woman wish to divorce they shall request the 
local hsiang or municipal government to register their divorce and issue a divorce 
certificate. 
Article 11. When either on the man's or the woman's side any of the following 
circumstances exists, the other party may apply to the government for divorce: (i) bigamy; 
(ii) fundamental lack of harmony of sentiment and will between the parties, continued 
cohabitation being impossible; (iii) adultery; (iv) cruelty to one party by the other; (v) 
desertion in bad faith by one of the parties; (vi) intent of one party to injure the other; (vii) 
impotence; (viii) malignant disease; (ix) uncertainty for a period of one year (in areas 
where communication by letter is impossibie, this period shall be two years) whether the 
other party is still living; (x) any other important reason. 
Article 12. When either the man or the woman requests divorce on any of the grounds 
provided in article 11, the hsiang or municipal government will after verification of his or 
her statements allow a divorce; the other party shall be notified, and if the other party 
after having received the communication does not contest the facts as stated, a divorce 
certificate shall be issued. If the other party contests the statements, his or her arguments 
shall be examined by the court, which shall decide whether or not divorce is to be 
allowed. 
Chapter Four. Marriage, Children and Property Relationships 
Article 13. Children born before their parents are divorced and not yet five years of age 
shall be cared for by the woman. The wishes of children who have reached five years of 
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age to be cared for by their father or their mother shall be respected. Neither the father 
nor the mother shall coerce the children. 
Arlicle 14. If the woman before her remarriage has not the capacity to support herself the 
living expenses of the children who have reverted to her care shall continue to be borne 
by the man until the children have reached the age of sixteen years. 
Article 15. When a woman marries again, her new husband will be responsible for the 
expense of caring for and educating the children she has brought with her. 
Article 16. When children are born out of wedlock and the natural mother furnishes proof 
of the identity of the natural father, the natural father shall be compelled to acknowledge 
his children as if they had been born in wedlock. 
Article 17. Children born out of wedlock shall enjoy all rights contained in these 
provisions and shall not be abandoned. 
Article 18.  Property owned by the woman and the man and debts incurred by them prior 
to marriage shall be administered by themselves. When after marriage the man and the 
woman have managed their affairs in common, the properry obtained and the debts 
incurred shall be administered by both of them jointly. 
Article 19. If after divorce and before her remarriage, the woman has no occupation or 
property and lacks the capacity to perform work and to support herself, the man shall 
assist her until she marries again, but this period shall be limited to three years. 
Article 20. Whosoever contravenes these regulations shall be accuscd by the persons 
affected before the court or he shall be publiciy accused by the procuratorial organs and 
be dealt with as the law may require. 
Chapter Five. Additional Provisions 
Article 21. The right of interpretation of these regulations is with the Government of the 
Border Area; the right of amendment is with the Consultative Council of the Border Area. 
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Article 22. The Border Area Government shall promulgate these regulations after they 
have been passed by the Border Area Consultative Council. 
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Appendix E: Revised Provisional Marriage Regulations of the Shaanxi, Gansu, 
Ningxia Border Area5 
(Promulgated 20th March 1944) 
Article 1. Marriage is based on the principle of the free will of the man and the woman. 
Article 2. Monogamy is enforced; polygamy and polyandry are forbidden. 
Article 3. In the case of marriage contracted by members of national minorities, while the 
principles of these Regulations shall be observed, their customary laws shall [also] be 
respected. 
Article 4. When a man and a woman contract marriage, they shall request registration of 
the marriage from the local government of the hsiang (or the municipality) and receive a 
marriage certificate. 
Article 5. Marriage is forbidden under the following circumstances: (i) when one of the 
Parties is suffering from venereal or any other incurable malignant disease; (ii) in the case 
of forcible abduction. 
Article 6. When a man and a woman have been betrothed and either of the parties before 
marriage is contracted does not agree to marry, that party may approach the government 
with a request that the betrothal contract be dissolved, whereupon each party shall return 
whatever betrothal presents he or she has received from the other. 
Article 7. When a man and a woman divorce of their own free will, they shall request 
registration of the divorce from the local government of the hsiang (or municipality) and 
receive a divorce certificate. 
Article 8. When either on the man's or the woman's side any of the following 
circumstances exists, the other party may approach the government and request divorce: 
                                                 
5  Originally collected in Genjudi fazhi wenxian xuanbian, vol.4, 808-810. Translated in Meijer, 288-289. 
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(i) bigamy; (ii) adultery; (iii) intent of one party to injure the other; (iv) incurable, 
virulent disease or impotence as certified by a physician; (v) desertion in bad faith of the 
other party; (vi) ill-treatment of one party by the other; (vii) fundamental lack of harmony 
of sentiment and will between the parties, continued cohabitation being impossible; (viii) 
a lapse of three years of uncertainty whether the other party is still living; (ix) lack of 
regular occupation by either the man or the woman, despite cautioning, the other party's 
standard of living being adversely affected as a result; (x) any other important reason for 
divorce. 
Article 9. During the pregnancy of the woman, the man is not allowed to file a petition 
for divorce. If conditions for divorce are met, such a petition may only be filed one year 
after the woman has given birth to the child. (Cases where both parties agree to divorce 
do not come within the provisions of this article.) 
Article 10. The spouse of a member of the army engaged in the war of resistance against 
the Japanese shall in principle not be granted a divorce for the duration of the war of 
resistance. Before a woman may request the local government for divorce, a period of at 
least five years since she last received any communication from her husband is required 
to have elapsed. When the local government receives such a petition it shall examine 
whether the circumstances stated therein are true, before granting a divorce. But if it is 
established that the husband of this army man's dependant is deceased, or has deserted, 
gone over to the enemy, or married another person, this article shall not apply. When a 
member of the army engaged in the war of resistance who had entered into a contract of 
betrothal with a woman but for three years has had no correspondence with her, or though 
he has corresponded, the woman has passed the legal marriageable age by five years and 
still cannot marry, the woman may request the local government to dissolve the betrothal 
contract. 
Article 11. Children born before divorce of the parents and under the age of seven years 
shall be cared for by the woman. The wishes of children over the age of seven to be in the 
custody of their father or their mother shall be respected. The parents shall not coerce the 
children, but relations between parent and child shall be taken into account. 
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Article 12. When the woman is divorced, and has not married again, and has no means to 
support herself, the living expenses and education of the children entrusted to her care 
shall continue to be borne by the man. When the woman has married again, the educarion 
and living expenses of these children shall be borne by her new husband. If the children 
wish to be in the custody of their father, the father shall accept them. 
Article 13. Children born out of wedlock have the same rights as children born in 
wedlock; they shall not be discriminated against. If the mother has proved the identiry of 
the father, the government shall compel the father to pay for the education and living 
expenses of the child. 
Article 14. In matters pertaining to the contracting of marriage or divorce, whosoever 
contravenes these Regulations shall be accused by the party affected and the accusation 
shall be verified by the local judicial body which shall decide whether the accusation is 
sustained or rejected. If the case comes within the category of criminal affairs, it shall be 
adjudicated according to the criminal law. 
Article 15. These regulations are promulgated and enforced by the Border Area 
Government, which has right of interpretation. After promulgation the Marriage 
Regulations of the Border Area of Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia promulgated on 4 April 
1939, shall immediately be abrogated. 
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Appendix F: Marriage Regulations of the Shanxi, Ch’ahar, and Hebei Border Area6 
Passed by the first session of the Consultative Assembly of the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Area on 
21 January 1943, and promulgated by the Administiative council of the Jin-Cha-Ji Border 
Area on 4 February 1943. 
Chapter One. General Provisions 
Article 1. These regulations are based on the spirit of the legislation in the Book of 
Family of the civil Law of the Republic of China, and are adapted to the circumstances 
prevailing in the Border Area. 
Article 2. When a man and a woman marry it is necessary that they act on their own 
initiative and of their own free-will; no person shall exercise coercion. Marriage of 
infants, the practice of taking a 'foster daughter-in-law', premature marriage, and 
marriage by purchase and sale are forbidden. 
Article 3. Monogamy is strictly enforced. Bigamy, concubinage, keeping slave girls and 
such devices of polygamy, and all kinds of maiiage by means of which one wife has more 
than one husband, are forbidden. 
Chapter Two. Contracting Marriage 
Article 4. A man who has not attained the age of twenty, and a woman who has not 
attained the age of eighteen years, shall not contract marriage. 
Article 5. A marriage to be contracted requires a public ceremony and two witnesses. The 
parties shall approach the marriage office of the public authority in the village where they 
reside or the hsien or municipal government to register the marriage and receive a 
marriage certificate. 
Article 6. Betrothal is not an indispensable procedure for marriage. 
                                                 
6  Originally collected in Genjudi fazhi wenxian xuanbian, vol.4, 826-829. Translated in Meijer, 291-294. 
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Article 7. Persons having the following family relationships to one another are not 
allowed to contract marriage: (i) linear relatives by blood or marriage; (ii) collateral 
relatives by blood within the eighth degree; but this provision does not apply to biao 
cousins, (iii) collateral relatives by marriage within the fifth degree who are not of the 
same rank. 
Article 8. No marriage is permitted in any of the following circumstances; viz. when 
either party is suffering from: (i) mental disease or any other grave incurable disease; (ii) 
venereal or any other malignant disease; (iii) impotence due to physical defect. 
Article 9. When divorce is pronounced by judicial decision as a result of the adultery of 
one party, or when punishment has been inflicted on him (her) by sentence of the court 
on that account, the said party shall not be allowed to contract marriage with the partner 
in adultery. 
Article 10. No person shall interfere with the marriage of a widow. 
Chapter Three. Rights and Duties of Husband and Wife 
Article 11. Husband and wife are duty bound to live together, but if there is a legitimate 
reason why they are unable to do so this provision shall not apply. 
Article 12. Both spouses are jointly responsible for the living expenses and management 
of the household. 
Chapter Four. Divorce 
Article 13. When both husband and wife are willing parties to a divorce, they shall 
approach the local hsien (or municipal) judicial body and request registration of the 
divorce, the signature of two or more witnesses being required. 
Article 14. When fundamental lack of harmony of sentiment and will between husband 
and wife exists to such an extent that cohabitation is intolerable, either party may 
approach the judicial body and request a divorce. 
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Article 15. When either on the man's side or the woman's side any of the following 
circumstances exists, the other party may approach the judicial body to request a divorce: 
(i) treason;(ii) bigamy;(iii) adultery; (iv) continual ill-ireatment, oppression, or desertion 
in bad faith; (v) sentence of imprisonment for three or more years for commiting a 
specific criminal offence; (vi) uncertainty for more than three years whether the other 
party is still living; (vii) intent of one party to injure the other; (viii) any of the 
circumstances in any of the paragraphs of Article 8. 
Article 16. Spouses of military personnel on active service in the war against Japan shall 
not request divorce, unless it has been uncertain for a period of more than four years 
whether the spouse is still living. 
Article 17. While the woman is pregnant or nursing a child, the man shall not file a 
petition for divorce. If there are grounds for divorce, such a petition may only be filed 
three full months after the birth of the child. However, in any of the circumstances 
mentioned in article 15, subsections i, ii, iii, iv, and vii, this provision does not apply. 
Article 18. When both husband and wife wish to divorce, they shall determine by 
agreement at the time of divorce who is to be responsible for education and custody of 
the children. However, notwithstanding the terms of any such agreement, if the wife is in 
financial difficulties, the husband is nevertheless obliged to provide all or part of the 
expenses of caring for and educating the children, for as long as the wife has not married 
another person. 
Article 19. When a judicial decision has ordered a divorce, the judicial body may in the 
interest of the children, and at its discretion appoint one of the parties to be responsible 
for their custody and education. 
Article 20. Should the wife, through a judicial decision ordering divorce, and through no 
fault of her own, come into financial difficulties, the husband, even should these 
difficulties arise through no fault of his, is nevertheless obliged to provide in part or in 
full for her living expenses; but if he is not able to do so, this provision shall not apply. 
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Article 21. When husband and wife divorce, each shall recover the property he or she 
originally owned. 
Chapter Five. Additional Provisions 
Article 22. Except for the provisions specifically contained in these regulations, the 
provisions of the Book of Family of the Civil Code concerning marriage shall also be 
applied. 
Article 23. These regulations shall be enforced as from the day of their promulgation. The 
Marriage Regulations of the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Area promulgated 7th July 1941shall at 
the same time be abolished. 
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Appendix G: The Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China7 
(Promulgated 1st May 1950) 
Chapter I. General Provisions 
Article 1. The feudal marriage system based on arbitrary and compulsory arrangements 
and the supremacy of man over woman, and in disregard of the interests of the children, 
is abolished.  
The new democratic marriage system, which is based on the free choice of partners, 
on monogamy, on equal rights for both sexes, and on the protection of the lawful interests 
of women and children, is put into effect. 
Article 2. Bigamy, concubinage, child betrothal, interference in the remarriage of widows, 
and the exaction of money or gifts in connection with marriages, are prohibited. 
Chapter II. The Marriage Contract 
Article 3. Marriage is based upon the complete willingness of the two parties. Neither 
party shall use compulsion and no third party is allowed to interfere. 
Article 4. A marriage can be contracted only after the man has reached twenty years of 
age and the woman eighteen years of age. 
Article 5. No man or woman is allowed to marry in any of the following instances: (a) 
Where the man and woman are lineal relatives by blood or where the man and woman are 
brother and sister born of the same parents or where the man and woman are half brother 
and half sister. The question of prohibiting marriage between collateral relatives by blood 
(up to the fifth degree of relationship) is determined by custom. (b) Where one party, 
because of certain physical defects, is sexually impotent. (c) Where one party is suffering 
                                                 
7  The Marriage Law of The People’s Republic of China (English edition), Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 
1975, 3rd edition.  
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from venereal disease, mental disorder, leprosy, or any other disease which is regarded by 
medical science as rendering a person unfit for marriage. 
Article 6. In order to contract a marriage, both the man and the woman should register in 
person with the people’s government of the district or township in which they reside. If 
the proposed marriage is found to be in conformity with the provisions of the law, the 
local people’s government should, without delay, issue marriage certificates. If the 
proposed marriage is not found to be in conformity with the provisions of this law, 
registration should not be granted. 
Chapter III. Rights and Duties of Husband and Wife 
Article 7. Husband and wife are companions living together and enjoy equal status in the 
home. 
Article 8. Husband and wife are in duty bound to love, respect, assist, and look after each 
other, to live in harmony, to engage in productive work, to care for their children, and to 
strive jointly for the welfare of the family and for the building up of the new society. 
Article 9. Both husband and wife have the right to free choice of occupation and free 
participation in work or in social activities. 
Article 10. Husband and wife have equal rights in the possession and management of 
family property. 
Article 11. Husband and wife have the right to use his or her own family name. 
Article 12. Husband and wife have the right to inherit each other’s property. 
Chapter IV. Relations Between Parents and Children 
Article 13. Parents have the duty to rear and to educate their children; the children have 
the duty to support and to assist their parents. Neither the parents nor the children shall 
maltreat or desert one another.  
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The foregoing provision also applies to foster parents and foster children. Infanticide 
by drowning and similar criminal acts are strictly prohibited. 
Article 14. Parents and children have the right to inherit one another’s property. 
Article 15. Children born out of wedlock enjoy the same rights as children born in lawful 
wedlock. No person is allowed to harm them or discriminate against them. Where the 
paternity of a child born out of wedlock is legally established by the mother of the child 
or by other witnesses or material evidence, the identified father must bear the whole or 
part of the cost of maintenance and education of the child until the age of eighteen.    
With the consent of the mother, the natural father may have custody of the child. 
With regard to the maintenance of a child born out of wedlock, if its mother marries, the 
provisions of Article 22 apply. 
Article 16. Neither husband nor wife may maltreat or discriminate against children born 
of a previous marriage by either party and in that party’s custody. 
Chapter V. Divorce 
Article 17. Divorce is granted when husband and wife both desire it. In the event of the 
husband or the wife alone insisting upon divorce, it may be granted only when mediation 
by the district people’s government and the judicial organ has failed to bring about a 
reconciliation. 
In cases where divorce is desired by both husband and wife, both parties should 
register with the district people’s government in order to obtain divorce certificates. The 
district people’s government, after establishing that divorce is desired by both parties and 
that appropriate measures have been taken for the care of children and property, should 
issue the divorce certificate without delay. 
When one party insists on divorce, the district people’s government may try to effect a 
reconciliation. If such mediation fails, it should, without delay, refer the case to the 
county or municipal people’s court. In dealing with a divorce case, the county or 
municipal people’s court should, in the first instance, try to bring about a reconciliation 
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between the parties. In case such mediation fails, the court should render a decision 
without delay. 
After divorce, if both husband and wife desire the resumption of marriage relations, 
they should apply to the district people’s government for a registration of remarriage. The 
district people’s government should accept such a registration and issue certificates of 
remarriage. 
Article 18. The husband is not allowed to apply for a divorce when his wife is pregnant, 
and may apply for divorce only one year after the birth of the child. In the case of a 
woman applying for divorce, this restriction does not apply. 
Article 19. In the case of a member of the revolutionary army on active service who 
maintains correspondence with his or her family, that army member’s consent must be 
obtained before his or her spouse can apply for divorce. 
Divorce may be granted to the spouse of a member of the revolutionary army who 
does not correspond with his or her family for a period of two years subsequent to the 
date of the promulgation of this law. Divorce may also be granted to the spouse of a 
member of the revolutionary army, who had not maintained correspondence with his or 
her family for over two years prior to the promulgation of this law, and who fails to 
correspond with his or her family for a further period of one year subsequent to the 
promulgation of the present law. 
Chapter VI. Maintenance and Education of Children Afrer Divorce 
Article 20. The blood ties between parents and children are not ended by a divorce of the 
parents. No matter whether the father or the mother has the custody of the children, they 
remain the children of both parties. 
After divorce, both parents continue to have the duty to support and educate their 
children. 
After divorce, the guiding principle is to allow the mother to have the custody of a 
breast-fed infant. After the weaning of the child, if a dispute arises between the two 
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parties over the guardianship and an agreement cannot be reached, the people’s court 
should render a decision in accordance with the interests of the child. 
Article 21. If, after divorce, the mother is given custody of a child, the father is 
responsible for the whole or part of the necessary cost of the maintenance and education 
of the child. Both parties should reach an agreement regarding the amount and the 
duration of such maintenance and education. Lacking such an agreement, the people’s 
court should render a decision. 
Payment may be made in cash, in kind, or by tilling land allocated to the child. 
An agreement reached between parents or a decision rendered by the people’s court in 
connection with the maintenance and education of a child does not obstruct the child 
from requesting either parent to increase the amount decided upon by agreement or by 
judicial decision. 
Article 22. In the case where a divorced woman remarries and her husband is willing to 
pay the whole or part of the cost of maintaining and educating the child or children by her 
former husband, the father of the child or children is entitled to have such cost of 
maintenance and education reduced or to be exempted from bearing such cost in 
accordance with the circumstances. 
Chapter VII. Property and Maintenance After Divorce 
Article 23. In case of divorce, the wife retains such property as belonged to her prior to 
her marriage. The disposal of other family property is subject to agreement between the 
two parties. In cases where agreement cannot be reached, the people’s court should 
render a decision after taking into consideration the actual state of the family property, 
the interests of the wife and the child or children, and the principle of benefiting the 
development of production. 
In cases where the property allocated to the wife and her child or children is sufficient 
for the maintenance and education of the child or children, the husband may be exempted 
from bearing further maintenance and education costs. 
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Article 24. In case of divorce, debts incurred jointly by husband and wife during the 
period of their married life should be paid out of the property jointly acquired by them 
during this period. In cases where no such property has been acquired or in cases where 
such property is insufficient to pay off such debts, the husband is held responsible for 
paying them. Debts incurred separately by the husband or wife should be paid off by the 
party responsible. 
Article 25. After divorce, if one party has not remarried and has maintenance difficulties, 
the other party should render assistance. Both parties should work out an agreement with 
regard to the method and duration of such assistance; in case an agreement cannot be 
reached, the people’s court should render a decision. 
Chapter VIII. By-Laws 
Article 26. Persons violating this law will be punished in accordance with law. In cases 
where interference with the freedom of marriage has caused death or injury to one or both 
parties, persons guilty of such interference will bear responsibility for the crime before 
the law. 
Article 27. This law comes into force from the date of its promulgation. 
In regions inhabited by minority nationalities in compact communities, the people’s 
government (or the military and administrative committee) of the greater administrative 
area or the Provincial People’s Government may enact certain modifications or 
supplementary articles in conformity with the actual conditions prevailing among 
minority nationalities in regard to marriage. But such measures must be submitted to the 
government administration council for ratification before enforcement. 
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